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Abstract  
 
 This thesis examines the interaction between emotional stimuli and motor 
processes. Emotions are thought to be intimately linked to action, often triggering specific 
biases that automatically guide our behaviour for successful interaction. For example, 
emotional behaviour is influenced in a very specific way by two opposing appetitive and 
defensive motivational systems that trigger specific actions. Appetitive stimuli trigger 
approach, whereas aversive stimuli trigger avoidance, freezing or attack. These approach-
avoidance tendencies are likely to interact with and bias various motor processes, such as 
action selection, planning and execution, revealing a privileged relationship between 
emotion and motor processes. However, this interaction remains poorly understood. 
Investigating how emotional tendencies influence different motor processes will further our 
understanding of how emotions influence actions. To this end, five experiments were 
conducted. Experiment One examined how approach-avoidance actions are selected. 
Experiment Two investigated how emotional cues in the environment bias and prepare for 
action to anticipated emotional stimuli. Experiment Three evaluated the effect of approach-
avoidance tendencies on action execution and motor planning. Experiment Four assessed 
whether tendencies also influence our ability to suppress action execution. Finally, 
Experiment Five investigated whether updating of actions in response to emotional changes 
in the environment are influenced by response tendencies. Overall, this thesis found that 
approach-avoidance tendencies influence the selection of actions via a combination of top-
down, goal-directed processes, and bottom-up, automatic processes. Predisposed 
tendencies did not influence any other motor process. Instead, positive and negative stimuli 
influenced action planning, execution and inhibition. Thus, motor processes are 
differentially influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies and emotional valence. This 
thesis demonstrates an intimate relationship between emotional stimuli and the motor 
system that appears to be influenced by both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms.  
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Glossary 
 
Action execution: The execution of a selected and planned movement.  
Action planning/specification: The process of specifying the spatiotemporal aspects of 
possible movements. 
Action selection: The process of choosing an action from among many possible alternatives. 
Action tendencies: States of readiness to execute specific actions that establish a particular 
relation with the environment, following emotional appraisal and driven by either appetitive 
or aversive systems. 
Affective priming: The response towards, or categorisation of, a valenced stimulus that is 
affected by a preceding prime stimulus of the same valence. 
Affordance: A potential action made possible to an agent by the environment around it. 
Arousal: The intensity of the physiological response relative to an emotional stimulus.  
Automatic: A process that occurs in (relative) independence from ‘top-down’ factors, such 
as attention and task instructions. At times, it is linked with the less strict notion of task-
irrelevant or implicit processing. 
Backward masking: A process whereby a visual stimulus is followed by another visual 
stimulus that “hides” the perceptual properties of the first stimulus thus impairing its 
detection or recognition. 
Defensive circuit: A set of processing areas that detect danger, leading a heightened state of 
vigilance and which culminate in a defensive action. 
Emotion: An episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in response to the evaluation of 
an external or internal stimulus event relevant to major concerns of the organism. 
Emotional stimulus: A stimulus that is either positive or negative in its affective content. 
Response facilitation: An improvement in behaviour, characterised by faster responses.   
Goal directed: A behaviour that is set out to achieve desired outcomes or goals.   
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Implicit process: Task-irrelevant, involuntary or unintentional processing of a stimulus that 
leads to changes in the outcome response.  
Response interference: A disruption in behaviour, characterised by slower responses.  
Interhemispheric transfer: The flow of information from one hemisphere to another; e.g. 
information from the left eye travels to the right side of the brain which subsequently needs 
to transfer to back to the left side in order to influence the movement of the right arm.  
Motor processes: Comprised of different motor stages such as action selection, planning 
and execution.  
Muscle-specific: Arm movements that activate specific muscle groups. For instance, pulling 
triggers flexion muscles, whereas pushing activates extension muscles.  
Predisposed: An action that is innate or has become automatic via repetitive behaviours.  
Response inhibition/suppression: Suppression of actions that are no longer required or that 
are inappropriate. 
Subliminal presentation: Short or weak stimulus presentations that do not elicit a conscious 
perception, but that result in a behavioural or physiological change. 
Supraliminal presentation: Supra-threshold perceptual state in which subjects are aware of 
the stimulus and that result in a behavioural or physiological change. 
Unconscious perception: A stimulus that is presented but is processed without any 
awareness of its presence or content.   
Valence: Stimulus dimension that varies from ‘pleasant’ to ‘unpleasant’.  
Vigour: The effort expended once an action has been initiated in order to achieve a 
desirable outcome. It can be characterised by variables such as movement time, 
acceleration or strength.  
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1. Introduction 
 
"The motor system of the brain exists to translate thought, sensation, and emotion into 
movement". (Henneman, 1974) 
 
There is no exact definition of what emotion is, but a general consensus is that 
emotions are a complex psychological and physiological reaction to both external and 
internal stimuli that are relevant to the individuals’ concerns (Darwin, 1872; Frijda, 1986; 
James, 1884; Scherer, 2005). Emotional experience can be divided into five main 
components that function independently of each other yet all coordinate and contribute to 
the processing of emotions (Table 1; Eder & Rothermund, 2013; Roseman, 2014; Scherer, 
2005). This framework suggests a serial processing of emotion, whereby an emotional 
stimulus is initially evaluated and processed (cognitive response), followed by physiological 
arousal (somatovisceral response) and the preparation of the body for action (behavioural 
response). Subsequently the organism communicates emotion via facial or vocal expressions 
(expressive response) which ultimately affects the internal state of the organism and results 
in feelings (experiential response).  
Emotions are therefore thought to be intimately linked to action (Frijda, 1986). The 
word emotion itself is derived from the Latin word movere, which means to move. But, what 
is an action? Actions are the process of converting thought into overt behaviour. Here, the 
motor system incorporates emotional information to select, plan and execute appropriate 
responses. Indeed, emotions such as fear, anger, happiness and disgust, have been 
suggested to be fundamental predispositions for action (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 1986; James, 
1884), often triggering specific biases that automatically guide our behaviour for successful 
interaction (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Lang, 1995; Lang & Bradley, 2010). 
Despite the intricate relationship between emotions and actions, the link between 
emotional processes and the motor system remains poorly understood.  
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Table 1. Relationship between emotional 
components and their corresponding 
subsystems, as well as presumed 
underlying substrata and functions 
(Scherer, 2005). This thesis will focus 
specifically on the preparation and 
direction of action (blue rectangle) and 
how critical the evaluation of emotional 
stimuli is for response tendencies to arise 
(green rectangle).   
 
 
 
 
Emotions, motivational systems and specific action tendencies 
The special relationship between emotions and actions has been demonstrated in 
studies investigating the influence of emotions on motor performance. Emotional stimuli 
can, for example, influence the speed of action initiation (Naugle, Hass, Joyner, Coombes, & 
Janelle, 2011), disrupt or increase the speed of suppressing actions that are no longer 
required (Albert, López-Martín, & Carretié, 2010; Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, & Bauer, 2012; 
Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007), and modulate how an action is executed (Coombes, 
Gamble, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2008; Esteves et al., 2016). These effects of valence on various 
motor processes, whereby positive and negative stimuli modulate behaviour relative to 
neutral stimuli, reveal an intricate relationship between emotion and motor processes.  
However, these effects disregard the fact that emotional behaviour is influenced in a 
very specific way by two opposing motivational systems: appetitive and defensive (Lang & 
Bradley, 2013; Lang & Bradley, 2010; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Appetitive behaviour 
is guided by positive stimuli that are typically linked to approach actions, whereas defensive 
behaviour, such as avoidance, freezing or escape, is typically linked to negative and 
threatening stimuli (Lang, Davis, & Ohman, 2000; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). These 
“primitive” motivational systems exist to promote survival in emotional situations (Darwin, 
1872; LeDoux, 1996). For instance, choosing the wrong action in response to an emotional 
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stimulus could be potentially costly: fighting off a bear might not be as successful as running 
away from it. It is this “survival” aspect that can make emotional stimuli and their associated 
action tendencies so influential on the motor system and important for appropriate 
behaviour. Thus, investigating the role that these motivational tendencies play in guiding 
action processes is fundamental for our understanding of the nature of how these 
“primitive” systems interact with the motor system.  
Models of appetitive and defensive behaviour (Fanselow, 1994; Lang et al., 1997; 
LeDoux 2000) suggest that emotional stimuli lead to heightened vigilance relative to non-
emotional stimuli, direct attention to the stimulus of interest and trigger actions that are 
selected from a wide repertoire of possibilities such as, for example, approach, avoidance or 
freezing. Thus, emotional behaviour occurs along a progression from an attentional state to 
active action through sensory-motor integration (Lang & Bradley, 2013; LeDoux, 2012). The 
predatory-imminence model, for instance, proposes that actions in threatening situations 
are selected from a “predatory imminence continuum” whereby according to the level and 
type of threat, behaviour will transition from increased attention and passive immobility to 
active fight-or-flight responses (Fanselow, 1994). This model was later extended to include 
appetitive approach behaviour (Lang et al., 1997). Other models propose that the detection 
of threat and subsequent responses occurs through learned experience, whereby 
associations between the evaluation of biologically relevant stimuli and specific actions 
serve as triggers along a sensory-motor circuit (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 2000).  
Importantly, these models suggest that defensive actions will be faster when 
negative stimuli are detected, whereas approach actions will be faster in positive contexts 
(Bargh, 1992; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Lang et al., 1990). Indeed, work on 
humans has shown that initiating approach is faster when presented with positive stimuli, 
whereas initiating avoidance is faster when presented with negative stimuli (Chen & Bargh, 
1999; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004; Stins et al., 2011). This has been 
replicated numerous times using diverse stimuli (e.g. pictures, faces, words) and diverse 
task-settings (e.g. moving a lever, pressing buttons, moving the whole body), consolidating 
the idea of response tendencies that are triggered faster in certain emotional contexts as a 
result of appetitive and defensive systems (LeDoux, 2000).  
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Is there an “emotion continuum” that influences action?  
While there is a clear relationship between emotional valence and approach-
avoidance tendencies, there is a distinction between both. Valence refers to the positivity or 
negativity of a stimulus. Approach-avoidance tendencies are responses associated to the 
valence. It is precisely that positivity or negativity that will subsequently inform approach-
avoidance tendencies. It is possible that the two work together along an “emotion 
continuum” in order to lead to appropriate action when we encounter an emotional 
stimulus. For example, specific approach-avoidance tendencies tied to positive and negative 
stimuli may influence what actions are selected in relation to that valence (e.g. how 
negative is this stimulus and what do I need to do in response to that negative stimulus [e.g. 
an aggressive person]?), and the negativity of that stimulus may subsequently influence 
motor processes after an approach or avoidance action has been selected (e.g. I need to 
push that very strong aggressor away very forcefully [e.g. make more effort]). However, in 
the latter example, both avoidance tendencies and the negativity of the stimulus may work 
together to influence various motor processes. At present, the interaction between both in 
motor processes that occur after action selection is currently unknown.  
 
Emotion and action tendencies: influences on the motor system 
The specific link between approaching positive and avoiding negative stimuli 
provides an ideal testbed for studying the interaction between emotion and action. This 
emotionally-driven action-specificity is likely to interact with various motor processes. They 
may, for example, bias how we select and prepare actions; influence how well we execute 
actions; and determine how quickly we inhibit inappropriate responses. Understanding this 
is important because each of these processes is guided by different underlying mechanisms. 
How emotional stimuli and associated tendencies influence these processes is unknown. 
Thus, investigating how emotional tendencies influence different motor processes will 
further our understanding of how emotions influence actions.  
To this end, this thesis aimed to shed light on the influence that emotional stimuli 
and associated approach-avoidance tendencies have on different stages of motor 
processing. This thesis will focus specifically on how such response tendencies influence the 
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preparation and direction of action (blue box in Table 1), and how crucial stimulus 
evaluation is for approach-avoidance tendencies to occur (green box in Table 1). In the 
section below, I address the different motor stages that may be under the influence of 
approach-avoidance tendencies. I will subsequently highlight the rapid conscious and 
unconscious processing of emotional stimuli and explain to what extent these tendencies 
are thought to be automatic. Finally, some methods will be highlighted, followed by a brief 
outline of each chapter. 
 
1.1. The influence of emotion on action selection, planning and execution 
The motor system is constituted by a functional hierarchy that is divided into several 
processes (Gallistel, 1980; Ghez & Krakauer, 2000; Wong, Haith, & Krakauer, 2015). 
Generally, movement generation can be divided into two separate phases (Figure 1.1): a 
“what” phase concerned with the selection of a motor goal (i.e. identification and 
intention), and a “how” phase concerned with the specification of an action (i.e. action 
selection and motor planning) (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Wong et al., 2015; Zhu & Thagard, 
2002). At the highest level, the “what” phase of movement is involved in the perceptual 
evaluation and identification of stimuli and in forming intentions and selecting goals. This 
selection of goals informs the “how” phase, which serves to translate a goal into a course of 
action and is itself also divided into two separate processes: the high-level selection of 
actions and planning of movement features (e.g. selecting the effector, defining the 
spatiotemporal characteristics of movement). The end stage of motor processing involves 
“low-level” action execution and the implementation of motor commands prepared during 
the “how” phase.  
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter One 
22 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Processes concerned with movement generation. Movement generation can be divided into two 
separate phases: the “what” phase, concerned with the selection of a motor goal (i.e. identification, intention 
and goal selection), and the “how” phase, concerned with movement preparation (i.e. action selection and 
motor planning) (modified from Wong et al. 2015). Motor commands are implemented during execution. 
 
The functional organisation of movement therefore allows stimuli to interact with 
the motor system at various stages. While it is evident that emotion influences action, we 
do not know which of these stages emotional stimuli and associated emotional tendencies 
interact with. Some evidence indicates that deciding whether to approach or avoid following 
stimulus evaluation is likely to occur in areas of the PFC (Damasio, 1994; Roelofs, Minelli, 
Mars, van Peer, & Toni, 2009; Volman, Roelofs, Koch, Verhagen, & Toni, 2011),guided by 
subcortical pathways that process emotion (LeDoux, 1996), whereas the planning of actions 
in response to emotional stimuli most likely occurs in the premotor cortex (Coombes, 
Corcos, Pavuluri, & Vaillancourt, 2012). Approach-avoidance tendencies may therefore 
interact with different motor processes guided by different underlying mechanisms.  
Thus, emotional approach-avoidance tendencies may influence the “what” and 
“how” phases of movement generation in specific ways, but the specific details of this 
influence remain largely undetermined. Various key questions remain unanswered. How 
does action selection of approach-avoidance tendencies occur and what are the possible 
underlying mechanisms? Do these tendencies also influence how quickly we inhibit 
inappropriate movement? Do these tendencies determine the planning of movement 
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parameters that will be sent as motor commands, thus influencing how an outcome is 
achieved? Do emotional changes in the environment influence and adapt action execution 
according to emotional tendencies? Each of these questions addresses different processes 
and mechanisms that emotional stimuli can interact with (Figure 1.2). Importantly, they are 
key to understanding how emotions influence actions. In the following subsections I delve 
deeper into how these questions will inform of the emotion-action link.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Processes concerned with movement generation in emotional situations. The selection of motor 
goals in the “what” phase involves the fast prioritisation of emotional stimuli which subsequently leads to the 
activation of predisposed approach-avoidance tendencies. Top-down influences from task instructions are 
likely to also influence goal selection. Approach-avoidance goals then influence the preparation of movement 
(selection and planning) (adapted from Wong et al. 2015). Movement parameters and motor commands are 
implemented during action execution.  
 
 
1.1.1. Emotional stimuli and the selection and planning of actions 
As explained above, the “how” phase of a movement can be divided into essentially 
two processes: action selection and movement planning. Here, I explain how processes 
involved in the structuring of an action are influenced by emotional stimuli.  
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1.1.1.1. Action selection  
 
1.1.1.1.1. The affordance competition hypothesis  
Classic models of action selection have always assumed that decisions are made in 
top-down areas and then passed down to low-level areas for execution (Pylyshyn, 1986). 
This idea of serial processing has been challenged by models proposing that the motor 
system is not just the “end-product” of cognition but rather, that it is a key influence on 
decision-making and biasing processes that take place prior to execution (Cisek, 2007; Cisek 
& Kalaska, 2010). Indeed, selecting actions involves a complex and integrated network that 
interacts in parallel across frontal, perceptual and motor areas and is dependent on our 
environment (Figure 1.3; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). This idea stems from proposals that our 
environment is full of stimuli that “afford” the opportunity for action (Gibson, 1977). That is, 
some stimuli can activate several competing response alternatives that all generate their 
own motor plan, leading to several potential actions that would all, for example, interact 
with the stimulus (e.g. picking up a mug by gripping by the handle, the top rim or the whole 
mug) (Cisek & Kalaska, 2002). These partially prepared motor plans will eventually be biased 
by decision-relevant information gathered over time (Basso & Wurtz, 1998; Hanks et al., 
2015; Oliveira, Diedrichsen, Verstynen, Duque, & Ivry, 2010). For instance, picking up a mug 
filled with freshly boiled water by holding the handle is more favourable than gripping the 
mug with the whole hand in order to avoid burning. This decision will be biased by gathering 
information related to the contents of the mug, which ultimately resolves the competition 
amongst response alternatives and leads to action selection. This framework has been 
termed the “affordance competition hypothesis” (Figure 1.3; ACH; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & 
Kalaska, 2010), and it suggests that action selection is biased by reciprocal and continuous 
influences between top-down and bottom-up levels (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & 
Cohen, 2006; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) that lead to parallel processing of decision processes 
and action plans. Other models of action selection support this idea by also suggesting that 
some degree of parallel competition between response alternatives must occur for 
successful behaviour (Beck et al., 2008; Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999).  
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 Figure 1.3. Schematic of the “affordance 
competition hypothesis” detailing the key 
structures involved in action selection and biasing 
responses (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). This 
hypothesis implies a parallel processing of 
decision and action, and of several action plans, 
with action selection being biased by the 
accumulation of decision evidence determined by 
the environment.  
 
 
Although this model has not been extended to incorporate emotional stimuli, it may 
serve as a blueprint for action selection in emotional situations. For instance, when 
encountering a negative stimulus both approach and avoidance (i.e. fight-or-flight) may be 
simultaneously planned as defensive actions, yet the type of negative stimulus (e.g. bear) 
will bias the selection of an action to what is most appropriate given the context, in this case 
running away. The ACH suggests that subcortical areas such as the basal ganglia that process 
selection-related information (Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al., 1999) and higher-order areas 
that detect context and value (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2008) may bias the resolution of 
competition amongst various motor plans. This interaction can extend to emotional actions. 
The basal ganglia, for instance, also receive emotional information via limbic cortico-striatal 
circuits (Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015) and other subcortical areas involved 
in emotion processing such as the amygdala (Cho, Ernst, & Fudge, 2013), which can bias 
motor output that is fed onto higher-order areas and which ultimately biases action 
selection (Middleton & Strick, 2000). 
Similarly, top-down processing has been implicated in action selection and decision-
making in emotional contexts (Damasio, 1994). For instance, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
has been shown to play a role in the selection of valence-related approach-avoidance 
actions, demonstrating that this area is essential to override predisposed response 
tendencies and guide the selection of actions contrary to these tendencies (Roelofs et al., 
2009). The initiation of so-called “incongruent” actions (i.e. approach negative and avoid 
positive) leads to increased OFC activity, suggesting that this region is recruited to overcome 
emotional action tendencies. Further support comes from work showing that disruption to 
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the anterior PFC using transcranial magnetic stimulation impairs the correct selection, and 
subsequent initiation, of approach-avoidance actions (Volman et al., 2011). This evidence 
suggests that action selection in approach-avoidance tasks is guided by higher-order areas 
involved in goal formation and action specification.  
Subcortical and cortical areas may therefore bias action selection in emotional 
contexts. Evidence in favour of this bias comes from work showing that the midcingulate 
cortex receives emotion-related input from the OFC and insula and is involved in translating 
emotional information into actions (Pereira et al., 2010). Thus, speculatively, the ACH may 
provide a framework for action selection in emotional contexts. From the point of view of 
optimal behaviour, the planning of several actions simultaneously may be beneficial since 
emotional situations may change rapidly and require fast action to avoid detrimental 
behaviour. For example, approaching to hug a friend with a dog in a leash may require a 
rapid change from approach to avoidance if their dog suddenly became aggressive. This 
rapid change may rely on the simultaneous planning of multiple actions. If approach-
avoidance tendencies exist, in an emotional context one planned action may be selected 
faster over another given their predisposition. Such approach-avoidance response 
tendencies should therefore influence the speed of action selection amongst competing 
responses.  
 
1.1.1.1.2. The theory of event coding  
Other models that explain how action selection may occur suggest an overlap 
between perceptual and action processing. The theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) based on the ideomotor and common-coding 
principles (Prinz, 1987, 1990; Stock & Stock, 2004), suggests that motor patterns underlying 
actions are represented by codes of their anticipated perceptual consequences. These 
perceptual codes are generated through experience and stored in memory, becoming 
retrieval cues that will be used in subsequent similar situations and thereby leading to the 
selection of the most appropriate action. This is similar to the somatic marker hypothesis 
(Damasio, 1994), whereby affective experiences are stored together with produced actions, 
becoming markers that are triggered in certain situations.  
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The TEC assumes that representations for perception and action share similar 
feature codes that must be co-activated and integrated for action selection to occur. Action 
selection occurs thus when there is an overlap between perceptual and action codes. For 
instance, generating the idea of an action activates codes that represent the perceivable 
effects of that action (i.e. goal generation) which in turn activate codes representations for 
that particular action (i.e. action selection). Thus, “thinking about an action” is imperative 
for selecting an action. Importantly, TEC does not consider action selection and motor 
planning as two sequential entities, but rather, assumes that when selection of action 
features activates a specific code, this code activation will also activate motor codes 
responsible for planning an action. Thus, it assumes that selection and planning occur in 
parallel, in support of the ACH.  
 
Unlike the ACH hypothesis, the TEC has been adapted to account for selection in 
emotional situations (Eder & Klauer, 2009; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 
2007). For example, approaching a positive object is represented by codes for moving 
towards but also by codes for positive and rewarding feelings. Here, the action and 
perceptual codes overlap because they are both considered positive. Similarly, avoiding a 
negative stimulus is represented by codes for moving away but also by codes for potential 
costs/punishments. Both of these codes are considered negative. The overlap of affective 
codes is what leads to faster action selection. Furthermore, actions can be defined relative 
to the body or relative to an external object (Markman & Brendl, 2005). Thus, the frame of 
reference may also play an important role in generating affective codes. Moving towards a 
positive stimulus or bringing a positive stimulus towards the self will both be coded as 
positive, yet will activate different actions (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Seibt, Neumann, 
Nussinson, & Strack, 2008). This suggests that actions that engage different effectors may 
be coded as having a similar affective valence depending on the type of emotional stimulus. 
Importantly, this framework suggests that goals and contextual evaluations of emotional 
situations are important determinants of the selection of approach and avoidance. Indeed, 
work has shown that while approach-avoidance tendencies may arise automatically, this 
automaticity is achieved based on the intentional implementation of approach-avoidance 
given the current setting ( Bargh, 1989).  
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter One 
28 
 
Different theories therefore appear to advocate similar ideas: both the ACH and the 
TEC suggest that action selection is a flexible, goal-directed process guided by 
environmental affordances. However, there are some differences. The ACH provides a 
biologically grounded framework that accommodates how interactions between cortical 
and subcortical regions may combine to bias actions in emotional contexts. In contrast, the 
TEC makes no formal assumption of biologically relevant processes and their anatomical 
underpinnings, but instead provides a psychological framework based on mental processes. 
Furthermore, the ACH bases selection on a competition of many response alternatives. 
Similarly, the TEC assumes that a stimulus can activate various perceptual and action codes 
simultaneously, but only codes that overlap in their affective coding will result in selection. 
Thus, rather than selection being biased by evidence accumulation over time like in the ACH, 
selection is biased by coding overlap. While both are integrative frameworks, they suggest 
different underlying mechanisms for action selection in emotional contexts. 
 
1.1.1.1.3. Action selection in emotional contexts: flexible or rigid?  
From an evolutionary perspective, actions in emotional situations would be 
considered to be rigidly predetermined in order to allow for fast and efficient behaviour 
(Darwin, 1872). Indeed, selection of approach-avoidance actions has been suggested to 
occur according to specific effectors in a rigid manner (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; 
Chen & Bargh, 1999). However, this sort of hardwired behaviour is not ecologically 
beneficial given the numerous possibilities for action in a given environment. In threatening 
situations, for example, both fight-or-flight may be appropriate responses but are selected 
according to the affordance of the situation. A hardwired framework would not allow for 
this flexibility.  
Despite a general consensus from the approach-avoidance literature that we are 
faster to initiate movements towards positive and away from negative stimuli, there is no 
general consensus as to how exactly approach-avoidance is triggered by emotional stimuli. 
Action selection in emotional contexts may be guided in a hardwired manner by specific 
effectors tied to predisposed tendencies or in a flexible manner by goals and contextual 
information (Figure 1.4). This specific question was addressed in Chapter Two, with the aim 
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to determine how different interchangeable contexts (i.e. different reference frames) and 
different effectors affect approach-avoidance tendencies, providing further evidence of how 
actions to positive and negative stimuli are selected.  
 
 
 Figure 1.4. Suggested model of action selection in emotional situations. The formation of approach-
avoidance goals during the “what” phase is assumed to be influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies. 
However, goal formation can also be biased by rigid muscle-specific tendencies (i.e. flexion/extension) or 
flexible contextual demands (i.e. the reference frame: am I moving to the stimulus or the stimulus moving to 
me?) that interact with approach-avoidance tendencies. For instance, approaching a positive stimulus by 
moving towards it.  
 
1.1.1.2. Motor planning  
Following the selection of actions, motor planning is the process that establishes the 
parameters that define how a movement is executed and a goal is achieved (Desmurget et 
al., 1999; Marteniuk, MacKenzie, Jeannerod, Athenes, & Dugas, 1987; Paulignan, Frak, Toni, 
& Jeannerod, 1997; Wong et al., 2015). Motor planning translates an abstract goal defined 
in the “what” phase into a concrete action. The appropriate implementation of action 
parameters is what determines how successful behaviour is. For instance, we may decide to 
pick up a mug, yet for a successful outcome, we must pick up a mug with sufficient strength 
so as to avoid dropping it on the floor. It has been suggested that the specification of 
movement parameters is a separate process to action selection (Wong et al., 2015).  
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While selection and planning processes may be separate entities with different 
underlying mechanisms, this does not mean they cannot work in parallel with each other. 
Indeed, the ACH suggests that these processes occur simultaneously during behaviour 
(Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005), with continuous monitoring of the environment 
feeding information into both selection and planning processes. Thus, the specification of 
action parameters, just like action selection, relies on sensory information from the 
environment, for example, the relation of the body to an object in space (Cisek, 2007). The 
parallel processing of selection and planning is important because it essentially suggests 
that while these processes have different underlying mechanisms, information that biases 
one process may also bias the other. As such, it may be possible that in emotional 
situations, emotional biases on action selection will also bias the planning of movement 
parameters for successful behaviour.   
One way to explore biases on motor planning is by investigating vigour, that is, the 
effort expended once an action has been initiated in order to achieve a desirable outcome 
(Niv, Daw, & Dayan, 2005). Vigour is reflected in the spatiotemporal properties of 
movement such as strength or speed, which are presumably determined during motor 
planning. Recent work has revealed that vigour is biased by the value of a predicted 
outcome, whereby a rewarding stimulus leads to more vigorous action, and a punishment 
leads to less vigorous action (Guitart-Masip, Beierholm, Dolan, Duzel, & Dayan, 2011; 
Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014; Niv et al., 2005). Similar work has revealed that 
the effort one must produce during execution informs individuals about the value of a 
reward, with increasing amounts of perceivable effort seeming less rewarding and leading 
to less vigorous actions (Klein-Flügge, Kennerley, Saraiva, Penny, & Bestmann, 2015). 
Similarly, uncertainty about an outcome is incorporated into movement plans in order to 
maximise rewards and minimise costs (Hudson, Maloney, & Landy, 2008; Zhang, Morvan, & 
Maloney, 2010). The more uncertain the environment, the more variable and less rewarding 
the movement. The parameters of vigour established during motor planning therefore 
reflect the opportunity cost of an action: the more rewarding a stimulus is, the more 
vigorous an action is, while the more aversive a stimulus is, the less vigorous an action will 
be.  
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How is this relevant to emotional situations? Emotional stimuli can be assigned 
positive or negative values: positive stimuli can be rewarding, whereas negative stimuli can 
be considered punishments (Lang & Bradley, 2008; Rolls, 2000). If non-emotional rewards 
and punishments, which are classified as positive and negative in value, bias the vigour of 
actions, then it is possible that positive and negative emotional stimuli also bias motor 
planning and vigour. More specifically, this bias may arise from approach-avoidance 
tendencies that lead to certain outcomes. For example, approaching a positive stimulus 
could be seen as rewarding, but approaching a negative stimulus may be seen as potentially 
costly. The same action is assigned a different value depending on the emotional stimulus. 
Similarly, in emotional situations some actions may lead to more certain outcomes than 
others. Approaching a threatening stimulus, for instance, will cause a higher degree of 
uncertainty about the outcome, whereas avoidance will cause greater certainty that the 
outcome will be positive. Approach-avoidance tendencies may therefore influence the 
degree of uncertainty of an action. Vigour thus allows to assess and assay the extent of this 
uncertainty.  
 
Figure 1.5. Model of how approach-avoidance tendencies may influence motor planning. Once goals have 
been selected, these goals are expected to bias selection and planning of movement parameters in parallel. 
These parameters specify the motor command which is implemented during execution. The vigour of an action 
should reflect these biases.  
 
It is currently poorly understood whether approach-avoidance tendencies have an 
influence on vigour. Some recent evidence has shown an influence of these tendencies on 
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the spatial (Stins, van Gelder, Oudenhoven, & Beek, 2015), and temporal (Esteves et al. 
2016) properties of execution, giving some indication of an influence on movement 
planning. However, other evidence suggests that vigour is not modulated by emotional 
stimuli or associated tendencies (Coombes, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2007, 2007; Stins, Roelofs, 
et al., 2011; Stins & Beek, 2011).   
 Taking into account the ACH, if approach-avoidance tendencies influence action 
selection, then such tendencies should also influence the specification of movement 
parameters (Figure 1.5). This should be the backbone of successful emotional behaviour: 
selecting to run away should be complemented by running away more vigorously. To this 
end, Chapter Four investigated the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on motor 
planning and vigour, giving further insight into the link between emotions and actions.  
 
1.1.1.3. The suppression of actions 
Suppressing actions that are no longer appropriate or advantageous is a 
fundamental requirement of flexible and successful behaviour (Aron, 2007; Aron et al., 
2007; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). In emotional situations, failure to inhibit inappropriate 
responses may lead to potentially costly outcomes. In everyday life stimuli lead us to 
prepare and execute actions (“go” stimuli), but occasionally, a stimulus signalling us to stop 
us from executing a prepared action may arise (“stop” stimulus). For instance, in a crossing a 
green light may signal us to start walking, but an unexpected passing car may signal us to 
inhibit walking. Response inhibition is therefore a fundamental influence on motor 
processing.  
The success of inhibition is dependent on competition between the preparation of a 
response following the “go” stimulus and the preparation of stopping processes following 
the appearance of the “stop” stimulus. This competition between two processes has been 
described in the “Horse Race Model” (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). In 
situations where one is required to stop their actions, if the “go” process is completed 
before the “stop” process (i.e. if action preparation was sufficiently fast), then inhibition 
would be difficult and a response will be executed. In contrast, if the “stop” process is 
completed before the “go” process (i.e. if action preparation was slow), inhibition is 
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successful. The speed of action suppression is therefore an indication of how quickly 
preparation to respond occurred (De Jong, Coles, Logan, & Gratton, 1990; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009). Some actions may be easier to prepare than others making them harder to 
inhibit, whereas unprepared responses will be easier to inhibit.  
 The speed of inhibition relies on competition between preparatory processes, and 
the inhibition itself requires the immediate suppression of an effector. How is this achieved? 
Two mechanisms have been proposed for this. The first one involves a global stopping 
mechanism, whereby the prepared response and other response alternatives are 
suppressed simultaneously (Badry et al., 2009; Coxon, Stinear, & Byblow, 2007; Majid, Cai, 
George, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2012). For instance, when suppressing a finger movement, 
there was also suppression of neural excitability of the leg despite the leg being task-
irrelevant (Badry et al., 2009). This type of inhibition is therefore nonselective in that all 
motor output is suppressed and it may be beneficial in situations that require the avoidance 
of potential danger. The second mechanism is more selective in that specific, rather than all, 
tendencies are suppressed (Aron, 2011; Aron & Verbruggen, 2008). That is, one specific 
action may be inhibited but other effectors may still be active. Selective inhibition may be 
important in situations where, for instance, one needs to inhibit a prepared approach 
response towards an animal that turned aggressive while simultaneously initiating an 
avoidance movement. In this situation inhibiting both approach and avoidance would not be 
beneficial.   
 Why is response inhibition relevant to the link between emotions and actions? 
Inhibition in the motor system can be deployed in two separate ways through distinct 
pathways. Inhibition of competing response alternatives during action selection, for 
instance, occurs prior to response initiation and is mediated via dorsal premotor areas, 
biased by cortical and subcortical structures (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). Response 
inhibition, in contrast, aims to inhibit an already selected action plan (Aron et al., 2007), and 
is mediated by the activation of the right inferior frontal cortex which projects to the 
subthalamic nucleus and suppresses motor output already prepared by the “go” process 
(Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Temel, Blokland, Steinbusch, & 
Visser-Vandewalle, 2005). In emotional situations, these inhibition networks extend to 
involve the orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex (Goldstein et al., 2007; 
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Schulz et al., 2009; Shafritz, Collins, & Blumberg, 2006). The existence of specialised 
response inhibition networks during emotional situations further suggests the possibility 
that emotional approach-avoidance tendencies may selectively influence the speed of 
stopping.  
In sum, response inhibition depends on a competition between “go” and “stop” 
processes, and can be implemented via global or selective mechanisms that target all or 
individual motor processes, respectively. Importantly, response inhibition is driven by 
different mechanisms than those observed in selection, demonstrating than inhibition is a 
separate yet critical process for successful interaction. The influence of emotional response 
tendencies on the speed and implementation of inhibition remains unknown. If action 
preparation influences how well inhibition can be deployed, then it follows that approach-
avoidance tendencies that result in faster actions may consequently influence how quickly 
we stop our movements. For example, preparing an approach to a positive stimulus may 
occur faster than the preparation to inhibit, “winning” the competition and thus delaying 
inhibition. While this link may seem obvious, there is surprisingly little evidence showing an 
influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on inhibition. Some evidence suggests that 
inhibition is harder when subjects need to initiate responses in positive contexts and easier 
when initiating responses in negative contexts (Albert et al., 2010; Chiu, Cools, & Aron, 
2014). Initiation in this case might be considered an “approach” action. Thus, in positive 
contexts “approach” was prepared faster whereas in negative contexts “approach” was 
prepared slower, leading to differences in inhibition. This is supported by evidence showing 
that threatening stimuli lead to immobility and faster inhibition (Facchinetti, Imbiriba, 
Azevedo, Vargas, & Volchan, 2006; Stins, Roerdink, & Beek, 2011).  
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Figure 1.6. Model of how approach-
avoidance may bias response 
inhibition. A) Emotional go signals 
should influence the preparation of 
“go” processes. Approach-avoidance 
tendencies should be prepared faster. 
When a stop signal is presented, this 
bias should influence the resolution 
between competing go and stop 
processes. B) Emotional stop signals 
and associated predisposed 
tendencies should bias “stop” 
processes. Inhibiting predisposed 
tendencies should be harder. 
 
 
To the best of my knowledge, no work has investigated response inhibition in 
situations where individuals are required to actively approach or avoid a stimulus. An 
influence of emotional tendencies on inhibition would suggest that these tendencies can 
influence different processes and mechanisms (Figure 1.6). The speed of response inhibition 
of approach-avoidance responses to positive and negative stimuli should reveal further 
insight into the state of preparation of such tendencies. Chapter Five investigates action 
preparation of approach-avoidance tendencies by looking at the speed of response 
inhibition.  
 
1.1.1.4. The re-planning of actions during execution  
Action execution is the implementation of the parameters defined during motor 
planning. In the face of ever-changing environments, these parameters may sometimes 
need to be updated in real time to accommodate new goals and ensure successful 
behaviour occurs (Desmurget et al., 1999; Goodale, Pelisson, & Prablanc, 1986). The ACH 
(Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) predicts that this quick re-planning most likely occurs 
via the parallel processing between motor planning and movement execution, whereby 
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feedback mechanisms update motor plans which in turn update outgoing motor commands 
(Kalaska & Crammond, 1992; Sabes, 2000). Neural data has supported this hypothesis, 
demonstrating that the same regions involved in movement planning are also active during 
action execution (Crammond & Kalaska, 2000; Kalaska, Scott, Cisek, & Sergio, 1997). Recent 
behavioural data show that errors performed during action execution inform decision-
making processes which subsequently modify the motor representation of reward and 
update motor commands (McDougle et al., 2016). Parallel processing of execution and 
motor plans during ongoing movement therefore allows for flexibility and adaptation even 
after an action has been committed.  
 How does movement re-planning during execution occur? Parallel processing is likely 
to reflect a combination of feedforward and feedback mechanisms (Desmurget & Grafton, 
2000). When a stimulus is identified, visual information allows for the planning and 
specification of potential actions (feedforward specification). Throughout execution, a 
forward model of the movement dynamics is generated based on continuous input into the 
visual system, which informs feedback loops to update these movement dynamics (see 
Figure 1.7). The speed of feedback mechanisms is dependent on the speed of sensory 
processing during ongoing movement (Striemer, Yukovsky, & Goodale, 2010).  
 
Figure 1.7. Tentantive schematic of 
feedforward and feedback 
mechanisms during motor re-planning 
as a consequence of emotional 
changes in the environment. Solid red 
arrow representing the original motor 
command. The presentation of an 
emotional stimulus updates motor 
plans according to its predisposed 
tendency (e.g. positive – approach) 
through feedback mechanisms. The 
position of the effector in space also 
contributes to this feedback. Dotted 
red line represents the updated motor 
command.  
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Visuomotor adaptation studies, in which participants are required to respond to 
environmental changes during execution with a movement correction, have been critical for 
our understanding of mechanisms involved in visually-guided movement corrections (Day & 
Lyon, 2000; Desmurget, Prablanc, Jordan, & Jeannerod, 1999; Kalaska & Crammond, 1992; 
Nijhof, 2003; Paulignan, MacKenzie, Marteniuk, & Jeannerod, 1991; Prablanc & Martin, 
1992). Evidence suggests that visuomotor corrections occur very rapidly, even when 
participants are unaware of the change (Goodale et al., 1986; Prablanc & Martin, 1992). 
Rapid corrections are subsequently followed by more intentional control of the movement. 
Indeed, two classes of responses appear to guide visuomotor corrections: a fast response 
guided by an automatic pathway and a slow response guided by a less automatic pathway 
(Day & Lyon, 2000a; Pisella et al., 2000). This automatic continuum allows for a gradual shift 
from “more automatic” to “less automatic” and is likely influenced by the speed of feedback 
(Striemer et al. 2010).       
In the example above, fast corrections are thought to be guided by subcortical 
structures. This view is supported by work on split-brain patients, who were able to make 
early limb adjustments despite not being able to transfer information between hemispheres 
(Day & Brown, 2001). In contrast, slow corrections are thought to be guided by top-down 
influences (Day & Lyon, 2000). Alternatively, both fast and slow responses may be guided by 
a single pathway, whereby top-down attentional engagement (or disengagement) 
determines the speed of visuomotor corrections (Tipper, Howard, & Houghton, 1998; 
Tipper, Howard, & Jackson, 1997). 
Changes in emotional environments may have specific consequences on motor 
updating and action execution. Neural evidence supports this assumption. For example, 
areas involved in motor planning, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
premotor cortex, are also active while executing actions in emotional contexts (Coombes et 
al., 2012). Can approach-avoidance tendencies associated to emotional stimuli influence the 
speed at which fast or slow pathways are engaged during visuomotor correction of 
movements? For instance, correcting a movement towards a positive target might occur 
faster than correcting towards a negative target. Similarly, correcting away from a negative 
target might be faster than correcting away from a positive target. This is because a positive 
stimulus predisposes approach whereas a negative stimulus predisposes avoidance (Chen & 
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Bargh, 1999). In essence, there may be two automatic systems at play: one related to the 
speed of visuomotor corrections (fast vs. slow responses) and another related to approach-
avoidance tendencies.  
The influence of emotional approach-avoidance tendencies on fast and slow 
pathways remains unexplored, yet is critical for our understanding of how emotional 
information may bias action execution. Importantly, any influence of emotional stimuli 
would indicate that approach-avoidance tendencies are able to influence motor processing 
at different stages, and bias different underlying mechanisms. To assess whether rapid 
emotional changes in the environment bias and influence action execution, three 
experiments were conducted in Chapter Six. 
 
1.1.1.5. Summary  
In sum, movement generation is divided into two phases: the “what” and the “how”, 
each composed of different processes that all contribute to guide appropriate behaviour 
given the environment. These different processes interact with each other to translate 
thought into action, often operating in parallel, yet are guided by different underlying 
mechanisms. This is key to successful behaviour in emotional situations. Investigating the 
influence of emotional stimuli and their associated tendencies on each of these different 
components of movement generation is crucial for our understanding of the mechanisms 
that translate emotions into actions. A link between approach-avoidance tendencies and 
different processing stages would demonstrate that emotional stimuli have a privileged 
status when it comes to the motor system that may be crucial for optimising behaviour.  
 
1.2. Forming action goals: an automatic process?  
Given how crucial emotional approach-avoidance tendencies are deemed for 
optimal behaviour, the fast detection and recognition of emotional stimuli must first occur. 
Above, we saw that movement generation is divided into the “what” and the “how”. The 
“what” phase is concerned with how a motor goal is created, whereby stimulus 
identification and evaluation determine the value of a stimulus (e.g. good or bad) and what 
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needs to be done to the stimulus (e.g. approach or avoid). The goals formed during the 
“what” phase will inform the “how” processes involved in converting a goal into an action. 
Furthermore, the deployment of attentional resources plays a fundamental role in forming 
goals by selecting the object of interest and excluding the surrounding environment, 
thereby increasing the availability of resources necessary for action. Thus, rapid stimulus 
processing and attentional allocation of resources to the stimulus is a necessity for action 
preparation (Wong et al., 2015).  
In emotional environments the fast allocation of attentional resources to, for 
example, a threatening stimulus is a prerequisite for fast action. Indeed, the processing of 
emotional information is considered to be prioritised in a fast and automatic manner, via a 
subcortical network involving the amygdala and brainstem areas, and presumably bypassing 
consciousness (Figure 1.8; LeDoux, 1995; Méndez-Bértolo et al., 2016; Mobbs et al., 2009; 
Tamietto & Gelder, 2010). The processing of emotional information is assumed to require 
less attentional resources than non-emotional stimuli (Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; 
Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). For instance, emotion 
processing areas are activated by the appearance of emotional faces even when participants 
are engaged in another task (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Williams, 
McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2005). This is supported by evidence showing that even 
when emotional information is masked (i.e. a visual stimulus that hides the perception of 
another visual stimulus) processing areas are still activated without the participants’ 
awareness of the emotional stimulus (Morris et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
the presence of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli can disrupt task performance (Hartikainen, 
Ogawa, & Knight, 2000; Pereira et al., 2006). Overall, the evidence suggests that participants 
process emotional information independently of attention (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De 
Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003). Thus, in emotional situations, the formation of goals during 
movement generation may be guided by the rapid and unconscious processing of emotional 
information. 
This contrasts with evidence showing that the processing of emotional stimuli is 
dependent on attentional resources and awareness of the emotional stimulus (Pessoa, 
McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa, Japee, & 
Ungerleider, 2005). For instance, studies in which highly demanding attentional tasks were 
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performed while showing task-irrelevant emotional stimuli, demonstrated no amygdala 
activation, presumably because the majority of attentional resources were devoted to the 
highly demanding task (Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002; Schupp, Flaisch, 
Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006). The formation of goals during movement generation may 
therefore be dependent on awareness and on consciously directing attention to an 
emotional stimulus. 
 
Figure 1.8. Key subcortical and cortical emotion 
structures in the brain, including the amygdala, basal 
ganglia, brainstem nuclei and orbitofrontal and anterior 
cingulate cortices (from Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). 
Projections from subcortical to cortical structures may 
underlie the automatic triggering of response tendencies 
in goal-directed situations. For instance, fast detection of 
emotional content in the amygdala (AMG) may inform 
prefrontal areas such as the OFC, which may subsequently 
influence selection of goals and actions, depending on the 
context.  
 
 
The mixed evidence presented above suggests that processing of emotional stimuli 
can occur with and without awareness and is dependent on the availability of attentional 
resources. Speculatively, the processing of emotional stimuli may be guided by interactions 
between top-down and bottom-up processes. For instance, the amygdala is widely 
connected to other subcortical structures and to cortical areas (Amaral, 1992). The 
facilitation of attention in emotional situations has been suggested to occur through 
amygdala modulation of cortico-sensory areas (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999), whereby 
the amygdala influences further attentional and perceptual processing of the emotional 
stimulus (Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004). Furthermore, reciprocal 
connections between higher-order areas and the amygdala exist (Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, 
& Everitt, 2002; Everitt & Robbins, 1992; Young, Scannell, Burns, & Blakemore, 1994), 
suggesting that these structures work together to rapidly detect and evaluate emotional 
stimuli, form goals and intentions and direct appropriate actions given the context. For 
instance, while emotional processing may rely on initial bottom-up processing via the 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter One 
41 
 
amygdala, the medial prefrontal cortex has been shown to be involved in directing 
defensive behaviour (Fanselow, 1994). Furthermore, top-down influences gather 
information related to the context and subsequently project to the amygdala to trigger 
appetitive or defensive actions (LeDoux, 1996; Mobbs et al., 2009).  
If the “how” phase is dependent on the formation of goals during the “what” phase, 
then the fast prioritisation of emotional information, the allocation of attention with or 
without awareness, and reciprocal interactions between top-down and bottom-up areas 
during processing may all play a role in the formation of approach-avoidance goals. 
Although the current thesis is not primarily concerned with the processing of emotional 
stimuli, an additional goal was to investigate to what extent stimulus evaluation and 
awareness are necessary to form approach-avoidance goals. To this end, two chapters 
presented emotional information in a task-unrelated way (i.e. they are not directly relevant 
to task). 
Chapter Three investigates if action preparation of approach-avoidance tendencies is 
influenced by task-irrelevant emotional information presented for durations deemed too 
low but sufficiently high for the detection and discrimination of emotional content. Previous 
work has shown that briefly presenting task-irrelevant emotional information prior to an 
emotional target influences the speed of responses, with matching emotional information 
facilitating responses (Eder, Leuthold, Rothermund, & Schweinberger, 2012; Klauer, 1997), 
presumably via the prioritisation of emotional stimuli. This suggests that task-irrelevant 
emotional information unintentionally influences the preparation of subsequent responses. 
Tendencies triggered by task-irrelevant emotional information may therefore also 
unintentionally bias response preparation. If the tendency prepared by the task-irrelevant 
stimulus (e.g. approach) matches that of the target, then responses will be faster. This 
suggests that irrelevant information in the environment may be prioritised and help predict 
and prepare for upcoming emotional stimuli. This specific hypothesis was addressed in a 
series of experiments with the aim of understanding whether approach-avoidance 
tendencies can implicitly influence action preparation.  
Similarly, Chapter Six investigated whether action execution is influenced by task-
irrelevant emotional distractors (see section 1.1.1.4). Thus, both chapters assume that due 
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to attentional prioritisation, participants will unintentionally process task-unrelated 
emotional information that should consequently impact different motor stages.  
 
1.2.1.  Automatic approach-avoidance tendencies 
Approach-avoidance tendencies are assumed to occur automatically and 
unintentionally (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002). However, 
what does automatically mean? Automaticity is difficult to define, but generally it can be 
described as a process occurring independently of the availability of resources, not affected 
by intentions, and not necessarily tied to consciousness (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Indeed, automatic processes require very little attention, depleting minimal resources from 
the task at hand yet allowing to maximise behaviour (Moors & De Houwer, 2006, 2010). 
Some have even suggested that visual processes can flow automatically into actions such 
that actions can be triggered with little or no conscious intention (Tipper, 2001). The 
automaticity of emotional tendencies is in line with the fact that emotional stimuli are 
prioritised when attentional resources are limited (Vuilleumier et al., 2005) and even when 
individuals are seemingly unaware of the presence of the stimuli (Whalen et al., 1998). In 
this thesis automaticity refers to an unintentional effect that occurs faster than others with 
and without awareness of the emotional stimulus. I do not attempt to give a detailed 
overview of automaticity here as this is beyond the scope of the current thesis (see Moors & 
De Houwer, 2006 for a review).  
Despite much of the approach-avoidance literature describing predisposed 
tendencies as occurring automatically and unconsciously (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; 
Krieglmeyer, Houwer, & Deutsch, 2013; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), there is conflicting 
evidence regarding the extent to which these actions are automatic. Much evidence has 
demonstrated a direct link between the immediate and unintended evaluation of emotional 
stimuli and approach-avoidance tendencies (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Neumann, Förster, & 
Strack, 2003). For instance, we are faster to approach positive and avoid negative stimuli 
even when instructions do not explicitly mention approach and avoidance (Chen & Bargh, 
1999), when we are required to approach and avoid a non-emotional feature such as the 
colour or gender of the emotional stimulus (Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, Houwer, & Raedt, 2010) 
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and even when they are presented so briefly they are deemed unconscious (i.e. without 
awareness) (Duckworth et al., 2002). Moreover, even when participants are explicitly told to 
move towards positive and negative stimuli and away from both stimuli (Roelofs et al., 
2009; Volman et al., 2011), they are still faster to approach positive and avoid negative, 
showing that response tendencies still automatically arise. One would assume that if such 
tendencies were not automatic, intentionally approaching positive and negative stimuli as 
dictated by task instructions should not differ from each other. However, this is not the case 
when explicit instructions are given. Thus, approach-avoidance tendencies appear to 
automatically and unconsciously generate motor goals, suggesting a strong predisposition to 
act in specific ways in emotional situations. Accordingly, motor processes should be 
automatically biased. 
Despite strong evidence for automatic tendencies, other work has shown that 
approach-avoidance may not be completely independent of goals and context (Eder & 
Klauer, 2009; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lang & Bradley, 2013; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). 
Task instructions and contextual evaluation, for instance, have been shown to dictate 
whether an approach or avoidance is required (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Markman & 
Brendl, 2005). Similarly, approach-avoidance tendencies are not triggered when participants 
are instructed to respond to a non-affective component of an affective stimulus (Rotteveel 
& Phaf, 2004). Furthermore, such tendencies may not just be triggered by the presence of 
an emotional stimulus, but also by the anticipated consequences of the action (e.g. if I 
approach a cute puppy then I may be able to play with it) (Eder & Rothermund, 2013; Eder 
& Hommel, 2013). Evaluating a context and anticipating the consequences of an action 
according to that context suggests a top-down mechanism involved in generating approach-
avoidance goals that will subsequently bias motor processes. Accordingly, approach-
avoidance tendencies may be goal-directed (Lang & Bradley, 2013).  
To summarise, the above evidence suggests that while some degree of automaticity 
exists, approach-avoidance tendencies still interact with environmental demands in order to 
lead successful behaviour. This is supportive of an interaction between top-down and 
bottom-up processes, mentioned previous in sections 1.1.1.1 and 1.2. Speculatively, 
bottom-up processes may prioritise the processing of emotional stimuli, plan competing 
responses upon stimulus evaluation, and interact with top-down areas to establish what the 
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most appropriate action is given the current context, biasing behaviour towards approach or 
avoidance. Approach-avoidance is therefore likely to be a combination of automatic and 
goal-directed processes. 
 
1.3. A brief introduction to methods  
 
To answer the research questions in this thesis, a variety of behavioural techniques 
were used. Here, I briefly outline the emotional stimuli used to evoke approach-avoidance 
actions and highlight a couple of important measurements necessary to assess the effect of 
emotional stimuli on motor processes.  
 
1.3.1. Presenting emotional stimuli: emotional pictures and affective faces  
Emotions are subjective and emotional stimuli may evoke emotions in very different 
ways depending on the individual (Bradley & Lang, 2007). For example, someone might 
strongly dislike babies yet the majority of people love them. For this reason, when studying 
emotion and their respective approach-avoidance tendencies it is necessary to use a 
standardised, validated and established set of emotional stimuli that are confirmed to evoke 
specific emotions. Moreover, there is a range of emotional stimuli that can be used to evoke 
approach-avoidance tendencies. We can use, for instance, auditory or pictorial stimuli of 
emotional scenes, emotional words and affective faces. In this thesis I opted to present 
participants with emotional pictures and affective faces. These were chosen for the 
following reasons: pictures of emotional scenes and faces are static (i.e. unchanging) 
meaning that they are easily interpretable and their content does not change throughout a 
trial (Bradley & Lang, 2007), they are ecologically valid (Garvert, Friston, Dolan, & Garrido, 
2014), they are clearly evocative, and their features – image size, duration, brightness, 
luminance and colour – can be easily controlled for and manipulated to make 
standardisation better.  
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The most widely employed database of emotional pictures is the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). This database comprises of 
more than a thousand pictures depicting content showcasing everyday human experience – 
relationships, babies, families, erotica, attack, threat, wars, death, plants and flowers, and 
many others. In the current thesis only emotional pictures depicting humans or animals 
were included as they represent what most humans interact with emotionally on a daily 
basis. Neutral pictures contained inanimate objects such as chairs and tables. To standardise 
and validate the database, each picture has been rated on a scale of 1 – 9 on their valence 
(e.g. pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant) and their arousal (e.g. not very arousing, neutral, 
and very arousing) by a large group of naive participants. A comprehensive review of the 
standardisation and validation procedure of the IAPS can be read in Bradley & Lang (2007).  
 Contrary to emotional pictures, there are many standardised databases that contain 
emotional faces – the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2009), the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998), Radboud 
Faces Databases (RFD; Langner et al., 2010), and others. The most widely used database is 
the KDEF, which comprises of 4900 pictures of human emotional expressions taken from 70 
male and female individuals. Similarly, the RFD comprises of 536 emotional expressions 
taken from 67 individuals. Given the large amount of emotional faces provided and because 
these databases have been validated (Goeleven, Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008; 
Langner et al., 2010), the KDEF and RFD were the preferred choice for this thesis. 
Importantly, in all the experiments conducted here, participants rated all of the stimuli 
presented on their valence and arousal ratings.  
 
1.3.2. Measuring approach-avoidance: the joystick/manikin task 
The main goal of this thesis was to investigate how approach-avoidance tendencies 
influence motor processes, and as such, it was imperative to use a task that readily evokes 
approach-avoidance. Two prominent tasks have been used separately in the approach-
avoidance literature: the joystick and the manikin tasks.  
 The joystick task (Figure 1.9A) was originally devised in the prominent Chen & Bargh 
(1999) paper and has been used by others (Eder & Klauer, 2009; Roelofs et al., 2009; Seibt et 
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al., 2008). The premise is rather simple: participants are required to pull or push the joystick 
in order to approach or avoid emotional stimuli on a computer screen. Some studies do not 
provide task instructions related to valence (Chen & Bargh, 1999), while others give explicit 
movement instructions related to valence (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Eder & Klauer, 2009). 
The majority of joystick studies do not provide visual feedback (i.e. the movement they 
make does not cause any changes to the stimulus), but a few have provided the illusion that 
the emotional stimulus does approach or avoid the participant (Rinck & Becker, 2007; Seibt 
et al., 2008; van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008). Providing feedback on the screen adds a 
realistic touch to the joystick task and is advantageous in that participants can see the 
consequences of their actions which might provide feedback to the motor system.  
 The manikin task (Figure 1.9B) was devised by De Houwer and colleagues (2001) as 
an alternative to the joystick task. A small stick figure (i.e. manikin) on the screen was 
moved up or down using a keyboard in order to approach or avoid an emotional word 
presented on the centre of the screen. Crucially, depending on the position of the manikin 
(i.e. above or below the word), an upward movement could mean approach or avoidance, 
meaning that for each trial participants must decide which movement means approach and 
which means avoidance. This task is advantageous over the joystick task in two ways: 
participants can see the change in distance between the “self” (i.e. manikin) and the object 
by means of visual feedback, and there is less chance of re-categorisation of movements 
(e.g. in joystick tasks pulling a joystick to bring a positive stimulus towards may also be 
interpreted as pulling the joystick away from negative pictures, whereas in manikin tasks 
participants only press a button and explicitly see the consequence on the screen). Re-
categorisation of movements can introduce error variance (some participants may re-
categorise, others may not), which reduces the sensitivity of the measure.  
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Figure 1.9. Schematics of the joystick and manikin tasks. A) A joystick is used to push or pull when an 
emotional stimulus is presented on the screen. Typically, pulling is considered an approach and pushing an 
avoidance response, although the opposite can be true as well (taken from Eder & Klauer). B) In the manikin 
task, a stick figure representing the self is moved on the screen via button presses, either towards or away 
from the emotionl stimulus.  
 
 A recent comparison between the tasks (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010) 
demonstrated that the manikin task had greater sensitivity over the joystick task in 
depicting approach and avoidance. This result was also true only when the joystick task 
provided visual feedback of the consequences of arm movement. Thus, this suggests that 
approach-avoidance tendencies are more strongly evoked when participants can observe 
the consequences of their actions on the screen and when there is no chance of re-
categorisation of the movement. This helps generate goals as participants know what they 
can expect from their movements. 
 Taking this into consideration, for the current thesis I devised a novel task that 
combined the feedback joystick and manikin tasks. Essentially the manikin is moved on the 
screen by participants pulling or pushing a joystick. For example, when the manikin is 
located above the picture participants need to pull the manikin to approach and push to 
avoid the stimulus, whereas when the manikin is located below the picture participants 
must push to approach and pull to avoid. It combines the strengths of both the manikin and 
feedback joystick tasks and moreover, allows participants to physically make approach-
avoidance movements rather than pressing buttons. This task was used in Chapters Two, 
Three and Five, whereas a modified version using button presses was used in Chapter Four.  
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1.4. Quantifying approach-avoidance  
Quantifying approach and avoidance can involve a number of dependent variables 
that will not all be discussed here. All variables are explained in their respective chapters. 
However, a special note is given to the two most featured variables of the entire thesis: the 
reaction and movement time. Both of these comprise what is known as the response time 
(Welford, 1980).  
 
1.4.1. Reaction Times 
The reaction time (RT) is the time taken from stimulus onset to the initiation of a 
motor response, and it is estimated to last approximately 200 ms (Welford, 1980), although 
this varies with the type of stimulus presented and the type of response that needs to be 
executed. A series of events occur during the RT: a stimulus is perceived and identified, a 
goal is formed, the action required is determined and a motor command is implemented 
that will subsequently mobilise the respective group of muscles (Wong et al., 2015). The RT 
therefore encompasses many different processes, namely the “what” and “how” phases of 
movement generation that were described in section 1.1. Thus, RT comprises perceptual 
and motor processing.   
What does the RT mean and why is it important? It is difficult to truly define what 
the RT means. A broad definition is that the RT is a determinant of processing speed, giving 
an indication of how fast an individual can carry out mental operations required by the task 
(Welford, 1980). Indeed, the RT has been found to increase proportionately with the 
amount of information needed to be processed (Jensen, 1987). However, because it 
presumably encompasses a variety of processes, it is difficult to accurately determine from 
an RT if detection and identification consumed more resources than action selection. For 
example, from an RT of 300 ms, one cannot be sure that the “what” phase consumed 150 
ms and the “how” phase consumed the remaining 150 ms. A recent review suggests that the 
“what” phase consumes the majority of the RT, whereas the “how” only consumes a small 
fraction (Haith et al. 2016), demonstrating how quickly motor processes occur in the brain. 
Irrespective of this, the RT is essential for determining the speed of evaluation, action 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter One 
49 
 
selection and response inhibition. For instance, faster RTs give an indication that a specific 
stimulus was processed more easily than another stimulus or that an action was selected 
faster than a competing alternative. This is evident in approach-avoidance studies, in which 
approaching positive and avoiding negative stimuli has a faster RT than the opposite actions. 
Throughout this thesis, the RT is measured and reported as an indication of the speed of 
processing and action selection, as well as being used to determine the speed of response 
inhibition.  
 
1.4.2. Movement times  
The movement time (MT) is the time taken from response initiation to reaching the 
target and thus reflects the total time of action execution. Unlike the RT, MT is unaffected 
by increases in the amount of stimulus information (Jensen, 1987), suggesting that it does 
not reflect processes that occur prior to action initiation. However, some work has 
suggested that MT is also sensitive to stimulus evaluation processes (Houlihan, Campbell, & 
Stelmack, 1994). The MT may be relatively unaffected by what happens prior to the 
initiation of movement, but it might be affected by unexpected changes that occur once a 
movement has been initiated, thereby reflecting evaluation processes that occur while a 
movement is ongoing. Thus, the MT may not only reflect the speed of action execution but 
may also be a reflection of the speed of motor planning.  
With respect to approach-avoidance tendencies, we may not only be faster at 
initiating such responses, but the rate at which we move towards or away from an 
emotional stimulus may also be affected. That is, our speed may increase at a faster rate as 
time progresses if we are approaching a positive stimulus relative to a negative stimulus. MT 
is therefore an important measure of how motor planning and action execution are 
influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies.  
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1.5. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is about how emotional stimuli and their related action tendencies impact 
different motor processes. I address my research questions by using a variety of behavioural 
techniques including psychophysical testing and movement tracking. Thus, I focus largely on 
behavioural measures, which can only lead me to speculate on the anatomical regions 
involved in translating emotions to actions. The anatomical, functional and behavioural 
relationship between emotion and the motor system outlined above has led me to ask 
several unanswered, yet important, questions related to the preparation, execution and 
inhibition of actions in emotional contexts. Below I outline the relevant question each 
chapter attempts to answer.  
Chapter Two is concerned with how approach-avoidance actions are selected. Some 
studies have demonstrated that approach-avoidance actions are linked to specific muscle 
activation (Caccioppo et al., 1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999) whereas others have suggested that 
approach-avoidance tendencies are flexibly determined by the reference-frame (Lavender & 
Hommel, 2007; Seibt et al., 2008) or task instructions (Eder & Rothermund, 2008). While the 
former implies that action selection occurs in a rigid and muscle-specific way, the latter 
implies that action selection is flexibly influenced by the environment. Given that previous 
work has demonstrated that action selection relies on the simultaneous planning of several 
competing responses until the more appropriate one is chosen (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010), it is 
less likely that emotionally-guided behaviour is muscle-specific, but is instead flexibly guided 
by contextual requirements. However, no study has previously pitted these two lines of 
evidence against each other. This chapter aims to shed light on the “how” phase of 
movement generation in emotional contexts and further understand in what manner 
actions in response to emotional stimuli are selected.  
Chapter Three investigates how actions in response to emotional stimuli are 
prepared. Emotional cues in the environment may serve as “warning” signals that may 
predict upcoming emotional stimuli, leading to fast and efficient behaviour. These 
emotional cues in the environment are not task-relevant yet may be unconsciously 
prioritised, biasing goal formation towards automatic response tendencies which will 
subsequently prepare the motor system for appropriate action and maximise the efficiency 
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of our behaviour. Alternatively, in goal-directed situations whereby task instructions dictate 
approach and avoidance, instructions may be unconsciously applied to task-irrelevant 
emotional cues. Thus, is preparation determined by unintentional automatic tendencies or 
goal-related task-instructions? And can this biasing still occur when emotional cues are 
presented under the threshold for conscious detection? To this end, three experiments 
were conducted using affective primes to determine how action preparation occurs and 
establish the extent to which processing of emotional information is unconscious.  
In Chapter Four, the effect of approach-avoidance tendencies on action execution 
was investigated. While selecting the appropriate action is important for behaviour, the 
correct implementation of action parameters in order to achieve the desired outcome is as 
important. The planning of spatiotemporal parameters during the “how” phase of 
movement generation may be biased by approach-avoidance tendencies. Deciding to fight 
off an attacker is not enough for successful behaviour. The vigour with which we fight off 
the attacker will determine the success of the outcome. Indeed, emotional approach-
avoidance tendencies may affect the vigour with which execute our actions. No work has 
previously addressed whether vigour is influenced by response tendencies. If vigour is 
biased it would demonstrate that such tendencies do not only bias action selection, but also 
influence the planning of the spatiotemporal parameters, thus suggesting that such 
tendencies have the capacity to influence distinct motor stages.  
A fundamental property of behaviour is not only to execute accurate responses to 
emotional stimuli, but to also suppress inappropriate actions that may be detrimental. In 
Chapter Five, two experiments were conducted to examine whether our tendencies to 
approach and avoid emotional stimuli also influence our ability to inhibit our actions. 
Inhibiting a planned approach action to pet a friendly dog, for example, is necessary in order 
to avoid getting bitten if the dog has turned aggressive. Response inhibition is influenced by 
the competing “go” and “stop” processes. These processes are in turn influenced by the 
speed of action preparation. Thus, inhibition is a measure of movement preparation. 
Because approach-avoidance tendencies are assumed to be prepared faster than other 
response alternatives, inhibiting such tendencies may be harder. Whether this is the case is 
currently unknown.  
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Lastly, Chapter Six further explores the effect of approach-avoidance tendencies on 
action execution, but focuses on their ability to influence the re-planning of actions in the 
face of changing environments to accommodate new goals and ensure successful behaviour 
(Goodale et al., 1986; Desmurget et al., 1999). The updating of motor plans as actions are 
executed may rely on two mechanisms: a fast and a slow pathway. The fast pathway allows 
for the early and automatic adjustment of an effector, whereas the slow pathway allows for 
later and less automatic adjustments that under top-down control (Day & Lyon, 2000). The 
interaction of these pathways with emotional stimuli remains undetermined. To this end 
three experiments investigated the influence of emotional stimuli and approach-avoidance 
tendencies on reaching trajectories.  
 
 
 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Two 
53 
 
 
2.  Chapter Two. Emotional valence and contextual 
affordances flexibly shape approach-avoidance 
movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is a modified version of Saraiva, A.C, Schuur, F & Bestmann, S. (2013) 
Emotional valence and contextual affordances flexibly shape approach-avoidance 
movements. Frontiers in Psychology: Emotion Science.  
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2.1. Abstract  
Behaviour is influenced by the emotional content – or valence – of stimuli in our 
environment. Positive stimuli facilitate approach, whereas negative stimuli facilitate 
defensive actions such as avoidance (flight) and attack (fight). Facilitation of approach or 
avoidance movements may also be influenced by whether it is the self that moves relative 
to a stimulus (self-reference) or the stimulus that moves relative to the self (object-
reference), adding flexibility and context-dependence to behaviour. Alternatively, 
facilitation of approach avoidance movements may happen in a predefined and muscle-
specific way, whereby arm flexion is faster to approach positive (e.g. flexing the arm brings a 
stimulus closer) and arm extension faster to avoid negative stimuli (e.g. extending the arm 
moves the stimulus away). While this allows for relatively fast responses, it may 
compromise the flexibility offered by contextual influences. This experiment investigates 
under which conditions approach-avoidance actions are influenced by contextual factors 
(i.e. reference-frame). The reference-frame in which actions occurred was manipulated by 
asking participants to move a symbolic manikin (representing the self) towards or away 
from a positive or negative stimulus, and move a stimulus towards or away from the 
manikin. The type of movements used to approach or avoid in each reference were also 
controlled for. The results show that the reference-frame influences approach-avoidance 
actions to emotional stimuli, and additionally show muscle-specificity for negative stimuli in 
self-reference contexts. Speculatively, this muscle-specificity may be a fast and adaptive 
response to threatening stimuli. The results confirm that approach-avoidance behaviour is 
flexible and reference-frame dependent, but can be muscle-specific depending on the 
context and valence of the stimulus. Reference-frame and stimulus-evaluation are key 
factors in guiding approach-avoidance behaviour towards emotional stimuli in our 
environment, and are determinants of how action selection occurs in emotional 
environments. 
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2.2. Introduction 
Selecting appropriate actions in response to emotional stimuli is crucial for 
successful social and emotional interaction. For example, while it seems safe to approach 
and sit next to a smiling stranger on the bus, one should avoid a potentially dangerous scene 
of disturbance on the street. Indeed, emotions are thought to be fundamental 
predispositions for action (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 1986; James, 1884): positive stimuli 
facilitate approach, whereas negative stimuli facilitate avoidance (e.g. withdrawal and 
escape) (Bradley et al., 2001; Lang & Bradley, 2010). 
Approach and avoidance behaviour may not be only shaped by the valence of the 
stimulus, but also by the context in which behaviour occurs (common-coding account; Eder 
& Klauer, 2009; Eder & Rothermund, 2008). More specifically, behaviour may be influenced 
by whether the environment requires us to move ourselves towards or away from an 
emotional stimulus (self-reference) or whether it requires us to move the emotional 
stimulus towards or away from ourselves (object-reference). Moreover, both arm extension 
and flexion can be used to approach or avoid: we can extend our arm to pet a puppy, or 
alternatively flex our arm to bring the puppy closer to us. Similarly, we can flex our arm to 
move away from a spider but also extend our arm to chip that spider away from us. Thus, to 
achieve the same behavioural goal, actions conducted in a self-reference frame are opposite 
to the ones conducted in an object-reference frame. This suggests that the reference-frame 
may determine which actions are coded as “approach” and “avoidance”. In the self-
reference frame, for example, arm flexion may be coded as an avoidance action and would 
subsequently be facilitated upon negative stimulus evaluation. In the object-reference 
frame, by contrast, arm flexion may be coded as an approach action and, following stimulus 
evaluation, would be facilitated by a positive stimulus. Viewed in this way, the reference-
frame may determine the “affordance of an action” (Gibson, 1977): flexion can elicit 
avoidance in a self-reference frame, whereas in an object-reference frame the same 
movement allows for approach.  
An alternative suggestion is that specific movements may automatically be facilitated 
to approach or avoid emotional stimuli upon (conscious or non-conscious) stimulus 
evaluation (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Duckworth et al., 2002). This suggestion will be referred to 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Two 
56 
 
as the “muscle-specific” account. Accordingly, we should be faster at flexing our arm to 
bring a positive stimulus closer to us (e.g., a puppy) and faster at extending our arm to push 
away a negative stimulus (e.g., a spider; Caccioppo et al., 1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999) 
independently of the context. Such automaticity would suggest a close but rigid relationship 
between emotional stimuli, selective muscle recruitment, and approach-avoidance 
behaviour, which may be a hard-wired process that bypasses conscious awareness of the 
encountered stimuli (Lang & Bradley, 2010). This may allow for faster responses, but 
compromises the flexibility offered by contextual influences. To understand how contextual 
factors may allow for flexible actions therefore requires controlling for the presence of 
muscle-specificity within each reference-frame.  
Evidence for the common-coding account has been substantial (Bamford & Ward, 
2008; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Proctor & Zhang, 2010; Seibt 
et al., 2008; see Table 2.1). To demonstrate movement flexibility, studies have varied either 
the reference-frame (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Seibt et al., 2008) or the arm movements 
required to approach and avoid (e.g. flexion vs. extension to approach; Markman & Brendl, 
2005; Proctor & Zhang, 2010), but never both. Similarly, other work supporting the 
common-coding account suggested that when the self approaches and avoids, behaviour is 
a goal-dependent mechanism rather than muscle-specific (Bamford & Ward, 2008), but in 
this work there was no manipulation of neither the reference-frame nor movement type. 
Manipulation of both factors, however, is required to test for movement flexibility within 
each reference-frame. Studies in support of the muscle-specific account (Duckworth et al., 
2002; Roelofs et al., 2009) did not manipulate the reference-frame or movement type either 
(for an overview of studies on approach and avoidance and the experimental factors 
included in their designs, see Table 2.1) and could not reveal muscle-specificity in different 
contexts.  
To investigate the extent of flexible movement facilitation for approach-avoidance 
within each reference-frame and how this may explain action selection in emotional 
situations, one needs to demonstrate that within each reference-frame there is facilitation 
of a variety of movements and that one type of movement (e.g. flexion) is not per se faster 
than another (e.g. extension) when approaching and avoiding stimuli. Studies showing that 
approach and avoidance of emotional stimuli is influenced by the reference-frame, for 
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example, only included specific subsets of flexion and extension movements to approach or 
avoid emotional stimuli. In Lavender & Hommel (2007), subjects always made an extension 
when the self moved towards (approached) and always made a flexion when the self moved 
away from (avoided) emotional stimuli. Similarly, in Seibt et al. (2008), in the self-reference 
frame condition subjects pushed (extended) a joystick to move towards and pulled (flexed) 
to move away from a stimulus. Essentially, both studies assumed that specific arm 
movements are naturally facilitated in self-reference situations, namely arm extension when 
the self approaches, and flexion when the self avoids. No direct comparison was made with 
flexion movements for approach and extension movements for avoidance within a self-
reference frame, which is essential to eliminate any potential confounds with the 
biophysical properties of the arm.  
The direct comparison of movements to approach and avoid emotional stimuli has 
only been conducted in an object-reference frame, in which both flexion and extension 
movements were facilitated when moving a stimulus closer to and away from a reference 
on the screen (Markman & Brendl, 2005; Proctor & Zhang, 2010; van Dantzig, Zeelenberg, & 
Pecher, 2009). It remains undetermined whether this flexible facilitation of flexion and 
extension movements extends to the self-reference frame (i.e. when the self moves towards 
or away from stimuli). Directly comparing different reference-frames allows one to 
distinguish how different interchangeable contexts affect approach-avoidance. This crucial 
manipulation is essential to reveal the extent of movement flexibility within different 
contexts and to determine how action selection in emotional contexts occurs.  
In contrast to previous studies (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010; 
Lavender & Hommel, 2007; van Dantzig et al., 2008), the current study looked at 
participants’ reaction times for positive and negative stimuli separately. Approach-
avoidance behaviour occurs in response to the valence of the stimuli in our environment. 
That is, approach is typically linked to positive and avoidance is typically linked to negative 
valences. However, negative stimuli are known to facilitate various defensive actions such as 
escape or attack (Lang & Bradley, 2010), which are not necessarily linked to avoidance (i.e. 
moving away from the stimulus). Thus, given that negative stimuli can trigger a variety of 
defensive actions, it may be possible that negative stimuli do not only facilitate avoidance. 
To demonstrate the how approach and avoidance is influenced by emotional stimuli, 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Two 
58 
 
reaction times were analysed for both valences separately. Questionnaires were also 
administered that would help determine any subjective influences on our reaction times. 
Factors such as personality and motivational traits may influence the subjective 
interpretation of various emotional stimuli, and consequently determine approach and 
avoidance behaviour (Elliot & Thrash, 2010).  
 
Paper 
Manipulation type 
Reference-
frame 
Movement type (flex/ext) Valence RT  
Chen & Bargh, 
1999 
No – object-
reference only 
No – Flexion to approach, extension to avoid No – averages RTs 
across valences 
Markman & 
Brendl 2005 
No – object-
reference only 
Yes – Both flexion and extension movements 
were made for approaching and avoiding 
Yes  
Lavender & 
Hommel 2007 
No – self-
reference only   
No – Flexion to approach, extension to avoid  No  
Eder & 
Rothermund 
2008 
 
No  
Yes – Both flexion and extension movements 
made for approaching and avoiding - not 
directly compared within the same 
experiment 
 
No  
 
Seibt et al. 
2008 
Yes – both 
reference-
frames  
No – Flexion to approach, extension to avoid 
in the object-reference; extension to approach 
and flexion to avoid in the self-reference  
Yes  
Bamford & 
Ward, 2008 
Yes – self-
reference only  
No – extension to approach and avoid  Yes 
Van Dantzig, 
Zeelenberg & 
Pecher, 2009 
No – Object-
reference only  
Yes - Both flexion and extension movements 
were made for approaching and avoiding 
Yes 
Krielgmeyer 
et al. 2010 
No – self-
reference only  
No – No flexion or extension was executed No  
Proctor & 
Zhang 2010  
No – object-
reference only  
Yes - Both flexion and extension movements 
were made for approaching and avoiding 
Yes 
Current 
experiment  
Yes – both 
reference-
frames 
Yes - Both flexion and extension movements 
were made for approaching and avoiding 
Yes  
Table 2.1. Overview of studies supporting the muscle-specific vs. common-coding accounts. The table 
summarises the experimental factors included in previous approach-avoidance studies. Studies included depict 
situations in which the self moves towards or away from a stimulus, or a stimulus is moved towards or away 
from the self, irrespective of the requirement to move a symbolic self/object on a screen. Reference-frame: 
Was a manipulation of reference-frame included? In the self-reference frame, the self always moves towards 
or away from an emotional stimulus. In the object-reference frame, an emotional object is always moved 
towards or away from the self. Movement type: Were flexion movements made to approach and avoid, and 
extension movements made to approach and avoid emotional stimuli, or was a predefined set of movements 
used? Valence influences on RT: Was the relative influence of positive and negative valences on RTs assessed?  
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No study, to the best of my knowledge, has directly compared the effects of 
different movement types within different reference-frames on approach-avoidance 
behaviour to investigate the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on the speed of 
action selection and initiation (see Table 2.1; current experiment). Combining these three 
factors within the same experimental design is key for understanding the individual 
contributions of reference-frame, movement type and valence and, of any interactions 
between them, to the selection of approach and avoidance actions. The manipulation of 
reference-frame allows for observing contextual influences on the speed of selection and 
initiation of approach-avoidance actions. Similarly, the manipulation of movement type 
controls for the potential presence of muscle-specificity within different reference-frames. 
And the manipulation of valence allows us to demonstrate the individual contribution of 
each valence to approach-avoidance. This design therefore allows us to uncover interactions 
other work has not been able to show, for example, muscle specificity within one reference-
frame for one type of valence only; only full factorial designs can uncover interaction 
effects. 
A design that incorporated two different arm movements (flexion/extension) used to 
approach or avoid, varied the reference-frame in which these movements occurred, and 
balanced the valence of the emotional stimuli that had to be approached or avoided was 
employed. To this end, a novel paradigm was devised which combined two tasks commonly 
used to study approach-avoidance behaviour: the manikin task (De Houwer et al. 2001) and 
the joystick task (Chen & Bargh, 1999). This combination improves previous versions of the 
manikin task (De Houwer et al., 2001; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010) in that the movement of the 
symbolic manikin on the screen is actually linked to arm flexion and extension, which is 
crucial for the goal of this study. This allows participants to see the behavioural 
consequences of their actions, as either a decrease or increase in the distance between the 
self and the emotional stimulus. Furthermore, it controls for the possibility that apparent 
movement facilitation can be due to the specific biophysical constraints of different arm 
movements: some movements may be more difficult to execute than others. Finally, the 
reference-frame was manipulated by moving the symbolic manikin towards or away from a 
stimulus or a stimulus towards or away from the manikin. This design allowed manipulating 
the reference-frame (self vs. object) and movement type (extension vs. flexion) 
independently.  
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If the common-coding account holds true, reference-frame should flexibly influence 
facilitation of approach-avoidance movements (i.e. the consequences of stimulus evaluation 
determines whether we approach or avoid) and the specific movements that are facilitated 
(i.e. both flexion and extension can be used to approach and avoidance within the particular 
context). That is, the common-coding account predicts an interaction of the reference-
frame, stimulus valence and approach-avoidance actions. In contrast, the muscle-specific 
account predicts an interaction of movement type with stimulus valence (i.e. specific actions 
will be activated by emotional stimuli to achieve faster approach or avoidance). That is, 
participants should pull faster to approach positive and push faster to avoid negative 
stimuli, irrespective of the reference-frame. Possible interaction effects occurring between 
the reference-frame, movement type and valence were predicted, which previous work had 
not been able to reveal. 
In brief, the current work aimed to determine how actions to approach and avoid 
emotional stimuli are selected, and whether automatic approach-avoidance tendencies 
influence the speed of action selection and initiation in emotional contexts. The data shows 
that the reference-frame influences which actions are facilitated to approach and avoid, and 
also determine the speed at which we approach and avoid emotional stimuli, in line with 
previous findings. There was no evidence of muscle-specificity in object-reference 
conditions. In contrast, in the self-reference evidence of movement flexibility for positive 
stimuli and muscle-specificity for negative stimuli was found. Novel, albeit speculative, 
evidence that negative (threatening) stimuli have the capacity of triggering a variety of 
defensive actions in a fast and efficient manner is provided. Flexible selection of approach-
avoidance actions is dependent on the reference-frame.  
 
2.3. Methods 
 
2.3.1. Participants  
28 healthy volunteers (mean age = 25.7 ± 5.95 S.D. years; 17 female) were recruited 
from the University College London Psychology database, with local ethics approval (UCL). 
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All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects gave written informed 
consent to participate in the study, and received monetary compensation for their time and 
travel (10£/h). Two participants were excluded from the analysis for having a total number 
of errors above 2 S.D.’s from the population mean for self and object references. Picture 
ratings from one subject were missing and the subject was excluded from the questionnaire 
correlation analysis. Overall, 26 subjects were included in the main analysis and 25 subjects 
were used in the picture ratings analysis and questionnaire correlations analysis. 
 
2.3.2. Stimuli and Apparatus 
220 pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang et al., 2008): 110 negative pictures (e.g. gang violence, mutilated bodies) with valences 
1.8-3.8 (1.8 = most negative), and 110 positive pictures (e.g. babies, families) with valences 
6.2-8.2 (8.2 = most positive). All pictures (maximum 240 x 180 pixels) were matched for 
luminance. Pictures differed in their arousal ratings, which was addressed in the analyses. 
Pictures depicting only humans or animals were included as they are believed to represent 
what most humans interact with on a daily basis. The assignment of pictures in each of the 8 
blocks and order of presentation was randomised for each subject. Block order was 
randomised per subject such that no two subjects had the same sequence of block 
instructions or same sequence of pictures in each block. Each block comprised of 110 trials 
(55 positive/negative). In total, for each reference-frame, there were 110 repetitions for 
each experimental condition.  
All stimuli were presented on an 19 inch LCD monitor of a Dell Optiplex-780 
computer (refresh rate: 60 Hz), using the Cogent 2000 toolbox (University College London, 
http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.html) and MATLAB (v.7.9.1.705; The 
MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA). A white manikin (2.8 x 1.9 cm) represented the self. A small 
yellow circle (1.3 x 1.2 cm) representing the “away” target was presented at the edge of the 
screen on the same side as manikin presentation. This “away” target was presented purely 
for guidance purposes when subjects had to move away. The manikin or picture stimuli 
were moved smoothly on the screen using a home-made analogue joystick connected to a 
CED1401 (Cambridge Electronic Design) machine. Joystick data were recorded using a 
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CED1401-MATLAB interface (matced32; Cambridge Electronic Design) between MATLAB and 
the data acquisition device.  
 
2.3.3. Experimental Procedure & Design 
One experimental session was conducted for each reference-frame, in a counter-
balanced order, and each session was separated by at least one day. At the start of the 
experiment, participants completed 3 questionnaires: the Big Five Personality Inventory 
(BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), the Behavioural Activation and Inhibition Scales 
(BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994) and the Fear Survey Schedule (FSS-III; Wolpe & Lang, 1964). 
Participants then sat in front of a computer at a distance of approximately 50 cm with the 
joystick fixed to the table on the right-hand side. They were instructed to imagine that the 
manikin represented themselves on the screen.  
In the self-reference condition, participants moved a manikin (the self) on the screen 
towards or away from an emotional picture. Previous work has shown that participants can 
represent themselves on a computer screen when moving positive or negative stimuli 
towards or away from their own names (Markman & Brendl, 2005). Here, the subject is 
represented on the screen by means of a symbolic manikin, which has produced reliable 
approach-avoidance effects (De Houwer et al. 2001; Krieglmeyer et al. 2010; Krieglmeyer & 
Deutsch, 2010). Trials started with a fixation cross presented in the centre of the screen 
(500 ms), followed by both the fixation cross and the manikin (500 ms), which was 
presented pseudo-randomly either above or below fixation (Figure 2.1A). Central fixation 
was then replaced by a picture (max. 2000 ms, or until the respective target was reached). 
The inter-trial-interval was 500 ms. Within this condition, two types of blocks occurred, each 
repeated four times. In congruent blocks (approach-positive, avoid-negative) participants 
were instructed to move the manikin towards positive pictures and away from negative 
pictures, as fast and as accurately as possible upon picture presentation. In incongruent 
blocks (approach-negative, avoid-positive) participants had to move towards negative and 
away from positive pictures. The starting position of the manikin (above or below) 
determined the type of movement that was executed to approach and avoid. When the 
manikin was located above, subjects had to pull to approach and push to avoid. When the 
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manikin was located below, subjects had to push to approach and pull to avoid. Therefore, 
both approach and avoidance could be achieved by either pulling or pushing, depending on 
the starting position of the manikin.  
 
Figure 2.1. Illustration of the task. A) Self-reference condition: A manikin was presented either above or below 
an emotional picture. Participants moved the manikin towards or away from the picture depending on the 
block. In congruent blocks (approach-positive, avoid-negative) participants were instructed to move the 
manikin with a joystick towards positive pictures and away from negative pictures, as fast as possible upon 
picture presentation. In incongruent blocks (approach-negative, avoid-positive) participants had to move 
towards negative and away from positive pictures. B) Object-reference condition: An emotional picture was 
presented either above or below a manikin. Participants moved the emotional picture towards or away from 
the manikin depending on the block. Participants were instructed to move positive pictures towards and 
negative pictures away from the manikin (congruent blocks), or move negative pictures towards and positive 
pictures away from the manikin (incongruent blocks). For both reference-frames, the direction of movement 
determined whether subjects had to make a pull or a push to approach and avoid.  
 
In the object-reference condition, participants moved an emotional picture (object) 
towards or away from a centrally presented manikin. Trials started with the central fixation 
cross (500 ms), followed by both the fixation and a blue square that was pseudo-randomly 
presented above or below fixation (500 ms; Figure 2.1B). Subsequently, the central fixation 
was replaced by the manikin and the blue square was replaced by the picture (max. 2000 
ms, or until the target was reached). Participants were instructed to move positive pictures 
towards and negative pictures away from the manikin (congruent blocks), or move negative 
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pictures towards and positive pictures away from the manikin (incongruent blocks). Here, 
the starting position of the picture also determined the type of movement that subjects had 
to execute to approach or avoid.  
Congruency thus refers to whether the goal of approaching or avoiding was 
congruent with the valence (i.e. approach positive and avoid negative pictures). Movement 
type refers to whether a pull or a push was executed to approach and avoid the emotional 
stimulus.  
For each reference-frame session, participants completed two training blocks of 30 
trials each, one for congruent and one for incongruent movements, before the main 
experiment to familiarise themselves with the task. For training, a different set of 60 
pictures (30 negative/positive) was used. Participants rated the valence of all the pictures at 
the end of the second experimental session on a scale of 1 to 9 (1 = most negative; 9 = most 
positive). They did not provide arousal ratings.  
 
2.3.4. Data Analyses  
Reaction times (RT; time from picture onset to joystick movement onset) and 
movement times (MT; time from movement onset to completion of the movement, i.e. 
reaching the target area) were measured as dependent variables. Joystick data were 
recorded in XY-coordinates and RTs were calculated based on vertical y-axis coordinate 
deviations (over 10 coordinates) from trial baseline. The baseline was recorded while the 
manikin remained stationary prior to the appearance of the picture.  
RTs determine the timing of action initiation and give an idea of how quickly 
processing takes place. Thus, it should reveal the speed of selection of approach-avoidance 
actions. In contrast, MTs determine the speed of action execution and therefore informs us 
of any effects of approach-avoidance tendencies on online motor planning and action 
execution.     
All trials in which the movement did not match the instructions (e.g., avoiding when 
instructed to approach negative images; 10.2% of trials), with RTs below 100 ms (0.6%) or 
exceeding 2000 ms (3.8%) were excluded from analyses. Outlier RTs (2.5%) were calculated 
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per block for each subject using Grubb’s test (α = 0.05) and were excluded. Across both 
experimental sessions, 17.1% of trials were excluded.  
A 2x2x2x2 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA (rm-ANOVA) with factors 
Reference-Frame (self vs. object) x Movement type (pull vs. push) x Congruency (congruent 
vs. incongruent) x Valence (positive vs. negative) for both RT and MT analyses was 
conducted. For all analyses, partial 

2 is reported as a measure of effect size. For all 
significant results, statistical threshold was fixed at 0.05. Significant interactions were 
followed-up using two-tailed paired-sample t-tests. Mean RTs are reported in brackets, ±1 
standard error of the mean (SEM). For questionnaire correlations, a 2-tailed bivariate 
Pearson correlation was used and corrected for multiple comparisons. All RTs and MTs are 
in milliseconds.  
To analyse the effect of arousal on RTs, a multiple regression was conducted for each 
condition with dependent variable RT and independent variables valence and arousal for 
each participant separately. A 4-way RM-ANOVA was subsequently computed on the beta 
coefficients obtained from the multiple regression with factors Reference-Frame (self vs. 
object) x Variable type (valence vs. arousal) x Movement direction (approach vs. avoid) x 
Movement type (pull vs. push). The beta coefficients were taken as an indication of which of 
the independent variables (valence or arousal) had a greater impact on the RTs.  
 
2.4. Results  
 
2.4.1. Speed of movement initiation: Reaction times 
The 4-way RM-ANOVA yielded a 4-way interaction across all four factor types (Ref.-
Frame*Congruency*Valence*Movement type, F(1,25) = 33.31, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.57). All other 
interactions were qualified by this 4-way interaction, and therefore only follow-up statistics 
are reported for the breakdown of this 4-way interaction. The 4-way interaction was split 
and analysed separately for each Reference-Frame (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2. Mean reaction times (RTs) 
for each reference-frame. A) Object-
reference condition: RTs did not differ 
when pulling or pushing to approach 
and avoid. B) Self-reference condition: 
RTs were significantly faster for pulling 
to avoid and pushing to approach 
negative pictures. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); 
blue bars = pull; red bars = push. * = 
significant at p < 0.05 level.  
 
 
 
Follow-up analyses for the object-reference yielded a 3-way interaction 
(Congruency*Valence*Movement type, F(1,25) = 5.62, p = 0.026, ηp
2 = 0.18). Paired t-tests did 
not reveal any significant differences between making push and pull movements when 
avoiding and approaching emotional pictures (Figure 2.2A). The 3-way interaction was 
mainly driven by a Congruency*Valence interaction (F(1,25) = 10.09, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.29) 
which revealed a congruency effect for positive and negative valence, regardless of the type 
of movement made to achieve the required behaviour (Figure 2.3B). Reaction times were 
faster when approaching (655 ± 21 ms) compared to avoiding (703 ± 23 ms) positive 
pictures (t(25) = -5.18, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.05), and were marginally faster at avoiding 
(671 ± 24 ms) compared to approaching (692 ± 24 ms) negative pictures (t(25) = -1.78, p = 
0.087, Cohen’s d = -0.35). Furthermore, approaching was faster for positive compared to 
negative pictures (t(25) = -3.38, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = -0.69), and avoidance was faster for 
negative relative to positive pictures (t(25) = -2.62, p = 0.015, Cohen’s d = -0.52). 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Two 
67 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean reaction times (RTs) for each reference-frame collapsed across pull and push movements. 
A) Self-reference condition: RTs were significantly faster when participants approached compared to avoiding 
positive pictures. Avoidance was faster for negative relative to positive pictures. B) Object-reference condition: 
RTs were significantly faster for approaching than avoiding positive pictures and marginally significantly faster 
when avoiding compared to approaching negative pictures. Approach was faster for positive relative to 
negative pictures and avoidance was faster for negative relative to positive pictures. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); 
light blue bars = congruent; dark blue bars = incongruent. ** = significant at p < 0.001 level, * = = significant at 
p < 0.001 level; # = marginally significant. 
 
Follow-up analyses for the self-reference (Figure 2.2B) also yielded a 3-way 
interaction (Congruency*Valence*Movement type, F(1,25) = 52.00, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.42). In 
contrast to the object-reference, paired t-tests revealed differences between push and pull 
movements for negative pictures only. Avoidance was faster when subjects pulled (665 ± 23 
ms) than pushed negative pictures (681 ± 22 ms) (t(25) = -2.26, p = 0.032, Cohen’s d = -0.46). 
Similarly, approach was faster when subjects pushed (658 ± 23 ms) than pulled negative 
pictures (678 ± 26 ms) (t(25) = 3.61, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.76). No other significant 
differences were found. Therefore, this interaction was mainly driven by differences 
between the valences, but also by differences between pushing and pulling negative 
pictures.  
For the self-reference there was also a significant 2-way interaction between 
Congruency*Valence, F(1,25) = 61.79, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.71) which showed a congruency effect 
for positive pictures (Fig 2.3A). Approaching was faster (639 ± 20 ms) compared to avoiding 
(703 ± 23 ms) positive stimuli, irrespective of the required action (t(25) = -4.81, p < 0.001, 
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Cohen’s d = -0.97). A congruency effect for negative pictures was not observed (avoid: 673 ± 
23 ms, approach: 668 ± 25 ms, n.s). Thus, participants were equally fast in approaching or 
avoiding negative pictures, independently of the required movement. Additionally, avoiding 
was faster for negative than positive pictures (t(25) = -2.26, p = 0.032, Cohen’s d = -0.52). 
Approach was marginally faster for positive than negative (t(25) = -2.01, p = 0.055, Cohen’s d 
= -0.42).  
Overall, the speed of action selection and initiation appeared to be influenced by 
valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies. Importantly, action selection of response 
tendencies was influenced by whether it was the self moving towards the emotional 
stimulus, or the emotional stimulus moving towards the self, indicating an effect of context 
on action selection.  
 
2.4.2. Speed of action execution: Movement times 
Action execution was also influenced by the reference-frame and the type of 
movement made. Analysis of the MTs revealed a 4-way interaction (Ref.-
Frame*Congruency*Valence*Movement type, F(1,25) = 10.76, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.30). This 
interaction was analysed separately for each Reference-Frame.  
In the object-reference (Figure 2.4A), the 3-way rm-ANOVA (with factors Congruency, 
Valence and Movement type) revealed a 2-way interaction Congruency*Valence (F(1,25) = 
12.12, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.33). MTs were faster when avoiding (185 ± 12 ms) compared to 
approaching (219 ± 16 ms) negative pictures (t(25) = -3.84, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.85). 
Similarly, MTs for avoiding positive pictures (190 ± 13 ms) were faster than approaching 
(210 ± 16 ms), (t(25) = 2.08, p = 0.048, Cohen’s d = 0.41). Importantly, these effects occurred 
independently of the type of movement made. Thus, subjects were not only faster to 
initiate avoidance compared to approach when negative pictures were presented (as seen in 
the RTs) but they were also faster to move the picture away once the movement had been 
initiated. However, the result for positive pictures is difficult to interpret since RTs were 
faster for approach compared to avoidance, but subjects were faster at moving a positive 
picture away than towards. 
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In the self-reference (Figure 2.4B), follow-up analyses revealed a 3-way interaction 
(Congruency*Valence*Movement type, F(1,25) = 23.10, p < 0.000, ηp
2 = 0.48). This interaction 
was split into each Congruency. For Congruent trials, pulling to approach positive pictures 
was faster than pushing (pull: 152 ± 14 ms; push: 165 ± 13 ms; t(25) = -2.44, p = 0.022, 
Cohen’s d = -0.47). Differences between pushing and pulling to avoid negative pictures were 
not significant. For Incongruent trials, pulling to approach negative pictures was faster than 
pushing (pull: 154 ± 12 ms; push: 174 ± 14 ms; t(25) = -3.30, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = -0.74). 
Differences between pushing and pulling to avoid positive pictures were not significant. 
Thus, in situations where participants had to approach valenced stimuli, pulling was always 
faster than pushing. However, these differences for pulling or pushing movements to 
approach were the same for both valences, as revealed by paired sample t-tests. In contrast, 
when participants had to avoid both valences, there were no differences between 
movements. This highlights that without appropriate control, MTs can potentially be 
explained by the biophysical properties of the arm rather than by the content of the 
stimulus. In sum, valence did not affect action execution when the self was approaching or 
avoiding (see also (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.4. Mean movement times 
(MTs) for each reference-frame.  
A) Object-reference condition: MTs 
did not differ when pulling or 
pushing to approach and avoid 
albeit MTs to avoid were faster 
than to approach both valences. B) 
Self-reference condition: MTs were 
significantly faster for pulling to 
approach both positive and 
negative pictures. There were no 
significant differences in MT to 
approach or avoid both valences. 
Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); blue bars = 
pull; red bars = push. * = significant 
at < 0.05 level. 
 
 Overall, context appeared to influence the speed of action execution. When the 
emotional stimulus moved towards or away from the self, execution was faster when 
avoiding than approaching, irrespective of valence. When participants moved the self 
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towards or away from the emotional stimulus, approaching was faster than avoiding 
irrespective of valence. Thus, it appears as though context influenced the execution of 
actions but approach-avoidance tendencies did not.  
 
2.4.3. Individual picture ratings and arousal  
Subjects may differ in their perception of emotional stimuli, which may affect 
individual RTs. For this reason, the data was re-analysed using participants’ subjective 
picture ratings instead of the IAPS ratings. A 4-way rm-ANOVA identical to that computed 
for the main RT analysis above revealed the same 3-way interaction (Ref.-
Frame*Congruency*Valence, F(1,24) = 28.89, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.55). Follow-up ANOVA’s 
yielded the same results as the main analysis above. Therefore, results were no different 
from the IAPS ratings.  
Similarly, because emotional pictures also elicit arousal (i.e. intensity of activation; 
Lang & Bradley, 2010) the analysis examined whether RT effects could be explained by 
arousal rather than valence. Arousal ratings were taken from the IAPS. Average arousal 
rating for positive pictures was 5 and for negative pictures 5.7. The 4-way rm-ANOVA 
revealed an effect of the variable type (valence vs. arousal) on approach and avoidance (2-
way interaction Variable type*Movement direction, F(1,25) = 10.80, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.30). A 
positive correlation between valence and avoidance and a negative correlation between 
valence and approach was expected. Indeed, it was found that beta coefficients were 
significantly higher in the valence-avoidance (0.13 ± 0.03) compared to the valence-
approach (-0.09 ± 0.06) conditions (t(25) = 3.002, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.19). Arousal-
avoidance was not significantly higher than arousal-approach. Thus, the arousal associated 
with the emotional stimuli did not influence the results.  
 
2.4.4. Questionnaire correlations  
Some research has suggested that approach-avoidance tendencies may be 
influenced by motivation and personality traits (Elliot, 2006; Elliot & Thrash, 2010). As such, 
the analysis tested whether personality traits, motivational states, and fear levels correlate 
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with participants’ individual picture ratings and RTs for approach-avoidance. Positive 
questionnaire items (BAS drive, fun seeking, reward responsiveness; BFI factor Extraversion) 
were correlated with ratings and RTs for positive pictures. Positive picture ratings and 
Extraversion correlated with each other (r = 0.54, n = 25, p = 0.005) indicating that more 
extroverted individuals rate stimuli more positively compared to those with low 
extraversion. Thus, more optimism is related to increased positive evaluation of emotional 
stimuli, compared to participants with a more pessimistic outlook. No other questionnaire 
ratings correlated with RTs for approaching positive stimuli. This may be because 
extraversion relates to affective experience (e.g. being outgoing or sociable), whereas 
approach is related to a broader range of biologically relevant emotional stimuli. Similarly, 
no correlations were found for BAS items because they are mainly elicited by reward 
associated social situations (Elliot & Thrash, 2010). Negative questionnaire items (BIS; BFI 
factor Neuroticism; FSS-III (fear) items were correlated with ratings and RTs for negative 
pictures. There was a correlation trend between Neuroticism and Fear, (r = 0.46, n = 25, p = 
0.021), but was not significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. No other 
correlations were observed. Overall, personality traits, social motivational states and fear 
levels did not impact on approach-avoidance behaviour.  
 
2.5. Discussion 
The selection of approach-avoidance actions to emotional stimuli may be flexibly 
influenced by the context in which behaviour occurs or be rigidly determined by the 
activation of specific movements. To investigate how action selection in emotional 
situations occurs, an experiment was conducted comparing two different reference-frames 
and by manipulating the type of movements executed within each reference-frame. The 
results are supportive of evaluative-coding models of action selection (Lavender & Hommel, 
2007; Eder & Rothermund, 2008), whereby the context and the frame of reference 
determine approach-avoidance goals that will subsequently influence action selection.  
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Reference-frame facilitates different actions for approach and avoidance  
Results show that the reference-frame influences the facilitation of flexion and 
extension movements to approach or avoid emotional stimuli, indicating an effect on action 
selection. When the self had to move towards or away from a positive stimulus (self-
reference), results were incompatible with a muscle-specific account: when approaching 
positive pictures, pulling was not faster than pushing, and vice versa. Thus, this work shows 
support for the common-coding account and confirms previous studies (Bamford & Ward, 
2008; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Markman & Brendl, 2005a; 
Proctor & Zhang, 2010; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004; Seibt et al., 2008).  
In contrast, novel evidence of muscle-specificity for negative pictures was found. 
When the self avoided negative pictures, pulling was faster than pushing, and when the self 
approached negative pictures, pushing was faster than pulling. Thus, defensive behaviour 
facilitated specific movements when the self moved either towards or away from a negative 
stimulus. This supports previous work that push movements are faster when the self 
approaches a stimulus (e.g. a puppy), whereas pulling is faster for avoidance of a stimulus 
(e.g. a spider) (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Seibt et al., 2008; Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 
2000). Importantly, this effect is opposite to that proposed by the muscle-specific account, 
namely that flexion is faster for approach and extension is faster for avoidance. It is 
therefore the context that determines which actions are facilitated. The muscle-specificity 
of approaching and avoiding negative pictures supports the existence of a fast-acting and 
automatic response mechanism to threat. Responding quicker to negative stimuli in our 
environment when the self needs to withdraw from a stimulus may have evolutionary 
advantages, and it is speculated that this muscle-specificity arises from a hard-wired, 
possibly subcortical, process (LeDoux, 2000). 
In the object-reference condition, the facilitation of actions to approach and avoid 
positive and negative stimuli was not pre-defined and muscle-specific. That is, when 
participants were required to move a stimulus towards or away from the self, there were no 
differences in initiating (RTs) and making (MTs) approach or avoidance movements, 
suggesting no influence on the selection or execution of actions. Thus, contrary to the 
predictions of the muscle-specific account, pulling was not faster than pushing to approach, 
and pushing was not faster than pulling to avoid. The results replicate and confirm those of 
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Markman & Brendl (2005) who had previously manipulated movement direction in an 
object-reference frame and demonstrated the actions to approach and avoid were not 
muscle-specific. Rotteveel & Phaf (2004) had also previously shown that although approach 
and avoidance were faster for positive and negative faces, respectively, such behaviour was 
not automatically dependent on flexion or extension movements. Similarly, Eder & 
Rothermund (2008) suggested that it is not the pull or push action made that drives 
approach-avoidance behaviour but rather the instruction that is assigned to the responses.  
 The results therefore advocate the flexibility of pull and push actions to approach 
and avoid in both reference-frames, but also demonstrate a degree of muscle-specificity 
present only in situations when the self has to respond to threat. Thus, the results confirm 
that actions to approach and avoid are not rigidly determined, as previously speculated 
(Bamford & Ward, 2008; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004; Seibt et al., 
2008). That is, when we want to chip a spider away extension is not faster than flexion and 
we want to pet a puppy or when we want to bring a puppy closer to us, extension is not 
faster than flexion. However, results also show that in some instances of threat, muscle-
specific actions can be facilitated, supporting the existence of a fast-acting defensive 
circuitry. Importantly, these effects could not be attributed to arousal or personality traits, 
confirming that approach and avoidance are valence-driven behavioural effects. 
Importantly, the results demonstrate an influence of context on the selection of approach-
avoidance actions.   
 
Reference-frame determines the affective coding of approach-avoidance actions 
 In the current experiment, approach and avoidance behaviour is shown to be 
influenced by whether it is the self that moves relative to an object or whether it is an 
object that is moved relative to the self. Thus, context determines how to approach or avoid 
emotional stimuli, and suggests an influence of context on action selection and initiation. 
While in the self-reference condition participants were faster to approach than avoid 
positive pictures, there was no difference between approaching and avoiding negative 
pictures (see also Gawronski, Deutsch, & Strack, 2005; Stins, Roelofs, et al., 2011). In 
contrast, in the object-reference condition, participants were also faster to approach than 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Two 
74 
 
avoid positive stimuli but avoidance was now faster than approach for negative pictures. 
Whereas the object-reference showed the typical avoidance pattern for negative stimuli, 
the self-reference did not. These differences indicate that, through the experimental set up, 
subjects viewed both reference-frames as being different and therefore both tasks could be 
used interchangeably. Previous studies had shown that movements made to approach and 
avoid can occur to a salient reference on the screen (Proctor & Zhang, 2010; van Dantzig et 
al., 2009). In line with previous work (Markman & Brendl, 2005), the results show that a 
symbolic self on the screen is capable of eliciting different approach-avoidance results for 
different reference-frames. It is demonstrated that directly looking at interchangeable 
approach-avoidance contexts is important to determine context-dependent approach-
avoidance effects.   
It has been previously shown that negative stimuli can trigger a variety of defensive 
actions including escape (i.e. avoidance) and attack (i.e. approach) (Lang et al. 1997; Lang & 
Bradley, 2010). The current findings reinforce this hypothesis by showing that the self can 
facilitate movements either towards or away from a negative picture with equal speed. This 
tendency may result from the fact that the set of pictures contained both fearful and violent 
scenarios, which have been classified as being the most threatening from a survival 
perspective (Bradley et al., 2001). Speculatively, the former may predominantly facilitate 
“flight” responses (i.e. the self moving away), whereas the latter may trigger “fight” 
responses (i.e. the self moving towards), which may be coded as appropriate responses to 
negative stimuli. Previous work had suggested that approach-avoidance is faster when there 
is a correspondence between the affective content and associated approach-avoidance 
response codes (e.g. positive-move towards, negative-move away; Proctor & Zhang, 2010). 
However, there is no evidence of such correspondence for negative stimuli, as moving 
towards was also coded as a negative response.     
To speculate, the specific content of the negative stimulus (e.g., fearful vs. attack) 
may determine which behaviour is facilitated (approach or avoid) and in self-reference 
contexts, the evaluation of negative stimuli may not necessarily result in avoidance. Indeed, 
recent work using whole-body movements suggests that the body approaches negative 
(attack) stimuli faster than it avoids such stimuli (Naugle et al., 2011). Similarly, faster 
avoidance has been linked to fearful faces (Seidel, Habel, Kirschner, Gur, & Derntl, 2010a), 
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and faster approach to angry faces (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Wilkowski & Meier, 
2010; though see Stins et al. 2011). Furthermore, in the self-reference frame there was no 
difference in approach or avoidance speed once the movement was initiated (MTs). This 
reinforces the crucial role of stimulus evaluation in dictating differences in approach and 
avoidance, rather than any subsequent perceptual or cognitive mechanisms that may take 
place once the movement has been initiated, supporting studies that have shown an 
“evaluative-dependency” of approach-avoidance behaviour (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; 
Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). However, this result is at odds with 
previous work which has suggested that negative stimuli automatically trigger avoidance, 
both with and without conscious evaluation of the stimulus (Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Krieglmeyer et al., 2010; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004).   
Crucially, in the self-reference frame, pulling (flexing) was faster to avoid and 
pushing (extending) was faster to approach negative stimuli, consistent with previous 
suggestions (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Wentura et al., 2000). Thus, we may not only have 
a tendency to approach and avoid negative pictures depending on their level of threat, but 
for each tendency, specific movements are facilitated in a fast and efficient manner, 
suggesting a fast-acting context-dependent defensive circuitry (LeDoux, 2000).   
Lastly, results highlight the importance of looking at approach and avoidance effects 
for positive and negative stimuli separately. Thus, previously reported approach-avoidance 
effects (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; van 
Dantzig et al., 2008) may mask important differences in reactions to valenced stimuli due to 
the practice of averaging RTs across positive and negative valences for congruent (i.e. 
approach-positive/avoid-negative) and incongruent (i.e. avoid-positive/approach-negative) 
conditions. Although previous work attempted to eliminate any confounding effect of 
stimulus evaluation on RTs by averaging across valences, the results highlight that a 
combination of stimulus evaluation and movement facilitation drive differences in RTs. This 
work raises the interesting question whether avoidance effects can be further subdivided 
according to the specific requirement for flight or fight actions in response to negative 
stimuli. Given the current results, future studies could directly address this by comparing 
approach and avoidance to pictures that have been classified as containing violent/attack 
scenarios and pictures depicting fearful stimuli.  
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In sum, the data suggest that emotional approach-avoidance tendencies influence 
the speed of action selection and initiation, and this selection is dependent on the context. 
Furthermore, the results highlight the existence of automatic (i.e. faster) approach 
tendencies when encountering a positive stimulus, and suggest the existence of automatic 
defensive actions to negative stimuli, which may involve both approach and avoidance 
depending on the type of negative stimulus encountered.    
 
Movement execution is not influenced by valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies  
 The results demonstrated an influence of emotional tendencies on the speed of 
selection of approach-avoidance actions. However, such response tendencies did not 
appear to influence the speed of action execution. There was no influence of approach and 
avoidance on how quickly actions were executed, but there was an influence of context. 
When the emotional stimulus moved relative to the self, action execution was faster when 
avoiding than approaching, whereas when the self moved relative to the stimulus the 
opposite was true. This shows an influence of context and movement type on movement 
planning and action execution. Importantly, it demonstrates a dissociation in the effect of 
approach-avoidance tendencies on action preparation and action execution, with approach-
avoidance tendencies only influencing the former.   
 
Alternative explanations 
An alternative explanation suggests that approach and avoidance is dictated by the 
subjective outcome of the action (a decrease or an increase in the distance between the self 
and the emotional stimulus), rather than by stimulus evaluations (distance regulation 
account; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The current design allowed participants to directly 
observe the outcome of their actions, and therefore show whether there was an actual 
increase or decrease in distance between the self and the stimulus. The results for negative 
pictures in the self-reference condition do not support the distance regulation account 
because in this condition the self both increased and decreased the distance This provides 
additional evidence for the evaluative nature of approach-avoidance, showing that the 
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evaluation of the content of the picture dictates the facilitated action and that this occurs 
independently of the distance change involved.   
 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the current work has shown that the reference-frame influences the 
speed of selection of approach and avoidance actions, and flexibly determines the 
facilitation of actions to approach and avoid emotional stimuli. Thus, the data support the 
common-coding account by showing that action facilitation to approach and avoid 
emotional stimuli is not pre-determined and muscle-specific. Only when the self moves 
relative to a negative (threatening) stimulus, specific movements are triggered to either 
approach or avoid, similar to a “fight or flight” response, depending on whether stimulus 
evaluation elicits attack or escape. Results therefore confirm that approach-avoidance 
behaviour is flexible and reference-frame dependent, but can be muscle-specific depending 
on the context and valence of the stimulus. Valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies 
and the context therefore are key influences on the speed of action selection and initiation. 
Importantly, such valence-related tendencies do not influence the speed of action 
execution, demonstrating a dissociation in the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies 
on different motor stages. The reference-frame and stimulus-evaluation are key factors in 
guiding approach and avoidance behaviour towards emotional stimuli in our environment.  
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3. Chapter Three. Facilitation and interference of 
approach-avoidance responses through affective 
primes 
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3.1. Abstract  
The faster preparation of action should benefit humans by allowing for the 
anticipation of potential threats or advantages in the environment. Emotional tendencies 
associated to affective cues in the environment may influence how fast action preparation 
occurs, subsequently speeding up the initiation of actions to impending affective stimuli 
(valence-trigger account). Alternatively, affective cues may bias responses according to task-
defined stimulus-response (S-R) associations, irrespective of any pre-established valence-
action mappings (action-trigger account). Here, these two accounts were directly contrasted 
to investigate how task-irrelevant primes influence action preparation, and whether this 
influence can occur implicitly. In Experiment 1, supraliminal positive and negative face 
primes preceded task-relevant affective face targets that required approach-avoid 
responses. Results showed that task-irrelevant affective primes influenced target responses 
according to task-specific instructions. In Experiment 2, the specificity of facilitation and 
interference effects was further assessed. Results showed that when compared to a 
baseline, the same prime-target valence pairings resulted in faster responses, whereas 
different prime-target pairings slowed down responses. Using the same task, Experiment 3 
presented affective primes subliminally and supraliminally to assess for implicit effects on 
preparation. There was no evidence for implicit effects of subliminal primes. In sum, 
affective primes bias the preparation of approach-avoidance actions through the task-
defined context in which these actions occur, rather than by response tendencies. The 
results therefore lend support to the action-trigger account. Importantly, this influence does 
not occur implicitly without conscious stimulus evaluation. 
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3.2. Introduction  
 
Chapter Two demonstrated that action selection and initiation is influenced by 
approach-avoidance tendencies and the reference frame. Valence-related approach-
avoidance tendencies and the emotional context therefore have an impact on the 
preparation of actions prior to the initiation of movement. This influence on preparation 
should benefit humans by allowing for the anticipation of potential threats or advantages in 
the environment. That is, affective stimuli may act as warning cues that signal, for example, 
upcoming danger (LeDoux, 1996), and may allow individuals to prepare appropriate 
responses in expectation of forthcoming emotional events (Damasio, 1994; Fijda, 1986; 
James, 1884). Upon hearing scary music in a movie, for example, one may anticipate a scary 
scene and consequently prepare to cover one’s eyes to avoid the expected negative movie 
scene. Given that valence-related response tendencies influence how quickly we select 
approach and avoidance actions prior to the initiation of movement, responses to 
impending positive or negative stimuli may occur faster if these target stimuli are preceded 
by affective cues (or primes) of the same valence (Eder & Klauer, 2009; Eder & Rothermund, 
2008; Hommel, 1998). Seemingly, a positive affective cue would prepare for approach and 
subsequently lead to a faster approach response if a positive target follows, whereas a 
negative cue would allow for faster avoidance. 
 Importantly, these emotional cues may be unintentionally processed via the 
prioritisation of emotional information (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier 
et al., 2001). It is currently unknown whether task-irrelevant emotional cues are 
unintentionally processed such that they trigger approach-avoidance tendencies to help 
prepare responses to upcoming emotional stimuli. In this chapter, preparation refers to the 
ability to anticipate the selection of actions. This anticipation of action selection would 
suggest that irrelevant emotional information in the environment may sometimes become 
relevant in order to guide appropriate and successful behaviour, demonstrating the ability 
for emotional information to have privileged access to motor processes.  
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This chapter investigated how approach-avoidance tendencies influence action 
preparation using an approach-avoidance task in which affective primes preceded affective 
target stimuli. Affective primes are stimuli that are task-irrelevant and presented briefly 
before an imperative target stimulus (i.e. a stimulus that requires a behavioural response), 
and can influence the processing of these targets (Eder et al., 2012; Klauer, 1997). Indeed, 
previous work has suggested that primes are used to predict an outcome and influence 
expected upcoming responses (Klauer, 1997). A positive prime may lead to faster responses 
to an expected positive target stimulus, whilst a negative prime may decrease the time 
needed to respond to an expected negative target stimulus. Thus, if the response tendency 
associated with the prime and the target match (stimulus-response (S-R) validity), responses 
will be faster (Kunde, 2004; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Moors & De Houwer, 2010; 
Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003).  
There are two ways in which affective primes may bias response preparation to 
affective targets (Figure 3.1). Firstly, primes may be biased by predisposed, and presumed 
automatic, tendencies (Bargh, 1992; Bradley et al., 2001; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Lang et al., 
1990). As such, positive primes may bias towards approach while negative primes may bias 
towards avoidance action preparation (Bradley et al., 2001; Chen & Bargh, 1999). 
Accordingly, valence biases actions, and this will be referred to as the “valence-trigger 
account”. Indeed, previous work (Eder & Klauer 2009; Experiment 3) showed that approach 
movements are faster when preceded by a briefly presented positive word cue, and 
avoidance is faster when preceded by a negative word cue. Importantly, the influence of 
affective primes on action preparation may occur in an unconscious manner, in accordance 
with evidence suggesting that goals do not need to be consciously set in order to influence 
subsequent responses (Custers & Aarts, 2010). 
Secondly, affective primes may prepare responses depending on context-dependent 
top-down influences set up through task instructions, as has been shown previously (Kiesel, 
Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Liefooghe, Houwer, & Wenke, 2013; Waszak, Pfister, & Kiesel, 
2013). For example, instructions may be given to approach positive and avoid negative 
target faces. Assuming a predisposed tendency to approach positive and avoid negative 
faces, instructions are congruent with this response tendency. By contrast, one may be 
given incongruent instructions to avoid positive and approach negative target faces. If task 
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instructions determine the influence of primes on responses, presenting a positive prime 
during an incongruent block, for example, might result in faster avoidance of a subsequent 
positive target, even if participants are instructed to ignore primes. Indeed, “subjects 
unconsciously apply the task instructions to the prime” and consequently prepare an action 
in response to the prime despite being told to ignore the prime (Dehaene et al., 1998; 
p598). This is further supported by common-coding models, whereby a prime will lead to 
faster responses to a target if both the prime and the target share similar coding features 
(Hommel, 1997). This “action-trigger account” (Kiesel et al., 2007; Kunde et al., 2003) is in 
contrast to the valence-trigger account, and suggests that movement preparation is guided 
via top-down influences that override possible automatic S-R tendencies (Waszak et al. 
2013).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Model of how a task-irrelevant prime may prepare for upcoming action. Actions may be prepared 
via predisposed automatic tendencies, whereby positive triggers approach and negative triggers avoidance 
irrespective of task instructions, or by the application of task rules that override automatic tendencies. The 
task-relevant target is expected to trigger approach and avoidance by the application of task rules. If the action 
prepared by the task-irrelevant prime matches the response prepared by the task-relevant target, then these 
responses will be compatible and faster than if they do not match. For schematic purposes some steps are left 
out but for clarification, valence identification and evaluation occurs for both the prime and target.  
 
Previous work has shed light on how actions to approach and avoid are selected 
(Eder & Klauer, 2009; Lavender & Hommel, 2007), yet no work has directly addressed how 
task-irrelevant emotional cues are unintentionally processed such that they trigger 
approach-avoidance goals to help prepare responses to upcoming emotional stimuli. As 
such, two experiments were conducted to investigate whether and how affective primes 
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bias the preparation of approach-avoidance responses to subsequently presented affective 
targets. A third experiment was conducted to assess if this bias occurs in situations where 
the prime is subliminally presented such that it does not reach consciousness. This third 
experiment was expected to give insight into any unconscious effects on preparation.  
Experiment 1 sought to determine if the influence of affective primes on approach-
avoidance responses to subsequent affective targets is mediated via predisposed (i.e. 
valence-trigger account) or task-related response associations (i.e. action-trigger account). 
An adapted manikin and joystick task was used (see Chapter One for details), where 
participants moved a manikin on the screen with a joystick either towards or away from an 
affective target face that was always preceded by a briefly presented prime face. 
Participants moved depending on whether the block had congruent (i.e. approach-positive, 
avoid-negative) or incongruent (i.e. avoid-positive, approach-negative) instructions. 
Affective primes had either the same valence as the target face or not. Emotional faces were 
used because these are ecologically valid stimuli that have been shown to be processed fast 
and reliably (Garvert et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 3.2. Predicted RTs for each account during blocks when participants need to approach negative and 
avoid positive faces only (incongruent blocks). This condition was expected to reveal differences in the 
preparation of approach-avoidance actions. A) Expected RTs for the valence-trigger account, which predicts 
that when negative primes are presented, which presumably automatically trigger the preparation of 
avoidance, approaching negative target faces should take longer than avoiding positive target faces. Equally, 
when positive faces are presented, which presumably trigger the preparation of approach, approaching 
negative target faces should be faster than avoiding positive target faces. B) Expected RTs for the action-trigger 
account which predicts that primes activate actions according to the task-instructions. In incongruent cases, 
negative primes therefore presumably trigger the preparation of approach and should subsequently lead to 
faster RTs when negative targets are presented relative to positive targets. Similarly, positive targets that 
presumably trigger avoidance should lead to faster responses to positive target faces than to negative target 
faces due to the fact that primes and targets activate the same responses according to the task instructions.  
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Under a valence-trigger account, positive primes should always lead to the preparation 
of approach, whereas negative primes should always lead to the preparation of avoidance of 
subsequent affective targets, irrespective of task instructions (Eder & Klauer, 2009). Thus, 
approach-avoidance tendencies should override context-determined actions. By contrast, if 
preparation is guided by top-down influences, primes should lead to the preparation of the 
response as determined by the current context, and thus task instructions should hold a 
stronger influence on how actions are prepared by affective primes (Waszak et al., 2013). To 
determine which of the two proposed accounts is more fitting, it was expected that the 
reaction times of the incongruent condition compared to the congruent condition would be 
key in revealing how primes influence action preparation (see Figure 3.2 for predicted RTs). 
Furthermore, responses should be initiated faster (i.e. facilitation) for the same prime-target 
pairings and response initiation should be slower (i.e. interference) for different prime-target 
pairings.  
Both facilitation and interference effects are ways of determining that a response was 
prepared. However, the results of Experiment 1 only demonstrated an interference arising 
from the S-R mismatch between the primes and the targets. It remained unknown whether a 
S-R match between the primes and the targets can also speed up responses. To determine 
this, a comparison was necessary between situations when affective and non-affective 
information is available prior to response initiation. Presumably, when primes are not 
emotional, there should be no interference or facilitation of approach-avoidance responses, 
whereas when emotional primes are presented their associated approach-avoidance 
tendencies should interfere or facilitate subsequent response initiation.   
As such, in Experiment 2 a neutral face prime condition was introduced as a baseline 
control that allowed for distinguishing the changes in reaction times in terms of a decrease 
or increase from this non-affective condition. Importantly, if neutral primes have no effects 
on the initiation of target responses, then it would show that affective valence is an 
important feature of action preparation that serves to anticipate emotional outcomes.   
Based on the results of Experiment 1, it was predicted that, in comparison to neutral 
primes, affective primes would slow down responses to affective targets when prime-target 
pairings were invalid. Similarly, it was expected that affective primes would speed up the 
selection of responses during valid prime-target pairings. However, if neutral primes have 
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the capacity to elicit their learned associated responses, there should be no difference 
between the neutral and affective primes in interfering or speeding up action initiation to 
affective targets. Therefore, the aim of Experiment 2 was two-fold: firstly, to further 
determine if primes are capable of biasing towards predisposed S-R approach-avoidance 
associations by applying a different experimental method, and secondly, to demonstrate 
both facilitatory and inhibitory effects of affective primes. 
Irrespective of the type of mechanisms underlying preparation, the prioritisation of 
task-irrelevant emotional information presented as the prime is expected to drive 
preparation. This prioritisation may occur unconsciously, whereby participants have no 
awareness of the existence of the prime (Whalen et al., 1998). Indeed, because work has 
shown that primes have the capacity of biasing responses, even without participant’s 
awareness of the prime valence (Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Hermans, Spruyt, De 
Houwer, & Eelen, 2003; Sweeny, Grabowecky, Suzuki, & Paller, 2009) it was hypothesised 
that accurate detection and discrimination of the affective content of primes may not be 
required for priming effects. Furthermore, previous work suggests that approach-avoidance 
responses are unconsciously triggered by affective stimuli (Duckworth et al., 2002) and that 
goals as determined by the environment can be set without awareness of the stimulus 
influence (Custers & Aarts, 2010).  
The current study also examines whether correct discrimination of the prime is 
essential to influence the preparation of approach-avoidance responses. If this is the case, it 
would demonstrate an implicit effect of approach-avoidance tendencies on response 
preparation. To test for this, in Experiment 1 affective face primes were presented prior to 
the appearance of the target in an upright or inverted orientation, with the latter orientation 
known to reduce valence discrimination (Eimer, 2000; Rieth & Huber, 2010). Inverted faces 
were presented for design purposes, in order to maintain primes at a supraliminal threshold 
yet impair discrimination. It was predicted that if correct discrimination of the affective 
prime was necessary for priming effects, priming effects with inverted face primes should be 
reduced or absent. In Experiment 3 face primes were presented in a supraliminal and 
subliminal manner and participants approached or avoided affective target faces. Previous 
studies claiming that conscious evaluation is not necessary for approach-avoidance typically 
display the emotional content but instead require a different property of the stimulus to be 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Three 
86 
 
evaluated. For example, presenting a positive or negative face and asking subjects to 
approach and avoid based on gender and not valence (Krieglmeyer et al. 2010). Thus, the 
stimulus is still perceivable and may allow for ‘affective leaks’. To overcome this, the 
stimulus was presented subliminally. Work has shown that non-consciously perceived 
emotional stimuli can increase activity in areas responsible for emotional processing 
(Anderson et al., 2003) and can elicit electrophysiological activity (Liddell, Williams, Rathjen, 
Shevrin, & Gordon, 2004). Thus, it is possible for subliminal stimuli to be unconsciously 
detected and influence the preparation of responses. It was predicted that both supraliminal 
and subliminal prime faces should influence the initiation of responses to affective targets, 
albeit subliminal effects should be more subtle. If subliminal primes have the capacity to 
impact response preparation despite being unconsciously processed, it would suggest that in 
emotional information is prioritised without the participants’ awareness in order to improve 
the success of emotional behaviour.  
 
3.3. Experiment 1  
 
3.3.1.  Methods 
 
3.3.1.1. Participants  
32 healthy volunteers (mean age = 25.6 years [± 5.95 S.D.]; 11 female) were recruited 
from the University College London Psychology database, with local ethics approval (UCL). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants gave written informed 
consent to participate in the study, and received monetary compensation for their time and 
travel (10£/h). Two participants were excluded from the analysis for having a total number 
of errors above 2 S.D.’s from the population mean. 
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3.3.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
264 male and female faces were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces 
(KDEF; Lundqvist et al., 1998) and from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010): 
132 fearful (negative) faces and 132 smiling (positive) faces. All faces (178 x 241 pixels) were 
presented in black and white and the ears, neck and hair were excluded. Assignment of faces 
to blocks and trials was randomised per subject. Each block comprised of 132 trials (66 
positive/negative faces). A high contrast pixelated black and white mask (178 x 241 pixels) 
created in Matlab (v.7.9.1.705; The MathWorks Inc.) was used. The mask was not intended 
to make the prime subliminal or impair discrimination, but was used instead to eliminate any 
after images of the prime. The same faces were used as primes and targets but the same 
face never repeated within a trial.  
All stimuli were presented on an LCD screen of a Dell Optiplex 780 computer (refresh 
rate of 60 Hz), using the Cogent 2000 toolbox (University College London, 
http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.html) and MATLAB. A white manikin (2.8 x 
1.9 cm) was used to represent the subject on the screen. A small yellow circle (1.3 x 1.2 cm) 
representing the “away” target was presented at the edge of the screen on the same side 
and at the same time as the manikin. This “away” target was presented on all trials and it 
was purely for guidance purposes when participants had to move away. The manikin was 
moved using an analogue joystick connected to a CED1401 (Cambridge Electronic Design) 
machine. Joystick data were recorded using a CED1401-MATLAB interface (matced32; 
Cambridge Electronic Design) between MATLAB and the data acquisition device. This allowed 
for the joystick to move the manikin smoothly on the screen.   
 
3.3.1.3. Speed of action preparation: Priming task procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a computer at a distance of approximately 40cm 
with their heads fixated on a chin rest. The joystick was fixed to the table on their right-hand 
side. Participants were instructed to imagine that the manikin represented them on the 
screen. Previous work has demonstrated that participants have the ability to represent 
themselves on a screen, a form of disembodied cognition (Van Dantzig et al., 2009).  
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Congruency was determined by the approach or avoidance movements made in 
relation to each valence. 4 blocks (2 congruent/incongruent) were presented in random 
order. In congruent blocks (approach-positive, avoid-negative), participants were instructed 
to evaluate target valence and subsequently move the manikin towards positive faces and 
away from negative target faces (Fig 2A). In incongruent blocks (approach-negative, avoid-
positive), participants were instructed to approach negative and avoid positive target faces. 
In valid trials, prime faces had the same valence. In invalid trials, the prime faces did not 
have the same valence as the target. Thus, prime validity was determined by whether the 
valence of the prime and the target were the same or different. Participants were told that a 
stimulus would briefly appear prior to the presentation of the faces and were instructed to 
ignore it. Participants were not informed of the content of this stimulus. The presentation of 
the prime face was either inverted (50% of trials) or upright (50%), in random order.  
 
Figure 3.3. Illustration of two trial sequences for Experiment 1 and 2. A) Experiment 1 task: An upright or 
inverted prime face was presented for 83 ms followed by a high contrast black and white mask displayed for 
33 ms. Subsequently, the target was presented and participants had to move the manikin towards positive and 
away from negative faces (congruent block) or had to move the manikin away from positive and towards 
negative faces (incongruent block). B) Experiment 2 task: An upright affective or neutral face prime was 
presented for 83 ms followed by a high contrast black and white mask displayed for 33 ms. Subsequently, the 
target was presented and participants had to move the manikin towards positive and away from negative 
faces (congruent block) or had to move the manikin away from positive and towards negative faces 
(incongruent block).   
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Trials started with a central fixation cross (500 ms), followed by the appearance of 
the prime and the manikin (5 frame displays of 16.6s; 83 ms), backwardly masked for 33 ms 
(2 frame displays). Subsequently, the target face was presented (max. 1500 ms or until the 
respective target was reached). The inter-trial-interval was 500 ms. Previous work has shown 
good subjective and objective discrimination at displays of around 90 ms (Hsu, Hetrick, & 
Pessoa, 2008), therefore rendering the prime supraliminal. As such, prime faces were 
displayed for the duration closest to this value (83 ms). To avoid confounds with the 
biophysical properties of the arm (e.g. pull vs. push), the manikin was pseudo-randomly 
presented either above or below the face. If participants moved before the presentation of 
the target, the trial was aborted and was added to the trial sequence at a randomised 
location. Error feedback was provided when subjects made a wrong movement. All target 
faces were presented upright (only primes were either upright or inverted). Before the 
experiment, participants completed two short training blocks, one congruent and one 
incongruent, of 30 trials each with faces to familiarise participants with the task. The faces 
used for training were different to those used in the experiment.  
 
3.3.1.4. Awareness of emotional content: Discrimination task procedure 
After completion of the priming task, participants discriminated the valence of each 
face, to test for participants’ awareness of affective valence. In two blocks, faces were 
presented in the upright or inverted orientation, respectively. Order and duration of 
presentation were identical to the priming task. The only difference was that no target face 
was presented after the prime face. After presentation of the prime face participants had to 
indicate the valence of the stimulus, by pressing one of two indicated keys. Immediately 
after they made their judgement participants rated via a key press how confident (high or 
low) they were of their decision. If they were very sure they had made the correct 
discrimination, their confidence was high, if they were unsure about their judgement, their 
confidence was low.  
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3.3.1.5. Data analyses 
Reaction times  
Reaction times (RT) were determined from the time of target onset to the initiation 
of joystick movement. Joystick data were recorded in XY-coordinates and joystick onset was 
calculated based on vertical y-axis coordinate deviations (±10 y-coordinates) from trial 
baseline. The baseline was recorded while the manikin was stationary prior to the 
appearance of the target. All trials in which the movement did not match the instructions 
(e.g., avoiding when instructed to approach negative faces; 6.3% of trials), with RTs below 
100 ms (1.0%) or exceeding 2000 ms (2.4%) were excluded from the analyses. Outlier RTs 
(1.2%) were calculated per block for each subject using a Grubb’s test, α = 0.05. In total, 
10.9% of trials were excluded.  
A 2x2x2x2 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) was conducted 
with factors Presentation (upright vs. inverted), Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), 
Target-Valence (positive vs. negative) and Prime-Validity (valid vs. invalid). For all analyses, 
partial-  is reported as a measure of effect size. Statistical threshold was fixed at 0.05. 
Significant interactions were followed up using two-tailed paired-sample t-tests and Cohen’s 
d is reported. RT means and standard error of the mean (SEM) are also reported.  
 
Discrimination task 
For discrimination both subjective and objective d’ were measured. Subjective d’ was 
calculated from individual confidence ratings (see Hsu et al., 2008) using Signal Detection 
(Wickens, 2001). Trials were classified as hits if participants answered correctly and reported 
high confidence, as misses if participants answered correctly but reported low confidence, as 
false alarms if participants gave an incorrect answer with high confidence, and as correct 
rejections if participants gave an incorrect answer with low confidence. Objective d’ (see Hsu 
et al., 2008) was based on participants’ actual correct responses and was determined by 
taking the proportion of total hits for both negative and positive faces for each presentation 
and calculating their z-scores. These z-scores were then added to give a combined objective 

2
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d’ across both valences. Paired-sample t-tests were used to determine significant differences 
from chance level (d’ = 0). 
 
3.3.2. Results  
 
3.3.2.1. Priming task  
 
3.3.2.1.1. Speed of response initiation: Reaction times 
The influence of prime validity on target responses was demonstrated by a 3-way 
interaction between the prime presentation, valence of the target and the validity of the 
prime with respect to the target (Figure 3.4A & B; Presentation*Target-Valence*Prime-
Validity: F(1,29) = 7.91, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.21). This interaction revealed that when the prime 
was presented upright or inverted, the effect of prime validity was different for each target 
valence. A follow-up of this interaction was conducted separately for each level of 
Presentation (2 x 2 ANOVA’s with factors Target-Valence and Prime-Validity, collapsed across 
Congruency).  
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Figure 3.4. The influence of affective primes on the speed of response initiation to affective targets. Upper 
panels: Mean RTs for valid and invalid trials for the interaction between Presentation*Target-Valence*Prime-
Validity (A) Negative targets: RTs were significantly faster when negative targets were primed by negative 
upright and inverted primes. Validly primed trials were therefore significantly faster than invalidly primed 
trials. (B) Positive targets: RTs were significantly faster when positive targets were primed by positive upright 
primes. There was no difference in RTs when positive targets were primed by inverted positive or negative 
faces. Lower panels: Mean reaction times (RTs) for valid and invalid trials for the interaction between 
Congruency*Target-Valence*Prime-Validity (C) Negative target faces: Avoidance and approach were faster in 
valid compared to invalid trials (D) Positive target faces: Approach was faster in valid compared to invalid 
trials. No significant difference between valid and invalid trials when avoiding positive faces. Approach was 
significantly faster than avoidance for positive target faces. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); light bars = valid; dark bars = 
invalid. ** significant at p < 0.001 level 
 
 
When upright prime faces were presented, the effect of Prime-Validity was the same 
for both target valences (Target-Valence*Prime-Validity, n.s.). Thus, valid trials were faster 
than invalid trials for both positive (valid: 610 ± 15 ms; invalid: 644 ± 15 ms; t(29) = -5.42, p < 
0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.98) and negative (valid: 630 ± 16 ms; invalid: 652 ± 15 ms; t(29) = -4.86, 
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.84) upright prime faces. In contrast, for inverted prime faces (Fig 
3B), the effect of Prime-Validity was affected by the valence of the prime face (Target-
Valence*Prime-Validity, F(1,29) = 9.73, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.25). This interaction revealed that, for 
negative target faces, valid trials were faster than invalid trials (valid: 627 ± 16 ms; invalid: 
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647 ± 17; t(29) = -4.63, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.85), but for positive target faces, valid trials 
(620 ± 15 ms) were not significantly different from invalid trials (624 ± 14 ms).  
The influence of affective primes on approach-avoidance responses made in response 
to affective targets was demonstrated by a 3-way interaction (Figure 3.4C & D; 
Congruency*Target-Valence*Prime-Validity, F(1,29) = 4.73, p = 0.038, ηp
2 = 0.14). This 
interaction showed that the initiation speed of approaching and avoiding positive and 
negative target faces was influenced by the validity of the prime).  
A follow-up of this interaction was conducted separately for Target-Valence (2 x 2 
RM-ANOVA with factors Congruency and Prime-Validity collapsed across Presentation). Both 
2-way ANOVA’s for negative and positive targets yielded significant Congruency*Prime-
Validity interactions. For negative target faces, avoidance was faster in valid compared to 
invalid trials (valid: 641 ± 17 ms; invalid: 659 ± 17 ms; t(29) = -3.683, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -
0.68) and approach was faster for valid compared to invalid trials (valid: 617 ± 17 ms; invalid: 
640 ± 17 ms; t(29) = -4.62, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.80). In contrast, for positive target faces 
(Figure 3D), approach was faster for valid compared to invalid trials (valid: 574 ± 14 ms; 
invalid: 600 ± 14 ms; t(29) = -5.71,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.05). Avoidance was not 
significantly faster for valid compared to invalid trials (valid: 658 ± 17 ms; invalid: 668 ± 16 
ms; n.s). Therefore, both for congruent and incongruent movements, invalid trials were 
slower than valid trials.  
Additionally, for both valences, there was a main effect of congruency. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that for negative targets, approaching was significantly faster than 
avoiding (avoid: 650 ± 16 ms; approach: 628 ± 16 ms; t(29) = 2.58, p = 0.042, Cohen’s d = 
0.44). Similarly, for positive targets, approach was faster than avoidance (avoid: 663 ± 16 ms; 
approach: 587 ± 14 ms; t(29) = -6.81, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.58). Approaching was therefore 
faster than avoidance for both valences.  
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3.3.2.1.2. Awareness of emotional content: Discrimination task 
 
Subjective d’  
To show whether the correct discrimination of the primes was necessary for priming 
effects both subjective and objective discrimination was calculated. Subjective discrimination 
was above chance (i.e. zero) for both upright and inverted faces (d’upright: 1.72 ± 0.31, t(28) = 
-5.48,  p < 0.001; d’inverted: 0.92 ± 0.13, t(29) = -7.09,  p  < 0.001) when combined across 
valences. Furthermore, subjective d’ was higher when faces were upright compared to when 
they were inverted (t(28) = 2.52,  p = 0.018).   
When subjective discrimination was split into individual valences for upright faces, 
discrimination for both valences was above chance (d’positive: 2.02 ± 0.43, t(28) = -4.49,  p < 
0.001; d’negative: 1.42 ± 0.41, t(25) = -3.12,  p = 0.005), therefore showing participants 
confidently discriminated both positive and negative upright faces. For inverted faces, 
subjective discrimination was above chance level for positive faces (d’positive 1.87 ± 0.34: 
t(27) = -5.38,  p < 0.001) but discrimination was not significantly different from chance level 
for negative faces (d’negative: 0.30 ± 0.26, n.s.). The lack of a difference from chance level 
for negative inverted faces resulted from a combination of high proportion of misses (i.e. 
correct responses but low confidence) and false alarms (i.e. incorrect responses with high 
confidence). Thus, participants had low confidence despite being accurate and had high 
confidence despite being inaccurate.  
 
Objective d’ 
Objective discrimination was above chance level (i.e. 0.5) for both upright and 
inverted faces (d’upright: 3.48 ± 0.03; t(29) = -23.68,  p < 0.001; d’inverted: 2.07 ± 0.03, t(29) = -
12.44,  p  < 0.001). Furthermore, objective discrimination was higher for upright than 
inverted faces (t(29) = 10.62,  p < 0.001). The z-scores for each individual valence are shown, 
which were all significantly above chance (d’positive upright: 1.69 ± 0.08; d’ positive 
inverted: 1.32 ± 0.1; d’negative upright: 1.79 ± 0.08; d’ negative inverted: 0.77 ± 0.09).  
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3.3.3. Discussion  
Experiment 1 was concerned with determining how action preparation to approach 
and avoid occurs. The results show that affective primes help prepare actions according to 
their contextual (i.e. task-related) S-R associations. This is supportive of the action-trigger 
account (Kiesel et al., 2007): when participants were instructed to approach positive and 
avoid negative targets, positive primes facilitated responses for approaching positive targets, 
but slowed down responses for avoiding negative targets. Similarly, in approach-
negative/avoid-positive blocks, positive primes biased responses towards avoidance, 
subsequently making it easier to avoid positive targets but interfering with approaching 
negative targets. This demonstrates that the instructed link between the response and the 
valence of a target stimulus is also applied to the task-irrelevant prime. Primes do not bias 
according to the predisposed action-valence associations as predicted by the valence-trigger 
account. Action preparation to approach and avoid emotional stimuli appears to occur in a 
top-down manner, whereby goals established by task instructions bias response preparation.     
When primes were presented in the upright orientation, validly cued trials were 
initiated faster than invalidly cued trials for both positive and negative target faces, 
irrespective of whether an approach or avoidance movement was required. In contrast, 
when negative inverted prime faces were presented, there was no difference in reaction 
times to positive target faces between valid and invalid trials. As inverted negative prime 
faces were not subjectively discriminated above chance, it is speculated that their influence 
on subsequent responses was minimal and therefore valid trials did not differ from invalid 
trials in this condition. In contrast, positive inverted faces were discriminated above chance 
and therefore did influence responses in invalid trials. Indeed, responses for valid trials in all 
conditions were similar, while responses for invalid trials were not. Speculatively, the 
differences between valid and invalid trials for the remaining conditions are driven by 
interference (i.e. slowing down) of the prime on subsequent responses. One possibility for 
such a ‘disruptive’ effect is response conflict (Bartholow, Riordan, Saults, & Lust, 2009; Eder 
et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 1996), whereby conflicting responses are evoked by a prime 
and a subsequent target. Importantly, this response conflict demonstrates that affective 
primes, though task-irrelevant, biased responses in a fast manner.  
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A likely explanation for better discrimination of positive upright and inverted faces 
compared to negative faces is the salience of features such as the presence of teeth or an 
open mouth. Smiling faces display more teeth than fearful faces. Recent studies have 
suggested that the prominent features of an affective face influence the discrimination and 
processing of such a stimulus (Beaudry, Roy-Charland, Perron, Cormier, & Tapp, 2014; Calvo 
& Nummenmaa, 2011; daSilva et al., 2016; Horstmann, Lipp, & Becker, 2012). The current 
results highlight the important role of the presence of teeth on priming effects.  
The interference effects observed above indicates that primes can bias preparation 
towards a specific response, which subsequently conflicts with the response activated by the 
affective target, slowing down responses. This biasing effect, however, does not inform us 
whether affective primes can also facilitate approach-avoidance responses to subsequent 
affective target stimuli compared to when no affective information is present to prepare 
actions. If invalid information between a prime and a target slows down responses relative 
to when there is no affective information (i.e. negative inverted prime that was not 
discriminated), then it follows that prime-target validity should speed up the initiation of 
action relative to when there is no affective information available. Demonstrating this is 
crucial for determining that affective primes can influence and maximise action preparation 
in order to carry out fast appropriate responses to emotional situations. As such, Experiment 
2 addressed whether valid trials lead to response facilitation when compared to a non-
affective baseline. Experiment 2 was therefore concerned not with how response 
preparation occurred, but with whether affective cues are able to prepare the motor system 
for fast and appropriate responses to emotional targets, thereby demonstrating a specific 
relationship between emotion and motor processes. That is, does the unexpected sound of 
crackling leaves in a wooded area really prepare someone to avoid potential threat in a 
faster manner?  
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3.4. Experiment 2  
 
3.4.1. Method  
 
3.4.1.1. Participants  
30 healthy volunteers (mean age = 24.5 years [± 5 S.D.]; 15 female) were recruited as 
in Experiment 1.  
 
3.4.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
For the training session, 130 neutral (65 female/male) faces were selected from the 
same databases as in Experiment 1. Presentation of faces during the task was randomised 
for each subject. Due to insufficient neutral faces, 30 neutral faces were repeated 
throughout the training session to make each block comprise of 150 trials. The same 30 
faces were repeated for all participants. The training session comprised of 2 blocks of 150 
trials.   
For the main task, 390 male and female faces were selected from the same 
databases: 130 fearful (negative) faces, 130 smiling (positive) faces, and 130 neutral faces. 
All faces (178 x 241 pixels) were masked as in Experiment 1. Assignment of faces to blocks 
and trials was randomised in across participants. Each positive and negative face was used 
as both a prime and a target, but the same face was never shown as the prime and the 
target within the same trial. Neutral faces were only shown as primes. Some faces were 
repeated as primes (9 in total) and some faces were repeated as targets (16 in total) in order 
to have sufficient stimuli for each block. The same faces were repeated for all participants. 
Each block comprised of 144 trials (72 positive/negative target faces; 48 
positive/negative/neutral prime faces). Stimuli were presented using the same equipment 
as in Experiment 1.   
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3.4.1.3. Training task procedure  
Based on an arbitrary mapping of the gender of face stimuli, participants were 
trained to approach neutral female faces and avoid neutral male faces (counterbalanced) 
(Woud, Becker, & Rinck, 2008). This removed the affective component of the primes, and 
formed a new S-R conflict between the neutral primes and the affective targets, which 
allowed addressing whether these newly established S-R associations for neutral primes can 
act in a similar manner to those predisposed valence-action associations.  
Participants trained to approach or avoid neutral female or male faces. The 
procedure was the same as Experiment 1, except that no prime was presented during the 
task. The training task was counterbalanced across participants, with half approaching 
female faces and avoiding male faces, and the remaining half approaching males and 
avoiding female faces. A similar number of males and females were included in each set of 
training instructions.  
The inclusion of the training was important for two reasons: firstly, it ensured that 
both the affective and neutral primes shared similar response properties (i.e. approach-
avoidance), and secondly, it allowed to conclusively demonstrate whether emotional S-R 
associations can be facilitated by primes. If neutral primes are unable to elicit trained S-R 
associations, then it would provide indication that learned or conditioned S-R associations 
are weak, contrary to previous suggestions (Damasio, 1994; Hommel et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, if no effect arises from neutral primes, then it would serve as a baseline 
condition with which affective primes can be compared against when determining 
facilitation and interference effects of the affective primes.  
Participants completed two training blocks. Depending on the instructions, 
participants either moved a manikin towards neutral female faces and away from neutral 
male faces, or vice versa. Trials started with a fixation cross presented in the centre of the 
screen (500 ms), followed by the appearance of the neutral target face and the manikin 
(max. 2000 ms or until the respective target was reached).  
To ensure that maximum learning was achieved, participants who made >10% errors 
during the last 280 trials of the training had to repeat an extra block of 150 trials of the 
training.  
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3.4.1.4. Speed of action preparation: Priming task procedure 
Following training, participants completed a priming task similar to Experiment 1, 
with both neutral and affective faces as primes but only affective faces as targets. As such, 
neutral prime faces were always affectively different from the affective target faces (e.g. 
neutral prime – positive target) but were still related with respect to the responses they 
elicit (e.g. neutral female prime followed by positive target – both could facilitate approach) 
thus allowing for a potential S-R conflict, and mimicking the affective priming task.  
The priming task was the same as in Experiment 1 with a few exceptions (Figure 
3.2B). Like in Experiment 1, for affective primes, validity was determined by whether the 
affective prime and targets had the same valence or not (e.g. positive prime followed by a 
positive target). In contrast, in Experiment 2, for neutral primes, validity was determined by 
whether the prime and the target had the same response or not (e.g. neutral female prime 
face followed by a positive target; both are linked to an approach response; neutral male 
face followed by a positive face; one facilitates avoidance whereas the other one facilitates 
approach). Contrary to Experiment 1, all prime faces were presented in an upright 
orientation. This was because Experiment 1 determined that awareness was necessary for 
priming effects to occur, and therefore inverted faces were dropped. Trial sequence was the 
same as in Experiment 1. Participants completed two short practise blocks, one congruent 
and one incongruent, of 72 trials each to familiarise participants with the new instructions.  
 
3.4.1.5. Awareness of emotional content: Discrimination task  
The discrimination task was identical to that of Experiment 1 with the exception that 
participants discriminated neutral faces as well. Participants pressed one of three response 
keys. In addition, all faces were presented upright.  
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3.4.1.6. Data analyses 
 
Speed of action initiation: Reaction times  
Reaction times were measured as in Experiment 1. Exclusion criteria were also the 
same. For the training session, wrong responses (e.g. approach males when instructed to 
avoid males; 7.5% of training trials), too slow (3.0%) or too fast responses (0.3%) and 
outliers (0.5%) were excluded. A total of 11.3% of trials were excluded from the training 
data. For the affective priming task, wrong responses (e.g., avoiding when instructed to 
approach negative faces; 4.1% of trials), too fast (0.9%) or too slow responses (1.8%), and 
outlier trials (0.3%) were excluded from the analyses. In total, 7.1% of trials were excluded 
from the main task.  
A 2x2x2x2 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) with factors 
Prime-type (affective vs. neutral), Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), Target-Valence 
(positive vs. negative) and Prime-Validity (valid vs. invalid). Statistical analyses were the 
same as in Experiment 1.  
 
Training 
As participants learn the appropriate responses associated with the male and female 
neutral faces, reaction times should decrease as participants complete more trials. A curve-
fitting toolbox in MATLAB (The Mathworks) was used to fit an exponential function to the 
mean reaction times across all participants to test for such decrease. RT data was analysed 
for the first 250 of 300 training trials because, after eliminating training errors, all subjects 
had up to 250 trials left for analysis. Response errors were compared between the first and 
second training blocks to assess any further indication of learning throughout the second 
block.  
A 1-way RM-ANOVA was also conducted with factors Movement Type (approach vs. 
avoid) for each counterbalancing independently (i.e. approach female, avoid male and vice 
versa). Follow-up paired samples t-tests were conducted. Furthermore, an independent 
samples t-test was calculated between each counterbalancing group for each movement 
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type, to compare any differences in RTs between approaching female and male faces, and 
avoiding female and male faces.  
 
Awareness of emotional content: Discrimination  
Discrimination analyses were the same as in Experiment 1, with the exception that 
subjective and objective discrimination was calculated for neutral faces as well as positive 
and negative faces. Discrimination was employed to ensure that participants could perceive 
the faces at a supraliminal level. 
 
3.4.2. Results  
 
3.4.2.1. Training task 
The exponential fit revealed a sharp initial decrease in RTs after approximately 25 
trials, followed by relatively stable RTs throughout the remaining training (Figure 3.5; SSE = 
1.69, R2 = 0.39, adjusted R2 = 0.38, RMSE: 25.93).  
 
Figure 3.5. Exponential curve showing a sharp 
decrease in RTs over the course of training. Mean 
RTs are shown in ms. Participants learned the 
respective stimulus-response associations (e.g. 
female neutral – approach, male neutral – 
avoidance) in the first 25 trials of the task. These 
RTs subsequently stabilised until the end of the 
task.  
 
Furthermore, the average number of response errors made during the first block 
was significantly higher than the number of errors made during the second block (first: 13 ± 
0.9: second: 9 ± 0.6; t(29) = 3.81,  p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.70). Thus, as expected, both RTs 
and the number of errors successfully decreased during training, indicating that participants 
learned the respective S-R associations quickly. 
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The 1-way RM-ANOVA’s revealed an effect of gender on approaching and avoiding 
for counterbalancing group one (Movement type; F(1,14) = 10.10, p = 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.44), and 
group two (Movement type, F(1,24) = 16.85, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.55). For group one, approaching 
female faces was significantly faster than avoiding male faces (app-fem: 623 ± 22 ms; avoid-
male: 648 ± 20 ms; t(14) = -3.32,  p = 0.005, Cohen’s d = -0.89), and for group two, 
approaching male faces was significantly slower than avoiding female faces (app-male: 686 
± 23 ms; avoid-fem: 640 ± 21 ms; t(14) = 4.10,  p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.08).  
Between-subjects t-tests comparing approach and avoidance between the two 
groups showed that approaching female faces was not significantly different from 
approaching male faces (t(29) = -1.98,  p = 0.07, Cohen’s d = -0.11), and avoiding female faces 
was not significantly different from avoiding male faces (t(29) = 0.31,  p = 0.76, Cohen’s d = 
0.02). This is important as it shows that there was no difference between the two groups for 
approach and avoidance.   
 
3.4.2.2. Priming task  
 
Reaction times 
The three factors Prime-type, Congruency, and Target-Valence interacted 
significantly (F(1,29) = 6.39, p = 0.017, ηp
2 = 0.18), and a breakdown of this interaction was 
conducted separately for each Target-Valence (2 x 2 ANOVAs with factors Prime-type and 
Congruency collapsed across Prime-Validity).  
For negative target faces (Figure 3.6A), Prime-Type did not affect approach-
avoidance responses (Prime-type*Congruency, n.s). By contrast, for positive target faces 
(Figure 3.6B; Prime-type*Congruency, F(1,29) = 7.45, p < 0.011, ηp
2 = 0.204), approaching 
positive faces was faster when primed by affective faces than when primed by a neutral 
faces (affective prime: 620 ± 16 ms; neutral prime: 626 ± 16 ms; t(29) = -2.99,  p = 0.006, 
Cohen’s d = -0.55), whereas there were no differences in RTs when avoiding positive target 
faces. Positive target faces also elicited an expected congruency effect, with approach being 
faster than avoidance when primed by both positive and neutral faces (positive approach: 
620 ± 16 ms, positive avoid: 707 ± 20 ms; t(29) = -11.94,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -2.79; neutral 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Three 
103 
 
approach: 626 ± 16 ms, neutral avoid: 706 ± 20 ms; t(29) = -11.60,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -
2.58). There was no difference between approaching and avoiding negative target faces.  
 
 
Figure 3.6. Influence of primes and congruency on response initiation. Left panels: Mean RTs for the 
interaction Prime-type*Congruency*Target-Valence (A) RTs for negative and positive target responses. 
Negative target faces: RTs did not differ between affective and neutral faces for approaching or avoiding. (B) 
Positive target faces: RTs were significantly faster for approaching when primed by an affective prime than a 
neutral prime. Right panel: Mean reaction times (RTs) for the interaction Prime type*Prime Validity (C) RTs for 
affective targets when primed by affective and neutral primes; light bars = valid; dark bars = invalid. light bars = 
affective primes; dark bars = neutral primes. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * significant at p < 0.05 level.  
 
 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the Prime-Type differentially influenced the S-
R validity effect (Figure 3.6C; Prime-type*Prime-Validity, F(1,29) = 32.54, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
0.529). This was followed up with a 2-way ANOVA with factors Prime-type and Prime-
Validity, collapsed across Congruency and Target-Valence; Prime-type*Prime-Validity, F(1,29) = 
44.83, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.61). Follow-up paired t-tests showed that valid trials were faster 
than invalid trials when affective primes were presented (valid: 652 ± 18 ms; invalid: 681 ± 
17 ms; t(29) = -7.30,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.84), but no such difference was found for 
neutral primes (valid: 667 ± 17; invalid: 665 ± 18; n.s). Overall, responses on valid trials were 
faster for affective vs. neutral primes (affective valid: 652 ± 18 ms; neutral valid: 667 ± 18 ms; 
t(29) = -5.27,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.03). Equally, on invalid trials, responses were slower 
for affective vs. neutral (affective invalid = 681 ± 18 ms; neutral invalid = 665 ± 18 ms; t(29) = 
6.03,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.08).  
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3.4.2.3. Discrimination task 
 
Subjective d’  
Combined across all valences, subjective d’ was above chance level (d’subjective: 
1.06 ± 0.14; t(29) =-7.51,  p < 0.001). When subjective discrimination was split into individual 
valences, discrimination for all valences was above chance level (d’positive: 0.55 ± 0.27, t(29) 
= -2.03,  p = 0.05; d’negative: 1.13 ± 0.31, t(29) = -3.62,  p = 0.001; d’neutral: 0.61 ± 0.2, t(29) = 
-3.12,  p = 0.004), showing participants could confidently discriminate positive, negative and 
neutral faces.  
 
Objective d’ 
Combined across all valences, objective discrimination was above chance level 
(d’objective: t(29) = -22.80,  p < 0.001). All valences were correctly discriminated by all 
participants (d’ positive: 1.73 ± 0.06, t(29) = 59.45,  p < 0.001; d’ negative: 1.60 ± 0.1,  t(29) = 
29.97,  p < 0.001; d’ neutral: 1.00 ± 0.11, t(29) = 10.76,  p < 0.001).  
 
3.4.3. Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether affective cues can help prepare 
the motor system for fast responses in anticipation of emotional targets. The results 
revealed that affective primes facilitate responses to affective target stimuli when the prime 
and target match in their actions, but slowed down responses when they did not match, 
when compared to a non-affective baseline. This demonstrates that affective primes can 
bias preparation such that appropriate behaviour occurs in a fast and timely manner, crucial 
for avoiding costs and optimising success. The current results support previous work 
showing that emotional stimuli speed up responses to targets (Eder et al., 2012; Klauer, 
1997; Spruyt, Hermans, Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007). Emotional stimuli and their 
associated approach-avoidance tendencies therefore influence action preparation.  
The interference effects observed here show that neutral primes did not facilitate 
the corresponding response tendencies that were invalid with the affective target response 
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(e.g. neutral female prime face that facilitated approach followed by a negative target face 
that triggered avoidance), and therefore did not slow down target responses. In contrast, 
invalid affective primes interfered with responses, thus replicating the findings from 
Experiment 1. With regards to facilitation effects, valid affective primes sped up responses 
to subsequent targets relative to valid neutral primes. This facilitation of target responses 
suggests that affective primes can influence the speed of response initiation to affective 
stimuli of the same valence. Invalid affective primes therefore interfere with, whereas valid 
affective primes facilitate responses to affective target stimuli.  
In Experiment 2, neutral primes were associated to approach or avoidance actions 
through extensive learning. However, these newly established associations did not lead to 
valence specific validity effects. One obvious explanation for this is that the valence-specific 
top-down instructions prevailed over the trained S-R associations for neutral primes, as has 
been previously shown (Liefooghe, Wenke, & De Houwer, 2012; Waszak et al., 2013). This is 
unlikely to be the result of insufficient training, as both reaction times and error rates 
decreased and plateaued during training, suggesting that the newly formed response 
associations to specific neutral faces were fully established. Importantly, the reaction times 
when making the same movement towards different genders did not differ, suggesting that 
the associations were learned to the same extent during training and were not affected by 
gender. As such, like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also demonstrated that context-related 
instructions override learned response associations.  
In sum, Experiment 2 confirms the interference effect observed in Experiment 1 and 
shows that there was also a response benefit when both the prime and the target responses 
matched, suggesting that action preparation to affective stimuli benefits from relevant 
affective cues in the environment. By comparing to a baseline, novel evidence is provided 
that affective primes can both facilitate and interfere with upcoming responses. Approach-
avoidance tendencies therefore influence the speed of action preparation, demonstrating a 
link between emotion and preparatory processes that may benefit survival.   
Both Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrated that supraliminal affective primes influence 
action preparation. Although Experiment 1 demonstrated that awareness was necessary for 
priming effects to occur, the supraliminal presentation of an inverted prime face may not 
have the same influence as an upright prime presented subliminally. Previous work has 
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suggested that affective primes have the capacity to influence responses to targets in an 
unconscious manner (Whalen et al., 1998), and that approach-avoidance tendencies may be 
triggered unconsciously (Duckworth et al., 2002). To investigate the extent to which 
unconscious processing of the emotional stimulus will result in priming effects, Experiment 
3 presented affective prime faces in a subliminal and supraliminal manner. If emotional 
primes are capable of influencing responses unconsciously, the effects between subliminal 
and supraliminal presentations should be similar. Prior to the main task (Experiment 3B), the 
parameters for subliminal presentation were determined in a pilot (Experiment 3A).  
 
3.5. Experiment 3  
 
3.5.1. Method  
 
3.5.1.1. Participants  
In Experiment 3A (pilot), 5 healthy participants were recruited (mean age = 25.5 
years [± 7 S.D.]; 1 female) as in Experiment 1 and 2. 
In Experiment 3B, 14 healthy volunteers (mean age = 25.4 years [± 4 S.D.]; 7 female) 
were recruited. 
 
3.5.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
For both experiments, 132 male and female faces were selected from the same 
databases as above: 66 fearful (negative) faces and 66 smiling (positive) faces. All faces (178 
x 241 pixels) were masked as in Experiment 1 and 2. It has been shown that a pattern mask 
is successful at making affective faces subliminal (Kim et al., 2010). Assignment of faces to 
blocks and trials was randomised across participants. For Experiment 3B, each positive and 
negative face was used as both a prime and a target, but the same face was never shown as 
the prime and the target within the same trial. The same faces were repeated for all 
participants. Stimuli were presented using the same equipment as in Experiment 1 and 2.   
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Contrary to Experiment 1 and 2, all stimuli were presented on a 20-inch screen 
(SONY Trinitron, refresh rate: 120 Hz). The improved refresh rate was crucial for subliminal 
presentations as this allowed better precision for presentation times. For the detection and 
discrimination tasks, multiples of 10 ms were used as masking durations. For the affective 
priming task, subliminal stimuli were presented for two refresh rates of 10 ms each giving a 
total of 20 ms, whereas supraliminal stimuli were presented for 8 refresh rates of 10 ms 
each giving a total of 80 ms.  
 
3.5.1.3. Discrimination and detection tasks  
For Experiments 3A and B, a discrimination task was conducted based on Hsu et al. 
2008. For both experiments, the discrimination task was identical to that of Experiment 1, 
with some timing exceptions (Figure 3.7A). 
In Experiment 3A (pilot), primes were presented for 20 ms and there were eight 
different masking durations (10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 ms), resulting in a variety of 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) timings. The duration of the SOA is usually the total time of 
the prime and mask presentations. There were four blocks in total, two for short SOAs (30 – 
60 ms) and two for long SOAs (70 – 100 ms). Each block comprised of 132 trials. Each face 
was presented in an upright manner and a total of 4 times.  
In Experiment 3B, participants completed two discrimination blocks of 132 trials, one 
for subliminal and another for supraliminal presentations. For subliminal presentations, 
primes were presented for 20 ms and masked for 80, giving an SOA of 100 ms. Supraliminal 
primes were presented for 80 ms and masked for 20 ms to give an SOA of 100 ms. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants had to press two keys in order to give their response.  
In Experiment 3A only, a detection task (Kiesel et al., 2007; Kunde, 2004) was also 
conducted, in which subjects simply indicated whether they detected the presence of a 
stimulus or not. Thus, the detection task helped identify if subjects could actually see if a 
stimulus was presented, whereas the discrimination task revealed if subjects were able to 
discriminate the content of the stimulus. In the detection task, the procedure was the same 
as in the discrimination task, except that participants were asked if they could detect the 
presence of a face or not. Catch trials were included in which no face was presented at all.    
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3.5.1.4. Priming task procedure in Experiment 3B 
In Experiment 3B, the priming task was the same as in Experiment 1 with a few 
exceptions (Figure 3.7B). Like in Experiment 1, for affective primes, validity was determined 
by whether the affective prime and targets had the same valence or not (e.g. positive prime 
followed by a positive target). Trial sequence was the same as in Experiment 1. There were 
six blocks in total, three subliminal and three supraliminal. Subliminal faces were presented 
using an SOA of 100 ms, which was determined by Experiment 3A as being the ideal 
presentation time that rendered the stimulus subliminal. Supraliminal faces were presented 
for 80 ms and masked for 20 ms, so that the SOA was identical to the subliminal SOA. All 
prime faces were presented upright. Participants completed two short practise blocks, one 
congruent and one incongruent, of 72 trials each to familiarise participants with the 
instructions.  
 
Figure 3.7. Task schematic for Experiment 3. A) Upper panels: trial sequence when participants had to 
discriminate the valence of the emotional face as positive or negative (objective discrimination) and 
subsequently say how confident they were (subjective discrimination). Bottom panel: trial sequence when 
participants had to detect the presence of an emotional face and subsequently say how confident they were. 
B) Trial sequence for valid and invalid trials in the priming task. In the subliminal task, a prime face was shown 
for 20 ms and a mask was subsequently shown for 80 ms giving an SOA of 100 ms. In the supraliminal task, a 
prime face was shown for 80 ms and a mask was shown for 20 ms giving an SOA of 100 ms. Participants were 
subsequently required to approach or avoid the emotional target face depending on the instructions given at 
the beginning of each block. In valid trials, the valence of the prime and the target face matched, whereas in 
invalid trials the valence of the prime and target faces mismatched. Participants were never informed of the 
emotional prime.  
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3.5.1.5. Data analyses 
For Experiments 3A and 3B, discrimination and detection was calculated as in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
For Experiment 3B, reaction times were measured as in Experiment 1. Exclusion 
criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. For the affective priming task, wrong responses 
(e.g., avoiding when instructed to approach negative faces; 5.6% of trials), too fast (1.2%) or 
too slow responses (2.4%), and outlier trials (0.6%) were excluded from the analyses. In 
total, 9.8% of trials were excluded from the main task.  
A 2x2x2x2 RM-ANOVA with factors Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), Target 
Valence (positive vs. negative), Prime Validity (valid vs. invalid) and Presentation (subliminal 
vs. supraliminal) was conducted. For discrimination, a 2-way RM-ANOVA with factors 
Presentation (Subliminal vs. Supraliminal) and Valence (Positive vs. Negative) was 
conducted. Statistical analyses were the same as in Experiment 1. T-tests for the detection 
and discrimination tasks were adjusted for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni 
correction using MATLAB code.  
 
3.5.1.6. Power analyses  
For both experiments a power analysis was conducted post-hoc using G*Power 
(version 3.1.9.2) to calculate how many subjects would be necessary for significant effects.  
For Experiment 3A, a 2-way RM-ANOVA was initially conducted on the detection and 
discrimination means across short (30 – 60 ms) and long SOA (70 – 100 ms) latencies from 
the sample of five subjects, with Timing (short vs. long) as a factor. The produced partial 
correlation was subsequently used for a sample size calculation. For detection, there was a 
main effect of Timing (F(1,4) = 10.99, p = 0.029, ηp
2 = 0.73), with better detection in long 
compared to short SOA’s. The partial correlation yielded an effect size of 1.66 and a 
suggested sample size of 6 subjects to achieve a power of 0.8. In contrast, for 
discrimination, there was no main effect of Timing and the partial correlation used 
suggested a sample of 84 subjects. Given the results for detection, and the fact that 
Experiment 3A was a pilot, a sample size of five subjects deemed sufficient.  
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Three 
110 
 
For Experiment 3B, the partial correlations from the 4-way RM-ANOVA were used. 
As I was interested on a difference between subliminal and supraliminal presentations, only 
the partial correlation (ηp
2 - 0.35) of an interaction between Presentation and Validity was 
used. This correlation yielded an effect size of 0.73 and a suggested sample size between 16 
and 18 to achieve a power of 0.8. Given that this interaction of interest was significant with 
14 subjects, and that the suggested sample size was not significantly greater, only 14 
subjects were tested.  
 
3.5.2. Results  
 
3.5.2.1. Experiment 3A 
3.5.2.1.1. Detection task 
Combined across positive and negative faces, detection was significantly above 
chance level for longer SOAs only compared to short SOAs after correcting for multiple 
comparisons (Figure 3.8A; d’70: p = 0.0054; d’80: p = 0.0014, d’90: p = 0.0015, d’100:  p = 
0.007). When averaged across long and short SOAs, only priming with long SOAs allowed for 
significantly above chance detection (short SOAs: t(4) = -1.65,  n.s; long SOAs: t(4) = -2.57,  p = 
0.062). 
 
3.5.2.1.2. Discrimination task  
 
Subjective d’  
Combined across positive and negative faces, subjective d’ was significantly above 
chance level after adjusting for multiple comparisons for SOAs 40, 60 and 70 ms (Figure 
3.8B) (d’30: p = 0.299; d’40: p = 0.010; d’50: p = 0.142; d’60: p = 0.010; d’70: p = 0.038; d’80: 
p = 0.073; d’90: p = 0.093; d’100: p = 0.467). When averaged across long and short SOAs, 
both priming with long and short SOAs allowed for above chance discrimination (short 
SOAs: t(4) = 4.50,  p = 0.011; long SOAs: t(4) = -3.98,  p = 0.016). 
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Objective d’ 
Combined across positive and negative faces, objective d’ was significantly different 
from chance level after correcting for multiple comparisons for all SOAs except for SOA 50 
ms and 100 ms (Figure 3.8C; (d’30: p < 0.001; d’40: p = 0.0001; d’50: p = 0.011; d’60: p = 
0.001; d’70: p = 0.001; d’80: p = 0.016; d’90: p = 0.023; d’100: p = 0.099). When averaged 
across long and short SOAs, both priming with short SOAs allowed for above chance 
discrimination, but not for long SOAs (short SOAs: t(4) = 3.22,  p = 0.032; long SOAs: n.s.).  
 
 
Figure 3.8. Detection and discrimination of affective faces at different SOAs. A) Detection of affective faces at 
different SOAs shows that participants were marginally better at detecting positive and negative faces with 
longer SOAs. B) Subjective discrimination (i.e. how confident participants were of their decision) of positive 
and negative faces shows that discrimination was impaired at an SOA of 30, 50 and 100 ms only. C) Objective 
discrimination (i.e. the probability of correct responses) was impaired at an SOA of 100 ms only. For stimuli to 
be considered subliminal, participants must be able to detect the presence of the stimulus but not be able to 
discriminate its content. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
 
 Combining the data for detection and discrimination tasks, the SOA that led stimuli to 
being subliminal was 100 ms. Detection was above chance level for 100 ms, yet both 
objective and subjective discrimination were not significantly different from chance. As such, 
an SOA of 100 ms was used in the priming task in Experiment 3B.   
 
 
 
 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Three 
112 
 
3.5.2.2. Experiment 3B  
 
3.5.2.2.1. Affective priming task  
Overall, there was an effect of target valence on the initiation of approach-avoidance 
actions (Figure 3.9A; Target valence*Congruency; F(1,13) = 136.12, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.91). RTs 
were significantly faster when approaching compared to avoiding positive faces (approach: 
583 ± 21 ms; avoid: 669 ± 23 ms; t(4) = -8.23,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.98). There was no 
difference when approaching negative compared to avoiding (approach: 631 ± 22 ms; avoid: 
653 ± 23 ms; t(4) = 1.79,  n.s.). Participants were faster to approach positive than negative 
faces (t(4) = -4.20,  p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.13). There was no difference in avoidance 
between positive and negative faces.  
The effects of prime-target validity were also different between subliminal and 
supraliminal presentations (Figure 3.9B; Validity*Presentation; F(1,13) = 6.84, p = 0.021, ηp
2 = 
0.35). Results showed that there was no effect of subliminal primes on RTs to affective 
targets. For subliminal presentations, there was no significant difference between valid and 
invalid trials (valid: 625 ± 21, invalid: 632 ± 22, n.s.). In contrast, for supraliminal 
presentations, there was a significant effect of validity (valid: 623 ± 21 ms; invalid: 655 ± 23 
ms; t(29) = -4.03,  p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.12), replicating Experiment 1. 
Additionally, all four factors yielded main effects. There was a main effect of 
presentation (F(1,13) = 6.19, p = 0.027, ηp
2 = 0.32) with faster RTs for subliminal compared to 
supraliminal primes (sub: 629 ± 22 ms; sup: 640 ± 22 ms; t(13) = -2.52,  p = 0.026, Cohen’s d = -
0.70). There was a main effect of congruency (F(1,13) = 10.04, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.44), with faster 
RTs for congruent compared to incongruent movements to affective faces (cong: 618 ± 22 
ms; incong: 651 ± 23 ms; t(13) = -3.16,  p = 0.008, Cohen’s d = -0.86). There was a main effect 
of validity (F(1,13) = 21.16, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.62), with faster action initiation for valid 
compared to invalid trials (valid: 624 ± 21 ms; invalid: 644 ± 22 ms; t(13) = -4.62,  p < 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -1.28), and a main effect of valence (F(1,13) = 8.74= 0.011, ηp
2 = 0.40), with faster 
responses to positive compared to negative target faces (pos: 626 ± 21 ms; neg: 642 ± 22 ms; 
t(13) = -2.93,  p = 0.012, Cohen’s d = -0.81) 
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Figure 3.9. Speed of initiation to target faces when subliminal and supraliminal primes are presented. A) 
Interaction between the valence of the target face and the speed of initiation of approach and avoidance 
actions for supraliminal presentations. Approaching negative faces was faster than avoiding, whereas 
approaching positive faces was faster than avoiding. B) Interaction between the type of presentation 
(subliminal vs. supraliminal) and prime-target validity showing that the speed of response initiation was only 
influenced by supraliminal primes. Responses were faster when supraliminal valid primes were presented 
compared to when invalid primes were presented. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at p < 0.001 level, * 
significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
 
3.5.2.2.2. Discrimination task 
 
Subjective d’  
There was a main effect of Presentation (F(1,13) = 26.82, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.67), with 
discrimination below chance level for subliminal primes (sub: -0.48 ± 0.37), and above 
chance level for supraliminal primes (sup: 1.06 ± 0.18). Discrimination between both was 
significantly different from each other (supraliminal: t(13) = 5.17,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d =  
1.35). Subjective d’ for subliminal presentations was not significantly different from chance 
(t(13) = 1.27,  n.s), indicating that subjects were not able to discriminate the content of the 
subliminal primes. In contrast, subjective discrimination was above chance level for 
supraliminal primes (t(13) = -5.88,  p < 0.001).  
When split into positive and negative valences, subjective discrimination for 
subliminal affective faces was not significantly different from chance. When primes were 
presented supraliminally, both positive and negative primes were significantly discriminated 
above chance (negative: 1.32 ± 0.25; t(13) = 5.38, p < 0.001; positive: 0.81 ± 0.27; t(13) = 2.97, 
p = 0.011).  
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Objective d’ 
There was a main effect of Presentation (F(1,13) = 138.78, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.91), with 
discrimination below chance level for subliminal primes (sub: 0.12 ± 0.01), and above 
chance for supraliminal primes (sup: 0.57 ± 0.04). Discrimination between both was 
significantly different from each other (t(13) = 11.79,  p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 15.44). Objective 
d’ for subliminal presentations was significantly below chance level (t(13) = 26.87,  p < 0.001), 
indicating that subjects were not able to discriminate the content of the subliminal primes. 
In contrast, discrimination was above chance for supraliminal primes (t(13) = -1.92,  p = 
0.049).  
When split into positive and negative valences, objective discrimination for 
subliminal affective faces was significantly below chance level (positive: 0.13 ± 0.01, t(13) = -
24.80,  p < 0.001; negative: 0.11 ± 0.02, t(13) = -16.86,  p < 0.001). When primes were 
presented supraliminally, only negative primes were significantly discriminated above 
chance (negative: 0.59 ± 0.04; t(13) = 2.27, p = 0.041).  
 
3.5.3. Discussion  
Experiment 3 aimed to determine the extent to which action preparation by 
emotional primes can be unconscious. To this end, subliminal and supraliminal prime faces 
were presented in an approach-avoidance task. Despite using an SOA that made affective 
primes subliminal, there was no difference in responses between valid and invalid trials, 
indicating that subliminal primes were unable to influence preparation. In contrast, when 
primes were presented supraliminally, there was an effect of prime validity, with faster 
responses for the same prime-target pairings compared to different prime-target pairings. 
This corroborates the results of Experiment 1 and 2, and confirms that when affective 
primes are consciously processed and correctly identified they can facilitate or interfere 
with the initiation of responses to affective targets. The current results contradict previous 
work suggesting that subliminal primes can affect the initiation of responses (Duckworth et 
al., 2002; Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008; Sweeny et al., 2009). 
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One could argue that the primes presented were not subliminal because 
discrimination of subliminal primes during the affective priming task was below chance 
level. However, Experiment 3A confirmed that using a combined SOA of 100 ms (20 ms 
prime, 80 ms mask) rendered stimuli subliminal because such stimuli were detected yet not 
discriminated, suggesting that the visual system was able to process the presence of a 
stimulus but not correctly identify its content. Indeed, other work has suggested that a 
combined SOA around 100 ms makes stimuli subliminal (Henson, Mouchlianitis, Matthews, 
& Kouider, 2008). Thus, during the priming task, subliminal affective primes should have 
been detected but not identified. Indeed, the discrimination results of the priming task 
confirm that subjects were unable to correctly discriminate subliminal prime faces. In 
contrast, supraliminal faces were identified above chance and were therefore consciously 
processed.  
Importantly, there was an overall effect of valence on approach-avoidance 
responses, with faster approach than avoidance to positive target faces, corroborating 
previous work demonstrating an effect of congruency (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Lavender & 
Hommel, 2007; Roelofs et al., 2009). In contrast, there was no difference in approaching or 
avoiding negative targets, as seen in Experiment 1 and 2, and in support of evidence shown 
in Chapter Two. However, when combined across positive and negative valences, response 
initiation was faster for congruent trials, demonstrating approach-avoidance tendencies in 
goal-directed contexts.  
In sum, primes are only capable of influencing the preparation of approach-
avoidance responses if they can be correctly discriminated and consciously detected. Action 
preparation is dependent on the conscious evaluation of affective information.  
 
3.6. General Discussion  
Having established an effect of approach-avoidance tendencies and context on the 
selection and initiation of actions in Chapter Two, the current chapter examined whether 
task-irrelevant emotional information would anticipate upcoming approach-avoidance 
responses, thereby leading to enhanced preparation. Experiment 1 demonstrated that 
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affective primes influence action preparation according to their task-related associations 
and that such primes are capable of interfering with target responses. Experiment 2 
replicated these results and confirmed that, when compared to a neutral control baseline, 
affective primes also speed up responses when primes matched targets. Experiment 3 
further showed that subliminal affective primes do not unconsciously influence the 
preparation of approach-avoidance responses to affective targets. The current chapter 
provides novel evidence on how affective primes influence the preparation of responses to 
upcoming emotional stimuli.  
 
Affective and neutral primes do not activate their predisposed stimulus-response (S-R) 
mappings  
Both Experiment 1 and 2 confirmed that top-down influences established through 
task instructions determine how affective primes bias approach-avoidance responses, 
supporting the action-trigger account (Kiesel et al., 2007; Kunde et al., 2003). Thus, despite 
previous proposals that predisposed tendencies are immediately triggered upon stimulus 
evaluation (Chen & Bargh, 1999), this work shows that top-down instructions can override 
response tendencies, in support of previous work (Bunzeck, Guitart-Masip, Dolan, & Düzel, 
2011; Liefooghe et al., 2013; Waszak et al., 2013). This is also supportive of the common-
coding account (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Eder & Rothermund, 2008), which proposes 
that movement instructions may drive the preparation of approach-avoidance responses. 
Thus, contrary to the results of Eder & Klauer (2009), positive and negative primes do not 
automatically predispose for approach and avoidance, respectively. This result corroborates 
previous work showing that affective primes do not automatically influence flexion 
(approach) and extension (avoidance) movements to affective targets (Rotteveel & Phaf, 
2004; Experiment 3). Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, and further showed that 
neutral face primes did not affect responses to affective targets. It is likely that, despite 
extensive training, the newly established S-R associations for neutral primes were 
overridden by task-relevant instructions (Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). Indeed, it is 
suggested that preparation only occurs in cases when the irrelevant prime information is 
task-relevant (Hommel, 2000). As the task instructions were valence-related, the neutral 
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prime information was task-irrelevant. In line with Chapter Two, the current results further 
show that action preparation is guided by context-related influences.  
 
Affective primes can slow down and speed up the initiation of responses to affective targets  
The results further revealed that preparation had beneficial or interfering effects 
depending on the validity of the prime-target pairing. Compared to neutral primes, affective 
primes interfered with responses to subsequent affective target when the prime-target 
pairing was invalid, presumably due to response conflict between the prime and target. In 
contrast, affective primes facilitated target responses when prime-target pairings were 
valid, supporting other work (Klauer, 1997). The results suggest that relative to neutral 
primes, affective primes influenced action preparation, even though primes were task-
irrelevant. This is further supported by the observation that the lateralised readiness 
potential (LRP), a neural measure of response preparation, increases rapidly following prime 
onset but before target onset, suggesting rapid preparation for impending action by 
affective information (Bartholow et al., 2009; Eder et al., 2012; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Hsu et al., 2008; Leuthold, 2003; Schmidt, Haberkamp, & Schmidt, 2011).  
The influence of emotional primes on action preparation most likely occurred 
because despite being task-irrelevant, their emotional content was prioritised by attentional 
mechanisms (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001) thereby 
enhancing perceptual processing of the target (Pessoa et al., 2002; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; 
Scharlau, 2002). This suggests that affective primes do hold some automatic influence on 
action preparation, congruent with proposals that task instructions are unconsciously 
applied to primes (Dehaene et al., 1998), and that this influence interacts with top-down 
instructions. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that in Experiment 2, despite 
being correctly discriminated, neutral prime information did not seem to have been 
prioritised relative to emotional primes, evident in the lack of priming effect in the neutral 
condition. 
Overall, the results show that in a given environment, emotional cues may be used 
to determine preparation for an impending emotional stimulus, like when scary music in a 
movie prepares us for a potentially scary impending scene. To my knowledge, this is the first 
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demonstration that affective primes can influence the preparation of approach-avoidance 
actions.  
 
Correct discrimination of the prime is essential for interference effects  
All experiments assessed participants’ objective and subjective discrimination ability, 
based on previous reports that even in the absence of awareness, affective primes can still 
influence responses (Sweeny et al., 2009). In Experiment 1, there was no interference effect 
when positive target faces were primed by negative inverted faces. This may have resulted 
from negative inverted faces not being discriminated subjectively above chance (albeit 
objective discrimination was above chance) and therefore were not perceived as negative. It 
has been previously suggested that subjective awareness provides a better estimation of 
priming effects and that objective awareness alone may be insufficient to elicit priming 
effects (Hsu et al., 2008). Failure to perceive an affective prime correctly as negative meant 
that the associated response was not activated by the prime and no conflict occurred with 
the target.  
In contrast, when a negative target was primed by a positive inverted face there was 
a response interference effect because positive inverted faces were discriminated both 
subjectively and objectively above chance. This supports previous work (Lipp, Price, & 
Tellegen, 2009), and demonstrates that the correct subjective discrimination of the affective 
prime is a pre-requisite for driving interference/facilitatory effects between the prime and 
the target. This was further demonstrated in Experiment 3, which showed no influence of 
subliminal affective primes on action preparation. These results emphasize the need for 
correct discrimination of affective content to influence action preparation. Indeed, recent 
work demonstrated that correct affective categorisation requires awareness (Lähteenmäki, 
Hyönä, Koivisto, & Nummenmaa, 2015). However, the fact that subliminal faces did not lead 
to priming effects does not negate the fact that supraliminal emotional primes are still 
prioritised by the visual system. Rather, it suggests that the conscious evaluation of an 
emotional stimulus is a necessity for the prioritisation of emotional stimulus. This is 
supportive of studies suggesting that awareness of the emotional stimulus automatically 
engages attentional mechanisms (Pessoa et al. 2002; Pessoa, 2005). In sum, there are no 
unconscious effects of affective information on action preparation.  
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Two types of response conflict slow down reaction times to positive and negative target 
faces   
In the current experiments, two types of response conflict driving interference 
effects were observed. Firstly, the expected conflict between prime and target responses 
when both their responses and affective component did not match (validity conflict) 
(Bartholow et al., 2009). Secondly, in incongruent blocks there was the additional conflict of 
approaching negative and avoiding positive faces (congruency conflict). Previous studies 
have suggested that incongruent movements are slower to execute because they conflict 
with predisposed tendencies (Roelofs et al., 2009; van Peer et al., 2007).  
In all experiments, approaching positive target faces was faster than avoiding, 
demonstrating a degree of predisposition that influences the speed of initiating instructed 
responses. Therefore, in incongruent trials, avoiding positive faces conflicted with the 
natural tendency to approach positive faces, slowing down responses. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 1, responses were slower for invalid trials. As such, responses were slowest on 
trials in which movements were incongruent with the natural tendency to approach and in 
which the targets were invalidly cued, suggesting that a “double interference” occurred. It is 
possible that two different types of response conflicts were activated simultaneously, one 
by the prime-target pairing and the other by the approach-avoidance valence mapping.  
For negative target faces, in all experiments there was a trend toward faster 
approach than avoidance but was not significant. Responses were slowest in trials in which 
participants had to avoid fearful faces and in which the targets were invalidly cued, 
resembling the “double interference” seen for positive faces. This approach-avoidance trend 
is difficult to interpret because previous studies have shown either a clear avoidance 
(Ozono, Watabe, & Yoshikawa, 2012; Seidel, Habel, Kirschner, Gur, & Derntl, 2010) or 
approach (Hammer & Marsh, 2015; Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005) tendency for fearful 
faces. Our current results suggest that avoidance may not always be the natural tendency 
when encountering negative (fearful) faces. For example, although fearful faces are 
classified as negative faces, they can either be interpreted as alerting someone of 
impending danger and thus eliciting avoidance, or as a face showing a “cry for help” which 
elicits approach (Marsh et al., 2005). One can only speculate that given the ambiguous 
nature of the fearful faces, either approach or avoidance is elicited depending on the 
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interpretation of the subject. Each participant could subjectively perceive the fearful face 
either as an “alert for danger” or as a “cry for help”, which leads to either avoidance or 
approach. Indeed, Chapter Two has shown that negative stimuli can result in both approach 
and avoidance depending on the context. Furthermore, priming effects between fear and 
disgust, two emotions classified as negative, have been demonstrated to be context-
dependent (Lee, Kang, Lee, Namkoong, & An, 2011). Given the existing conflictive results in 
the literature regarding responses to fearful faces, it is likely that fearful faces are 
subjectively classified differently. Therefore, subjective ratings of how participants perceive 
the face to be would be a good measure to employ in situations where reaction times do 
not differ between approach and avoidance of fearful faces. 
In brief, there was not only a response conflict between the prime and the target, 
but also interference related to a conflict between an instructed response (e.g. avoid 
positive) and the emotional tendency (e.g. approach positive). Both of these conflicts 
resulted in an overall greater slowing down of responses. Future studies could look at the 
neural basis of when and where these two types of conflicts arise, for example by looking at 
the LRP. It is likely that response conflict between the prime and the target would arise first 
in an automatic manner and that congruency interference between the movement and the 
valence would arise second, via a slower and more cognitive mechanism.  
 
Conclusion  
To conclude, the current chapter provides novel evidence on the ability of affective 
information to anticipate and prepare for impending actions. Importantly, this preparation 
is determined by top-down influences that override response tendencies, supporting the 
action-trigger account but contradicting the valence-trigger account. Furthermore, the 
correct discrimination and conscious awareness of the affective content of the primes is 
essential for influencing preparation. Finally, this chapter shows that two types of 
interference contribute to slowing down of responses during preparation: validity and 
congruency conflict. Taken together, Chapter Two and Three demonstrate that emotional 
stimuli and the context in which actions take place are key influences on action selection 
and preparation processes.  
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4. Chapter Four. Action execution is influenced by 
emotional valence: evidence from response vigour 
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4.1. Abstract  
 
Approach-avoidance response tendencies influence action selection. The ability of 
such tendencies to bias behaviour may not just stop at the action selection stage. For 
instance, selecting to run away from a dangerous animal may need to be complemented by 
running away faster in order to achieve a successful outcome. Thus, the appropriate 
implementation of action parameters established through motor planning is what will 
ultimately determine how successful behaviour is. Biases on motor planning have recently 
been demonstrated in the vigour of an action, that is, the effort necessary to achieve a 
beneficial outcome. For instance, rewards and punishments have been shown to influence 
how vigorous actions are. In emotional situations, positive stimuli could be seen as 
rewarding, whereas negative stimuli can be considered punishments. It is therefore possible 
that emotional stimuli that lead to positive or negative outcomes also influence motor 
planning (and consequently vigour). However, emotional stimuli have associated approach-
avoidance tendencies that may also bias motor planning. Whether emotional stimuli and 
their associated approach-avoidance tendencies bias the planning of action parameters 
remains unresolved. To address this, a novel task was designed in which participants moved 
a manikin on a screen either towards or away from an emotional picture by pressing on force 
buttons. Results showed there was an influence of valence and arousal on vigour, with high-
arousing negative pictures leading to increased vigour relative to positive pictures. In 
contrast, approach-avoidance tendencies did not influence vigour, but did influence the 
speed of action selection. The results therefore demonstrate that approach-avoidance 
tendencies do not influence different motor processes. Instead, motor planning and action 
execution are influenced by negative stimuli that may activate a defensive circuitry that 
optimises behaviour in threatening contexts.  
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4.2. Introduction  
Approach and avoidance tendencies influence the speed at which actions are 
selected and initiated when encountering emotional stimuli, as demonstrated in Chapters 
Two and Three. However, the ability of approach-avoidance tendencies to bias behaviour 
may not just stop at the action selection stage. Selecting to run away from a dangerous 
animal may not be sufficient to avoid a costly outcome. Running away faster, for example, is 
what will lead to a successful outcome. Appropriate behaviour therefore encompasses the 
selection of the best available action and the implementation of high-quality movement. 
Indeed, after an action is selected, the action is subsequently planned (Cos, Duque, & Cisek, 
2014; Wong et al., 2015), determining the parameters (e.g. speed, strength) that will define 
how an action is executed (Desmurget et al., 1999; Marteniuk et al., 1987; Paulignan et al., 
1997). The appropriate implementation of these action parameters is what will ultimately 
determine how successful behaviour is. The specification of action parameters, just like 
action selection, relies on sensory information from the environment, for example, the 
relation of the body to an object in space (Cisek, 2007). This is important because it suggests 
that information that biases one process may also bias the other. As such, it is possible that 
emotional biases on action selection will also bias the planning of movement parameters for 
successful behaviour, and this is evident through execution (Shadmehr & Krakauer, 2008).   
Biases on motor planning have recently been demonstrated in the vigour of an 
action (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2014; Niv et al., 2005; Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007; 
Wong, Lindquist, Haith, & Krakauer, 2015). Here, vigour reflects the opportunity cost of an 
action: how much effort should I make given the available benefits? This can be quantified 
by changes in, for example, the speed (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012) or the strength (Coombes 
et al., 2007, 2008) of a response throughout execution. Evidence has shown that vigour is 
influenced by appetitive and aversive environments (Niv et al., 2005), and that performance 
is biased by the value of a predicted outcome, i.e. reward vs. punishment (Guitart-Masip et 
al., 2011; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014). For example, a rewarding stimulus will lead to more 
vigorous action, whereas punishment will lead to less vigorous action. Furthermore, the 
effort one must produce during execution informs individuals about the value of a reward, 
with increasing amounts of perceivable effort seeming less rewarding and leading to less 
vigorous actions (Klein-Flügge et al., 2015). The nature of a reward or punishment therefore 
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appears to influence the planning and vigour of the action made to achieve the outcome 
(Shadmehr & Krakauer, 2008).  
Emotional situations can be assigned positive or negative value, depending on the 
nature of the emotional stimulus (Rolls, 2000). Indeed, brain areas that encode reward 
value, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, have also been associated to the 
encoding of emotional stimuli (Schoenbaum, Roesch, Stalnaker, & Takahashi, 2009; Vrtička, 
Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Winecoff et al., 2013), suggesting that similar value encoding 
mechanisms work for rewards and punishments and emotional stimuli. For example, 
positive stimuli could be seen as rewarding, whereas negative stimuli can be considered 
punishments (Lang & Bradley, 2008; Rolls, 2000). If rewards and punishments, which are 
classified as positive and negative in value, bias the vigour of actions, then it is possible that 
this bias translates to positive and negative emotional stimuli. However, unlike common 
rewards and punishments, such as monetary gains and losses, emotional stimuli have 
associated approach-avoidance tendencies that may also bias opportunity costs. For 
example, approaching a positive stimulus may be rewarding, but approaching a negative 
stimulus may be potentially costly. The same action is assigned a different value given the 
emotional stimulus and this may impact performance. Indeed, work has shown that 
performance is better when participants need to respond to obtain a reward (which could 
be seen as an approach) but worse when they need to respond to avoid a punishment 
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). This gives an indication that both actions and valence bias 
opportunity costs. In emotional situations, response tendencies may bias vigour in order to 
achieve the desired outcome (e.g. avoid a threatening stimulus). To the best of my 
knowledge, this question currently remains unresolved. 
 
Emotional stimuli and associated response tendencies may impact vigour    
Work has demonstrated an effect of emotional valence on vigour (Ambron & Foroni, 
2015; Coombes, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2006; Coombes et al., 2008; Ferri et al., 2010). 
Emotional valence increases the strength of responses relative to neutral stimuli (Coombes 
et al., 2008; Naugle, Coombes, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2012), and decreases the speed of 
movement when compared to neutral stimuli (Ambron & Foroni, 2015; Ferri et al., 2010). 
Thus, emotional stimuli appear to bias the planning of execution parameters relative to 
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neutral stimuli. Vigour may also be modulated by approach-avoidance tendencies. Studies 
using whole body movements showed that the presentation of emotional stimuli influences 
the velocity and size of stepping made towards or away from such stimuli (Koch, Holland, 
Hengstler, & van Knippenberg, 2009; Naugle, Hass, Joyner, Coombes, & Janelle, 2011; Stins  
et al., 2011). For example, stepping tends to be smaller and slower when presented with 
negative compared to positive pictures (Stins et al., 2015). Furthermore, approach is faster 
when presented with positive stimuli relative to negative stimuli (Esteves et al., 2016). Thus, 
approaching is enhanced in positive contexts, whereas responding is diminished in negative 
contexts. This supports an interaction between action and valence that influences 
performance in emotional contexts (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).  
In contrast, other evidence suggests that emotional stimuli and approach-avoidance 
tendencies do not influence vigour (Coombes et al., 2007, 2007; Stins & Beek, 2011; Stins et 
al., 2011). For instance, the magnitude and speed of stepping towards or away from an 
emotional stimulus are unaffected by approach-avoidance tendencies (Stins & Beek, 2011; 
Stins et al., 2011). Similarly, the speed and magnitude of avoidance is not influenced by 
positive or negative stimuli (Coombes et al., 2007, 2007). The evidence for an effect of 
approach-avoidance tendencies and emotional valence on vigour is mixed and inconclusive.  
The parameters of vigour established during motor planning should reflect 
opportunity cost biases arising from approach-avoidance tendencies (Paulignan et al., 1997; 
Desmurget et al., 1999). Do tendencies associated to positive and negative stimuli bias the 
planning of action parameters that will be implemented during action execution? If this is 
the case, then it would add to evidence in favour of such tendencies influencing action 
selection. Thus, an effect on selection and planning would demonstrate a capacity for such 
approach-avoidance tendencies to influence different motor processes that occur prior to 
execution. At present, this issue remains unresolved. To this end, the aim of this study was 
to determine if approach-avoidance tendencies bias motor planning and the vigour of 
actions.  
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Investigating the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on action execution 
This chapter is concerned with how approach-avoidance tendencies influence the 
vigour of our actions. To investigate this, a novel task was designed in which participants 
were required to move a manikin on a screen either towards or away from an emotional 
picture by pressing on force buttons with their index fingers. Here, force and speed of 
movement quantified vigour. Based on previous studies (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rotteveel, 
Spinhoven, Tollenaar, Roelofs, & Van Peer, 2010), it was expected that participants would 
be faster at initiating approach than avoidance for positive stimuli, and faster at initiating 
avoidance than approach for negative stimuli. Further, in line with previous evidence 
(Esteves et al., 2016; Stins et al., 2015), I expected predisposed actions to be more vigorous. 
For example, subjects were expected to press harder and move faster to approach than to 
avoid positive pictures, and to press harder and move faster to avoid than approach 
negative pictures. If only action selection but not planning is influenced by approach-
avoidance tendencies, an effect on response initiation (i.e. the reaction time) but not on 
vigour is expected. Such an effect would dissociate between the effects of emotional 
tendencies on selection and planning. In contrast, if both action selection and planning are 
biased by approach-avoidance tendencies, then an effect of approach-avoidance on both 
initiation and vigour should be seen, demonstrating an ability of such tendencies to 
influence different motor stages.  
 
4.3. Methods 
 
4.3.1. Participants  
24 healthy volunteers (mean age = 22.7 years [± 3.7 S.D.]; 20 female) were recruited 
from the University College London Psychology database, with local ethics approval (UCL). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants gave written 
informed consent to participate in the study, and received monetary compensation for their 
time and travel (7.5£/h).  
 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Four 
127 
 
4.3.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
160 pictures were selected from the IAPS (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008): 80 
negative pictures with valences 1.8-3.8 (1.6 = most negative), and 80 positive pictures with 
valences 6.2-8.2 (8.2 = most positive). All pictures (maximum 240 x 180 pixels) were 
matched for luminance and matched as closely as possible in their arousal (with an equal 
proportion of high and low). Only pictures depicting humans or animals were included. The 
assignment of pictures in each of the 8 blocks and order of presentation was randomised for 
each subject. Block order was counterbalanced across participants. Each block comprised of 
80 trials (40 positive/negative).  
All stimuli were presented on a 19-inch LCD monitor of a Dell Optiplex-780 computer 
(refresh rate: 60 Hz), using the Cogent 2000 toolbox (v1.32; University College London, 
http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.html) and MATLAB (v.7.9.1.705; The 
MathWorks Inc.). A white manikin (2.8 x 1.9 cm) represented the self. A black square with 
yellow border (240 x 180 pixels), the same size as the pictures, represented the “away” 
target and was presented on the bottom half of the screen. The manikin was moved 
smoothly on the screen by increasing or decreasing the pixels of the y-coordinates. Subjects 
had to move the manikin 180 y-coordinates upwards or downwards, depending on the 
target.  
A custom-made USB force button box translated force into movement on the screen. 
The button boxes consist of four minibeam load cells (Omega Engineering Inc.) and one 
four-channel in-house developed instrument amplifier. The analogue output for each 
channel, proportional to the exerted force, was acquired using a Phidget21 InterfaceKit 
(v2.1.8, Phidgets Inc.) and fed into a Phidget A/D board. The force applied translated into 
online movement of the manikin on the screen via MATLAB code at a sampling rate of 60 
Hz. Depending on the strength, the manikin moved faster or slower (by moving more or less 
pixels on the screen during a specific time). The buttons were sensitive to force but because 
the buttons themselves did not move (i.e. isometric force), participants did not receive 
explicit (bodily) feedback on the strength of their responses.   
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4.3.3. Calibration 
To account for individual differences in strength, participants completed a 
calibration session in which they pressed with each index finger independently as hard as 
possible. An arrow pointing either to the left or the right indicated which index finger to 
press with. Participants began pressing when they saw the word start until they saw the 
word stop. They were required to press with their maximum strength for three seconds. 
This was repeated three times for each finger. An average of the three traces for each finger 
was calculated to obtain a mean maximum voluntary contraction (MVC) level for each finger 
independently. This MVC was used to set the starting threshold for when the manikin 
should start moving (20% of MVC) and was also used to calculate the speed at which the 
manikin should move on the screen (30% of 20% MVC).   
 
4.3.4. Experimental task 
Participants were seated in front of a computer at a distance of approximately 50 
cm. The force button box was placed in front of them. Participants were instructed to move 
the manikin either towards or away from the pictures, according to the instructions at the 
beginning of each block. They were specifically told that the goal of the task was to move to 
the correct target as accurately as possible. Neither force nor speed were ever emphasized. 
Vigour was therefore implicit. Participants were instructed to imagine that the manikin 
represented them on the screen, as in previous chapters.  
In line with previous chapters, blocks were congruent or incongruent with response 
tendencies. In one block type, participants were instructed to move towards positive and 
away from negative pictures. In another block type, they had to move towards negative and 
away from positive pictures. Each block type was repeated 4 times, meaning each picture 
was repeated four times, twice in each condition. In total there were 160 repetitions for 
each experimental condition. Participants were always instructed of the mapping at the 
beginning of each block. To avoid potential confounds with one finger being stronger than 
the other, half the subjects were instructed to press to move towards with their left index 
finger and to press to move away with their right index finger. The remaining half had the 
opposite mapping.  
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Figure 4.1. Task schematic depicting two trials. 
Participants were presented with a fixation cross 
(500 ms), followed by the presentation of the 
manikin on the centre of the screen (300 ± 100). 
Subsequently, an emotional picture and a yellow 
“away” target were simultaneously displayed for a 
total duration of 2000 ms. According to the 
instructions given at the beginning of the block (e.g. 
move the manikin towards positive, move away from 
negative pictures), participants were required to 
press the respective force key to approach or avoid. 
The emotional picture remained on the screen 
irrespective of how fast the manikin moved to the 
target area. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the task schematic for two trial sequences. Trials started with a 
central fixation cross (500 ms), followed by the appearance of the manikin at the centre of 
the screen (randomly jittered – mean 300 ± 100 ms), and then the appearance of the picture 
on the upper half of the screen and the away target area on the bottom half of the screen 
(2000 ms). The manikin was moved to the respective target as a function of force (the harder 
subjects pressed the faster the manikin moved). However, to discourage subjects from 
removing the pictures from the screen faster by pressing harder, all pictures remained on 
the screen for 2000 ms irrespective of when the subjects reached the correct target area. 
Thus, there was no time benefit of reaching the target area as fast as possible. 
Before the experiment, participants completed two short training blocks, one with 
each valence-movement mapping, of 30 trials each to familiarise participants with the task. 
After completion of the experimental session, participants rated the valence and arousal of 
all 180 pictures on a scale of 1 (i.e. very negative/very low arousal) to 9 (i.e. very 
positive/very high arousal).  
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4.3.5. Variables of interest and data analyses 
Response initiation was quantified by reaction times (RTs), whereas vigour was 
quantified by the speed of movement and strength of responses during execution. These 
two measures for vigour were taken because it is conceivable that in two trials the strength 
of the response is similar, but that the peak strength is reached at different times.  
 
Speed of action initiation: Reaction times  
To determine the speed of action selection and initiation, RTs were measured as in 
Chapters Two and Three. RTs were determined from the time of target onset to when the 
force exceeded the MVC threshold (20% MVC).  
 
Speed of vigour: movement times and acceleration 
Two measures revealed influences on the temporal profile of vigour: movement 
times (MTs) and peak acceleration.  
MTs reveal the total duration of movement from time of movement onset (RT) until 
the target area was reached. MTs reflect the overall speed of movement. Approach-
avoidance tendencies may influence how fast an action is performed (e.g. moving towards a 
negative stimulus may be slower than moving away because it is not a predisposed 
tendency). MTs are therefore on way to quantify the vigour of a response throughout a trial.  
However, just knowing whether an action was faster than another may not be 
sufficient to reveal the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on vigour. Two 
movements may have similar movement times but there may be changes in the speed of a 
movement during a given trial (i.e. acceleration) that are unaccounted for by MTs. 
Acceleration was calculated by dividing the change in force (end force minus RT force) by 
the change in time (end time minus the RT) throughout the trial. While two trials may have 
similar MTs, they may have different values at the RT force and end force (Figure 4.2), and 
this will result in different acceleration.  
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Figure 4.2. Potential differences between MT and 
acceleration (not based on real data).  While three trials 
may have the same MT, the RT force used to calculate 
acceleration may differ, resulting in differences in 
acceleration. For instance, the second trial had a greater 
RT force than the first trial.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strength of vigour: changes in force production  
The spatial profile of vigour was investigated by measuring peak force (max RT 
force), the timing of when peak force occurred (time of max RT force) and the amount of 
effort made throughout a trial (force integral).  
Avoiding a threatening dog may increase the force output relative to approaching a 
threatening stimulus. Max RT force was calculated as the maximum force value during a 
period from the RT until the participants had reached the respective target. This will give a 
value reflecting the maximum vigour achieved. The timing of when this maximum force is 
reached distinguishes between early or late influences on vigour. Some profiles may have 
the same peak force but there may be differences in how early this was reached.  Avoiding a 
negative stimulus, for instance, may not only be stronger but reaching the desired strength 
may also happen faster. The early spatiotemporal properties of movement are dissociated 
from later properties (Messier & Kalaska, 1999) and reveal biases on movement planning 
that occurs prior to action initiation. Maximum force was expected to be highly correlated 
with acceleration and MTs. 
The peak force simply reveals an overall effect on vigour and does not reflect 
changes on force that occur over a period of time. To assess this, the force integral was 
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calculated. A consistently higher force throughout a trial may be more vigorous than a 
briefly high and subsequently low force. Here, the force integral reflects effort. The force 
integral takes into account the magnitude and timing of movement and was calculated by 
taking the difference in force from RT until participants reached the target area and 
multiplying it by the MT.  
 
Variability of action execution: coefficient of variation  
Variability reflects the consistency of performing an action. For instance, 
approaching a positive stimulus may be more consistent than approaching a negative 
stimulus due to approach-avoidance tendencies. Assessing variability therefore indicates the 
level of bias of tendencies on movement planning. To assess this, the Coefficient of 
Variation (CV) was measured by taking the standard deviation of max RT force and dividing 
it by the max RT force. The CV measures variability relative to the mean of the population 
and thus controls for mean changes.  
 
4.3.6. Statistical analyses  
For RTs, all trials in which the movement did not match the instructions (e.g., 
avoiding when instructed to approach negative pictures; 2.4% of trials), with RTs below 100 
ms (0.8%) or exceeding 2000 ms (3.4%) were excluded from the analyses. Outlier RTs (1.3%) 
were calculated per block for each subject using Grubb’s test, α = 0.05. All force traces were 
normalised to zero before calculating maximum force measures. As above, outlier force 
values (0.5%) were calculated per block for each subject using Grubb’s test. In total, 8.4% of 
trials were excluded.  
A 2x2 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) was conducted with 
factors Movement type (approach vs. avoid) and Valence (positive vs. negative) for each 
dependent variable. Bivariate Pearson’s correlations (two-tailed) were also conducted to 
assess correlations between maximum force production and the force integral, and MTs and 
acceleration. 
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To analyse the effects of valence and arousal on both RTs and force, a multiple 
regression was first calculated by splitting RTs and force into approach and avoidance and 
having valence and arousal as independent variables. This assessed the strength and 
direction of the relationship between valence and RTs/force and arousal and RTs/force. The 
regression yielded beta coefficients (i.e. values indicating the strength and direction of the 
relationship between RTs and factors of interest) that were subsequently used in a two-way 
RM-ANOVA with factors Movement type (approach vs. avoidance) and Variable type 
(valence vs. arousal). The beta coefficients were taken as an indication of which of the 
independent variables (valence or arousal) had a greater impact on the RTs and maximum 
force.  
Paired samples t-tests were conducted between the IAPS and individual picture 
ratings for positive and negative pictures separately, and for high and low arousal 
separately. For all analyses, partial-  is reported as a measure of effect size. Statistical 
threshold was fixed at 0.05. Significant interactions were followed up using two-tailed 
paired-sample t-tests, in addition to calculating Cohen’s d. RT means and standard error of 
the mean (SEM) are reported in brackets.  
 
4.4. Results  
 
4.4.1. Individual picture ratings  
Subjective picture ratings for valence and arousal differed significantly from the IAPS 
picture ratings. Participants rated negative pictures as more negative than the IAPS ratings 
(IAPS: 2.53 ± 0.00, ratings: 2.19 ± 0.11; t(23) = -3.15, p = 0.004) and rated positive pictures the 
same as the IAPS ratings (IAPS: 7.30 ± 0.00, ratings: 7.59 ± 0.15; t(23) = 0.63, p = 0.535). 
Importantly, participants rated negative and positive pictures as different from each other 
(neg ratings: 2.19 ± 0.11, pos ratings: 7.59 ± 0.15; t(23) = -23.92, p < 0.001), indicating that all 
subjects perceived the pictures as being their correct valence.  
 

2
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Participants rated low arousal pictures as being less arousing than the IAPS ratings 
(IAPS: 5.13 ± 0.00, ratings: 4.16 ± 0.27; t(23) = -4.30, p < 0.001), and also rated high arousal 
pictures as being less arousing than the IAPS (IAPS: 6.54 ± 0.00, ratings: 5.02 ± 0.32; t(23) = -
4.82, p < 0.001). Importantly, participants rated low and high arousal pictures as being 
different from each other (low: 4.16 ± 0.10, high: 5.19 ± 0.12; t(76) = -4.93, p < 0.001), 
indicating that participants correctly perceived low and high arousal pictures as being 
different from each other.  
 
4.4.2. Calibration force  
To ensure that MVC did not differ significantly between the left and right index 
fingers, the individual MVC values for the right and left hand for each counterbalancing 
group were compared separately. Paired sample t-tests showed that the left and right 
MVC’s did not differ significantly for either counterbalancing group (Group 1: left: 81 ± 6, 
right: 83 ± 7, t(13) = -9.35, n.s; Group 2: left: 69 ± 5, right: 67 ± 6, t(11) = 9.28, n.s.).  
 
4.4.3. Speed of action initiation: Reaction times 
To assess the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on action selection and 
initiation, an interaction between the type of movement made and the valence of the 
emotional picture was expected. Indeed, the 2-way RM-ANOVA yielded this interaction 
(Figure 4.3; Movement type*Valence, F(1,23) = 34.12, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.60), indicating that the 
valence of the emotional pictures influenced how fast approach and avoidance actions were 
initiated. There was also a main effect of Movement type, F(1,23) = 8.59, p = 0.008, ηp
2 = 0.27, 
with faster initiation of movements to approach than to avoid pictures (app: 745 ± 20 ms; 
avoid: 769 ± 19 ms; t(23) = -2.93, p < 0.008, Cohen’s d = -0.60).  
Follow-up paired t-tests of the 2-way interaction revealed that subjects were faster 
to approach than to avoid positive pictures (app: 721 ± 19 ms; avoid: 803 ± 22 ms; t(23) = -
6.56, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.38), and were faster to avoid than to approach negative 
pictures (app: 769 ± 23; avoid: 735 ± 19 ms; t(23) = 2.54, p = 0.018, Cohen’s d = 0.55). 
Furthermore, subjects were faster to approach positive than negative pictures (t(23) = -3.71, 
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p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.81), and to avoid negative than positive pictures (t(23) = -4.93, p < 
0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.04).  
 
Figure 4.3. The speed of action initiation when approaching 
and avoiding. Emotional pictures triggered their automatic 
response tendencies:  when negative pictures were presented, 
participants were faster to initiate avoidance than approach, 
and when positive pictures were presented, approach was 
faster than avoidance. Initiating approach was faster when 
presented with positive relative to negative pictures, and 
initiating avoidance was faster when presented with negative 
relative to positive pictures. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); light blue 
bars = approach; dark blue bars = avoidance. ** significant at p 
< 0.001 level, * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
Regression analyses conducted to assess the influence of factors valence and arousal 
on RTs confirmed the above results. A 2-way ANOVA conducted on the regression betas 
revealed an influence of valence only on the speed of initiation of approach and avoidance 
(Figure 4.4A; Movement type*Variable type, F(1,23) = 41.28, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.64). Follow-up 
t-tests indicated that when approaching, as valence increases (i.e. becomes more positive) 
RTs decrease (i.e. become faster), as indicated by a mean negative beta (app: -0.13 ± 0.03). 
In contrast, when avoiding as valence increases RTs increase, as shown by a mean positive 
beta (avoid: 0.17 ± 0.03). These beta values differed significantly from each other (t(23) = -
5.97, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.91). Importantly, for valence, the betas for approaching and 
avoiding were significantly different from zero (app valence: t(23) = -3.82, p = 0.001; avoid 
valence: t(23) = 5.31, p < 0.001), indicating a significant impact of valence on RTs. However, 
for the variable arousal, there was no difference between the betas for approach and 
avoidance, and these were also not significantly difference from zero.  
 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Four 
136 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The influence of valence and arousal on the speed of action initiation of approach-avoidance 
responses. A) Interaction between approach-avoidance and variable type showing that only valence 
influenced the speed of action initiation. As valence increased (i.e. became more positive), approaching was 
faster and as valence decreased (i.e. became more negative), avoidance was faster. B) Main effect of variable 
type showing that as arousal increased, participants were faster to initiate actions. Only arousal was 
significantly different from zero. C) Main effect of movement type showing that RTs were faster when 
approaching compared to avoiding, irrespective of valence. Both are significantly different from zero. Error 
bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at p < 0.001 level, * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
There was also a significant main effect of Variable type (Figure 4.4B; F(1,23) = 5.35, p 
= 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.19). As valence increased and became more positive, participants were 
slower to initiate actions (valence: 0.02 ± 0.02). As arousal increased, participants were 
slower to initiate their actions (arousal: -0.03 ± 0.01). However, the betas for valence did not 
differ from zero, most likely as a result of the approach and avoidance betas cancelling each 
other out, whereas there was a difference for the arousal betas (t(23) = -3.73, p = 0.001). 
There was also a main effect of Movement type, (Figure 4.4C; F(1,23) = 23.50, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
0.51) with faster approaching compared to avoiding (app: -0.08 ± 0.02, avoid: 0.07 ± 0.02; 
t(23) = -4.55, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.96). These betas were significantly different from zero 
(app: t(23) = -3.76, p = 0.001; avoid: t(23) = 3.81, p = 0.001). 
 
4.4.4. Vigour of responses: maximum force from RT 
A 2-way RM-ANOVA conducted to evaluate the influence of emotional valence on 
the force produced to approach and avoid yielded a main effect of Valence only, (Figure 
4.5A; F(1,23) = 10.24, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.31) with participants pressing harder for negative 
compared to positive pictures (neg: 76.3 ± 4.4; pos: 74.7 ± 4.4; t(23) = 3.20, p = 0.004, 
Cohen’s d = 0.66).  
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Figure 4.5. Influence of valence on the strength and consistency of action execution. A) Participants were 
more vigorous in pressing when negative pictures were presented relative to positive pictures. B) Force was 
less variable when presented with negative relative to positive pictures. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * significant at 
p < 0.05 level. 
 
Regression analyses confirmed the above results. If valence had an impact on force 
production while approaching and avoiding, an interaction between Variable type (valence 
vs. arousal) and approach-avoidance movements was expected. However, the 2-way ANOVA 
only revealed a significant main effect of Variable type, (Figure 4.6; F(1,23) = 19.26, p < 0.001, 
ηp
2 = 0.46) suggesting that approach-avoidance tendencies had no effect on force. Valence 
had a mean negative beta (-0.06 ± 0.02), suggesting that as valence increased (i.e. became 
more positive), force decreased, and arousal had a mean positive beta (0.015 ± 0.01), 
suggesting that as arousal increased, force increased. Paired samples t-tests revealed that 
only the betas for valence were significantly different from zero (t(23) = 2.69, p = 0.013). 
Thus, only valence had an impact on force. Furthermore, the betas for valence were 
significantly different from those for arousal (t(23) = -4.15, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.03).  
 
Figure 4.6. Influence of picture valence and arousal on 
the strength of responses. As valence decreased (i.e. 
became more negative), force increased, whereas as 
arousal increased, force increased. However, only the 
effect of valence on force was significantly different from 
zero. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at p < 0.001 
level; * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
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4.4.5. Time to peak force 
The time taken to reach peak force while approaching or avoiding was influenced by 
the valence of the picture (Valence*Movement type, F(1,23) = 45.56, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.64). For 
negative pictures, participants were numerically faster to reach the maximum peak when 
avoiding compared to approaching but this was not significant (app: 937 ± 28 ms; avoid: 926 
± 25 ms; t(23) = 1.25, n.s.). For positive pictures, participants were faster to reach the 
maximum peak when approaching compared to avoiding (app: 902 ± 27 ms; avoid: 986 ± 28 
ms; t(23) = -6.56, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.43). Participants were also faster to reach peak 
force when approaching positive pictures compared to negative pictures (t(23) = -3.48, p = 
0.002, Cohen’s d = -0.75), and were faster to reach peak force when avoiding negative 
compared to positive pictures (t(23) = -2.94, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.88). Approach-
avoidance tendencies therefore influenced how fast maximum vigour was reached. 
A main effect of movement type (F(1,23) = 21.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.52) with 
participants being faster to reach the peak force when approaching compared to avoiding 
(app: 920 ± 27 ms; avoid: 956 ± 25 ms; t(23) = -4.66, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.02) was also 
found.  
 
4.4.6. Consistency of force: coefficient of variation of force from RT 
Approach-avoidance tendencies may influence the consistency of movement. When 
calculating the CV from the time of action initiation, there was a significant main effect of 
valence on the variability of vigour (Figure 4.5B; F(1,23) = 5.79, p = 0.025, ηp
2 = 0.20), 
indicating that emotional valence influenced the consistency of force during action 
execution. Vigour was less variable when shown negative pictures compared to positive 
pictures (neg: 0.35 ± 0.017; pos: 0.36 ± 0.016; t(23) = -2.34, p = 0.028, Cohen’s d = -0.41).  
 
4.4.7. Effort: Force integral  
 The effort made to approach or avoid after movement initiation was not affected by 
the valence of the picture (Figure 4.7; F(1,23) = 3.36, p =  n.s.), although there was a trend for 
less effort required to avoid negative compare to positive pictures.  
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Figure 4.7. The effect of valence on effort. Participants 
worked harder to avoid than to approach positive pictures. 
It was easier for participants to approach positive than 
negative pictures. There was no difference between the 
work expended to avoid negative and positive pictures. Light 
blue bars = approach; Dark blue bars = avoid; Error bars (+1 
S.E.M.); # depicts a trend.  
 
 
 
 
4.4.8. Speed of action execution: Movement times  
The 2-way RM-ANOVA yielded a main effect of Valence (Figure 4.8A; F(1,23) = 5.45, p = 
0.029, ηp
2 = 0.19), with faster movements for negative than positive pictures (neg: 290 ± 15 
ms; pos: 295 ± 15 ms; t(23) = -2.33, p = 0.029, Cohen’s d = -0.47). Because the speed at which 
the manikin moved was directly related to how hard participants pressed, a correlation 
between MTs and maximum force was calculated. MTs and maximum force collapsed across 
movement type correlated significantly across all subjects (neg: r = -0.47, n = 24, p = 0.022; 
pos: r = -0.44, n = 24, p = 0.032). Therefore, MTs can be explained as a function of force 
production. Movement execution was influenced by valence only.   
 
4.4.9. Rate of change in the speed of action execution: Acceleration 
 Subjects were numerically faster when moving in response to negative pictures 
compared to positive pictures (Figure 4.8B; neg: 0.26 ± 0.03 m/sec; pos: 0.25 ± 0.03 m/sec; 
t(23) = 1.99, p = 0.060, Cohen’s d = 0.47). Correlation analyses revealed that acceleration was 
highly correlated with maximum force produced. As expected, the harder subjects pressed 
when executing an action to negative pictures correlated with increased acceleration (neg: r 
= 0.79, n = 24, p < 0.001; pos: r = 0.78, n = 24, p < 0.001).  
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Figure 4.8. Speed of action execution. A) Executing actions in negative contexts was faster than in positive 
contexts. B) Increased acceleration when moving in negative relative to positive contexts. Error bars (+1 
S.E.M.); * significant at p < 0.05 level.  
  
 
4.5. Discussion 
The current experiment investigated whether valence-related approach-avoidance 
tendencies influence vigour. More specifically, do approach-avoidance tendencies 
associated to positive and negative stimuli bias the planning of action parameters that will 
be implemented during action execution? To achieve this, participants were required to 
move a manikin on a screen either towards or away from an emotional picture by pressing 
on force buttons. Thus, vigour was quantified by the speed and strength of responses, 
parameters that will have been determined during the planning phase of movement 
generation.  
The results are clear-cut: approach-avoidance tendencies influence the selection and 
initiation of movement but do not influence vigour, supporting previous work (Coombes et 
al., 2007, 2007; Stins & Beek, 2011; Stins et al., 2011). Instead, motor planning and action 
execution appear to be influenced by the valence of emotional stimuli, with vigour being 
greater when presented with negative relative to positive pictures in accordance with some 
evidence (Coombes et al. 2006; Coombes et al., 2008; Naugle et al., 2012). The data 
therefore demonstrate that approach-avoidance tendencies bias decision processes related 
to the selection of actions, but this bias is not translated into motor planning and action 
execution, suggesting a distinction in the influence of such tendencies on various motor 
processes.  
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Action selection is influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies  
The current results replicate previous studies (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Eder & Klauer, 
2009; Roelofs et al., 2009; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004), showing that we are faster to initiate 
approach to positive and avoidance to negative stimuli, even when subjects are not 
instructed to respond as fast as possible. Importantly, regression analyses confirmed that 
only valence, and not arousal, triggered approach-avoidance tendencies. Thus, action 
selection and initiation are affected by valence-related tendencies, confirming the results 
from Chapters Two and Three.  
Action selection of approach-avoidance has been suggested to occur via top-down 
mechanisms engaged by context and task-instructions (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Eder & 
Rothermund, 2008). This is supported by evidence showing that areas of the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) are involved in the selection of approach-avoidance tendencies (Etkin, Egner, 
Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Roelofs et al., 2009; Volman et al., 2011). The left 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) appears to be activated when individuals need to overcome 
predisposed tendencies and select opposite actions (Roelofs et al., 2009), for example, in 
cases where one needs to approach a threatening spider in order to kill or remove it. 
Indeed, selecting opposite actions is slower than selecting established tendencies. This 
complements studies which have shown that the OFC is involved in overriding previous 
reward associations (Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000; Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck, & Walton, 
2007). Similarly, disruption to the anterior PFC leads to deficits in the selection of 
predisposed tendencies (Volman et al., 2016, 2011). Moreover, the ventromedial PFC has 
been shown to encode the value of emotional stimuli as positive or negative (Winecoff et 
al., 2013). This value information may complement contextual information that will 
eventually inform the selection of approach or avoidance.  
In accordance with the affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010), it 
is unlikely that prefrontal areas are solely responsible for guiding the selection of approach-
avoidance actions. For instance, recent evidence shows that amygdala activation is 
modulated by whether an approach or avoidance is required in threatening contexts (Radke 
et al., 2015). Reciprocity between cortical and subcortical areas has also been shown while 
participants execute actions in emotional situations (Pereira et al., 2010). Similarly, other 
work has shown extensive reciprocal connections between top-down and bottom-up areas 
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which are likely to guide action selection in emotional contexts (Rolls, 1999). Action 
selection of approach-avoidance actions is therefore guided by top-down and bottom-up 
processes: bottom-up processes drive automatic responses, whereas top-down processes 
override these tendencies.   
 
Approach-avoidance tendencies do not influence action execution 
In contrast to the influence on action selection, the results showed that approach-
avoidance tendencies had a mixed influence on vigour. The time taken to reach the peak 
force was significantly influenced by valence and associated response tendencies, with 
participants reaching peak force faster when presented with positive pictures during 
approach, and faster when presented with negative pictures during avoidance. This 
supports recent work showing that reaching maximum velocity while approaching is faster 
in positive relative to neutral contexts (Esteves et al., 2016). This evidence points to a 
possible influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on execution, although it is more likely 
that the influence on force peak times was influenced by the faster initiation times of 
approach-avoidance tendencies. The lack of an effect of emotional tendencies on other 
spatiotemporal properties of vigour supports this conclusion. For instance, there was no 
influence of such tendencies on the strength, speed or the variability of movements. 
Because the spatial and temporal profiles of vigour were highly correlated, it was not 
expected that these properties would be influenced independently from each other.  
Overall, there appears to be no evidence indicating that approach-avoidance 
tendencies bias the planning of parameters that will be implemented during action 
execution. This is supportive of previous work showing no influence of approach-avoidance 
tendencies on action execution (Coombes et al., 2007; Stins & Beek, 2011; Stins et al., 2011). 
The current work therefore demonstrates a distinction in the influence of these tendencies 
on different motor stages: approach-avoidance tendencies influence the selection but not 
the planning of actions.  
This work contrasts with studies which have demonstrated an influence of positive 
and negative value and action (respond/don’t respond) on vigour (Niv et al. 2005; Niv et al. 
2007; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014). There are three possible reasons why there was no 
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influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on vigour. Firstly, despite work showing that 
rewards and punishments and emotional stimuli are highly related (Bradley & Lang, 2008; 
Rolls, 2000), other work has suggested that while they may be similar, there are differences 
between them (Roseman, 2008). Rewards and punishments lead to highly goal-directed and 
intentional actions typically associated to hedonic experience (e.g. I want to obtain a reward 
to feel good). In contrast, emotional stimuli lead to predisposed actions, which can be 
triggered without a particular intention and that are not biased by hedonic experience (e.g. 
immediately running away from a bear to stay alive). Furthermore, rewards and 
punishments can increase or decrease in value, whereas emotional stimuli do not. The 
positive and negative values associated to rewards and punishments and emotional stimuli 
may not be related.   
Secondly, participants may not have viewed approach and avoidance as rewards and 
punishments, respectively. Situations of rewards and punishment typically lead to real 
positive or negative outcomes. For instance, in reward/punishment experiments, 
participants can receive real monetary rewards or losses. In the current experiment this was 
not the case. While participants approached and avoided positive and negative stimuli, 
there was no real positive or negative outcome. For example, approaching a picture of a 
spider did not lead to a punishment because there was no negative consequence of 
approaching the negative stimulus. Indeed, work has shown that planning of a particular 
outcome is tightly linked to the anticipated consequences of the action (Eder & 
Rothermund, 2013; Eder & Hommel, 2013; Kühn, Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011). This 
logic does not apply to action selection because selecting approach and avoidance does not 
lead to an outcome. Performing an action is what ultimately leads to the outcome. Thus, 
participants did not associate approach and avoidance to rewards and punishments, and 
this may have led to no biases in vigour.  
Lastly, it may be possible that approach-avoidance tendencies influence the early 
formation of goals that serve to help choose the most appropriate response. Any process 
that occurs after selection may not be biased by these motor goals because presumably the 
bias will have already occurred. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence showing how such 
tendencies guide action selection (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Roelofs et al., 2009; Volman 
et al., 2011), but very little evidence for an influence on processes after action selection 
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(Esteves et al., 2016). Speculatively, subsequent processes may instead be influenced by a 
more global and less goal-directed emotional mechanism, whereby valence biases the 
planning and implementation of action parameters (see below).  
 
Action execution is influenced by the valence and arousal of an emotional stimulus 
While there was no influence of approach-avoidance tendencies, emotional valence 
and arousal on their own did affect vigour: as valence decreased (i.e. became more 
negative), maximum force increased, and as arousal increased, maximum force increased. 
These results corroborate previous studies which have shown that relative to neutral 
pictures, positive and negative pictures increase vigour (Esteves et al., 2016; Naugle et al., 
2012; Schmidt et al., 2009), demonstrating that both the valence (Coombes et al., 2006) and 
the arousal (Bouman, Stins, & Beek, 2015; Coombes, Corcos, Pavuluri, & Vaillancourt, 2011; 
Coombes et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2009) of emotional stimuli influences the execution of 
actions.  
Furthermore, results suggest that negative stimuli have more impact in vigour 
relative to positive stimuli. This was demonstrated by the fact that both speed and strength 
were greater and less variable when shown negative pictures compared to positive pictures, 
in support of previous work that found greater vigour during extension movements without 
compromising movement variability when exposed to unpleasant images (Coombes et al., 
2006). Overall these results suggest that the planning of movement parameters and their 
implementation is influenced by negative valence. Being stronger, faster and more 
consistent at pushing an aggressive person away is more beneficial for survival than being 
stronger, faster and more consistent at approaching to pet a puppy.  
Increased vigour and decreased variability found in negative contexts may arise as a 
result of the activation of a fast defensive circuitry (LeDoux, 2012; LeDoux, 2000; Ohman & 
Soares, 1998) that has an immediate impact on action execution in order to optimise the 
outcome and minimise costs. The activation of a defensive circuit would suggest that in 
negative contexts it is important to both initiate and execute actions appropriately, and 
suggests a global rather than selective effect of negative valence on motor processing. 
Alternatively, the effect of highly-arousing negative stimuli on vigour may be related to the 
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fact that these stimuli tend to be prioritised relative to less threatening stimuli (Ohman et 
al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2005). Faster attentional prioritisation leads to increased 
perceptual processing that results in improved performance (Pessoa et al., 2002).  
In sum, vigour is affected by the valence and arousal of emotional pictures, but not 
by related approach-avoidance tendencies. Moreover, vigour is greater and more consistent 
in negative contexts, leading to the speculation that this might be related to increased 
attentional resources and the activation of a defensive circuitry that biases opportunity 
costs and promotes survival in threatening situations.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the results lend support to previous evidence showing that emotional stimuli 
have a differential impact on motor processing: valence-related approach-avoidance 
tendencies influence the action selection stages of movement but do not influence motor 
planning. Instead, motor planning is influenced by emotional valence: vigour was greater 
and less variable in negative relative to positive contexts. Motor planning of execution 
parameters and their implementation is therefore biased by negative stimuli, possibly 
guided by a primitive defensive mechanism that biases opportunity costs. Making more 
effort in negative or threatening situations is more beneficial and will lead to a more 
successful outcome.   
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5. Chapter Five. Differential influence of approach-
avoidance tendencies and valence on response 
inhibition 
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5.1. Abstract 
Suppressing actions that are no longer appropriate or advantageous is an important 
characteristic of successful behaviour. Valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies 
influence action selection. Such tendencies may also influence our ability to inhibit actions. 
Two competing processes dictate the speed of response inhibition: the preparation of “go” 
processes and the preparation of “stop” processes. Emotional approach-avoidance 
tendencies may influence these preparatory processes, influencing the speed of response 
inhibition. Two experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 investigated the influence of 
approach-avoidance tendencies on the preparation of “go” processes. Experiment 2 
investigated the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on the preparation of “stop” 
processes. In Experiment 1, participants approached or avoided emotional stimuli presented 
as “go” cues, but on a proportion of trials were required to inhibit their prepared movement 
in response to an abstract acoustic cue. In Experiment 2, participants approached or avoided 
abstract cues and in some trials were required to inhibit their prepared movement in 
response to an emotional stimulus. This difference allowed tapping into the preparation of 
“go” and “stop” processes separately. Experiment 1 showed an influence of approach-
avoidance tendencies on the speed and variability of inhibition, suggesting an influence of 
approach-avoidance tendencies on the “go” preparatory processes. In Experiment 2, 
inhibition was influenced by valence only, with faster inhibition in negative relative to 
positive and neutral contexts. This suggests an influence of valence on the preparation of 
“stop” processes. Overall, the results show that approach-avoidance tendencies influence 
preparation processes prior to when an action needs to be executed, while stopping 
processes are influenced by negative information, possibly modulated by a defensive circuit. 
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5.2. Introduction  
Our social and emotional interactions require us to select appropriate actions and 
inhibit inappropriate or unsafe response alternatives (Aron, 2007; Aron et al., 2007; Aron & 
Verbruggen, 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Much as valence-related approach-
avoidance tendencies influence action selection and initiation, as seen in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four, such tendencies may also influence our ability to inhibit actions that may be 
potentially costly. This chapter addresses if action tendencies influence how fast we stop or 
inhibit a prepared motor response from being executed in light of ever-changing 
environments. 
Response inhibition involves the suppression of an already planned movement and 
the initiation of a stopping response (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008, 2009). This has primarily 
been studied using the stop-signal paradigm (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008), whereby participants plan and execute a response when a particular go stimulus is 
presented (“go” process), but are required to occasionally withhold this response if a stop 
signal is presented (“stop” process) after a particular delay (stop-signal delay; SSD). The 
speed of inhibition is quantified by estimating the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) as a 
function of the reaction time distribution of the “go” process and the SSD (Figure 5.1). 
The “horse-race model” has been proposed as a general model for response 
inhibition (Figure 5.1; Logan & Cowan, 1984). In this model, how quickly inhibition occurs is 
thought to depend on a race between the competing “go” and “stop” processes. The 
resolution of this competition (i.e. which process ultimately wins the race) is determined by 
the extent of preparation of each competing response. For instance, if the “stop” process is 
completed before the “go” process, inhibition will be successful (i.e. if the stop-signal is 
presented early enough that preparation is biased towards inhibition), and if the “go” 
process is completed before the “stop” process, no inhibition will occur (i.e. the stop-signal 
was presented too late to bias preparation towards inhibition). The speed of response 
inhibition may therefore inform about the underlying preparation processes of behaviour 
(De Jong et al., 1990; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009): faster response inhibition means that the 
preparation of “go” responses was slower, whereas slower response inhibition indicates 
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that preparation processes for the “go” responses were faster than the preparation of 
“stop”.  
 
Figure 5.1. Horse-race model of response inhibition (Logan & Cowan, 1984). A) The success of 
response inhibition is determined by the relative finishing times of the go and the stop process. The probability 
of responding and inhibiting is influenced by the b) SSD, c) the distribution of the “go” RTs and the d) SSRT.  If 
“go” RTs are longer than SSD + SSRT they are successfully inhibited; if “go” RTs are shorter than SSD + SSRT 
they are not inhibited. Taken from Verbruggen & Logan (2008).  
 
In emotional situations, response inhibition may be beneficial as it would avoid the 
execution of potentially costly actions. For example, we may be tempted to extend our arm 
to approach and pet a cute dog, but may need to quickly inhibit the prepared movement if 
the dog became suddenly aggressive. Inhibition in this situation is crucial to avoid getting 
bitten. Because emotional stimuli predispose for specific action tendencies which are 
prepared faster than other actions (Eder & Klauer, 2009; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; de 
Oliveira et al., 2012), this may influence the resolution of competition between “go” and 
“stop” processes. It is possible that actions that are prepared faster may be more difficult to 
inhibit than those that are prepared more slowly. For example, inhibiting avoidance to 
positive stimuli may be faster than inhibiting an approach because avoidance is prepared 
more slowly than approach in positive contexts.  
Previous work has shown that inhibiting a prepared action within positive contexts is 
more difficult relative to negative contexts, and that initiating an action is faster when 
presented with positive pictures (Albert et al., 2010). Similarly, positive information biases 
the motor system to act, as shown by increased preparatory excitability prior to movement, 
whereas negative information decreases the tendency to act (Chiu et al., 2014; de Oliveira 
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et al., 2012). The tendency for slower movement initiation in negative contexts is supported 
by evidence showing that threatening stimuli can often result in immobility (i.e. freezing) of 
responses in both rats (Lang et al., 2000) and humans (Facchinetti et al., 2006; Roelofs et al. 
2010; Stins et al., 2013). Freezing, or slower response initiation, may have evolved to avoid 
potentially costly actions in threatening situations (LeDoux, 1996). Thus, it appears that 
inhibition is more difficult when subjects need to initiate responses in positive contexts and 
easier when initiating responses in negative contexts. Initiation in this case might be 
considered an “approach” action. Thus, in positive contexts “approach” was prepared faster 
whereas in negative contexts “approach” was prepared slower, leading to differences in 
inhibition.  
Surprisingly, little is known about how approach-avoidance tendencies influence our 
ability to stop our actions. Response inhibition is a process that interacts with and influences 
motor processes, and is guided by neural mechanisms that interact with emotion (Albert et 
al., 2010; Goldstein et al., 2007; Shafritz et al., 2006). Investigating if approach-avoidance 
tendencies influence response inhibition would show that emotion can selectively influence 
different processes and underlying mechanisms, furthering our understanding of how 
emotions are linked to action. To my knowledge, this remains unknown.  
 
Emotional stop-signals speed up response inhibition  
The stop-signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984) allows for revealing underlying 
preparatory mechanisms of “go” and “stop” processes. Presenting emotional stimuli as 
stop-signals can facilitate (i.e. speed up) inhibition (Chiu, Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Pawliczek et al., 2013; Pessoa et al., 2012; Senderecka, 2016). For instance, when an 
emotional stimulus is presented as a stop-signal after the go-signal, inhibition of positive 
and negative stimuli is faster relative to neutral pictures (Pessoa et al., 2012; Senderecka, 
2016), and inhibition of negative stimuli is faster relative to positive stimuli. In terms of 
preparation, it appears as though emotional stimuli speed up the preparation of competing 
“stop” processes, biasing competition resolution towards inhibition.  
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Two mechanisms may underlie the speeding up of inhibition. Firstly, faster inhibition 
relative to neutral stimuli may occur as a result of increased perceptual processing and 
attentional allocation (Pessoa, 2007; Pessoa, 2009), whereby emotional stop-signals 
generate enhanced sensory representations in the visual system (Pessoa et al., 2002; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2005). Secondly, faster inhibition of negative relative to positive stimuli is 
likely to reflect “freezing” mechanisms triggered by the presence of threatening 
information, supporting previous work (Chiu et al., 2014; Facchinetti et al., 2006).  
Emotional stop-signals therefore influence the preparation of the “stop” process by 
biasing competition between “go” and “stop” processes towards inhibition. However, if the 
success of inhibition relies on the state of preparation of “go” processes, then presenting 
emotional information prior to a stop-signal is as informative about inhibition as presenting 
an emotional stop-signal. Presenting emotional information as go-signals may influence the 
preparation of “go” processes, influencing the resolution of competition between “go” and 
“stop” processes. Indeed, Verbruggen & Logan (2008) showed that the success of inhibition 
is influenced by both the distribution of the “go” RTs (“go” process; Figure 5.1c) and the 
SSRTs (“stop” process; Figure 5.1d). It is currently unknown whether presenting emotional 
information prior to a stop-signal also speeds up inhibition.  
Moreover, the state of preparation of “go” and “stop” processes may be influenced 
by approach-avoidance tendencies (Figure 5.2). The preparation of “go” processes may be 
faster for predisposed tendencies compared to actions that are not predisposed, biasing the 
competition between “go” and “stop” towards responding. In contrast, the preparation of 
“stop” processes may be slower for approach-avoidance tendencies. In either case, 
presenting emotional information as the “go” or “stop” signal should inform of the influence 
of approach-avoidance tendencies on inhibition. To the best of my knowledge no study has 
compared inhibition guided by the preparation of “go” processes and of “stop” processes 
under situations of approach-avoidance. Thus, the main goal of this chapter was to 
investigate the process of response inhibition in emotional situations and determine if 
approach-avoidance tendencies influence the resolution of competing responses by biasing 
the preparation of “go” or the preparation of “stop” processes, or both. To my knowledge 
this remains unknown. If approach-avoidance tendencies influence inhibition, it would 
demonstrate their capacity to influence a variety of motor processes, giving further 
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evidence of their privileged relationship with the motor system. If there is no such influence 
of tendencies on inhibition, it would demonstrate that these tendencies do not have a 
widespread bias throughout the motor system, and their influence may be potentially 
confined to selection processes, as seen in Chapters Two, Three and Four.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Inhibition predictions based on the preparation of “go” and “stop” processes. A) When a positive 
stimulus is presented, approach (solid black curve) should be prepared faster than avoidance (dotted black 
curve), reflected on different GO RT distributions. The faster preparation of approach should “win” the 
competition between “go” and “stop” processes, making inhibition harder, whereas the slower preparation of 
avoidance should make inhibition easier. B) A similar principle applies to negative stimuli. Preparation of 
avoidance (solid black curve) should be faster than approach (dotted black curve), leading to differences in 
inhibition. C) The preparation of approach and avoidance to abstract stimuli should not differ, meaning the 
“go” process is the same. The presentation of a positive stop-signal during approach should slow down the 
preparation of the “stop” process, leading to delayed inhibition (dotted black line), whereas the preparation of 
a “stop” process should be faster during avoidance (dotted red line). SSRTs should differ. D) The presentation 
of a negative stop-signal during avoidance should slow down the preparation of the “stop” process, leading to 
delayed inhibition (dotted black line), whereas the preparation of a “stop” process should be faster during 
approach (dotted red line). Approach-avoidance biases on the “go” or “stop” processes are predicted to have 
the same effect on the SSRTs. A and C should lead to faster SSRTs when avoiding (red bars) than approaching 
(green bars). B and D should lead to faster SSRTs when approaching (green bars) than avoiding (red bars).  
 
Valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies and inhibition  
Two experiments were conducted to investigate the influence of the preparation of 
“go” and “stop” processes on inhibition of approach-avoidance tendencies. Experiment 1 
tested the hypothesis that positive and negative “go” signals bias the preparation of 
approach-avoidance “go” processes and this would in turn influence the speed of inhibition. 
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Participants were instructed to approach or avoid depending on the valence of the go-
signal. In 30% of trials, a non-emotional auditory tone was presented as the stop-signal. 
Participants were required to inhibit their movement when this stop-signal was presented. 
Given valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies, an interaction between valence and 
the type of movement made was expected. It should be more difficult to inhibit approach-
avoidance tendencies because they are prepared faster (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Accordingly, 
inhibition should be slower when prepared to approach positive and avoid negative stimuli, 
than when prepared to avoid positive and approach negative stimuli, given that the latter is 
a response considered to be counterintuitive to the natural response (Roelofs et al., 2009).  
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that emotional stop-signals and their related 
tendencies influence the speed of preparation of the “stop” process. Abstract go-signals 
(e.g. shapes) linked to approach-avoidance responses were presented. These go-signals 
therefore still triggered the preparation of approach and avoidance “go” processes. Positive, 
negative and neutral stimuli served as the stop-signals. Here, neutral was included as a 
control condition. In line with previous work, emotional stop-signals were expected to 
speed up stopping in comparison to neutral stimuli (Pessoa et al., 2012; Senderecka, 2016). 
As a result of approach-avoidance tendencies, faster inhibition of avoidance was expected 
when presented with a positive stop-signal and faster inhibition of approach when 
presented with a negative stop-signal. No differences in inhibition of approach and 
avoidance were expected when presented with neutral stop-signals. Furthermore, there 
should be faster overall inhibition when presented with negative stop-signals relative to 
positive and neutral stop-signals, due to such stimuli being low in their level of threat 
(Pessoa et al., 2012).  
 
5.2.1. Experiment 1  
 
5.2.1.1. Method  
5.2.1.1.1. Participants  
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19 healthy volunteers (mean age = 22.4 ± 3.9 S.D. years; 14 female) from the 
University College London Psychology database, with local ethics approval (UCL) were 
tested. Subjects gave written informed consent to participate in the study, and received 
monetary compensation for their time and travel (£7.5/hr).  
 
5.2.1.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
80 pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; (P.J. 
Lang et al., 2008): 40 negative pictures with valences 1.8-3.8 (1.6 = most negative) and 40 
positive pictures with valences 6.2-8.2 (8.2 = most positive). All pictures (maximum 240 x 
180 pixels) were matched for luminance. Pictures were matched in their arousal (with an 
equal proportion of high and low). However, despite my best efforts to match as closely as 
possible, positive pictures were on average slightly less arousing than negative pictures. The 
assignment of pictures in each of the 8 blocks and order of picture presentation was 
randomised for each subject. Block order was counterbalanced across participants. Each 
block comprised of 80 trials (40 positive/negative). Each picture was repeated eight times 
during the entire experiment. In total there were 160 trials for each experimental condition.  
All visual stimuli were presented on an 19 inch LCD monitor of a Dell Optiplex-780 
computer (refresh rate: 60 Hz), using the Cogent 2000 toolbox (v1.29; University College 
London, http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.html) and MATLAB (v.7.9.1.705; 
The MathWorks Inc.). A white manikin (2.8 x 1.9 cm) represented the self. A small yellow 
circle (38 x 33 pixels) represented the “away” target that participants had to move to when 
avoiding. The manikin was presented in either the upper or lower half of the screen in a 
pseudo-randomised order. A sound stimulus (50 Hz noise) was generated using MATLAB and 
presented binaurally via headphones and was used as the stop-signal. 
As in Chapters Two and Three, the manikin was moved across the screen using an 
analogue joystick connected to a CED1401 (Cambridge Electronic Design) machine. Joystick 
data were recorded using a CED1401-MATLAB interface (matced32; Cambridge Electronic 
Design) between MATLAB and the data acquisition device.  
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5.2.1.1.3. Experimental task  
The approach-avoidance task used in Chapter Two was adapted for the present 
experiments. Participants were seated in front of a computer at a distance of approximately 
40 cm. The joystick was fixed to the table on their right-hand side. Participants were 
instructed to move the manikin towards or away from the emotional stimulus as fast as 
possible, according to the instructions at the beginning of each block. In congruent blocks 
(approach-positive, avoid-negative), participants moved the manikin towards positive 
pictures and away from negative pictures. In incongruent blocks (approach-negative, avoid-
positive), participants moved the manikin towards negative and away from positive 
pictures. As in previous chapters, participants were instructed to imagine that the manikin 
represented them on the screen.  
The stop-signal paradigm was used to indirectly measure the speed of response 
inhibition (see figure 5.1; Logan & Cowan, 1984). A stop-signal occurred at specific delays 
after the presentation of the emotional go-signal (stop-signal delay; SSD). The shorter the 
SSD (i.e. the earlier the stop-signal is presented), the easier it should be for participants to 
withhold their response because the stop process will have started earlier than the go 
process. As the SSD increases, the stop process should start later and thus finish after the go 
process, making inhibition harder.  
Figure 5.3 depicts two typical trial sequences. Trials started with the presentation of 
a fixation cross (500 ms), followed by the simultaneous appearance of the manikin and 
fixation cross (jittered with a mean of 500  200 ms). The jitter prevented participants from 
anticipating the exact timing of the go-signal. After the jittered delay, an emotional picture 
appeared on the screen (max 2000 ms or until participants reached the target area). On 30% 
of all trials, a beep occurred (duration 50 ms) at a specific SSD to signal that participants 
should withhold their prepared response (stop-trials). The remaining 70% were go-trials. 
Participants were instructed to always respond as fast as possible and not to worry if they 
were unable to inhibit their responses. Previous literature (Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 
2013) has argued that participants sometimes strategically slow down their responses in 
order to maximise response inhibition. To avoid this from happening, reaction time (RT) 
feedback was provided after every block and encouraged subjects who exceeded a certain 
RT threshold (i.e. 700 ms) to increase the speed of their responses.  
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The SSD was fixed at 300 ms at the beginning of every block. The SSD was changed 
throughout the block using a staircase procedure. In stop-trials, if participants successfully 
inhibited their response the SSD increased by 50 ms. If inhibition was unsuccessful, the SSD 
decreased by 50 ms (Pessoa et al., 2012). This tracking method (± 50) essentially determines 
the SSD at which subjects inhibit their responses 50% of the time and typically results in a 
probability of responding given the presence of the stop signal [p(respond/signal)] of 
approximately 0.5. The SSD varied independently for each of the four conditions: approach-
positive, avoid-negative, approach-negative and avoid-positive. Thus, there were four 
independent SSDs that varied as a function of which group of trials they belonged to. For 
example, in trials in which participants approached positive pictures the SSD decreased or 
increased as a function of successful inhibition in that specific group of trials, and this SSD 
was different from the SSD used in the other types of trials. Participants only got feedback in 
successful trials. 
 
Figure 5.3. Task schematic of two trial 
sequences. A manikin appears on the 
screen above or below a fixation cross. 
A positive or negative picture was 
subsequently presented. In go-trials, 
participants moved the manikin 
towards or away from the picture, 
depending on the block instructions. In 
stop-trials, a beep was played for 50 
ms at a variable time after the 
presentation of the picture (stop-
signal). Participants had to withhold 
their response when they heard this 
beep. Participants received feedback 
when they made a wrong response 
(e.g. approach instead of avoid) and when inhibition was successful. 
 
 
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to assess the influence of approach-avoidance 
tendencies on the preparation of “go” processes and how this influences response 
inhibition. Crucially, this design allowed participants to prepare approach-avoidance 
responses to positive and negative stimuli prior to the presentation of a stop-signal. These 
early preparatory processes were expected to bias the competition between “go” and 
“stop” processes towards “go”.  
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5.2.1.1.4. Data analyses and variables of interest 
To assess the influence of valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies on the 
ability to suppress actions the following variables were measured: Reaction Times (RTs), 
SSRTs and the parameters of the RT and SSRT distributions, mean (µ), spread (σ), and skew 
(τ).  
To assess inhibition, the RT was here considered the most important variable. 
Without the RT distribution it is impossible to estimate the SSRT. As such, RTs were 
measured in order to give an estimate of the ability to inhibit approach-avoidance 
movements. RTs were determined from the time of shape onset to the initiation of joystick 
movement. Joystick data were recorded in XY-coordinates and joystick onset was calculated 
based on vertical y-axis coordinate deviations (±10 y-coordinates) from trial baseline. The 
baseline was recorded while the manikin was stationary prior to the appearance of the 
target.  
SSRTs provide an inferred measure about the latency of the stop process. The SSRT 
corresponds to the time interval between when the stop process begins and when it 
finishes. The point at which the stop process finishes is estimated from the observed RT 
distribution.  
A problem often encountered by considering only the mean RT and SSRT is that 
distributions may have the same mean but have different variance (i.e. one distribution may 
be more consistent than the other; Figure 5.2). I used a method that not only gave me the 
mean RT and SSRT, but also gave me the parameters of the distributions that may reveal 
underlying influences on inhibition that may not otherwise be revealed by mean values. 
Three distribution parameters were of interest: mu (μ) and sigma (σ), which represent the 
mean and the standard deviation of the distribution respectively, and tau (τ), which gives an 
indication of the skew of the distribution. The mean of the distribution is meant to reflect 
the mean RT and is not expected to greatly differ from the RT calculated without taking into 
account other distribution measures. The standard deviation, however, is expected to 
determine the consistency (or variability) of response initiation and suppression. Smaller σ 
values, for example, give an indication of greater consistency, that is, inhibition occurred at 
similar speeds in each trial for a given condition (i.e. stopping approach to positive stimuli). 
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Consistency may be important for indicating how uncertainty biases inhibition. Stopping 
some actions is more uncertain than stopping others. For instance, stopping an approach to 
a positive stimulus may not be only harder, but also more uncertain regarding the outcome. 
In contrast, stopping an action to a negative stimulus is more certain. Indirectly, this might 
also give an idea of automaticity, with the initiation or inhibition of predisposed actions 
being less variable. The skew of the distributions may also influence the estimation of the 
SSRT (Verbruggen et al. 2013), and therefore τ will be important in determining whether the 
tail-end of the distributions was a determining factor in the estimations. Greater τ values 
indicate a more positively skewed distribution.  
Mean RTs and SSRTs, and distribution parameters were calculated using BEESTS 
(Bayesian Ex-Gaussian Estimation of Stop-Signal RT distributions; Matzke et al., 2013). This 
Bayesian parametric approach (BPA; Figure 5.4) assumes that SSRTs are ex-Gaussian 
distributed and uses a Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling (MCMC) to obtain posterior 
distributions for RT and SSRT parameters and hence estimate the mean and variance of the 
speed of go and stopping processes. MCMC algorithms are used for sampling from the 
probability distributions of a particular sample and construct a Markov Chain with the 
desired distribution. Markov chains typically use a random walk algorithm, which explores 
the entire sample distribution in a random fashion, walking forward one step and walking 
back two steps, which can increase the chance of covering the majority of the sample. The 
quality of the chain will improve the more steps there are. Similarly, the more chains, the 
more likely it will lead to converging distributions. To demonstrate that the chains have 
properly converged BEESTS also computes the Gelman-Rubin R statistic. If the chains have 
converged properly, R needs to be lower than 1.1.  
RTs and SSRTs were calculated at the hierarchical (group) level using 3 chains, 36000 
samples, 12000 burn-in and 12 thinning in accordance to Matzke et al. (2013). Hierarchical 
analysis was used as there was a relatively small number of observations per participant and 
as this takes into account between-subject variability of the participant-level parameters 
(Matzke, Dolan, Logan, Brown, & Wagenmakers, 2013). In the current case, this analysis 
provides accurate parameter estimates with fewer observations per participant than the 
individual analysis and yields less variable estimates than single-level parameter estimation. 
Individual analyses were still conducted for comparison, but are not presented.  
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Figure 5.4. Assumptions of the Bayesian parametric approach (BPA). Two distributions are considered: the 
signal-respond RT (i.e. the RTs of those trials in which a stop-signal is presented but participants still 
responded; grey shaded area) and the SSRT. The signal-respond RT is considered the “go” RT in this case, 
which is censored by the SSRT distribution. The censoring point can take on a different value on each stop-
signal trial (e.g. SSD + SSRT1, SSD + SSRT2, and SSD + SSRT3).  If the “go” RT is longer than the SSD + SSRT value, 
responses are successfully inhibited. If the “go” RT is shorter than the SSD + SSRT value, the response is not 
inhibited and it results on a signal-respond RT (from Matzke et al. 2013).  
 
Using BEESTS, I obtained the following parameters: summary statistics (including the 
RT, SSRT, µ, σ, and τ), posterior distributions, MCMC chains, deviance, and goodness-of-fit. 
The prior distribution is the distribution of the parameter(s) before any data is observed, 
whereas the posterior distribution takes into account the observed data. The prior 
distributions are updated by the incoming data and ultimately yield the posterior 
distribution. The spread of the posterior distributions quantifies the uncertainty about the 
parameter estimates: the larger the spread, the greater the uncertainty of parameter 
estimation. Prior and posterior distributions are therefore necessary to determine if the µ, 
σ, and τ parameters are adequate and trustworthy. Parameters are obtained for “go” and 
“stop” data, but “go” parameters are more reliable calculated because they are estimated 
from both the GO RTs and signal-respond (unsuccessful stop trials) RTs. Before interpreting 
the parameters, we need to check that the data is adequate. This is done by verifying that 
the posterior distributions of the model parameters are unimodal and by running multiple 
MCMC chains. If the MCMC chains converge they should look like “hairy caterpillars”. 
As a control, BEESTS results were validated using the mean method (Logan, 1994). 
The mean method requires subtracting the mean SSD for a particular condition from the 
mean RT for that condition (e.g. condition 1 mean RT-condition 1 mean SSD). Contrary to 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Five 
160 
 
BEESTS, it does not take into account underlying distributions and variance into the 
calculation of SSRTs. The mean method is the most widely used for estimating the SSRTs in 
the response inhibition literature. By comparison, BEESTS is a recent method that has only 
been used in a small fraction of the inhibition literature. As such, the comparison between 
the BEESTS and the mean method output served to confirm the reliability of BEESTS. 
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the mean method should be abandoned due to its 
susceptibility to miscalculating the SSRT as a result of skewed RT distributions and strategic 
slowing of RTs by participants (Verbruggen et al., 2013). 
 
5.2.1.1.5. Statistical analysis and trial exclusion  
All trials in which the movement did not match the instructions (e.g., avoiding when 
instructed to approach; 5.1% of trials), and with RTs below 100 ms or exceeding 2000 ms 
(1.5%) were excluded from the analyses. Outlier RTs (0.9%) were calculated per block for 
each subject using a Grubb’s test, α = 0.05. In total, 7.6% of trials were excluded. 
A 2x2 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) with factors Valence 
(positive vs. negative) and Movement type (approach vs. avoid) was conducted separately 
for RTs, SSRTs and the posterior distribution µ, σ and τ parameters. All statistical analyses 
were calculated using the statistical package SPSS (v. 22).  
Because each picture has a valence and arousal, and both may influence the speed 
of action initiation differently, a multiple linear regression was conducted on the RTs to 
assess the influence of different variables. The RTs for each condition (e.g. approach 
positive) were taken separately and were used as the dependent variable (i.e. the measure 
that will be affected by other factors). The independent variables valence and arousal (i.e. 
the measures that might influence RT) were then regressed against the RTs obtained for 
each condition. The multiple regression yielded beta coefficients that indicated the direction 
(e.g. negative or positive) and strength of the relationship of each variable to the RTs. If an 
independent variable has a significant impact on the RT then the beta value should be 
significantly different from 0. The regression yielded betas for four conditions: the influence 
of valence and arousal when participants approached positive, avoided negative, 
approached negative and avoided positive pictures. These betas were then used to compute 
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a 3-way RM-ANOVA with factors Picture Valence (negative vs. positive), Movement type 
(approach vs. avoidance) and Variable type (valence vs. arousal).  
For all analyses, partial-  is reported as a measure of effect size. Statistical 
threshold was fixed at 0.05. Significant interactions were followed up using two-tailed 
paired-sample t-tests. For paired-samples t-tests Cohen’s d is reported. RT and SSRT means 
and standard error of the mean (SEM) are shown and reported in milliseconds.  
 
5.2.2. Results  
 
5.2.2.1. Individual picture ratings  
Subjects rated the valence and arousal of all negative and positive pictures. For 
negative pictures, participants rated negative pictures as being more negative than the IAPS 
ratings (individual: 2.42 ± 0.19, IAPS: 3.00 ± 0.00; t(18) = 3.01, p = 0.007). However, individual 
positive ratings did not differ from the IAPS ratings (individual: 6.79 ± 0.20, IAPS: 7.00 ± 0.00, 
n.s.).  
With respect to arousal, participants did not rate the arousal of negative pictures as 
being different from the IAPS ratings (individual: 5.26 ± 0.40, IAPS: 6.00 ± 0.00; n.s.). In 
contrast, participants rated the arousal of positive pictures as being less arousing than the 
IAPS ratings (individual: 3.37 ± 0.32, IAPS: 5.00 ± 0.00; t(18) = 5.00, p < 0.001).   
Overall, the results suggest that participants perceived pictures as being their correct 
valence, and identified the correct level of arousal for each picture. For this reason, analysis 
was carried out using the IAPS ratings only.  
 
5.2.2.2. Hierarchical analysis using BEESTS  
The results for the group-level analysis using all subjects are displayed below. All 
results were obtained using BEESTS.  
 

2
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5.2.2.2.1. Speed of action initiation: Reaction Times  
To determine whether positive and negative pictures influenced the speed of 
initiation of approach-avoidance actions, an interaction between valence and movement 
type was expected. Indeed, results showed that valence impacted on the initiation of 
approach and avoidance (Figure 5.5A; Valence*Movement type, F(1,18) = 17.04, p = 0.001, 
η2p = 0.49). Subjects were faster to approach than avoid positive pictures (app: 578 ± 16 ms, 
avoid: 630 ± 16 ms; t(18) = −6.81, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.57). There was no difference in 
approaching or avoiding negative pictures (app: 601 ± 19 ms, avoid: 609 ± 19 ms; n.s). 
Approach was also faster for positive compared to negative pictures (t(18) = 2.46, p = 0.024), 
and avoidance was faster for negative compared to positive pictures (t(18) = −2.75, p = 
0.013). There was also a main effect of Movement type (F(1, 18) = 30.82, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.63), 
with participants being faster at initiating approach (590 ± 17 ms) compared to avoidance 
(619 ± 17 ms) movements (t(18) = −5.55, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.23). This result however, 
could not be attributed to one arm movement being easier than another due to the fact 
that the manikin appeared above and below, meaning that both approach and avoidance 
required pull and push movements. Overall, the results demonstrate an effect of approach-
avoidance tendencies action selection and initiation. 
 
5.2.2.2.2. Speed of action suppression: Stop-Signal Reaction Times   
If valence affects the speed of inhibition of approach-avoidance actions, an 
interaction between valence and movement type should be observed. However, this was 
not the case, as there was no difference in inhibiting avoidance or approach movements 
when presented with emotional pictures (Figure 5.5B; Valence*Movement type, n.s). 
Participants were numerically faster at inhibiting avoidance (206 ± 15 ms) compared to 
approach (220 ± 15 ms) irrespective of the valence. However, follow-up paired samples t-
tests did not reveal a significant difference between inhibition of approach and avoidance 
(t(18) = 1.29, n.s). At first glance, the speed of response inhibition was not influenced by 
valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies.  
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Figure 5.5. Speed of action 
initiation and inhibition. A) Mean 
RTs showing that approach was 
faster for positive compared to 
negative pictures, and avoidance 
was faster for negative compared 
to positive pictures. B) SSRTs 
showing the speed of inhibition 
when approaching and avoiding 
positive and negative pictures. 
There was no effect of valence on 
inhibition.  Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); 
** significant at p < 0.001 level, * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
 
5.2.2.2.3. The certainty of parameter estimation: prior and posterior distributions, R statistic 
and goodness-of-fit 
 
The advantage of BEESTS is that it uses the RT and SSRT distributions to better 
quantify the effects on the initiation and suppression of actions. BEESTS yielded parameters 
for µ (the mean of the RT and SSRT distributions), σ (the spread) and τ (the skew). The 
certainty that these parameters are accurate is given by the prior and posterior 
distributions. Figure 5.6A shows the posterior and prior distributions (top panel) for the 
group analysis for the condition where participants had to approach positive pictures. As 
mentioned above, the posterior distribution is a measure of how uncertain the parameters 
yielded are. In Figure 5.6A, the prior distributions (black dotted lines) are adequately 
updated and the posteriors (black solid lines) are narrower than the priors, indicating less 
degree of uncertainty in the parameters. Figure 5.6B shows the MCMC chains for this 
particular condition converged adequately, and this was verified by the fact that the 
Gelman-Rubin R convergence diagnostic values were all lower than 1. All subjects had an R 
value lower than 1.1 for all conditions. Overall, in this particular example, one can be 
confident in the parameters µ, σ, and τ obtained by the analysis.  
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Figure 5.6. A) Posterior and prior distributions for the hierarchical group analysis when approaching positive 
pictures. The prior distributions (black dotted lines) are adequately updated and the posteriors (black solid 
lines) are unimodal for both the group-level mean (upper panel) and group-level variability (lower panel). B) 
MCMC chains when approaching positive pictures. All three chains converged adequately for parameters mu, 
sigma and tau in the GO and STOP conditions both the group-level mean (upper panel) and group-level 
variability (lower panel). Black, green and red reflect the results for each individual chain.  
  
Figure 5.7 is a comparison of the posterior predictive model checks for individual 
(Figure 5.7A) and hierarchical BPA (Figure 5.7B) for Participant 1. I present both model 
checks for the sake of demonstrating how similar the individual and hierarchical analyses 
were and to show that group-level analyses did not significantly distort the results for each 
individual. This comparison also gives an idea of the goodness-of-fit. For the selected stop-
signal delays (SSDs), the observed median signal-respond RTs (i.e. black triangles) are within 
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the predicted median signal-respond RTs, and are 
approximated by the median of the predicted median signal-respond RTs (i.e. white circles). 
This indicates that both the individual and hierarchical BEESTS appropriately accounted for 
the observed data, adding to the certainty of the observed parameters.  
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Figure 5.7. Posterior predictive model checks for A) individual and B) hierarchical BPA for participant 1. 
These checks give an idea of goodness-of-fit. For each SSD, the figures show the observed median signal-
respond RTs (black triangles), the predicted median signal-respond RTs (white circles in the grey violin plot), 
and a boxplot from the 25
th
 to 75
th
 percentile of the predicted median signal-respond RT. Both the individual 
and hierarchical BEESTS approximately accounted for the observed data. 
 
5.2.2.2.4. Parameters of the RT and SSRT distributions: µ, σ, and τ  
 
Speed of action initiation: µ-Go (mean of the RT distribution) 
µ represents the mean of the distribution. Similar to the mean RT results above, 
there was an effect of valence on approach-avoidance actions (Figure 8A; 
Valence*Movement type, F(1, 18) = 5.60, p = 0.029, η
2
p = 0.24). Subjects were faster to 
approach than avoid positive pictures (app: 484 ± 14 ms, avoid: 528 ± 15 ms; t(18) = 
−5.60, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.31). However, participants were also faster to approach 
than avoid negative pictures (app: 496 ± 17 ms, avoid: 515 ± 18 ms; t(18) = −2.57, p = 0.019, 
Cohen’s d = -0.59). There was no difference in the initiation of approach for positive and 
negative stimuli, and the initiation of avoidance for negative and positive stimuli. There was 
also a main effect of Movement type (F(1, 18) = 28.54, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.61), with participants 
being faster at initiating approach (490 ± 15 ms) compared to avoidance (522 ± 16 ms) 
movements (t(18) = -5.37, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.09).  
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Variability of action initiation: σ-Go (spread of the RT distributions) 
The valence of the picture and the type of movement made (approach vs. avoid) did 
not significantly affect the variance of the RT distributions. 
 
Direction of action initiation: τ-Go (skew of the RT distribution) 
When looking at the skew of the distribution for RTs, there was a 2-way interaction 
between Valence and Movement type (F(1, 18) = 8.22, p = 0.01, η
2
p = 0.31), indicating that 
valence affected the tail-end of the distribution depending on the type of movement made. 
For negative pictures, the tail-end distribution was significantly smaller (or shorter) for 
avoidance than approach (app: 106 ± 4 ms, avoid: 93 ± 4 ms; t(18) = 3.38, p = 0.003, Cohen’s 
d = 0.79), indicating that avoidance had less of a positive skew in comparison to approach, 
and suggesting a more compact distribution when making avoidance movements. For 
positive pictures the opposite trend was observed but this was not significant (app: 94 ± 5 
ms, avoid: 103 ± 3 ms; t(18) = −1.65, n.s).  
 
Figure 5.8. Mu, sigma and tau parameters for A) GO and B) STOP conditions. A) Results for GO-MU display a 
similar RT pattern to the RT results shown above, with subjects being faster at approaching than avoiding 
positive and negative pictures. There were no differences for SIGMA-GO. B) Results for STOP-MU confirm that 
there were no differences in inhibition of approach and avoidance movements when presented with positive 
or negative pictures. STOP-SIGMA shows that the variability of SSRTs was affected by valence and movement 
type. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at p < 0.001 level, * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
In sum, the RT distributions reveal an effect of approach-avoidance tendencies on 
the shape of the distribution but not on the speed and consistency of initiation.   
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Speed of action suppression: µ-Stop (mean of the SSRT distribution) 
There was no difference in the speed of inhibiting avoidance or approach 
movements when presented with negative or positive pictures (Figure 5.8B; 
Valence*Movement type, n.s). No main effects were significant, corroborating the SSRT 
results above.   
 
Variability of action suppression: σ-Stop (spread of the SSRT distribution) 
There was an effect of Valence and Movement type on the variance of the SSRT 
distributions (Valence*Movement type, F(1, 18) = 315.02, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.95). Thus, although 
the SSRT distributions had similar means across all conditions, the spread of such 
distributions was different, demonstrating that the consistency of stopping was affected by 
emotional stimuli and their associated response tendencies. For negative pictures, there 
was less variability when inhibiting avoidance compared to approach (app: 18 ± 0.15 ms, 
avoid: 17 ± 0.31 ms; t(18) = 3.64, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.78), whereas for positive pictures 
there was less variability when inhibiting approach compared to avoidance (app: 15 ± 0.13 
ms, avoid: 21 ± 0.38 ms; t(18) = -16.02, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -4.13). There was a main effect 
of Valence (F(1, 18) = 52.17, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.74), with less variability in inhibiting movements 
to negative compared to positive pictures (neg: 17 ± 0.19 ms, pos: 18 ± 0.21 ms; t(18) = -
7.22, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.55). There was also a main effect of Movement type (F(1, 18) = 
76.34, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.81), showing less variability when inhibiting approach versus 
avoidance movements (app: 16 ± 0.11 ms, avoid: 19 ± 0.31 ms; t(18) = -8.74, p < 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -2.93). Thus, both the valence and the type of movement made influenced the 
variability of inhibition.  
 
Direction of action suppression: τ-Stop (skewness of the SSRT distribution) 
Valence and movement type did not significantly affect the tail-end of the SSRT 
distributions. 
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To sum up, the consistency, but not the speed, of stopping was affected by 
approach-avoidance tendencies. Stopping was more consistent when approaching positive 
and avoiding negative pictures, demonstrating some sort of automaticity that leaked into 
movement initiation. Furthermore, it demonstrates a dissociation between the effects of 
approach-avoidance on response suppression: movement planning was influenced by 
approach-avoidance tendencies but action selection was not.  
 
5.2.2.2.5. Validating BEESTS: SSRTs calculated using the mean method analysis  
SSRT results were validated using the mean method. Results did not show an 
influence of valence on inhibition of approach-avoidance actions, nor did they suggest any 
main effects of valence or the type of movement made. These results therefore confirm the 
SSRT results obtained via the BEEST method.  
 
5.2.2.2.6. Regression analyses  
Regression analyses assessed whether valence and arousal impacted the RTs. 
Multiple regression yielded beta coefficients representative of the strength and direction of 
the influence of each variable on RTs. A 3-way RM-ANOVA with factors Picture Valence 
(positive vs. negative), Movement type (approach vs. avoidance) and Variable type (valence 
vs. arousal) was subsequently conducted using these beta coefficients to observe the impact 
of valence and arousal on RTs for approaching and avoiding positive and negative pictures. 
The results revealed an interaction between Valence and Variable type (Figure 5.9; F(1, 18) = 
20.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.52). As negative pictures become less negative, RTs increase, and as 
the arousal of the negative pictures increase the RTs decrease, although these trends were 
not significantly different from zero (valence betas: 0.75 ± 3.37, arousal betas: -4.27 ± 2.23). 
As positive pictures become more positive, RTs decrease and as the arousal of positive 
pictures increases, RTs increase, and these trends were significantly different from zero 
(valence betas: -7.65 ± 1.93, t(18) = 3.95, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.52; arousal betas: 6.65 ± 
1.42, t(18) = -4.68, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.88). Despite there being only a trend for negative 
pictures, the positivity or negativity of the emotional pictures and their associated arousal 
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appeared to impact on the speed of action initiation, suggesting that the automaticity of 
emotional tendencies may be dependent on how positive and negative the stimuli are.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Regression showing the effect of valence and 
arousal on the speed of approaching and avoiding positive 
and negative pictures. As negative pictures become less 
negative, RTs increase, and as the arousal of negative pictures 
increase, RTs decrease. As positive pictures become more 
positive, RTs decrease, and as the arousal for positive pictures 
increases, RTs increase. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant 
at p < 0.001 level. 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3. Discussion  
Experiment 1 investigated whether positive and negative go-signals bias the 
preparation of approach and avoidance “go” processes and if this influences the speed of 
inhibition. I expected that inhibiting approach-avoidance tendencies would be more difficult 
because they are prepared faster. The results demonstrate that the speed of initiation was 
influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies, confirming the influence of such tendencies 
on action selection. In contrast, the speed of response inhibition was not affected by 
approach-avoidance tendencies and the preparation of “go” processes. However, the 
consistency of stopping was, indicating a possible influence of such tendencies on 
preparation processes involved in response inhibition.   
 
Selection and initiation of approach-avoidance actions is affected by the valence of 
emotional pictures 
The results replicate previous findings: participants were faster to initiate approach 
than avoidance when presented with positive pictures (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Chapter Two, 
Three and Four), but there was no difference in approaching or avoiding negative pictures 
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(Chapter Two and Three). However, participants were faster to approach when presented 
with a positive compared to negative picture, and faster to avoid negative compared to 
positive pictures, demonstrating an approach-avoidance effect. Regression analyses 
confirmed that the speed of initiation of approach-avoidance actions is only influenced by 
the valence and not the arousal of the emotional pictures. This finding confirms that 
approach-avoidance tendencies influence the selection and initiation of actions, as has been 
demonstrated in Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis.   
 
Approach-avoidance tendencies influence the consistency but not the latency of stopping  
The effect on the speed of initiation of approach-avoidance actions demonstrates 
that valence influenced the speed of preparation of “go” processes. Based on my 
predictions, this effect should have biased the resolution of competing “go” and “stop” 
processes influencing the speed of inhibition. However, this was not the case. Albeit non-
significant, results showed the expected trend for faster inhibition of avoidance responses 
when preceded by positive pictures. This follows the clear RT result for positive pictures 
which showed faster initiation (and therefore preparation) of approach compared to 
avoidance. Previous work has proposed that it is more difficult to inhibit “go” responses 
within positive contexts (Albert et al., 2010, Chiu et al., 2014). Here ”go” responses could be 
seen as an “approach” response. The current results support previous work by showing that 
inhibiting a prepared approach response to positive pictures is more difficult than inhibiting 
avoidance, presumably due to differences in the speed of preparation of each. 
Speculatively, approach tendencies to positive stimuli may have a possible influence on the 
selection and inhibition of actions.  
In contrast, the effect of negative pictures on the speed of inhibition was less clear 
and this may be because there was no difference in the initiating avoidance or approach 
when negative pictures were presented. This result corroborates that of Chapter Two, which 
showed no difference in the selection of approach-avoidance actions, possibly as a result of 
conflicting “fight-or-flight” responses. If inhibition reflects the state of action preparation, 
and RTs demonstrate that there is apparently no difference in the preparation of these two 
actions, then there should be no impact on inhibition. Indeed, this was the case, 
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demonstrating no effect of negative stimuli on the speed of action selection or inhibition. If 
“go” preparatory processes had been engaged, however, it may have influenced inhibition. 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the distributions of RTs when negative pictures 
were presented were skewed such that they may have compromised the calculation of the 
SSRTs (Verbruggen et al., 2013), suggesting that these results should be taken with caution.  
Despite the lack of a clear effect on the latency of inhibition, there was an effect on 
the consistency of the speed of inhibition. The distribution of SSRT responses revealed an 
influence of the “go” valence on the variability of inhibitory responses, with less variability 
at inhibiting avoidance when presented with negative pictures and less variability inhibiting 
approach for positive pictures. Thus, although the mean value of the SSRTs may not have 
been affected by approach-avoidance tendencies, the consistency of the speed of stopping 
was. This effect suggests that response inhibition is indeed affected by approach-avoidance 
tendencies but this is manifested in the consistency and not the latency of stopping. The 
consistency of behaviour is a measure of motor planning and uncertainty (Coombes et al., 
2007; Shadmehr & Krakauer, 2008). In this case, motor planning occurred relative to the 
“go” process, which was biased by the certainty of the outcome of predisposed actions. 
Speculatively, less variability at inhibiting approach-avoidance tendencies suggests a bias of 
the consistency of the “go” preparatory process on inhibitory processes. Valence-related 
approach-avoidance tendencies therefore influence the variability but not the latency of 
inhibitory responses, suggesting an influence of “go” preparatory processes on the 
resolution of competing “go” and “stop” processes.  
Subjects were also more consistent at inhibiting their responses to negative pictures 
compared to positive pictures, suggesting a possible predisposition for immobility in 
negative contexts (LeDoux, 1995). This may be guided by two possible mechanisms. Firstly, 
negative stimuli may have triggered “freezing-like” responses, in accordance with previous 
work (Facchinetti et al., 2006; Roelofs et al. 2010; Stins et al., 2013). Freezing, or slower 
response initiation, may have evolved to avoid potentially costly actions in threatening 
situations (LeDoux, 1996). Immobility in negative contexts therefore leads to less costly 
outcomes. Accordingly, environmental uncertainty is less in negative contexts and inhibition 
is easier.  Secondly, threatening information may have increased perceptual processing and 
increased attentional resources, devoting them to improving the consistency of inhibition in 
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negative contexts (Pessoa et al., 2002). However, the effect on variability is not supported 
by effects on latency, and therefore these suggestions are purely speculative.  
It may be possible that the null result on inhibition was due to the experiment 
lacking the adequate power. To account for this, a post-hoc power analysis was conducted 
(GPower 3.1). Using the partial effect sizes derived from SPSS on the 19 subjects tested, a 
sample size needed for a power of 0.8 was calculated. This power analysis suggested a 
sample size of 70 subjects would be necessary to yield statistically meaningful results for 
SSRTs. The same calculation suggested that only a sample of 6 subjects was necessary to 
obtain meaningful approach-avoidance RTs. Thus, it is clear that insufficient subjects were 
test but due to time constraints further testing was not possible.  
Despite this, the results indicate that the state of preparation of “go” processes may 
determine the speed and consistency of inhibition of approach-avoidance responses. 
Speculatively, approach tendencies appear to bias the competition between “go” and “stop” 
processes towards “go”, possibly as a result of “go” preparation of predisposed tendencies 
being faster. To my knowledge, this is the first demonstration that “go” preparatory 
processes may be under the influence of predisposed biases. Improved power may help 
solidify the above speculation.  
 
Can approach-avoidance tendencies bias response inhibition by influencing the preparation 
of “stop” processes?  
In contrast to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that emotional stop-
signals and their related approach-avoidance tendencies would bias the preparation of the 
“stop” process. Abstract go-signals linked to approach-avoidance responses were presented. 
These go-signals therefore still triggered the preparation of approach-avoidance “go” 
processes but preparation was expected to be equal for approaching and avoiding.  Positive, 
negative and neutral stimuli served as the stop-signals. Emotional pictures were therefore 
expected to influence the preparation of “stop” processes. “Stop” preparatory processes 
were expected to be slower for approach-avoidance tendencies. Neutral pictures were 
included as a control condition.  
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5.3. Experiment 2  
 
5.3.1. Method 
5.3.1.1. Participants  
26 healthy volunteers (mean age = 26.4 years [± 5.6 S.D.]; 15 female) were recruited 
as in Experiment 1. Two subjects were excluded from the data analysis for having a total 
number of errors two S.D. above the mean. Data analysis was therefore conducted on data 
from 24 subjects only.  
 
5.3.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
120 pictures were selected from the same database as in Experiment 1: 40 negative 
pictures, 40 neutral pictures (e.g. plates, chairs) with valences 4.5-5.5, and 40 positive 
pictures. The assignment of pictures in each of the 6 blocks and order of picture 
presentation was randomised for each subject. Block order was counterbalanced across 
participants to avoid all subjects starting with the same stop-signal valence. This was 
important because participants do improve their stopping abilities throughout the 
experiment. Each block comprised of 120 trials (40 positive/negative/neutral) and each 
picture was repeated six times throughout the experiment.  
There were six experimental conditions: approach movement, stop negative; 
approach movement, stop positive; approach movement, stop neutral; avoidance 
movement, stop negative; avoidance movement, stop positive; avoidance movement, stop 
neutral. In blocks where the stop-signal was a negative picture, the go-signals were positive 
and neutral pictures. In blocks where the stop signal was a positive picture, the go-signals 
were neutral and negative pictures. In blocks where the stop signal was a neutral picture, 
the go-signals were negative and positive pictures. In total there were 40 repetitions for 
each experimental condition.  
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All stimuli were presented using the same apparatus used in Experiment 1. For 
simplicity, in contrast to Experiment 1, the manikin was only presented on the bottom half 
of the screen. This was not expected to impact performance. A small black rectangle with 
yellow border (103x35 pixels) represented the “away” target where participants moved to 
when avoiding and was presented on the bottom half of the screen. A grey circle and square 
(134 x 134 pixels) were used as stimuli to approach and avoid. Each shape was created using 
Microsoft Paint.  
 
5.3.1.3. Experimental task 
The experimental procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1. Only differences 
will be described. Participants were instructed to move the manikin towards or away from 
the circle or square as fast as possible, according to the instructions at the beginning of each 
block. To avoid confounds of a shape being easier to approach or avoid, half the participants 
were instructed to move the manikin towards circles and away from squares in all blocks, 
and vice versa for the remaining half. They were told that in all trials, an emotional picture 
would appear shortly after the appearance of the shape. According to the instructions at the 
beginning of each block, participants were instructed to inhibit their response when a 
picture of a specific valence appeared (e.g. do not move when a negative picture is shown 
on the screen) but to respond when a picture of another valence appeared. Thus, 
participants were required to evaluate the valence of the picture presented shortly after the 
shape in order to know whether they were to move or not. All pictures were presented for 
300 ms, after which the shape would be shown on the screen again. Therefore, the initial 
presentation of the shape prepared subjects for the type of movement they had to make 
(approach vs. avoid), and the valence of the picture acted as either the go or stop signal.  
Figure 5.10 shows a trial sequence. Trials started with a central fixation cross (500 
ms), followed by the simultaneous appearance of the fixation cross and manikin on the 
screen (jittered, mean 500 ± 100 ms). A grey shape replaced the fixation cross, and 
remained on the screen until the appearance of an emotional picture. In go trials, the 
appearance of the picture on the screen was jittered (with a mean of 300 ± 200 ms) and was 
presented for 300 ms. The jitter essentially prevented participants from guessing when the 
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picture would appear but also to match the fact that the stop-signal was displayed at 
different latencies due to changing SSD. In stop trials, the appearance of the stop-signal 
picture was determined by the SSD derived from a staircase procedure. SSD was fixed at 300 
ms at the beginning of the experiment and was adjusted dynamically throughout the whole 
experiment. If participants successfully inhibited their response the SSD would increase by 
50 ms. If inhibition was unsuccessful, the SSD decreased by 50 ms. The SSD varied 
independently for each of the six experimental conditions. The picture was then replaced by 
the grey shape once again until the end of the trial (1500 ms). Like in Experiment 1, reaction 
time feedback was provided at the end of each block to discourage strategic slowing.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Experiment 2 task schematic. Participants were instructed to move the manikin towards squares 
and away from circles (go-signal). After a certain delay, an emotional picture (positive, negative or neutral) 
appeared (for a duration of 300 ms). In go trials this delay was jittered around a mean of 500 ms. In stop trials, 
this delay corresponded to the stop signal delay (SSD), which varied as a function of the previous stop trial. 
After the emotional picture disappeared, the original shape, either a circle or a square, reappeared on the 
screen and participants made or inhibited their movement. Thus, each trial was divided into three phases: a 
preparation phase in which participants were informed of the type of movement they had to make (approach 
or avoid), a go/stop phase in which participants were informed whether they had to execute or inhibit the 
movement, and an execution/inhibition phase in which participants either initiated movement or inhibited 
their movement until the next trial started. Participants received feedback when they made a wrong response 
(e.g. approach instead of avoid) and when inhibition was successful. Despite having a preparation phase, 
subjects were still instructed to move as fast as possible once the shape appeared on the screen.  
 
Using this design, “go” preparatory processes to abstract shapes should have been 
the same. This was important because I did not want differences in “go” preparation to 
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influence inhibition. Instead, inhibition should be influenced by biases of valence on “stop” 
processes.  
Before the experiment, participants completed three short training blocks, one with 
each valence as the stop-signal, of 30 trials each (20 GO, 10 stop-trials) to familiarise 
participants with the task. After completion of the experimental session, participants rated 
the valence and arousal of all the pictures on a scale of 1 (i.e. very negative/very low 
arousal) to 9 (i.e. very positive/very high arousal).  
 
5.3.1.4. Data analyses and trial exclusion 
Data analyses were conducted like in Experiment 1. Only differences will be 
highlighted in this section. All trials in which the movement did not match the instructions 
(e.g., avoiding when instructed to approach; 4.2% of trials), with RTs below 100 ms (2.2%) or 
exceeding 2000 ms (5.3%) were excluded from the analyses. Outlier RTs (1.2%) were 
calculated per block for each subject using a Grubb’s test, α = 0.05. In total, 12.9% of trials 
were excluded.  
RTs were analysed in two different ways. Firstly, the influence of the go-signal 
valence on approach-avoidance RTs irrespective of block type (e.g. stop-positive) was 
assessed to test for any influence of the go valence on action initiation (GO-RT). To calculate 
this, go valences were collapsed across blocks, that is, all RTs when the go-signal was 
positive, neutral or negative. GO-RT should essentially reflect incidental influences of 
approach-avoidance tendencies on action initiation. This is because task instructions did not 
explicitly ask participants to approach or avoid the emotional pictures, but rather the 
abstract shapes. Secondly, RTs within each block (e.g. stop-negative block, RTs for GO 
positive and GO neutral collapsed) for approach and avoidance irrespective of the valence of 
the GO picture were determined (block-RTs). The distribution of the collapsed block-RTs was 
used to calculate the SSRT distributions.  
Like in Experiment 1, hierarchical analyses were conducted on the entire data set. 
Due to the complexity of the task, some subjects were deliberately slow in their responses 
in order to maximise their chances of successful inhibition and therefore had very high RTs 
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(> 1000 ms). Previous work has demonstrated that strategic slowing down by subjects in 
anticipation of the stop-signal has an effect on the estimation of SSRTs (Verbruggen et al., 
2013), and therefore this slowing down of responses by some of the subjects may have 
compromised the SSRT estimations of the hierarchical (group) analysis. To control for this, 
an overall RT mean was calculated collapsed for all conditions and across all subjects to 
serve as a baseline. Subjects that had RTs below that of the baseline mean (+1 SEM) were 
subsequently included in a further hierarchical analysis. With this approach, only 13 subjects 
were selected for further analyses.  
A 3x2 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) with factors Valence 
(positive vs. negative vs. neutral) and Movement type (approach vs. avoid) was conducted 
separately for GO-RTs, SSRTs and parameter estimates. For block-RTs only a 3x2 within-
subjects RM-ANOVA was conducted with factors Block type (pos-stop vs. neg-stop vs. neu-
stop) and Movement type (approach vs. avoid). For all analyses, where sphericity was 
violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. Statistical reporting was the same as 
in Experiment 1.  
Regression analyses were conducted as in Experiment 1. Because each picture has an 
associated valence and arousal, and both may influence inhibition differently, a multiple 
regression was conducted on the RTs to assess the influence of different variables. This 
regression yielded beta coefficient values representing the strength and direction of the 
influence of each variable on the RTs. A 3-way RM-ANOVA with factors GO valence (negative 
vs. positive vs. neutral), Movement type (Approach vs. Avoidance) and Variable type 
(valence vs. arousal) was subsequently computed using these beta values.  
As in Experiment 1, BEESTS results were validated using the mean method.  
 
5.3.1.5. Power analysis of sample size  
Like in Experiment 1, a power analysis was calculated. Using the effects sizes for the 
main effects in SSRTs and RTs, a sample size of ~30 participants was necessary to obtain 
significant results for main effects for SSRTs and RTs. However, for SSRTs, for the interaction 
between factors Valence (positive vs. negative. vs. neutral) and Movement type (approach 
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vs. avoidance), a sample size of >100 participants was required. Due to time constraints, it 
was not possible to test 100 participants. Thus, only main effects were expected given the 
sample size.  
 
5.3.2. Results  
 
5.3.2.1. Individual picture ratings  
Subjects rated the valence and arousal of all negative, neutral and positive pictures. 
For negative pictures, participants rated negative pictures as being more negative than the 
IAPS ratings (individual: 2.08 ± 0.10, IAPS: 3.00 ± 0.00; t(23) = 8.92, p < 0.001). Participants 
also rated positive pictures as being more positive than the IAPS ratings (individual: 7.29 ± 
0.17, IAPS: 7.00 ± 0.00; t(23) = 4.30, p < 0.001). However, individual neutral ratings did not 
differ from the IAPS ratings (individual: 5.04 ± 0.07, IAPS: 5.00 ± 0.00, n.s.).  
With respect to arousal, participants the arousal of negative pictures as being the 
same as the IAPS ratings (individual: 6.00 ± 0.32, IAPS: 6.00 ± 0.00; n.s.). Similarly, the 
arousal of positive pictures was the same as the IAPS ratings (individual: 4.21 ± 0.40, IAPS: 
5.00 ± 0.00; n.s). In contrast, participants rated neutral pictures as being less arousing than 
the IAPS ratings (individual: 1.58 ± 0.19, IAPS: 3.00 ± 0.00; t(18) = 7.47, p < 0.001).   
The results suggest that participants perceived pictures as being their correct 
valence, and identified the correct level of arousal for each picture.  
 
5.3.2.2. Hierarchical analysis using BEESTS  
Group-level analyses on the data from all subjects are presented first and 
subsequently the results from analyses on a sub-group of 13 subjects. The second 
hierarchical analysis on the sub-group was conducted due to possible strategic slowing of 
response initiation.    
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5.3.2.2.1. Speed of action initiation: Reaction Times  
To investigate influences of the valence of the go-signal on the initiation of approach 
and avoidance actions, RTs were collapsed across all blocks and sorted into each go valence 
(e.g. approach and avoidance RTs when the go-signal was positive, irrespective of block). An 
influence of the valence of the go-signal should manifest as an interaction between valence 
and movement type. Indeed, results showed an effect of valence on the initiation of 
approach-avoidance actions (Figure 5.11; Valence*Movement type, F(2, 46) = 3.68, p = 0.033, 
η2p = 0.14). Follow-up paired t-tests revealed that this interaction was influenced by a 
numerical difference, albeit not significant, between avoidance and approach for negative 
go-signals, (app: 832 ± 23 ms, avoid: 816 ± 23 ms; t(23) = 1.78, p = n.s). For positive and 
neutral pictures, there were no differences between initiating approach and avoidance. In 
general, there were no incidental influences of approach-avoidance tendencies on action 
initiation.  
 
 
Figure 5.11. RTs as a function of the type of GO picture that was 
presented. In GO trials, when a negative picture was presented 
as a GO signal, participants were numerically faster at initiating 
avoidance compared to approach movements. There were no 
differences in approach or avoidance when positive or neutral 
GO signals were presented. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); # depicts a 
numerical trend.  
 
 
 
 
 
To assess whether the valence of the stop-signal (and therefore the type of block) 
had an influence on the speed of initiation of approach and avoidance, RTs were collapsed 
across valence but separated into blocks (e.g. approach RTs collapsed across neutral and 
negative go-signals when the stop-signal was positive). Results showed a main effect of the 
stop-valence of the block type (Fig 10; F(2, 46) = 5.01, p = 0.011, η
2
p = 0.18). Subjects were 
faster to move in blocks where the stop signal was negative (and therefore the go-signals 
were positive and neutral), compared to blocks where the stop-signal was positive or 
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neutral (stop-neg: 818 ± 25 ms, stop-pos: 836 ± 24 ms, stop-neu: 867 ± 28 ms; neg-pos 
difference: t(23) = -2.33, p = 0.029, Cohen’s d = -0.48; neg-neutral difference: t(23) = -3.07, p = 
0.005 Cohen’s d = -0.62). Similarly, subjects were faster to move in blocks where the stop-
signal was positive relative to that where the stop-signal was neutral but this was not 
significant.  
In sum, there appeared to be no incidental effects of the valence of the go picture on 
the initiation of approach-avoidance actions. However, there was an incidental effect of 
valence, with slower initiation of actions, irrespective of whether an approach or avoidance 
was required, when positive and negative stimuli were the go-signals in comparison to 
neutral go-signals. Emotional stimuli therefore delayed action initiation compared to neutral 
stimuli.  
 
5.3.2.2.2. Speed of action suppression: Stop-Signal Reaction Times   
If positive and negative stop-signals influence the ability to stop ourselves from 
initiating approach-avoidance actions, then an interaction between valence and movement 
type should be observed. However, there was no difference in the speed of inhibiting 
avoidance or approach movements when presented with emotional pictures 
(Valence*Movement type, n.s). Despite the lack of a significant interaction, paired-samples t-
tests revealed that inhibition of approach was significantly faster than avoidance for 
negative pictures (Figure 5.12A; app: 274 ± 41 ms, avoid: 365 ± 45 ms; t(23) = -2.96, p = 
0.007, Cohen’s d = -0.66). Inhibition of approach and avoidance for positive and neutral 
pictures did not differ from each other.  
 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Five 
181 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Speed of action suppression as shown by the mean SSRTs. A) When negative stop-signals were 
presented, approach was significantly faster to inhibit compared to avoidance. Differences were not observed 
for positive or neutral stop-signals. B) Movement inhibition was significantly faster when presented with 
negative stop pictures compared to positive and neutral pictures. There was no difference in movement 
inhibition between positive and neutral stop pictures. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
 
There was a significant main effect of Movement type (F(1, 23) = 4.76, p = 0.04, η
2
p = 
0.17) indicating that participants were faster at inhibiting approach compared to avoidance 
irrespective of the stop valence. Follow-up paired t-tests showed a significant difference 
between inhibition of approach and avoidance (app: 368 ± 37 ms, avoid: 409 ± 34 ms, t(23) = 
-2.18, p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = -0.51). Results also showed a main effect of stop Valence (Figure 
5.12B; F(1, 23) = 4.32, p = 0.019, η
2
p = 0.16), with faster inhibition for negative pictures 
compared to positive (neg: 319 ± 40 ms, pos: 431 ± 43 ms) and neutral (neu: 416 ± 42 ms). 
Follow-up paired t-tests confirmed that inhibition of negative pictures was significantly 
faster than positive (t(23) = -2.59, p = 0.016, Cohen’s d = -0.46) and neutral (t(23) = -2.11, p = 
0.046, Cohen’s d = -0.33). There was no difference in inhibition of positive and neutral 
pictures.  
 
5.3.2.2.3. The certainty of parameter estimation: prior and posterior distributions, R 
statistic and goodness-of-fit 
 
Figure 5.13A shows the posterior and prior distributions for Participant 15 for the 
condition where they had to approach negative pictures. The prior distributions (black 
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dotted lines) are adequately updated and the posteriors (black solid lines) are narrower 
than the priors indicating that we can be certain that the parameters obtained are 
adequate. Figure 5.13B shows the MCMC chains for this particular condition converged 
adequately, and this was verified by the fact that the Gelman-Rubin R convergence 
diagnostic values were all lower than 1. All subjects had an R value lower than 1.1 for all 
conditions. Overall, the example demonstrates a high degree of certainty in the accuracy of 
the parameters obtained.  
 
 
Figure 5.13. A) Posterior and prior distributions for participant 15 when approaching negative pictures. The 
prior distributions (black dotted lines) are adequately updated and the posteriors (black solid lines) are 
unimodal. B) MCMC chains when approaching negative pictures. All three chains converged adequately for all 
parameters in the GO and STOP conditions. Black, green and red reflect the results for each individual chain. 
 
5.3.2.2.4. Parameters of the RT and SSRT distributions: µ, σ, and τ  
 
Speed of action initiation: µ-Go (mean of the RT distribution) 
Similar to the RT results above for Block type, the µ parameters also showed a main 
effect of the valence of the stop-signal in each block (F(2, 46) = 4.08, p = 0.026, η
2
p = 0.19). 
Subjects were faster to move in blocks where the stop signal was negative (and therefore 
the go-signals were positive and neutral), compared to blocks where the stop-signal was 
positive or neutral (stop-neg: 639 ± 34 ms, stop-pos: 670 ± 31 ms, stop-neu: 699 ± 34 ms). 
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that negative stop-signal blocks were significantly faster 
than neutral stop-signal blocks; t(23) = -2.91, p = 0.008, Cohen’s d = -0.62). There were no 
other significant results.  
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Variability of action initiation: σ-Go (spread of the RT distributions) 
The Block type also significantly affected the variance of the RT distributions (F(2, 46) = 
4.01, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.19), with less variability in blocks with a negative stop-signal (due to 
go-positive and go-neutral pictures) compared to positive and neutral stop-signal blocks 
(stop-neg: 123 ± 12 ms, stop-pos: 137 ± 13 ms, stop-neu: 154 ± 13 ms). Paired-samples t-
tests revealed that negative stop-signal blocks were significantly less variable than neutral 
stop-signal blocks; t(23) = -2.80, p = 0.011, Cohen’s d = -0.59). There were no other significant 
results. 
 
Direction of action initiation: τ-Go (skewness of the RT distribution) 
Block type and movement type did not significantly affect the tail-end of the RT 
distributions.  
The speed and variability of movement initiation was affected by the valence of the 
stop-signal, with faster and less variable movement initiation when negative stop-signals 
were presented (and positive and neutral go-signals were displayed), indicating an effect of 
threat on action initiation.  
 
Speed of action suppression: µ-Stop (mean of the SSRT distribution) 
Contrary to the SSRT data from above, there was a difference in the µ parameters for 
inhibiting avoidance or approach movements when presented with emotional stop pictures 
(Valence*Movement type, F(2, 46) = 4.46, p = 0.019, η
2
p = 0.21). Paired t-tests revealed that for 
negative pictures, inhibition of approach was faster than inhibition of avoidance (app: 161 ± 
33 ms, avoid: 220 ± 38 ms, t(23) = -2.40, p = 0.027, Cohen’s d = -0.57). For positive pictures, 
inhibition of approach was also faster than avoidance (app: 222 ± 44 ms, avoid: 299 ± 40 ms, 
t(23) = -2.40, p = 0.028, Cohen’s d = -0.57). Neutral stop-signals did not influence the speed of 
inhibition of approach-avoidance actions (app: 266 ± 34 ms, avoid: 230 ± 38 ms, t(23) = -1.69, 
n.s). Inhibition of approach was faster for emotional stop-signals, relative to neutral.  
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There was also a significant main effect of Movement type (F(2, 46) = 5.52, p = 0.031, 
η2p = 0.26) indicating that participants were faster at inhibiting approach compared to 
avoidance irrespective of the valence. Follow-up paired t-tests showed a significant 
difference between inhibition of approach and avoidance (app: 204 ± 28 ms, avoid: 234 ± 32 
ms, t(23) = -2.16, p = 0.043, Cohen’s d = -0.47). Contrary to the SSRT data from above, there 
was no main effect of valence.  
  
Variability of action suppression: σ-Stop (spread of the SSRT distribution) 
Variability of inhibiting approach-avoidance movements was differentially affected 
by emotional pictures (Valence*Movement type, F(2, 46) = 6.60, p = 0.004, η
2
p = 0.28). Follow-
up paired-samples t-tests revealed that for negative pictures, variability of inhibition of 
avoidance was less than inhibition of approach (app: 246 ± 15 ms, avoid: 212 ± 18 ms, t(23) = 
2.06, p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.49). For positive pictures, variability of inhibition for avoidance 
was less than for approach (app: 236 ± 13 ms, avoid: 179 ± 22 ms, t(23) = 3.07, p = 0.007, 
Cohen’s d = 0.81). There was no effect of neutral pictures on the variability of inhibition of 
approach-avoidance actions.  
There was also a significant main effect of Movement type (F(2, 46) = 5.16, p = 0.036, 
η2p = 0.23) indicating that the variability of inhibiting avoidance movements was less than 
inhibiting approach movements, irrespective of the valence. Follow-up paired-samples t-
tests showed this difference was not significant (app: 224 ± 10 ms, avoid: 213 ± 15 ms, t(23) = 
1.03, n.s).  
 
Direction of action suppression: τ-Stop (skewness of the SSRT distribution) 
Valence and movement type did not significantly affect the tail-end of the SSRT 
distributions. 
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Overall, the speed and variability of stopping was influenced by the valence of the 
stop-signal. Stopping approach was faster but more variable than stopping avoidance for 
positive and negative stop-signals. Crucially, there was no effect of neutral pictures on the 
speed or variability of approach-avoidance inhibition, suggesting that emotional valence 
does influence response inhibition.   
 
5.3.2.3. Controlling for strategic slowing: hierarchical analysis on a subset of 13 
participants using BEESTS  
Data was re-analysed on a subset of participants to control for strategic slowing. 
Overall, the results did not change significantly with the exclusion of participants with high 
RTs, adding confidence to the whole group analysis.  
 
5.3.2.3.1. Speed of action initiation: Reaction Times  
Contrary to the whole group analysis showing an effect of the valence of the GO 
picture on the RTs, analysis on a subset of subjects indicated that there was no such 
influence. Results for the influence of the GO valence on RTs irrespective of block type did 
not show any significant differences.   
Results for RTs for approaching and avoiding irrespective of the type of valence 
presented showed a main effect of the stop valence of the block (F(2, 24) = 5.47, p = 0.011, 
η2p = 0.31). Subjects were faster to move in blocks where the stop-signal was negative (and 
therefore the go pictures were positive and neutral), compared to when the stop-signal was 
positive or neutral (stop-neg: 723 ± 21 ms, stop-pos: 751 ± 25 ms, stop-neu: 778 ± 34 ms; 
neg-pos: t(12) = -2.13, p = 0.055, Cohen’s d = -0.61; neg-neu: t(12) = -2.76, p = 0.018, Cohen’s d 
= -0.95). Similarly, subjects were faster to move in blocks where the stop-signal was positive 
relative to when it neutral but this was not significant. There was also a main effect of 
Movement type, F(1, 12) = 6.45, p = 0.026, η
2
p = 0.35), with faster RTs for avoidance compared 
to approach (app: 760 ± 28 ms, avoid: 740 ± 24 ms; t(12) = 2.50, p = 0.028, Cohen’s d = 0.74). 
Action initiation was slower in emotional contexts.  
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5.3.2.3.2. Speed of action suppression: Stop-Signal Reaction Times   
There was a trend towards a difference in the speed of inhibition of avoidance and 
approach movements when presented with emotional pictures (Valence*Movement 
type, F(1, 24) = 2.76, p = 0.083, η
2
p = 0.19). Follow-up paired t-tests of this trend revealed that 
for negative pictures, inhibition was faster for approach than avoidance (app: 312 ± 56 ms, 
avoid: 450 ± 56 ms; t(12) = −4.04, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = -1.12). No other effects were 
observed. Thus, contrary the whole-group analysis, there was no main effect of Valence. 
Thus, after removing participants who deliberately slowed down their responses, the SSRT 
results did not show faster inhibition when negative stop-signals were presented.  
 
5.3.2.3.3. The certainty of parameter estimation: prior and posterior distributions, R 
statistic and goodness-of-fit 
Figure 5.15A shows the posterior and prior distributions (left panel) for the group 
analysis for the condition where participants had to approach positive pictures. The prior 
distributions (black dotted lines) are adequately updated and the posteriors (black solid 
lines) are narrower than the priors, indicating a high degree of certainty in the parameters. 
Figure 5.15B shows the MCMC chains (right panel) for this particular condition converged 
adequately, and this was verified by the fact that the Gelman-Rubin R convergence 
diagnostic values were all lower than 1. All subjects had an R value lower than 1.1 for all 
conditions.  
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Figure 5.15. A) Posterior and prior distributions for the hierarchical analysis (n=13) when approaching 
positive pictures. The prior distributions (black dotted lines) are adequately updated and the posteriors (black 
solid lines) are unimodal both at the group-level mean (upper panel) and group-level variability (lower panel). 
B) MCMC chains. All three chains converged adequately for all parameters in the GO and STOP conditions for 
both the group-level mean (upper panel) and group-level variability (lower panel). Black, green and red reflect 
the results for each individual chain. 
 
 Figure 5.16 is a comparison of the posterior predictive model checks for individual 
and hierarchical BPA for Participant 15. This comparison also gives an idea of the goodness-
of-fit.  For the selected stop-signal delays (SSDs), the observed median signal-respond RTs 
(i.e. black triangles) are within the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the predicted median signal-
respond RTs, and are approximated by the median of the predicted median signal-respond 
RTs (i.e. white circles). BEESTS appropriately accounted for the observed data, and the 
parameters are adequate.  
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Figure 5.16. Posterior predictive model checks for A) individual and B) hierarchical BPA for participant 15.  
These checks give an idea of goodness-of-fit. The black triangles represent the observed median signal-
respond RTs, whereas the white circles represent the predicted median signal-respond RTs. Both the individual 
and hierarchical BEESTS approximately accounted for the observed data.  
 
 
5.3.2.3.4. Parameters of the RT and SSRT distributions: µ, σ, and τ 
Speed of action initiation: µ-Go (mean of the RT distribution) 
There was a main effect of the valence of the stop-signal on RTs (F(1, 24) = 8.46, p = 
0.002, η2p = 0.41), with participants being faster at initiating responses in blocks where the 
stop-signal was negative (570 ± 21 ms) compared to positive (611 ± 27 ms) and neutral (652 
± 35 ms) stop-signal blocks, irrespective of the type of movement made. Paired-sample t-
tests revealed that RTs in stop-negative blocks were significantly faster than in stop-neutral 
blocks (t(12) = -3.45, p = 0.005, Cohen’s d = -1.11), and significantly faster than in stop-
positive blocks (t(12) = -2.18, p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = -0.62). RTs in stop-positive blocks were 
also faster than stop-neutral blocks (t(12) = -2.46, p = 0.03, Cohen’s d = -0.77). Thus, the 
valence of the go-signal in each block affected how fast responses were initiated.  
 
Variability of action initiation: σ-Go (spread of the RT distributions) 
The Block type also significantly affected the variance in the RT distributions (F(2, 24) = 
9.60, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.44), with less variability in blocks with a negative stop-signal 
compared to positive and neutral stop-signal blocks (stop-neg: 96 ± 5 ms, stop-pos: 111 ± 7 
ms, stop-neu: 141 ± 13 ms). Paired-samples t-tests revealed that RTs in negative stop-signal 
blocks were significantly less variable than positive stop-signal (t(12) = -2.25, p = 0.037, 
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Cohen’s d = -0.97) and neutral stop signal blocks; t(12) = -3.38, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = -1.32). 
RTs in positive stop-signal blocks were also less variable than in neutral stop-signal blocks 
(t(12) = -2.86, p = 0.014, Cohen’s d = -0.95). There was also a main effect of Movement type 
(F(1, 13) = 10.47, p = 0.007, η
2
p = 0.47), with less variability when avoiding compared to 
approaching (app: 125 ± 7 ms, avoid: 107 ± 7 ms;  t(12) = 3.24, p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = 0.90). 
 
Direction of action initiation: τ-Go (skewness of the RT distribution) 
There were no significant effects for the tail-end of the RT distributions. 
 
Speed of action suppression: µ-Stop (mean of the SSRT distribution) 
Similar to the whole-group data, there was a difference in the µ parameters for the 
speed on inhibition of avoidance- approach movements when presented with emotional 
pictures (Figure 5.17; Valence*Movement type, F(2, 24) = 4.46, p = 0.023, η
2
p = 0.27). Follow-
up paired-samples t-tests revealed that for negative stop-signals, inhibition of approach was 
faster than inhibition of avoidance (app: 197 ± 42 ms, avoid: 274 ± 39 ms, t(12) = -2.67, p = 
0.020, Cohen’s d = -0.74). For positive stop-signals, inhibition of approach was not 
significantly faster than avoidance (app: 231 ± 50 ms, avoid: 318 ± 47 ms, p = n.s.). There 
was no difference between approach and avoidance for neutral pictures. Inhibition of 
approach was therefore faster for emotional pictures compared to neutral, suggesting that 
in general approach movements were prepared more slowly than avoidance movements 
but only in emotional contexts.  
There was also a significant main effect of Movement type (F(1, 13) = 4.96, p = 0.046, 
η2p = 0.29) indicating that participants were faster at inhibiting approach compared to 
avoidance irrespective of the valence of the stop-signal. Follow-up paired-samples t-tests 
showed a significant difference between inhibition of approach and avoidance (app: 241 ± 
39 ms, avoid: 279 ± 38 ms, t(12) = -2.23, p = 0.046, Cohen’s d = 0.62).  
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Variability of action suppression: σ-Stop (spread of the SSRT distribution) 
Similar to the hierarchical analyses for all participants, there was an effect of the 
valence of the stop-signal on the variability of inhibiting approach-avoidance actions 
(Valence*Movement type; F(2, 24) = 27.01, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.69). For negative pictures, there 
was less variability when inhibiting avoidance compared to approach (app: 288 ± 5 ms, 
avoid: 199 ± 0.20 ms; t(12) = 5.10, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.04). For positive pictures inhibiting 
avoidance was less variable compared to approach (app: 297 ± 4 ms, avoid: 161 ± 28 ms; 
t(12) = 5.07, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.22). For neutral pictures, variability was less for 
approach compared to avoidance (app: 187 ± 18 ms, avoid: 257 ± 9 ms; t(12) = -4.50, p = 
0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.46). There was a main effect of Movement type (F(1, 12) = 19.81, p = 
0.001, η2p = 0.62), with less variability in inhibiting avoidance movements compared to 
approach (app: 257 ± 8 ms, avoid: 206 ± 16 ms; t(12) = 4.43, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.46).  
 
Direction of action suppression: τ-Stop (skewness of the SSRT distribution) 
Contrary to the whole-group analysis, the hierarchical analysis revealed an effect of 
stop-signal valence on the tail-end of the inhibition distribution (Fig 17; Valence*Movement 
type; F(2, 24) = 9.32, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.44). For negative pictures, the tail-end distribution was 
significantly smaller for approach than avoidance (app: 116 ± 16, avoid: 176 ± 20; t(12) = -
5.34, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.56). For positive pictures there was an opposite trend (app: 
177 ± 22, avoid: 117 ± 21; t(12) = 2.40, p = 0.028, Cohen’s d = 0.69). Neutral pictures had no 
effect on the shape of the distribution, suggesting that only emotional pictures impact the 
skew.  
 
Figure 5.17. Mu, sigma and tau parameters for the STOP condition. Stopping latency (ms) when approaching 
was significantly faster than when avoiding (MU). Stopping (SIGMA) was less variable when avoiding emotional 
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stimuli compared to neutral. The tail-end distribution (TAU) was only influenced by valence. Light blue bars = 
approach; dark blue bars = avoidance. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at p < 0.001 level, * significant at p 
< 0.05 level. 
 Overall, after removing participants that did not deliberately slow down their 
responses, the results for the RT and SSRT distributions did not differ from the whole-group 
analysis.   
 
5.3.2.4. Validating BEESTS: SSRTs calculated using the mean method analysis  
As a control, SSRTs were re-calculated for individual subjects using the mean 
method. Because the mean method is susceptible to miscalculating the SSRT as a result of 
strategic slowing, it was important to calculate the SSRT for the subset of participants which 
did not display a strategic slowing of RTs throughout the experiment.  
Results for the whole-group analysis showed similar results to those yielded by the 
BEESTS SSRTs. There was a significant main effect of Movement type (F(1, 23) = 8.06, p = 0.09, 
η2p = 0.26), with faster inhibition of approach compared to avoidance irrespective of the 
stop valence. Follow-up paired t-tests showed a significant difference between inhibition of 
approach and avoidance (app: 358 ± 31 ms, avoid: 414 ± 27 ms, t(23) = -2.85, p = 0.09, 
Cohen’s d = -0.59). There was also a main effect of stop valence (F(1, 23) = 3.31, p = 0.046, 
η2p = 0.13), with faster inhibition for negative pictures compared to positive (neg: 331 ± 37 
ms, pos: 429 ± 35 ms, neu: 396 ± 33) and neutral. Follow-up paired t-tests confirmed that 
inhibition of negative pictures was significantly faster than positive (t(23) = -2.32, p = 0.030, 
Cohen’s d = -0.47). There was no difference in inhibition of positive and neutral, and 
negative and neutral pictures. 
Results for the sub-group analysis, which removed participants with strategic 
slowing, showed a significant main effect of Movement type (F(1, 23) = 5.00, p = 0.045, η
2
p = 
0.29) indicating that participants were faster at inhibiting approach compared to avoidance 
irrespective of the stop valence. Follow-up paired-samples t-tests showed a significant 
difference between inhibition of approach and avoidance (app: 360 ± 39 ms, avoid: 419 ± 39 
ms, t(23) = -2.24, p = 0.045, Cohen’s d = -0.61). In contrast to the whole group analysis, there 
was no significant main effect of valence.  
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The mean method analysis incorporating all participants corroborated the results 
from the whole-group BEESTS analysis by showing that participants were faster to inhibit 
actions when presented with negative stop-signals. This is not surprising given that there 
were no effects of the valence of the go-signal on the skewness of the RT distributions. 
Skewness has been suggested to affect the calculation of SSRT. Since the RT distributions 
used to calculate the SSRT were not skewed for the whole-group analysis, the mean method 
was less susceptible to miscalculations. However, when participants that deliberately 
slowed down their responses were removed, the main effect of Valence was no longer 
observed, corroborating the results of the sub-group BEESTS analysis which also did not 
show that stopping was faster for negative stop-signals. Thus, it seems that the removal of 
participants with strategic slowing eliminated the valence effect, suggesting that the faster 
you are at responding, the less time available for valence to influence inhibition.  
 
5.3.2.5. Regression analyses on RTs 
Regression analyses were conducted to assess how much of the variability on the RT 
distributions could be accounted for by valence and arousal. A 3-way RM-ANOVA with 
factors Go-Valence, Variable type and Movement type was conducted on betas obtained 
from the regression to assess the impact of the valence and arousal associated to each 
picture on the speed of initiation of approach and avoidance movements. Because approach 
and avoidance are movements typically triggered by positive and negative valences, and not 
associated with picture arousal, an interaction between Go-Valence and Movement type 
only was expected. Indeed, the results revealed an interaction between Go-Valence and 
Movement type (Figure 5.18A; F(2, 46) = 4.53, p = 0.025, η
2
p = 0.17). This interaction was 
driven by differences in betas for the initiation of approach and avoidance when presented 
with positive go pictures (approach: -11.23 ± 3.69, avoidance: 3.41 ± 4.04), but only betas 
for approach differed from zero (t(23) = 3.08, p = 0.005). For approach, as the valence of 
positive pictures increases, RTs decrease and for avoidance, there is a trend that as the 
valence of positive pictures increases, RTs increase. Thus, there is an effect of positive 
valence on action initiation of approach-avoidance responses, supporting the GO-RT 
analyses above.  
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There was also an interaction between Valence and Variable type (F(2, 46) = 3.88, p = 
0.028, η2p = 0.15), driven by differences in betas for valence and arousal for negative 
pictures only (Figure 5.18B). Thus, as negative pictures become less negative, RTs increase, 
and as the arousal of the negative pictures increase the RTs decrease (valence betas: 6.85 ± 
3.58, arousal betas: -0.55 ± 4.17) although only the betas for valence differed from zero 
(t(23) = -1.92, p = 0.06). Therefore, the associated valence of negative pictures only affects 
movement initiation, but do not influence the speed of initiation of approach-avoidance 
responses.   
 
 
Figure 5.18. Regression showing the effect of valence on stopping. A) Interaction between valence 
and movement type, driven by difference in betas for approaching and avoiding positive pictures. As 
the valence of positive pictures increases, RTs decrease when approaching and decrease when 
avoiding. B) Interaction between valence and variable type driven by differences in betas for valence 
and arousal for negative pictures only. As negative pictures become less negative, RTs increase, 
whereas as the arousal of negative pictures increases, RTs decrease. Error bars (mean + S.E.M.); * 
significant at p < 0.05 level. 
 
 
5.3.3. Discussion  
Experiment 2 investigated if emotional stop-signals and their related response 
tendencies would bias the preparation of the “stop” process. I expected that for emotional 
pictures inhibition of predisposed tendencies would be harder compared to those that are 
not predisposed, and for neutral pictures there would be no difference on the inhibition of 
approach-avoidance responses. There was an influence of emotional valence, but not 
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approach-avoidance tendencies, on the speed of action initiation, with slower responses 
when presented with emotional pictures relative to neutral pictures. There was an effect of 
valence, but not approach-avoidance tendencies, on the speed of inhibition, with faster 
inhibition of responses in negative relative to positive and neutral contexts, supporting 
previous work (Pessoa et al., 2012; Senderecka, 2016). Overall, the results show that 
approach-avoidance tendencies do not influence the preparation of “stop” processes during 
response inhibition, but emotional valence does.  
 
Emotional valence influences the speed of action initiation  
Results showed that when looking at the block-RTs (defined by the valence of the 
stop-signal), collapsed across the go-signal valences (e.g. negative stop-signal block, with 
positive and neutral go-signals), RTs were faster and less variable in blocks with positive and 
neutral go-signals, and slowest in blocks with positive and negative go-signals irrespective of 
whether an approach or avoidance was made. These data demonstrate that the presence of 
neutral content makes us respond faster, and that the presence of emotional stimuli slows 
down action initiation. This effect may occur due to the attention-grabbing properties of 
such stimuli, corroborating previous evidence demonstrating an interference with 
performance (Carretié, 2014; Herbert, 2011; Gawronski et al., 2005; Hartikainen et al., 2000; 
Schimmack, 2005; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). Threat-related distractors, for 
instance, increase the number of errors when inhibiting a response (Hartikainen et al., 
2000). Indeed, regression analyses confirmed that RTs are only influenced by the valence of 
the go-signal and not the arousal, suggesting that the slowing down of action initiation 
relative to blocks with neutral pictures resulted from the emotional content of positive and 
negative pictures. Therefore, the emotional content, particularly negative, influenced the 
speed and consistency of action initiation to abstract stimuli. These results concord with 
previous work that has shown that participants are slower to initiate responses in negative 
(i.e. high threat) contexts (Albert et al. 2010; Facchinetti et al. 2006; Stins et al., 2013). The 
slower initiation of responses in negative contexts may result from that fact threatening 
stimuli trigger “freezing-like” responses that lead to immobility (Facchinetti et al. 2006; Le 
Doux, 1996, 2000).  
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The level of threat in emotional stimuli biases the “stop” process   
There was an effect of the valence of the stop-signal on the latency of stopping 
actions. Inhibition was faster when presented with negative stop-signals, compared to 
positive and neutral stop-signals. This demonstrates that the speed of inhibition is not 
modulated by arousal, in contrast to previous suggestions (Pessoa et al., 2012; Verbruggen 
& De Houwer, 2007), because there was no difference in inhibition between positive and 
neutral stop signals. Stopping was instead modulated by negative pictures.  
The current results may offer some support for the hypothesis that negative pictures 
induce freezing-like behaviour and decrease the speed the inhibition of responses (Pessoa 
et al., 2012; Senderecka, 2016). The RT results above suggest a slowing down of action 
initiation, and presumably action preparation, when presented with threatening content, 
subsequently leading to faster inhibition. This slowing down of action initiation 
demonstrates that emotional pictures captured attention and interfered with performance, 
and suggests that the improved inhibitory performance observed in negative contexts 
cannot be attributed to enhanced perceptual processing and increased attention, contrary 
to previous suggestions (Pessoa, 2009). Instead, they reveal that better stopping in negative 
contexts is mediated via freezing (Facchinetti et al., 2006; Roelofs et al. 2010; Stins et al., 
2013), a fast defensive response often deployed in threatening situations (LeDoux, 1996). 
Thus, negative stimuli may activate a defensive circuitry that results in freezing of 
responses, leading to slower action initiation and faster inhibition. In sum, negative stimuli 
speed up inhibition and low-threat stimuli (i.e. stimuli with no threat content) have no 
influence on inhibition.  
Importantly, this faster inhibitory effect of negative pictures was not present when 
removing participants who slowed down their responses strategically, revealing that long 
RTs are capable of distorting distributions and impact on the calculation of SSRTs (see 
Verbruggen et al., 2013). In this case, the slowing down of RTs led to overestimating the 
impact of valence on stopping. Thus, it appears that emotional valence did not impact the 
speed of response suppression. Irrespective of this, however, the valence effect observed 
above is still interesting and should be followed up.  
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In sum, Experiment 2 demonstrated that approach-avoidance tendencies do not 
influence response inhibition by biasing the preparation of “stop” processes. Instead, 
negative valence may facilitate inhibition relative to neutral and positive pictures as a result 
of defensive freezing mechanisms.    
 
5.4. General Discussion 
This chapter investigated the process of response inhibition in emotional situations 
by determining if approach-avoidance tendencies influence the resolution of competing 
responses by biasing the preparation of “go” or the preparation of “stop” processes. Two 
experiments were conducted to assess this. Experiment 1 investigated whether emotional 
tendencies influence the preparation of approach and avoidance “go” responses, resulting 
in biasing response inhibition. Results showed a possible influence of “go” preparatory 
processes on inhibition. In contrast, Experiment 2 investigated whether approach-avoidance 
tendencies bias the preparation of “stop” processes. The data revealed that only valence 
determined inhibition, with faster inhibition for negative compared to positive and neutral 
stimuli. The preparation of “stop” processes therefore is biased by valence but not by 
approach-avoidance tendencies. 
Overall, approach-avoidance tendencies influence inhibition by biasing the “go” 
preparatory processes but not the “stop” processes. This suggests that approach-avoidance 
tendencies influence preparatory processes that occur prior to action initiation, but not 
those that arise once an action has been executed. This corroborates the conclusions from 
previous chapters and confirms the effect that such tendencies have on selection processes. 
The current chapter therefore provides novel evidence on the underlying mechanisms 
whereby approach-avoidance tendencies influence response inhibition.  
 
Action initiation is influenced by emotional valence and approach-avoidance tendencies 
Both experiments confirmed that the emotional content of the go-signals influences 
our ability to initiate approach-avoidance actions. In Experiment 1, approach was initiated 
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faster for positive compared to negative pictures, and avoidance was initiated faster for 
negative compared to positive pictures, corroborating previous work (Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Roelofs et al., 2009) and other chapters in this thesis, and confirming the effect of approach-
avoidance tendencies on action selection and initiation.  
Experiment 2 demonstrated that response initiation was slower and less consistent 
in blocks containing positive and negative go-pictures relative to blocks which included 
neutral go-signals. This suggests prioritised attentional processing of emotional pictures 
relative to neutral (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001) that subsequently leads to 
slower response initiation. Indeed, relative to neutral pictures, emotional pictures interfere 
with task performance by slowing down RTs (Ambron & Foroni, 2015; Horstmann & 
Bauland, 2006) or increasing the number of errors (Hartikainen et al., 2000). This influence 
of valence on response initiation occurred irrespective of whether an approach or avoidance 
was made. This may be partly because, in Experiment 2, goals to approach and avoid 
emotional pictures were not made explicit like in Experiment 1. Previous work has 
highlighted the importance of task instructions and content evaluation in determining 
action selection (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Eder & Klauer, 2009; Lavender & Hommel, 
2007). Thus, Experiment 2 demonstrated that there is no implicit influence of approach-
avoidance tendencies on action selection and initiation, corroborating the findings from 
Chapter Three.  
In sum, emotional valence slows down action initiation relative to neutral stimuli, 
but within emotional stimuli some actions are more predisposed than others. The current 
chapter adds to the conclusion that approach-avoidance tendencies influence the speed of 
action selection and initiation, but only when explicit goal information is provided, 
confirming Chapters Two, Three and Four.  
 
Response inhibition is influenced by valence 
Both experiments demonstrated an effect of valence on inhibitory processes. 
Experiment 1 showed that inhibiting responses in negative contexts was less variable than in 
positive contexts. Experiment 2 demonstrated that inhibiting actions in negative contexts 
was faster than in positive or neutral ones. Thus, negative valence increased the speed and 
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decreased variability of inhibition, supporting previous work (Pessoa et al., 2012; 
Senderecka 2016). 
Mechanistically, faster inhibition in negative contexts may reflect “freezing-like” 
behaviour, whereby threatening information leads to immobility in order to minimise the 
cost of an action (Fanselow, 1994; Le Doux, 1996; Lang et al., 2000). Indeed, immobility (i.e. 
passive behaviour) has been suggested to be the first step in defensive behaviour, followed 
by active fight-or-flight (Fanselow, 1994; Mobbs et al., 2009). Immobility may result from a 
global inhibitory mechanism, whereby the prepared response and other response 
alternatives are suppressed simultaneously (Badry et al., 2009; Coxon et al., 2007; Majid et 
al., 2012). For instance, suppressing a finger movement, also results in suppression of neural 
excitability of the leg despite the leg being task-irrelevant (Badry et al., 2009). Thus, faster 
inhibition may result from a global stopping mechanism triggered by threatening 
information. This type of inhibition contrasts with selective mechanisms which suppress 
only specific effectors (Aron, 2011; Aron & Verbruggen, 2009). That is, one specific action 
may be inhibited but other effectors may still be active.  
The speed of inhibition is therefore modulated by a defensive circuitry activated by 
the presence of negative information. Because there were no effects of positive stimuli on 
inhibition, the results argue against the hypothesis that task-relevant emotional stop-signals 
increase perceptual processing, thereby leading to facilitatory effects (Pessoa, 2009). 
Importantly, what seems clear from the results is that inhibition is not influenced by neutral 
pictures, confirming that behaviour is heavily influenced by emotional stimuli in our 
environment.  
 
Can the level of threat influence inhibition?  
Some work has suggested that inhibition is guided by the level of threat of emotional 
information (Pessoa et al., 2012). Neutral and positive stimuli can be classified as low-threat 
and negative stimuli as high-threat (Pessoa, 2009). The content of negative pictures contains 
a degree of threat. This degree of threat, however, may vary depending on the nature of the 
negative picture. For example, a negative picture of a dead animal may not necessarily have 
the same degree of threat as a negative picture of a violent dog displaying their teeth. 
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Indeed, a recent study suggested that negative stimuli with disgust and fearful properties 
have a differential impact on response inhibition (Xu et al., 2015), with disgust distractors 
interfering more with inhibition than fearful distractors. In the current chapter, pictures 
were not classified and were not formally assessed, for their threatening content because 
the goal was not to investigate how the level of threat influences stopping. However, given 
the established effect that negative pictures have on response inhibition, assessing the 
impact of different negative stimuli on the speed of inhibition seems imperative in order to 
understand if this is a general effect of negative valence or a more focused effect of 
threatening content. This is a very interesting question and one that should be formally 
assessed in the form of another experiment.  
 
Conclusion  
In sum, approach-avoidance tendencies appear to influence response inhibition by 
biasing the preparation of “go” processes prior to movement initiation. Approach-avoidance 
tendencies therefore only manifest prior to when an action needs to be executed. 
Furthermore, for these tendencies to impact action preparation and initiation, there needs 
to be an explicit goal to approach or avoid. In contrast, the preparation of “stop” processes 
is influenced by emotional valence, with faster inhibition in negative contexts. Stopping 
processes are therefore influenced by negative information, possibly modulated by a fast 
defensive circuit. This chapter dissociates the effect of valence and approach-avoidance 
tendencies by demonstrating their differential impact on “go” and “stop” processes. To my 
knowledge this is the first demonstration of this dissociation. 
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6. Chapter Six. Emotional valence updates motor 
plans during action execution 
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6.1. Abstract 
  Successful behaviour requires adapting to changes and new opportunities that may 
arise in the environment while we perform actions. Adapting to changes involves updating 
motor output in real time via feedforward and feedback mechanisms. Two mechanisms may 
be responsible for updating motor output: a fast, more automatic mechanism and slow, less 
automatic one. What remains unknown is whether the fast or slow mechanisms underlying 
visuomotor updating are influenced by emotional stimuli. More specifically, can approach-
avoidance tendencies associated to emotional stimuli influence the speed at which these fast 
and slow mechanisms are engaged? If so, it would demonstrate that approach-avoidance 
tendencies and visuomotor corrections during execution are not independent processes. 
Two experiments were conducted to assess this. In Experiment One, participants made 
simple reach-to-target movements and emotional distractors were presented shortly after 
movement initiation. Emotional distractors and related response tendencies were expected 
to perturb reaching and cause spatiotemporal changes. The speed at which these changes 
occur should inform of fast or slow pathways. In Experiment Two, targets paired with 
emotional distractors jumped from the centre to the left or right shortly after reaching 
initiation. Participants corrected their movement towards or away from the new target 
location. Emotional distractors and associated approach-avoidance tendencies were 
expected to influence the speed of these corrections, revealing fast or slow mechanisms. 
Both experiments showed that only the end stage of reaching is influenced by emotional 
relative to neutral stimuli, affecting accuracy and precision. Furthermore, Experiment Two 
demonstrated that the speed of visuomotor corrections is influenced by valence. Overall, 
both experiments demonstrated that emotional stimuli, but not approach-avoidance 
tendencies, engage the slow mechanism, guided by top-down attentional modulation. 
Approach-avoidance emotional tendencies are independent of action execution.    
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6.2. Introduction  
Successful behaviour requires the continuous monitoring of our environment for 
changes and new opportunities that may arise while we perform actions (Cisek, 2007;  
Shadmehr & Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994; Wolpert & Miall, 1996). These environmental changes 
update motor output via a system of feedforward and feedback mechanisms (Desmurget & 
Grafton, 2000), whereby monitoring of the environment adjusts movements in real time to 
accommodate new goals (Desmurget et al., 1999; Goodale et al., 1986). This quick re-
planning most likely occurs via the parallel processing between motor planning and 
movement execution (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). Emotional changes in the environment may 
influence how this motor re-planning occurs. More specifically, given that valence-related 
approach-avoidance tendencies influence how quickly we select and initiate actions, as has 
been demonstrated in Chapters Two, Three and Four, emotional changes in the 
environment may trigger approach-avoidance tendencies that influence movement 
execution by biasing the updating motor plans.  
 
Visuomotor reaching corrections may inform of the underlying mechanisms in approach-
avoidance  
Arm reaching movements are especially suited to investigate both how our brain 
plans a goal-directed action (Kalaska & Crammond, 1992) and how unexpected changes in 
the environment influence the fast re-planning of actions via feedforward and feedback 
mechanisms while the movement is being executed (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Messier & 
Kalaska, 2000; Sabes, 2000). Within this framework, movements towards a target are 
initially planned, specifying the motor command (feedforward specification). While an 
action is executed, a forward model of movement dynamics is generated via information 
regarding the location of the effector in space, which simultaneously updates movements 
via feedback loops (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000). Changes in execution in response to 
environmental changes will therefore reflect the speed of feedforward and feedback 
mechanisms.   
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Visuomotor adaptation studies, whereby an arm perturbation or environmental 
change occurs while individuals perform an action, have also been critical for understanding 
the mechanisms involved in visually guided movement corrections (Day & Lyon, 2000; 
Desmurget et al., 1999; Paulignan et al., 1991; Prablanc & Martin 1992). These studies have 
added to models of movement control by revealing two further underlying mechanisms 
guiding visuomotor corrections: a fast, automatic pathway and a slower, less automatic 
pathway (Day & Lyon 2000; Pisella et al., 2000).  
Day & Lyon (2000) implemented a task in which subjects moved towards or away 
from targets that “jumped” either to the left or the right of a central target. This target jump 
occurred 25 ms after movement initiation and in only 30% of trials, making it unexpected 
and meaning that subjects were not capable of preplanning a movement correction prior to 
movement initiation. Results showed that correcting towards the new target location 
occurred approximately 125 ms after the initiation of movement, whereas correcting away 
from the new target occurred at about 200 ms after movement initiation, despite the target 
jump in both situations occurring at the same time.  
Thus, the authors dissociated two classes of responses during visually-guided 
movement. Early reaching corrections towards new targets were suggested to occur in a 
fast and automatic way, independently of conscious experience, supporting earlier work 
(Goodale et al., 1986; Jeannerod, 1988; Prablanc & Martin, 1992). In contrast, later 
corrections were assumed to be modifiable by the subjects’ intention to move in the 
opposite direction to the target and were classified as voluntary and less automatic than the 
early response. The shift from more automatic to less automatic is presumably influenced 
by the speed in which feedback loops can gather information during ongoing movements 
(Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Gaveau et al., 2014; Striemer et al., 2010). Two models were 
proposed for driving these different classes of responses. The dual-pathway model proposes 
that visual input throughout execution is sent to either a cortical or subcortical pathway 
which ultimately dictates the flexibility of the correction (Day & Lyon, 2000). In contrast, the 
single-pathway model is generated by a single visuomotor mechanism driven by attention, 
whereby attention is automatically diverted to the new target triggering the early response, 
and the later response is driven by inhibition of attention, where higher processes redirect 
lower processes (Tipper et al., 1998).   
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The existence of two classes of responses for visuomotor corrections may suggest 
that, depending on the situation, one may prevail over the other. In emotional situations 
that require rapid action, for instance, the fast, more automatic response may be favoured 
over the slower, less automatic response. This sort of distinction exists in emotion 
processing (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2011), whereby prioritisation of emotional information can 
occur via fast, bottom-up networks (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010) or driven by top-down 
attentional mechanisms (Pessoa et al., 2002). Thus, the question now is: can these fast and 
slow visuomotor mechanisms be influenced by emotional information? More specifically, 
can automatic emotional approach-avoidance tendencies influence the speed at which 
these mechanisms are engaged? For instance, correcting towards a positive target might 
occur faster than correcting towards a negative target. Similarly, correcting away from a 
negative target might be faster than correcting away from a positive target. This is because 
a positive stimulus automatically predisposes approach whereas a negative stimulus 
predisposes avoidance (Chen & Bargh, 1999). In essence, we may have two automatic 
systems at play: one related to the speed of visuomotor feedback (here referred to as 
visuomotor automaticity) and another related to approach-avoidance tendencies (here 
referred to as valence automaticity).  
To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated the potential relationship 
between these two automatic systems. If we observe an effect of valence automaticity on 
visuomotor automaticity, whereby predisposed tendencies trigger the fast or slow pathways 
earlier, it suggests that these two processes may not be independent from each other, 
potentially relying on similar underlying pathways. Importantly, if such corrections occur 
earlier in relation to neutral stimuli, it would demonstrate that emotional stimuli may have a 
privileged access to motor processes over non-emotional stimuli. It may be possible that the 
speed of visual feedback mechanisms during visuomotor corrections is influenced by the 
attentional prioritisation of emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli, driven by a fast and 
automatic visual pathway (LeDoux, 2000; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; West, Anderson, 
Bedwell, & Pratt, 2010). Indeed, visual pathways are extensively interconnected with 
emotional pathways at the cortical and subcortical level (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010), 
which may in turn be connected to the fast pathways guiding early movement corrections.  
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Emotional influences on arm kinematics  
While there is no evidence for an effect of approach-avoidance tendencies on the 
fast and slow mechanisms underlying reaching corrections, recent work has shown that the 
spatial characteristics of reaching execution are modulated by task-irrelevant emotional 
distractors (Ambron & Foroni, 2015; Ambron, Rumiati, & Foroni, 2016). Positive and 
negative distractors presented simultaneously with the target were shown to bias reaching 
toward the location of the distractor relative to neutral stimuli (Ambron & Foroni, 2015). 
This effect also occurred implicitly, even when the emotional dimension was not task-
relevant (Ambron et al., 2016). This work demonstrates an effect of emotional stimuli on 
action execution and adds to the existing literature showing that task-irrelevant, non-
emotional distractors cause changes in both the trajectory and the speed of movement 
(Buetti, Juan, Rinck, & Kerzel, 2012; Meegan & Tipper, 1998; Pratt & Abrams, 1994; Tipper 
et al., 1997; Welsh & Elliott, 2004). Mechanistically, these changes in spatiotemporal 
characteristics during movement may be driven by competition between the target and 
distractor, whereby the competing response elicited by the distractor is selectively inhibited 
by attentional mechanisms (Howard & Tipper, 1997; Tipper et al., 1997). The extent of 
inhibition biases the trajectory either towards (Welsh & Elliot, 2004) or away from the 
distractor (Howard & Tipper, 1997).  
Other studies have shown that distractors influence how accurate and precise 
participants are at reaching a target (Messier & Kalaska, 1999; van den Dobbelsteen, 
Brenner, & Smeets, 2001). Accuracy and precision are characterised by the endpoint 
distribution. Forward modelling receives information of the location of the arm in space as 
movement occurs, and this information is used to predict the endpoint of the movement 
relative to target location (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000). Emotional distractors may 
therefore influence feedback mechanisms and bias the estimation of the endpoint location 
compared to the target.  
While the above evidence demonstrates an effect of emotional stimuli on the 
spatiotemporal aspects of movement execution, the mechanisms underlying how emotional 
information influences the execution phase of movement remain undetermined. If changes 
that occur during action execution update motor output via a system of feedforward and 
feedback mechanisms (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000) presumably implemented via fast and 
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slow pathways (Day & Lyon, 2000), it is possible that emotional distractors presented after 
movement initiation may affect movement re-planning by influencing when and which of 
these pathways is engaged. Early spatiotemporal changes during execution would reflect 
the implementation of a fast pathway, whereas late changes would suggest the activation of 
a slow pathway.  
More specifically, emotional approach-avoidance tendencies may influence how and 
when these spatiotemporal changes occur. For instance, trajectories may veer towards or 
away from an emotional distractor depending on its valence: a positive stimulus could, for 
example, attract, and a negative stimulus could repel, the course of a reaching trajectory. 
Attract here would suggest an effect of approach tendencies, whereas repel would be a 
manifestation of avoidance. The extent to which emotion can “attract” or “repel” 
movement is most likely driven by the degree of response competition between the goal of 
the action and the emotional distractor (Tipper et al., 1997; Welsh & Elliott, 2004), which in 
turn may be influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies. Predisposed tendencies may 
need to be inhibited more than those that are not predisposed because they are presumed 
to be automatic (Chen & Bargh, 1999). The timing of when these attentional inhibitory 
mechanisms are engaged, evident in the timing of changes in speed and trajectory 
deviations, might provide a window into inferring the contribution of the underlying fast or 
slow processing pathways through which emotion influences movement. For instance, if any 
movement corrections in response to emotional distractors occur earlier in the movement, 
these will most likely be guided by fast pathways and would reveal a bottom-up movement 
influence of the distractor without yet being influenced by later top-down mechanisms. 
Valence automaticity may therefore influence visuomotor automaticity. 
 
The influence of biomechanics on arm reaching movements  
Movement corrections may not only be influenced by changes in context. The arm 
has joints, tendons and different mass distributions that may contribute to how an arm 
completes a movement towards a specific target. For example, to carry out a reaching 
movement the elbow, wrist and shoulders all have their individual torques (i.e. angle and 
force) that will allow the limb muscles to flex and extend from a resting position to a target. 
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Motor plans typically determine these biophysical properties prior to the initiation of 
movement (Cos, Bélanger, & Cisek, 2011; Messier & Kalaska, 2000). These properties 
influence reaching, with participants making movements that are biomechanically easier to 
achieve (Cos et al., 2011; Marcos, Cos, Girard, & Verschure, 2015) and opting for the 
movement path that allows for greater arm mobility (Hogan, 1985b). Furthermore, 
biomechanical costs (i.e. the degree of difficulty of the movement) are computed very 
quickly, influencing decisions about actions at a very early stage of motor processing (Cos et 
al., 2014; Marcos et al., 2015). Thus, it is important to consider that changes in the 
parameters of action execution during reaching may not only reflect the influence of 
emotional changes, but also the biophysics of the arm.  
 
Approach-avoidance tendencies and visuomotor corrections  
This chapter aims to determine whether valence automaticity influences visuomotor 
automaticity. More specifically, do approach-avoidance tendencies influence the fast and 
slow pathways involved in updating motor plans and guiding movement corrections? An 
influence of valence automaticity on the fast pathway would demonstrate that valence and 
visuomotor automaticity are guided by similar fast, bottom-up pathways, possibly due to 
underlying primitive survival circuits. An influence of valence automaticity on the slow 
pathway would demonstrate a top-down and possibly goal-directed mechanism underlying 
emotional actions. To achieve this aim, two experiments were conducted.  
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that action execution and concurrent motor 
planning are influenced by emotional distractors, which may guide movement re-planning 
via fast or slow pathways. Emotional distractors were presented to the left or right of the 
midline shortly after the initiation of a movement made towards a central non-emotional 
target. To distinguish between fast and slow pathways, I looked at changes in 
spatiotemporal properties throughout the movement, which may reveal early effects, and 
the accuracy and precision of the endpoints, which may reveal late effects of the distractor. 
Indeed, work has shown that the late stages of movement are independent from early 
kinematics and are more susceptible to top-down influences (Messier & Kalaska, 1999). 
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I expected that the appearance of a positive distractor would increase the speed of 
execution, while a negative distractor would decrease speed, according to previous 
evidence (Esteves et al., 2016). Furthermore, positive distractors should “attract” reaching 
movements (i.e. deviate trajectories towards the distractor, reflecting approach), whereas 
negative stimuli should “repel” trajectories (i.e. deviate trajectories away from the 
distractor, reflecting avoidance) (Figure 6.1A). Given the prioritisation of emotional stimuli 
(Ohman et al. 2001; Vuilleumier et al. 2001), it was expected that these deviations would 
occur earlier for emotional stimuli relative to neutral. If, in contrast, emotional valence 
causes changes later in the movement, where conscious perception and top-down control 
take over, then accuracy and precision of where the finger lands were anticipated to reveal 
these influences compared to neutral distractors (Figure 6.1B). 
 
 
6.1. Schematic of predictions for Experiment 1. A) Positive distractors were expected to “attract” trajectories, 
causing deviations towards the distractor. Negative distractors were expected to “repel” trajectories, causing 
deviations away from the distractor. Neutral distractors were not expected to cause significant changes. Here 
the stimulus is presented on the left. B) Endpoints were expected to be further away from negative (red dots) 
relative to positive (green) and neutral (blue) distractors presented on the left. Similarly, endpoints were 
expected to be closer to positive relative to negative and neutral distractors. The blue circle is the target.  
 
Experiment 1 demonstrated an effect of valence, but not approach-avoidance 
tendencies, on the late part of the reaching movement. There was therefore no influence of 
valence automaticity on visuomotor automaticity. A possible explanation for this is that the 
completion of the task did not rely on movement corrections. Visuomotor automaticity is 
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only engaged during visuomotor adaptation (e.g. Day & Lyon, 2000). Unlike simple reaching 
where distractors are task-irrelevant, the success of visuomotor adaptation relies on 
responding to a task-relevant change. Thus, Experiment 1 was not a visuomotor adaptation 
task per se because it relied on movement “perturbations” caused by the appearance of a 
task-irrelevant distractor. Following this logic, it is possible that for such tendencies to 
influence visuomotor corrections they have to be task-relevant. Indeed, previous work has 
shown that task-instructions are necessary to trigger approach-avoidance tendencies (Eder 
& Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). Importantly, the addition of task-
instructions does not impede valence automaticity from arising. Chapter Four demonstrated 
that both top-down and bottom-up processes contribute to the selection of approach-
avoidance actions. It is therefore possible to generate approach-avoidance goals and 
incorporate these into the on-going movement plan, yet still allow for a bottom-up 
influence of emotional tendencies.  
As such, Experiment 2 investigated whether valence automaticity influenced 
visuomotor automaticity by making the emotional stimulus more task-relevant. Participants 
made visuomotor corrections towards or away from targets paired with emotional stimuli. 
The speed of movement corrections to emotional stimuli should reveal fast or slow 
pathways. If valence automaticity leads to faster responses, correcting towards positive 
stimuli should be faster compared to neutral or negative stimuli, and correcting away from 
negative stimuli should be faster than neutral or positive. Furthermore, if valence 
automaticity only influences the slow, top-down pathway, then this should be reflected in 
the later stages of movement. Accuracy and precision should be greater when moving 
towards positive stimuli and moving away from negative stimuli.    
 
6.3. Experiment 1  
 
6.3.1. Methods  
6.3.1.1. Participants 
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16 healthy human subjects (nine males, mean age 24 ± 5 years) were recruited from 
the UCL psychology subject pool, with local ethical approval (UCL). All participants were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects gave written informed 
consent to participate in the study, and received monetary compensation for their time and 
travel (7.5£/h).  
 
6.3.1.2. Stimuli and experimental setup 
 
6.3.1.2.1. Target and distractor stimuli 
Emotional pictures used as distractors were taken from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008): 
30 negative pictures with valences 1.6–3.8 (1.6 = most negative), 30 neutral pictures with 
valences 4.8 – 5.8 and 30 positive pictures with valences 6.2–8.2 (8.2 = most positive). All 
pictures (maximum 240 x 180 pixels) were matched for luminance. Arousal was matched as 
closely as possible despite positive and neutral pictures being naturally less arousing than 
negative stimuli. To standardise all the pictures, they were displayed as round by 
superimposing a black mask created in MATLAB (240 x 180; v.7.9.1.705; The MathWorks 
Inc.). By displaying the pictures as round they resembled the target.  
Prior to choosing the pictures, a subset of pilot participants (n = 6) rated the pictures 
on their complexity on a scale of 1 – 5 (5 = most complex). Only pictures with a rating of 3 or 
less were chosen for the actual experiment. Pictures were presented to the left or the right 
of the target in a random order throughout the 8 blocks of trials.  
A blue circle (176 x 176 pixels) was presented as the target at two different heights, 
separated by 1cm. It has been suggested that the brain can predict biomechcanical 
properties of potential actions before the initiation of movement (Cos et al., 2011; Messier 
& Kalaska, 1999), thereby influencing motor planning. For this reason, and to avoid over 
training, two target locations were chosen which were randomised throughout the 
experiment, meaning subjects also maintained attention throughout the task. Participants 
still planned movements to the two target locations in parallel, but the correct one was 
chosen once the target was displayed (see Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). All stimuli were 
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presented on a 20-inch screen (SONY Trinitron, refresh rate: 120 Hz), using the Cogent 2000 
toolbox (University College London, http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.html) 
and MATLAB. 
The experiment consisted of twelve conditions depending on the position of the 
target (upper or lower), the position of the distractor (left or right of the target) and the 
valence of the distractor (negative, neutral or positive). There were a total of 480 trials, with 
40 trials in each condition.  
 
6.3.1.2.2. Recording reaching trajectories in the experimental 3D space 
The three-dimensional (3D) coordinates of trajectories were recorded at a sample 
frequency of 800Hz using two Cartesian Optoelectronic Dynamic Anthropometer (CODA) 
sensor units (Codamotion Inc). The recordings derived from the composite of the two 
sensor units placed on each of the participant’s sides were used. CODA cameras record the 
X, Z (0.05mm standard deviation resolution) and Y (0.3mm standard deviation resolution) 
coordinates of the arm movement in real time (sub-millimetre resolution) by means of 
infrared emitting diode (IREDs) markers positioned on the participant’s arm. A total of 8 
markers were used: 4 markers were placed the participants’ right arm and the remaining 4 
on defined the screen boundaries, allowing continual measurement of the speed and 
location of the hand relative to the screen. Marker 1 was placed on the tip of the right index 
finger nail, marker 2 on its metacarpopharyngeal joint, marker 3 on the wrist bone, and 
marker 4 on the elbow. By recording from four locations on the arm, it allowed for visual 
inspection of movements to ensure participants were correctly completing the task. 
However, only data from marker 1 was used but the other markers were recorded as 
potential backups.  
 
6.3.1.2.3. Calibration of the experimental setup   
For each subject, the CODA cameras were calibrated prior to the main experiment to 
define the experimental 3D space and the position of the screen inside this space. The 
position of the target and distractors presented on the screen were subsequently defined 
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relative to the 3D space. Participants placed their right index finger on a cross appearing on 
each of six previously defined locations on the screen for two seconds. Two locations 
corresponded to the target, and the remaining four locations corresponded to the position 
of the distractor. To define the starting position, subjects rested their finger on the touch 
sensor. To place all subjects’ data in the same 3D space during analyses, data from each 
subjects’ calibration session were used for normalising the starting point and endpoint 
coordinates.   
 
6.3.1.2.4. Detection of movement onset 
To test for an early effect of the distractor presentation on the reaching trajectory, it 
was of critical importance to use a time-sensitive approach to detect the initiation of the 
reaching movement. Using a customised current-sensor, the initiation of a movement was 
detected with millisecond precision. A trigger was sent to the computer to begin a new trial 
as soon as the participants’ finger touched the sensor. The release of the finger from the 
sensor triggered the presentation of the emotional distractor at precisely 25ms after finger 
release. Using a customised touch plate allowed detecting the presence of the finger 
without requiring any additional force from the participant’s arm (i.e. button press). This 
approach facilitated participants to reproduce a reaching movement as naturally as 
possible.   
 
6.3.1.3. Experimental procedure and design 
Participants were seated in a darkened room with their head supported on a chinrest 
and their eyes fixated on the centre of the screen. They were instructed to place their right 
index finger on a sensor located 40 cm in front of the screen. This initiated the trial. A blue 
target was presented on the screen 100 ms after the start of the trial for a duration of 500 
ms. Participants were instructed to release their finger from the sensor upon the 
presentation of the blue target (Figure 6.2), and to reach the target as accurately and as fast 
as possible. 25ms after the finger release, an emotional distractor picture was presented 
(duration 50 ms) to the left or right of the target. The blue target was presented for 500ms 
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only, meaning participants did not get visual feedback of how accurate they were. The 
location of the distractor (left/right), target (up/down) and valence 
(positive/neutral/negative) of the picture were randomised from trial-to-trial. The early 
presentation of the emotional stimulus allowed for the possibility of engaging fast or slow 
pathways. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Task schematic for Experiment 1. 
Participants started with a fixation cross and with 
their right index finger resting on a touchplate 
(500 ms). Upon the presentation of a blue target, 
participants released their finger and reached 
towards the screen. The target remained on the 
screen for 500 ms. 25 ms after the release of the 
finger, an emotional distractor appeared either 
on the left or right side of the target for a 
duration of 50 ms. The target and distractor 
disappeared from the screen while participants 
completed their reaching movement (blue dotted 
line). A new trial would begin when the right 
index finger rested on the touchplate again.  
 
Each participant performed a series of 8 blocks of 60 trials each, with a brief break 
between every block. Prior to the experiment they completed a training session of one block 
of 30 trials using blurred neutral pictures only to avoid pre-exposure to experiment pictures. 
Each picture was repeated 8 times in total.  
 
6.3.1.4. Picture ratings (valence/arousal/complexity) 
It is possible that each individual perceives an emotional picture in a different way 
(Bradley & Lang, 2007), and this may consequently affect how participants react to 
emotional distractors. To control for this, at the end of the experiment, each subject rated 
all the pictures presented according to their valence, arousal and complexity. They rated the 
valence and arousal on a scale of 1-9 on the computer keyboard. For valence, 1 represented 
extremely negative and 9 extremely positive. For arousal, 1 represented low arousing and 9 
high arousing. To control for picture complexity, participants rated how easy or hard it was 
to perceive the content of every picture on a scale of 1 - 5; 1 being very simple and 5 very 
complex.  
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The subjective ratings for valence and arousal were subsequently compared against 
those of the IAPS (Lang et al. 2008). A paired-samples t-test was performed to compare 
subjective ratings to IAPS ratings. Results showed (see section 6.3.2.1) that subjective 
ratings were similar to the IAPS ratings. As such, the IAPS ratings were used for all analyses.  
 
6.3.1.5. Kinematic data analyses  
 
6.3.1.5.1. Data conversion and trajectory normalisation 
For all analyses, CODA files were first exported into a text file and then imported into 
MATLAB (v. 7.10.0.499; the MathWorks) form. Time, position and velocity data were 
extracted for each X, Y and Z coordinate. Only data for marker one were used for the 
kinematics analysis. Data were analysed offline with custom written MATLAB code.  
Trajectories were normalised to a common 3D space for all subjects. Because the 
calibration of the 3D space was done on an individual basis and because of the excellent 
spatial resolution of the sensor system (0.5 mm), the finger starting position for each 
subject differed between sessions and between trials, depending on the way the finger 
landed on the sensor. In order to calculate the average trajectory for each condition within 
each subject, trajectories were first normalised so that the starting point was always at zero 
(i.e. XYZ coordinates [0, 0, 0]). To do so each subject’s sensor position coordinates of the 3D 
calibration session were subtracted from the starting point coordinates of every trial.  
 
6.3.1.5.2. Kinematics of reaching trajectories 
My central question was whether an emotional distractor can ‘perturb’ an ongoing 
movement, and lead to valence-specific fast corrections of the movement plan. These 
corrections are characterised by changes in the spatiotemporal parameters of movement 
set by the original movement plan, such as changes in the speed and magnitude of an arm 
movement.   
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To this end, several kinematic dependent variables were examined: peak velocity 
(PV), time of time of peak velocity (tPV), movement times (MT), and the integral (i.e. area 
under the curve) of each trajectory at three different time points (early, mid and late). 
Furthermore, because early movement properties are dissociated from later movement 
properties (Messier & Kalaska, 1999), the accuracy and precision of movement were also 
measured. How each of these variables contributes to investigating the main question is 
discussed further below.  
 
6.3.1.5.3. Changes in the speed of execution: movement times and velocity  
Two measures were expected to reveal influences on the temporal profile of 
reaching: movement times (MTs) and peak velocity (PV).  
MT is defined as the total duration time of the movement, from movement initiation 
to reaching the screen. MT is affected by the spatiotemporal characteristics of reaching 
(Wong et al., 2015). The speed of movement completion may, for example, be slower or 
faster depending on the emotional content of the distractor. Similarly, a movement 
deviation caused by the appearance of the stimulus may mean the movement takes longer 
to complete. MT therefore indexes the speed and magnitude of movement. The starting 
point of the movement was calculated from when the tangential velocity exceeded 0.1 
m/sec. The end of the movement was defined as the time point that the finger reached a 
virtual screen, calculated as 1 cm in front of the computer screen (Day & Lyon, 2000). MT 
was calculated by subtracting the starting time from the end time. To observe possible 
effects of distractor presentation, 25 ms were subtracted from all the times obtained (i.e. 
MT and tPV). All times are presented in milliseconds. Differences in the MT give an overall 
indication of the influence of emotion on action execution but do not inform of differences 
that occur early in the movement (e.g. influences on bottom-up mechanisms) and how 
these compare to later stages (e.g. influences on top-down mechanisms).   
To assess influences on early vs. late kinematics during movement, I measured time 
of the PV. For example, a positive stimulus may speed up a movement because participants 
were making what is considered to be an “approach” action towards the screen. In contrast, 
negative pictures may slow down movement by activating a defensive system that leads to 
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freezing (Stins et al., 2011). Importantly, unlike the MT, the PV is not affected by spatial 
properties of movement. That is, MTs account for the length of the movement, whereas PV 
doesn’t. The time at which PV is reached is particularly important to answer whether re-
planning is guided by fast vs. slow pathways. The PV and tPV were derived by measuring the 
tangential velocity to accommodate for the curvature of reaching movements. Tangential 
velocity refers to the instantaneous linear velocity of a body on a curved path and it is 
calculated by taking the linear velocity at every x and y coordinates. The units for PV are 
m/sec. The equation below displays how tangential velocity was calculated:  
 
TV = sqrt(x_velocity2 + y_velocity2). 
 
6.3.1.5.4. Changes in the magnitude of execution 
Reaching deviations that occur as a result of presenting a distractor may not reflect 
motor planning processes that occur prior to the initiation of a movement, but may reflect 
motor planning that occurs in parallel with action execution. As suggested by other studies 
(Ambron & Foroni, 2015; Ambron et al., 2016; Welsh & Elliott, 2004), the emotional valence 
of a distractor may cause arm deviations either towards or away from the distractor 
location. These deviations may occur early or later in the movement, which can provide 
indication about the contribution from fast or slow pathways guiding visuomotor 
corrections (Day & Lyon, 2000). Early movement corrections may be guided by fast bottom-
up pathways that are not yet influenced by later top-down mechanisms (McSorley, Haggard, 
& Walker, 2006). In contrast, if they occur later in the movement, they would reflect top-
down mechanisms which are under the control of participants intentions (Day & Lyon, 
2000).  
 Because previous work has shown that participants are able to correct their 
movement automatically in response to an environmental change at an early latency of 130-
160 ms (Day & Lyon, 2000), each reaching trajectory was split into three sections (i.e. early 
[start of movement until 33.3% of total trajectory], mid [early until 66.6% of total trajectory] 
and late [mid until 100% of total trajectory] portions). This allowed me to observe at which 
point in the trajectory any movement deviations occurred following the appearance of the 
distractor. To quantify for differences in deviations across conditions the integral (i.e. area 
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under the curve) was calculated on a trial-by-trial basis for each condition in each of the split 
portions. A mean across all trials for each condition was subsequently calculated. This was 
complemented by visual inspection of the laterality of these deviations for each subject for 
any significant results, following Day & Lyon (2000).  
 
6.3.1.5.5. Accuracy, precision and arm biomechanics  
Reaching accuracy and precision to target locations has been shown to be 
independent of the initial kinematics of a movement (Messier & Kalaska, 1999), instead 
reflecting top-down control. The later stage of movement therefore reflects conscious and 
top-down biases potentially guided by the subjects’ intention (Day & Lyon, 2000).  
Accuracy and precision were quantified by the distribution of the endpoints (i.e. 
where the index finger lands on the screen). Accuracy reflects how close the distribution of 
the endpoints is to the target, whereas precision reflects how spread out the distribution of 
the endpoints is. For example, the appearance of a negative distractor early in the 
movement may cause the endpoint of the movement to be further away from the target 
(i.e. an avoidance movement) thereby reducing the accuracy of reaching. Similarly, the 
appearance of emotional distractors may cause the distribution of endpoints to be more 
spread out than neutral distractors suggesting that emotional distractors disrupt the 
precision of reaching movements. The distribution of endpoints may also have an 
orientation that gives an indication of the direction of the spread of the endpoints. The 
orientation is important for revealing the “attract-repel” effect of emotional distractors. For 
instance, the orientation of the endpoint distribution may be in the opposite direction of 
where a negative distractor was presented, or closer to where a positive distractor was 
presented.  
Prior to calculating accuracy, precision and movement orientation, each individual 
endpoint was first normalised to a common 3D space. Both target positions were 
normalised to have position coordinates (X0, Z0) and endpoint coordinates were 
subsequently normalised according to the new target position coordinates. To normalise the 
endpoint position according to a common target for all subjects, the target position 
coordinates defined during the subject’s calibration session were subtracted from the 
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coordinates of the endpoint in every trial and respectively for different conditions. This 
normalisation procedure was repeated to normalise the endpoint distribution according to 
the distractor position and hence using the subject’s calibration coordinates for the 
distractor in the respective condition. The above normalisation process yielded new position 
coordinates of the trajectory endpoints, on a trial-by-trial basis, and created a common 3D 
space for all trials and all subjects. For simplicity’s sake, because both targets were now (0, 
0), endpoint data was collapsed between upper and lower targets, reducing the number of 
conditions to 6 (left distractor: positive, negative, neutral; right distractor: positive, 
negative, neutral).  
To account for the accuracy of the movement, the Euclidean distance, that is the 
“straight-line” distance between two points, was calculated. Here, the Euclidean distance 
from the target was calculated by subtracting the target x and z coordinates taken from the 
calibration from the endpoint x and z coordinates. The distances are presented in mm.  
Movement precision and the orientation of the spread of the endpoints were 
determined by fitting an ellipsoid (i.e. linear transformation of hyperspheres) over the 
distribution of the endpoints within a given condition (e.g. all the endpoints when a positive 
distractor was presented on the left), giving two variables: area and angle (Figure 6.3). The 
area (i.e. spread of the endpoints) reflects the precision of reaching, whereas the angle 
reflects the orientation of the area relative to a vertical line on the target (horizontal vs. 
vertical). Negative angles indicate that the distribution of the endpoints lie clockwise from 
the vertical line, whereas positive angles are anticlockwise from a vertical line. The larger 
the angle, in positive and negative directions, the more horizontal a distribution is. This is 
important because if there is a deviation of the trajectory away from the target caused by 
the appearance of a distractor, then the ellipses should become more horizontal. 
Confidence ellipsoids were fitted onto the endpoint distributions using the x and z 
coordinates of all the endpoints within a given condition for each participant individually. A 
confidence ellipsoid assumes a multivariate normal distribution and a probability of 0.95; 
therefore the ellipses encompassed 95% of the endpoint population. The area and angle of 
the distributions for each condition for each participant were subsequently used to compare 
between different valences. The endpoint distributions were calculated in reference to the 
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target and the distractor separately (van den Dobbelsteen et al., 2001). The units for area 
and angle are mm2 and degrees, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.3. Schematic of an ellipsoid fitted 
over the endpoint distribution. The 
precision is given by the area of the ellipsoid 
(grey oval). The orientation of the ellipsoid 
(red dotted line) relative to the target 
reveals the direction of the distribution 
(either to the left or the right). Accuracy was 
calculated as the distance between the 
centre of each endpoint (green dots) and 
the centre of the target (blue circle).  
 
 
 
6.3.1.6. Statistical analysis and trial exclusion 
To include only complete trajectories in our dataset, a virtual screen was defined, 
calculated as 1 cm in front of the y-coordinate of the target (Day & Lyon, 2000). Trajectories 
that started before the presentation of the target (0.7%), 500 ms after the target 
presentation (3.5%) or where there was no movement at all (0.1%) were excluded from the 
analysis. Trials in which the trajectory deviated from a straight line by more than two 
standard deviations were considered outlier trajectories and were excluded from the data 
(6.7%). Outliers from the means for PV, tPV, Euclidean distance and integrals obtained from 
the analysis were calculated for each variable, per condition and for each individual subject 
using Grubb’s test, α = 0.05 (7.3%). In total, 18.2% of trials were excluded from the data 
analysis.  
For the statistical analysis, the mean value of all the trajectories was first obtained, 
for each condition and every subject for the variables examined (PV, tPV, integral, Euclidean 
distances, ellipsoid angle and area). Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS statistics 
software (v 22).  
To investigate the effects of emotional valence and distractor location on reaching 
trajectories, a within-subjects 3x4 repeated-measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) with factors 
Picture Valence (Negative vs. Neutral vs. Positive) and Presentation (Target above-Distractor 
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left vs. Target above-Distractor right vs. Target below-Distractor left vs. Target below-
Distractor right) was performed. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was measured to validate the 
ANOVA. If the assumption of sphericity was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
applied. For all analyses, partial-  is reported as a measure of effect size. Statistical 
threshold was fixed at 0.05. Post-hoc Bonferroni corrections were made to correct for 
multiple comparisons. Significant interactions were followed up using two-tailed paired-
sample t-tests. RT means and standard error of the mean (SEM) are given, and for paired-
samples t-tests Cohen’s d is reported.  
To compare the effects of Valence only (positive vs. neutral; negative vs. neutral), a 
separate analysis was conducted with all measures normalised relative to the Neutral 
distractors, which were used as a baseline condition. Normalisation took place by 
subtracting values for each variable for the neutral distractors from those for positive and 
negative distractors. As such, all dependent variables for Positive and Negative distractors 
were normalised according to this baseline for comparison purposes. Paired sample t-tests 
were carried out between the normalised measures.  
 
6.3.1.7. Control analyses: influence of the arousal of the distractors 
It has been previously suggested that arousing pictures capture attention and 
influence the trajectory of goal-directed movements (Day, Shyi, & Wang, 2006; Most, Smith, 
Cooter, Levy, & Zald, 2007). Based on previous evidence, it was expected that highly 
arousing emotional stimuli would increase the speed of the trajectories whilst decreasing 
their accuracy (Coombes, Higgins, Gamble, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2009). To investigate the 
effect of the arousal of the distractors on reaching trajectories, a median-split of the data 
was conducted, separating pictures into highly arousing distractors (pictures rated above 5 
in the IAPS arousal scale) and low arousing distractors (pictures rated below 5 in the IAPS 
arousal scale).  
Data were then re-analysed as above for low vs. high distractors. An RM-ANOVA with 
factors Arousal (high vs. low) and Presentation (Target above-Distractor left vs. Target 
above-Distractor right vs. Target below-Distractor left vs. Target below-Distractor right) was 
performed.  

2
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Six 
221 
 
6.3.2. Results  
 
6.3.2.1. Individual picture ratings  
To control for individual differences, participants rated each picture on their valence 
and arousal. Paired samples t-tests revealed that negative and neutral pictures were not 
rated differently from the IAPS (neg-IAPS = 2.63 ± 0.00, neg-rate = 2.67 ± 0.19; neut-IAPS = 
5.00 ± 0.00, neut-rate = 5.07 ± 0.07). Positive pictures were rated significantly less positive 
than the IAPS ratings (pos-IAPS: 7.57 ± 0.00, pos-rate: 6.77 ± 0.21; t(15) = 6.33, p < 0.001) but 
positive nonetheless (all positive pictures were considered to have a ratings of 6.7 or 
above). The results suggest that subjects perceived pictures as being their correct valence.  
For arousal, paired t-tests revealed that negative pictures were not rated differently 
from the IAPS (neg-IAPS = 6.00 ± 0.00, neg-rate = 5.80 ± 0.38). However, both neutral (neut-
IAPS = 3.00 ± 0.00, neut-rate = 2.07 ± 0.38; t(15) = 2.43, p = 0.029) and positive (pos-IAPS: 
5.00 ± 0.00, pos-rate: 3.80 ± 0.36; t(15) = 3.38, p = 0.004) pictures were rated as being 
significantly less arousing than the IAPS ratings. In general, subjects perceived low-
threatening stimuli (i.e. neutral and positive) as less arousing.  
 
6.3.2.2. Effects of Valence on reaching kinematics 
All of the results below represent effects of distractor valence and the 
target/distractor location on arm reaching movements.  
 
6.3.2.2.1. Kinematic measures (PV, tPV, MT)  
 
Movement speed: Average Peak Velocity of arm reaching  
Differences in the PV reveal if the valence of the distractor affected how fast 
participants reached towards the target. PV was affected by the location of presentation of 
the distractor and the target (Figure 6.4; Presentation, F(3, 42) = 4.01, p = 0.013, η
2
p = 0.22). 
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When the distractor was presented on the left side, PV was lower for the upper compared 
to the lower target (upper: 1.10 ± 0.05 m/sec, lower: 1.11 ± 0.05 m/sec; t(15) = −2.18, p = 
0.047, Cohen’s d = -0.48). Participants were therefore faster when the target was presented 
in the upper positive compared to the lower position irrespective of the distractor location. 
This difference is most likely attributable to the biophysical properties of the arm and not an 
experimental manipulation. That is, participants follow a path that allows for the easiest and 
greatest arm mobility (Hogan, 1985a, 1985b). By essentially following the easiest movement 
path, participants presumably are also faster. Valence therefore did not impact how fast 
participants moved.   
 
Figure 6.4. Influence of presentation on peak velocity. Reaching was 
faster when moving to upper targets when left and right distractors 
were presented. Error bars (+1 S.E.M) * significant at p < 0.05 level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of Peak Velocity  
There was no significant effect of the Valence of the distractor or the side of 
Presentation of the target and distractor on the time at which PV was reached.  
 
Movement time (duration) of arm trajectories  
There was no significant effect of Valence or Presentation on the duration of the 
trajectory. The average overall MT was 358 ± 24 ms. MT was therefore not affected by 
speed or changes in the trajectory.  
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In sum, the lack of effects of valence on all kinematic variables above demonstrates 
that emotional distractors and their associated response tendencies do not influence the 
early or late kinematics of action execution.  
 
6.3.2.2.2. Effects of valence on trajectory deviations: Integral of the trajectory (area 
under the curve)  
 
Early and mid-trajectory deviations from a straight line 
There was no effect of Valence or Presentation on the area of the early or middle 
part of the trajectory.  
 
Late trajectory deviations from a straight line 
There was an effect of Valence of the distractor and the type of Presentation on the 
area of the late part of the trajectory (Valence*Presentation, F(6, 84) = 2.09, p = 0.063, η
2
p = 
0.13). When split for each presentation, results showed that this interaction was primarily 
driven by a Valence effect when the target was above and the distractor was on the right 
(F(2, 28) = 3.97, p = 0.030, η
2
p = 0.22). Follow-up tests showed that the integral area for 
negative distractors was significantly larger than the area for positive distractors (neg: 
37382 ± 1993 mm2, pos: 36630 ± 1878 mm2; t(14) = 2.75, p = 0.016, Cohen’s d = 0.70). There 
was no difference in the integral between emotional and neutral distractors. Thus, negative 
distractors appeared to cause a large deviation of the trajectory in comparison to positive 
distractors, but only during the late phase of a movement. Visual inspection of trajectories 
for all subjects when negative distractors were presented on the right confirmed that this 
deviation was indeed larger than positive distractors (Figure 6.5A and C). However, visual 
inspection also showed that this deviation was always to the right, irrespective of whether 
the distractor was presented on the left or right, demonstrating biophysical effects of the 
arm (Figure 6.5).  
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Figure 6.5. Raw trajectories for subject 1. A, B, C) Trajectories when the distractor was presented in the right 
demonstrating a larger deviation towards the right for negative distractors on the later part of the trajectory. 
Blue line depicts a straight-line trajectory for comparison. Raw trajectories are drawn in black. Blue circle 
represent the target, green circle represents the distractor. D, E, F) Comparison trajectories when the 
distractor was presented on the left demonstrating a deviation towards the right. Late trajectory deviations all 
occur towards the right irrespective of distractor location.  
 
 In sum, there were no trajectory deviations in the early part of reaching, whereas the 
latter part appeared to be affected by the valence of the distractor. In line with Day & Lyon 
(2000), these results suggest that top-down, cortical mechanisms were likely to be 
responsible for negative stimuli influencing action execution. Changes in the later portion of 
the trajectory however, did not show an “attract” or “repel” effect of emotional distractors, 
demonstrating no incidental effects of approach-avoidance tendencies on action execution.  
 
6.3.2.2.3. Effects of Valence on reaching accuracy, precision and endpoint orientation  
 
Accuracy of reaching: Euclidean distance of the endpoint from the target 
The Euclidean distance reflects the accuracy of reaching movements. Results showed 
that accuracy was affected by the location of presentation of the distractor and the target 
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(Figure 6.6; Presentation, F(1.04, 14.6) = 20.94, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.60). The distance from the 
target was smaller when the upper target was presented compared to the lower target, but 
this distance was unaffected by the side of distractor presentation. When the distractor was 
presented on the left side, the distance from the upper target was smaller compared to the 
lower target (upper: 22± 1 mm, lower: 35 ± 2 mm; t(14) = −4.61, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.21). 
Equally, when the distractor was presented on the right side, the distance from the upper 
target was also shorter compared to the lower target (upper: 21 ± 1 mm, lower: 35 ± 2 mm; 
t(14) = −4.63, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.20). Accuracy was better when reaching to the upper 
target. Thus, there was no effect of emotional valence on the accuracy of reaching, and 
instead any differences presented here may be attributable to the biophysical properties of 
the arm and not an experimental manipulation.   
 
Figure 6.6. Effect of target and distractor presentation on the 
accuracy. Distance of the endpoints from the target was smaller 
for the upper target, irrespective of where the distractor was 
presented. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at the p <0.001 
level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area of the ellipse: Precision of reaching  
The area of the ellipse reveals the precision of reaching movements. The greater the 
area, the less precise movements are. For precision there was a significant main effect of 
Valence (F(1.2, 18.4) = 9.02, p = 0.005, η
2
p = 0.38), indicating that the emotional content of the 
distractors influenced the precision of reaching trajectories (Figure 6.8A). Both negative and 
positive distractors significantly improved the precision of reaching towards the targets 
relative to neutral distractors (negative: 1260 ± 101 mm2, neutral: 1303 ± 93 mm2, positive: 
1279 ± 94 mm2; neg-neutral: t(15) = −3.17, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = -1.01; pos-neutral: t(15) = 
2.87, p = 0.012, Cohen’s d = 0.72). The area when negative distractors were presented was 
also significantly smaller than when positive distractors were presented (t(15) = −2.57, p = 
0.022, Cohen’s d = -0.34). This main effect was qualified by a 2-way Valence*Presentation 
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interaction (Figure 6.7; F(1.7, 25.2) = 19.30, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.56). This interaction was broken 
down for each Valence.  
For negative distractors, there was a significant main effect of Presentation (F(1.5, 
21.8) = 4.19, p = 0.040, η
2
p = 0.22). When distractors were presented on the left, precision 
differed between the upper and lower targets, with greater area for lower compared to 
upper targets (upper: 1185 ± 78 mm2, lower: 1260 ± 93 mm2; t(15) = −3.89, p = 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -1.54). However, when the distractor was presented on the right, there was no 
difference in the area between the upper and lower targets.  
For neutral distractors, there was no significant main effect of Presentation on the 
area of the ellipse.  
For positive distractors, there was a significant main effect of Presentation (F(1.4, 
21.0) = 7.28, p = 0.008, η
2
p = 0.33). When the distractor was presented on the left side, there 
was no difference in precision between the upper and lower targets. However, when the 
distractor was presented on the right side, precision differed between upper and lower 
targets (upper: 1365 ± 128 mm2, lower: 1125 ± 104 mm2; t(15) = 9.42, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 
2.12). 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Ellipses for reaching precision split 
into valence and each presentation. 
Endpoints were generally closer to the upper 
target relative to lower target (black dots). For 
negative (red dots) distractors, movements 
were more precise (i.e. area of red ellipse was 
smaller) when reaching to upper targets, 
whereas for positive pictures (green dots) 
reaching was more precise towards lower 
targets. There were no effects for neutral 
(blue dots). 
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Orientation of the spread of the endpoints: angle of the ellipse  
 The angle of the ellipse reflects the orientation of the spread of the endpoints which 
may inform about the biomechanics of the arm, taking into account measures such as, for 
example, the elbow torque and joint angles (Hogan, 1985). If the valence of the distractor 
causes an online deviation of the trajectory away from the target, then the angle of the 
ellipses should be as horizontal as possible (e.g. larger). Negative angles demonstrate that 
the endpoints lie mostly clockwise from a vertical line, whereas positive angles demonstrate 
the endpoints lie anticlockwise.  
 
 
Figure 6.8. Area (precision) and angle (orientation) of the endpoint distributions. A) Main effect of valence on 
reaching precision. The spread of the endpoints was significantly smaller for emotional relative to neutral 
pictures. B) Main effect of valence on the orientation of the ellipses. When negative distractors were 
presented, orientation was negative (clockwise from a vertical line), for neutral and positive distractors, 
orientation was positive (anticlockwise from a vertical line). Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * significant at the p <0.05 
level 
 
The results showed that angles were significantly affected by the Valence of the 
distractor (F(2, 30) = 13.87, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.48), with negative angles for negative, and 
positive angles for positive and neutral distractors (Figure 6.8B). Angle was also influenced 
by the location of Presentation of the target and distractor (F(1.5, 22.9) = 16.47, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 
0.52), with negative angles for upper and positive angles for lower targets. However, these 
main effects were qualified by a 2-way Valence*Presentation interaction (F(2.8, 41.6) = 3.31, p = 
0.032, η2p = 0.18). This interaction was broken down for each Valence.  
For negative distractors, there was a significant main effect of Presentation (F(1.3, 
18.7) = 12.77, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.46). Overall, for left distractors, the angle was negative 
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compared to the positive angle of the ellipse when the right target was presented (left: -
57.88 ± 13.11 deg, right: 37.38 ± 15.58 deg), indicating that the endpoints were located in 
the opposite direction to the location of the distractor, suggesting an avoidance mechanism. 
Furthermore, when the upper target was presented, there was a difference in angle 
between the left and right (left: -56.43 ± 14.86 deg, right: 32.23 ± 16.62 deg; t(15) = −3.17, p = 
0.006, Cohen’s d = -0.79). Equally, when the distractor was presented on the right side, 
there was a difference in the angles between the upper and lower targets (upper: -59.46 ± 
12.23 deg, lower: 42.58 ± 16.20 deg; t(15) = −4.28, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.09).  
For neutral distractors, there was a significant main effect of Presentation (F(3, 45) = 
14.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50). In contrast to above, the presentation of the distractor did not 
influence the angle. Instead, angle was influenced by the upper or lower target 
presentations only. In general, when the upper target was presented, the angle was 
negative compared to the positive angle when the lower target was presented (upper: -7.69 
± 12.74 deg, lower: 59.12 ± 6.28 deg; t(15) = −4.73, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.25). When the 
left distractor was presented, there was a difference in the angles between the upper and 
lower targets (upper: -53.86 ± 14.93 deg, lower: 38.27 ± 19.41 deg; t(15) = −3.93, p = 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -0.99). However, when the right distractor was presented, there was no 
difference in angle between the upper and lower targets.  
For positive distractors, there was a significant main effect of Presentation (F(1.9, 
28.5) = 7.59, p = 0.003, η
2
p = 0.34). When the upper target was presented, the angle was 
negative compared to the positive angle of the ellipse when the lower target was presented 
(upper: -22.44 ± 14.81 deg, lower: 45.88 ± 13.43 deg; t(15) = −2.72, p = 0.016, Cohen’s d = -
0.68). When the left distractor was presented, there was a difference in the angles between 
the upper and lower targets (upper: -56.00 ± 15.01 deg, lower: 11.33 ± 20.76 deg; t(15) = 
−3.21, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = -0.83). However, when the right distractor was presented, 
there was no difference in angle between the upper and lower targets. 
In sum, accuracy was guided by the biomechanics of the arm. Accuracy was greater 
when reaching for the upper target (i.e. endpoints were closer to the upper target) and 
endpoints being closer to the left distractor. Indeed, when thinking about the easiest 
movement path the right hand can make, due to the elbow joint torque properties, the right 
arm inevitably tends to land on the left of a straight line. Previous work has demonstrated 
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that the arm follows a movement path that is biomechanically viable and easier (Cos et al., 
2011; Cos et al., 2014). Unlike accuracy, precision was influenced by the valence of the 
distractor. Participants were more precise (i.e. less spread out) when presented with 
negative compared to positive and neutral pictures. Precision was also influenced by the 
valence and biophysics of the arm, with precision being different between the upper and 
lower targets depending on the valence of the distractor. In terms of the orientation of the 
endpoints, the results show that only negative distractors influenced the location of the 
endpoints, with endpoints located away from left distractors (i.e. clockwise from a vertical 
line) and away from right distractors (i.e. anticlockwise from a vertical line). Both precision 
and orientation of the endpoints were influenced by negative valence, demonstrating an 
influence of negative stimuli on action execution, in line with Chapter Four.  
 
6.3.2.2.4. Measures normalised to the baseline (Neutral) condition 
There were no differences between positive or negative valence in any of the above 
measures (tPV, PV, MT, Target Euclidean distance, Distractor Euclidean distance and area 
under the curve) when normalised relative to the neutral (baseline) condition, 
demonstrating no effect of valence on kinematic measures relative to neutral distractors.  
 
6.3.2.3. Effects of Arousal on movement kinematics   
Similar to the results presented above, all of the results below represent effects of 
distractor arousal (high vs. low) and the target/distractor location on the kinematics, 
accuracy and precision of arm reaching movements.  
 
6.3.2.3.1. Kinematic measures (PV, tPV, MT) 
 
Movement speed: Average Peak Velocity of arm reaching 
PV was affected by the presentation of the distractor and the target 
(Presentation, F(3, 42) = 3.74, p = 0.018, η
2
p = 0.21). PV was lower when reaching for upper 
targets compared to lower targets (upper: 1.10 ± 0.05 m/sec, lower: 1.11 ± 0.05 m/sec; 
t(15) = −2.23, p = 0.043, Cohen’s d = -0.59). When the distractor was presented on the left 
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side, PV was lower for the upper compared to the lower target (upper: 1.10 ± 0.05 m/sec, 
lower: 1.11 ± 0.05 m/sec; t(15) = −2.18, p = 0.047, Cohen’s d = -0.48). Movements were 
therefore faster when reaching for the upper target. This difference may be attributable to 
the biophysical properties of the arm and not an experimental manipulation.  
 
Time of Peak Velocity 
There was no significant effect of Arousal or Presentation on the time at which PV 
was reached.  
 
Movement time (duration) of arm trajectories 
There was no significant effect of Valence or Presentation on the duration of the 
trajectory.  
 
6.3.2.3.2. Trajectory deviations from a straight line: Integral of the trajectory (area 
under the curve) 
There was no effect of Arousal or Presentation on the area of the early, middle or 
late part of the trajectory, indicating that arousal did not cause any significant deviations.  
In sum, kinematic measures were not affected by the arousal of the distractors but 
were instead influenced by the biophysical properties of the arm.  
 
6.3.2.3.3. Effects of Arousal on accuracy, precision and angle 
 
Accuracy of reaching: Euclidean distance of the endpoint from the target  
 
Accuracy was affected by the presentation of the distractor and the target (Figure 
6.9; Presentation, F(1.03, 14.5) = 22.24, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.61). The distance of the endpoints was 
smaller for upper targets compared to lower targets (upper: 21 ± 1 mm, lower: 35 ± 2 mm; 
t(14) = −4.72, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.25), but this distance was unaffected by the side of 
distractor presentation. Thus, when the distractor was presented on the left, accuracy was 
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better for upper compared to lower targets (upper: 22 ± 1 mm, lower: 35 ± 2 mm; t(14) = 
−4.76, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.27). Equally, when the distractor was presented on the 
right, accuracy was better for upper compared to lower targets (upper: 21 ± 1 mm, lower: 
35 ± 2 mm; t(14) = −4.64, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.23).  
 
 
Figure 6.9. Accuracy of reaching towards upper and lower targets. 
Participants were more accurate in reaching to upper than to lower 
targets, as shown by the smaller Euclidean distance to the target. Error 
bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at the p <0.001 level 
 
 
 
 
 
Precision of reaching: area of the ellipse  
There was a significant main effect of Presentation (F(1.5, 20.8) = 10.17, p = 0.002, η
2
p = 
0.42) on the area of the ellipse that was qualified by a 2-way Arousal*Presentation 
interaction (F(1.4, 20.0) = 4.83, p = 0.029, η
2
p = 0.26). This interaction was broken down for 
each Arousal.  
For distractors with low arousal, there was a significant main effect of Presentation 
(F(1.3, 18.3) = 9.58, p = 0.004, η
2
p = 0.41). When the distractor was presented on the left, there 
was no difference in precision between the upper and lower targets. However, when the 
distractor was presented on the right, precision was better for upper targets compared to 
lower targets (upper: 3175 ± 462 mm2, lower: 3398 ± 500 mm2; t(15) = -4.26, p = 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -1.55).   
For distractors with high arousal, there was a significant main effect of Presentation 
(F(1.9, 26.1) = 9.76, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.41). When the distractor was presented on the left, there 
was no difference in the area between the upper and lower targets. However, when the 
distractor was presented on the right, the area for upper targets was smaller compared to 
lower targets (upper: 3066 ± 446 mm2, lower: 3490 ± 531 mm2; t(15) = -4.63, p < 0.001, 
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Cohen’s d = -3.54). Precision was better when reaching for upper targets but only when the 
distractors were presented on the right.  
 
Orientation of the spread of the endpoints: angle of the ellipse  
For the angle of the ellipse there were no significant effects of Arousal or 
Presentation, indicating no effect of the biomechanics of the arm on reaching endpoints.  
In sum, the data did not show any effects of arousal on the early or late phases of 
movement. Movement properties were instead influenced by the biophysical properties of 
the arm, with participants following the easiest and most achievable movement paths. 
Participants were faster, more accurate and more precise when reaching for upper targets 
compared to lower targets.  
 
6.3.3. Discussion  
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that action execution and concurrent motor 
planning are influenced by emotional changes in the environment. More specifically, it 
investigated whether automatic approach-avoidance tendencies (valence automaticity) may 
influence the fast vs. slow pathways (visuomotor automaticity) underlying movement re-
planning. If emotion indeed has privileged access to the motor system, then I would predict 
that such distractors have the potency to ‘alter’ ongoing movement. To this end I conceived 
an experiment that allowed for quantifying the influence of emotional distractors on 
movement kinematics.  
Positive distractors were expected to “attract” trajectories and negative distractors 
to “repel” trajectories, relative to neutral distractors. Given the proposed prioritisation of 
emotional stimuli by the visual system (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al. 2001), I 
expected that any influences on ongoing movement would occur earlier for emotional 
relative to neutral stimuli. Earlier changes should reflect bottom-up processes. If instead, 
corrections are guided by top-down influences, then changes should be observed towards 
the end of the movement, reflected by the accuracy and precision of movement.  
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The results showed that the later, but not early, stage of execution was influenced 
by emotional valence: negative distractors led to greater deviations at the end of the 
movement, and accuracy and precision were better in emotional relative to neutral 
contexts. Furthermore, action execution was influenced by the biophysical properties of the 
arm, indicating that participants made movements that were easier to achieve and allowed 
for greatest arm mobility. Overall, there was no evidence for valence automaticity, that is, 
approach-avoidance tendencies were not triggered by emotional distractors, and this did 
not manifest in the spatiotemporal characteristics of movement. This result suggests an 
independence of response tendencies and motor execution. Changes in execution are 
therefore driven by emotional valence but not by emotional approach-avoidance 
tendencies, in line with the results reported in Chapter Four. 
 
Valence influences the end-stage of action execution  
Valence, but not approach-avoidance tendencies, affected the latter stage of 
movement. Greater movement deviations occurred when negative relative to positive and 
neutral distractors were presented and positive and negative distractors improved the 
precision of execution relative to neutral distractors. Importantly these effects were not 
observed for arousal, confirming that the valence of the emotional picture was responsible 
for the effects. In contrast, there was no evidence of valence effects on the early or middle 
parts of the trajectory.  
The effect of valence argues against privileged access of emotional information to 
the motor system driven by fast, bottom-up processes. Instead, the later effects reflect the 
engagement of top-down attentional mechanisms which subsequently may have guided 
feedback mechanisms at the end stage of execution (Pessoa et al., 2002). Indeed, the speed 
of feedback mechanisms has been suggested to be reliant on the speed of sensory 
processing during ongoing movement (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Striemer et al., 2010). 
Importantly, the results suggest that emotional stimuli were prioritised relative to neutral 
stimuli, possibly due to increased perceptual processing and the engagement of top-down 
attentional processes driven by the conscious perception of emotional content (Pessoa et al. 
2002; Pessoa &, 2010). Indeed, the late effects on execution probably arose from the 
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conscious perception of emotional information. For instance, work has shown that the 
earliest emotional processing can occur is 100 ms (Pizzagalli, Regard, & Lehmann, 1999), 
although neural data shows that this is closer to 200 ms (Oya, Kawasaki, Howard, & Adolphs, 
2002). Emotional stimuli are therefore typically processed 100-200 ms after their initial 
presentation (Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & 
Hamm, 2004). Speculatively, in this context, emotional information may have been 
prioritised relative to neutral but only consciously perceived towards the end of the 
movement.  
Valence also influenced the orientation of the spread of the endpoints compared to 
neutral stimuli. For example, for both positive and negative distractors presented on the 
left, the majority of the endpoints were found to the right of the targets, whereas for 
distractors presented on the right, the endpoints were found to the left of the targets. 
Importantly, orientation was not influenced by arousal, implying that this is a purely 
valence-driven effect. Coupled with precision, the results suggest that valence also causes 
movements to end up further away from the emotional stimulus. This is supportive of 
previous work showing that movements are biased away from distractors due to attentional 
inhibition (Howard & Tipper, 1997). Here, the emotional distractor was prioritised and 
competed for attention with the target as the movement was on-going, according to earlier 
proposals (Howard & Tipper, 1997; Welsh, Elliott, & Weeks, 1999; Welsh, 2011; Welsh & 
Elliott, 2004). A top-down attentional mechanism has been suggested to “lock” attention to 
the target and be involved in suppressing the natural tendency to move towards competing 
targets (Tipper et al. 1998). Thus, because emotional distractors were prioritised by 
attention, a higher degree of top-down control was necessary to suppress the tendency to 
move to the competing distractor. This resulted in greater deviations away from the 
distractor, and trajectories ending up further away from the target than was originally 
intended. The extent of the deviation away depends on the relative activation of the 
response elicited by the emotional distractor (Tipper et al., 1997).  
The current results demonstrate an influence of valence, but not approach-
avoidance tendencies, on motor re-planning during action execution driven by higher-order 
processes. The results suggest a slow and intentional mechanism underlying motor updating 
during execution in emotional contexts, driven by conscious top-down attentional control 
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(Day & Lyon, 2000; Tipper et al., 1998). This slower, intentional mechanism is likely guided 
by prioritised emotional information. These results are also supportive of previous chapters 
that showed conscious evaluation of the emotional stimulus is essential for driving 
emotional influences on the motor system. Importantly, the results complement results 
from Chapters Two and Three which had suggested the involvement of top-down 
mechanisms on action selection. The results suggest top-down mechanisms influenced by 
emotional information that serve to update movements in response to emotional changes 
in the environment. However, these top-down mechanisms are not influenced by approach-
avoidance tendencies, suggesting different emotional top-down influences on action 
selection and execution.  
 
The biomechanics of the arm influences reaching kinematics, accuracy and precision  
While valence seems to affect reaching movements, it is possible that the biophysics 
of the arm may have also contributed. I therefore controlled for this.  The results show that 
many of the effects observed were indeed influenced by biophysical properties. That is, 
movements that are biomechanically easier to make, combined with the different target 
and distractor locations, resulted in differences in action execution. Overall, reaching 
movements were faster, more accurate and more precise when reaching to upper targets, 
suggesting that planning of movements to upper targets was biased by what was considered 
biomechanically easier for participants. There is evidence that biomechanical costs (i.e. the 
degree of difficulty of the movement) (Cos et al., 2011, 2014; Marcos et al., 2015; Sainburg 
& Kalakanis, 2000) are incorporated into movement planning prior to initiation and 
influence the kinematics of arm reaching.  
Movements were also faster for distractors presented on the right than the left. This 
suggests that the side that the distractor is presented in makes a difference to how quickly 
and accurate execution is. Faster movements when distractors were presented on the right 
might have been due to the fact that visual information processed on the left did not have 
to cross to motor areas. Thus, feedback was influenced faster for right distractors. For 
example, when reaching towards the right with the right arm, movements are faster than 
when reaching towards the left, presumably due to the time taken to transfer information 
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between hemispheres (Day & Lyon, 2000). However, given that in the current experiment 
participants only reached with their right arm, one cannot conclusively determine that 
interhemispheric crossing may account for the results.  
These data therefore reveal two different elements of planning during reaching. 
Firstly, movement planning takes biomechanical costs into account. Secondly, these plans 
are updated in real time throughout the movement.  
 
Active approach and avoidance in emotional contexts may influence reaching trajectories  
In sum, Experiment 1 demonstrated an influence of valence, but not approach-
avoidance tendencies, on motor re-planning during action execution driven by higher-order 
processes. However, Experiment 1 also suggested that there is no effect of valence 
automaticity on early, bottom-up pathways. There was therefore no influence of valence 
automaticity on bottom-up or top-down processes during execution.  
A possible reason for this may be because the completion of the task did not rely on 
movement corrections. Visuomotor automaticity is only engaged during visuomotor 
adaptation (e.g. Day & Lyon, 2000). Unlike simple reaching where distractors are task-
irrelevant, the success of visuomotor adaptation relies on responding to a task-relevant 
change. Participants may therefore be required to correct relative to emotional stimuli. If 
approach-avoidance tendencies are to influence movement trajectories, the context may 
need to require participants to engage in approach and avoidance movements. Indeed, 
work has shown that approach-avoidance is goal-directed, and that task-instructions may be 
responsible for driving whether an approach or avoidance is activated by the emotional 
stimulus (Bradley & Lang, 2013; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). 
Thus, participants may need to be given explicit goals to reach towards or away from a 
stimulus in order to generate such tendencies and possibly impact reaching execution.  
As such, Experiment 2 was designed to ask how the approach and avoidance of 
emotional targets influences known approach-avoidance effects on movement execution. 
Two experiments were conducted (see section 6.4.1.3). In both experiments, the participant 
was required to generate an approach-avoidance goal to an emotional picture. An adapted 
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version of the task in Day & Lyon (2000) was used in which participants reached towards a 
central target and in 30% of the trials the target jumped either to the left or the right shortly 
after movement initiation. Above the new target an emotional picture was presented. 
Participants either moved towards or away from the new target location. Thus, a correction 
in response to a target jump from the centre was required.  
The timing of when this correction occurs is crucial for determining any fast and slow 
underlying processes mediating such corrections (visuomotor automaticity). The goal was 
therefore to determine whether approach-avoidance tendencies to emotional pictures are 
capable of influencing the speed of visuomotor corrections. If the fast and slow mechanisms 
are influenced by valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies it would demonstrate 
that these two processes are not autonomous and that emotional information has 
privileged access to the motor system. Corrections made towards a new target were 
expected to be faster when the new target was paired with a positive picture compared to a 
negative or neutral picture. Similarly, corrections made away from a new target were 
expected to occur faster when the new target was paired with a negative relative to positive 
or neutral picture. Accuracy and precision of reaching was also expected to be influenced by 
emotional valence but not neutral pictures.  
 
6.4. Experiment 2 
 
6.4.1. Methods  
 
6.4.1.1. Participants 
16 healthy participants (four males, mean age 23 ± 3 years) were recruited as in 
Experiment 1. All subjects participated in Experiment 2A and B.  
In Experiment 2A, 5 subjects were excluded from the analysis. 2 participants were 
excluded due to an excessive number of errors as a result of not understanding the task. 3 
participants were excluded due to faulty recordings. Data analyses were conducted on 11 
subjects.  
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 In Experiment 2B, 7 subjects were excluded from the analysis. 4 participants were 
excluded due to an excessive number of errors as a result of not understanding the task. 3 
participants were excluded due to faulty recordings. Data analyses were conducted on 9 
subjects.  
 
6.4.1.2. Stimuli and experimental setup 
 
6.4.1.2.1. Target and emotional stimuli 
The same pictures used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiments 2A and 2B.  
An unfilled blue circle (130 x 105 pixels) was presented at three different locations 
on the same plane: centre (control target), left and right.  Only the circle that served as the 
target became filled, with the remaining two circles unfilled. All stimuli were presented as in 
Experiment 1.  
The experiment consisted of 12 experimental conditions depending on the position 
of the target (centre, left, right), the type of movement participants had to make (approach 
vs. avoid), and the valence of the distractor (negative, neutral or positive). Additionally, 
there was a control condition. In total, there were 13 conditions. In total there were 8 blocks 
with 60 trials each, giving a total of 640 trials and 40 trials in each condition.  
 
6.4.1.2.2. Recording in the experimental 3D space & calibration of the experimental 
setup   
Recording of reaching movements and calibration of the 3D space for Experiments 
2A and 2B was the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
6.4.1.3. Experimental procedure and design 
The experiment was divided into two sessions: Experiment 2A in which the target 
jumped after the reaching movement was initiated and Experiment 2B in which the target 
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jumped before the initiation of movement. Expt 2A investigated how emotional valence 
influenced the online correction of an already initiated movement, whereas Expt 2B 
investigated how emotional valence influenced the planning of a movement prior to 
initiation and whether this would influence the speed of visuomotor corrections. Expt 2B 
therefore acted as a “control”. This should reveal any differences in the influence of valence 
automaticity on visuomotor automaticity between movements that take emotional changes 
into account prior to movement initiation and those that only take it into account after 
movement initiation. In Expt 2B, the valence and the target jump should be incorporated 
into the movement plan meaning that effects of valence automaticity on visuomotor 
automaticity may arise earlier. Thus, the current experiment will assess if action initiation, 
motor planning and execution are influenced by valence-related approach-avoidance 
tendencies.   
For both experiments, participants were seated in the experimental room as in 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 2A (Figure 6.10), trials started with a fixation cross (jittered, 
mean 500 ± 100 ms). Subsequently, a filled blue circular target was presented at the centre 
of the screen along with two unfilled circles on the left and right sides (70% of trials) and 
participants were instructed to reach the central target as accurately and fast as possible. 
This control condition was used as a comparison against the remaining experimental 
conditions. On trials in which a target jump occurred (30% of trials), the filled blue circular 
target “jumped” either to the left or right along the same plane 25 ms after the release of 
the right index finger from the touch plate. The target “jump” was simulated by filling either 
the left or the right unfilled circles, and making the central target unfilled. On approach 
trials, an emotional picture was always presented above the new target (duration 300 ms) 
and participants were instructed to reach towards the new circular target as fast and 
accurately as possible. On avoidance trials, an emotional picture was always presented 
above one of the circles, but subjects were instructed to reach for the target opposite to 
that with the picture above it. Approach and avoidance were blocked: one block with 
approach trials and another block with avoidance trials. Trials were randomised so that 
subjects did not know when a target jump would occur or which direction the target would 
jump to. In all cases, the arm began reaching for the central target before the target jump. 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Six 
240 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Task schematic of three trials 
for Experiment 2. Upper panels show a trial 
sequence when participants were required 
to reach to the central target only and when 
no jump occurred (control). Middle panels 
show a trial sequence when participants 
had to reach to the new target location 
(approach). A target “jumped” from the 
centre to one of the lateral circles and an 
emotional picture was displayed above the 
new target simultaneously. After 300 ms 
the emotional picture disappeared. Bottom 
panels show a trial sequence when 
participants moved in the opposite direction of the new target (avoidance).  
 
The new targets were paired with emotional stimuli in order to keep the design as 
similar as possible and avoid target confounds. The central target was a blue circle. In order 
to keep the targets as homogeneous as possible, the new target also had to be a blue circle. 
Furthermore, because emotional distractors were expected to be prioritised by attentional 
mechanisms, they were still expected to elicit approach-avoidance tendencies.   
In Experiment 2B, the task was identical except that participants had two touch 
plates, placed side-by-side 40 cm away from the screen. Participants placed their left index 
finger on the same touch sensitive plate used in Experiment 1 and released to initiate a trial, 
but were instructed to leave their left arm in place. Instead, they reached with their right 
index finger that was located on another plate. Thus, the left finger release triggered the 
start of the trial, but the reaching task was completed with the right arm. Contrary to 
Experiment 2A, the arm reaching for the target was released after the target jump.  
The location (left/right) and valence (positive/neutral/negative) of the picture were 
randomised from trial-to-trial, as was the frequency of the target jumps.  Each participant 
performed a series of 8 blocks with a brief break between every block. Prior to the 
experiment they received a training session of two blocks of 30 trials using blurred neutral 
pictures only, one for approach and one for avoidance. 
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6.4.1.4. Picture ratings (valence/arousal/complexity) 
Participants rated the valence, arousal and complexity of the emotional pictures as 
in Experiment 1. Ratings only occurred at the end of the second session (Experiment 2B).  
 
6.4.1.5. Data analyses  
Data analyses followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1. The same dependent 
variables were analysed and for the same reasons. The only exception is that reaction time 
(RT) was also analysed. RT is the time between the onset of a stimulus and initiation of 
movement. In Experiment 2B, the presentation of the emotional stimulus occurred before 
the initiation of movement and therefore it may have had an influence on the RT. For this 
reason, RTs were analysed for both Experiment 2A and 2B, although RTs were only expected 
to be influenced in Experiment 2B.   
 
6.4.1.6. Statistical analysis 
As in Experiment 1, only complete or correct trajectories were included. Trajectories 
in which participants did not reach the screen (1.2%) and moved too early (i.e. before the 
target presentation) or 500 ms after the target presentation (1.4%) were excluded from the 
analysis. Outliers were calculated for each variable, per condition and for each subject using 
Grubb’s test (1.5%). In addition, trajectories where participants did not reach towards the 
correct target were excluded (i.e. made the wrong movement). To quantify this, circular 
boundaries were defined for each target using the x and z coordinates. These boundaries 
were calculated by taking the median of all the endpoints (across all conditions) 
corresponding to that specific target (after excluding outliers) and adding or subtracting 3 
S.D from this median. Any endpoints, and therefore trajectories, that fell outside of these 
circular boundaries (depending on the condition) were excluded (6.3%). In total, 10.4% of 
trials were excluded from the analysis.  
An average control trajectory was computed prior to all analyses by calculating the 
mean across all correct control trajectories. This average trajectory was subsequently used 
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to calculate the time point at which corrections to the left or the right occurred in the 
remaining conditions, for each participant individually, by taking all trials in each condition 
and subsequently running t-tests. Each t-test calculation consisted of 50 observations. For 
example, taking 50 time points from the control condition and 50 time points from the 
condition when you had to move towards the new target with a positive picture displayed, 
t-tests were run across each time point. Any significant differences from zero were 
considered as significant deviations from the control trajectory and the time point was 
logged. T-tests were conducted with correction for multiple comparisons (i.e. FDR 
correction) for the lateral velocity (i.e. x-velocity because it logged the position of the arm 
on a horizontal plane) in accordance with Day & Lyon (2000). FDR correction was used 
instead of Bonferroni due to the high number of comparisons that needed to be made here 
(in Experiment 1 the number of multiple comparisons was far less and Bonferroni was 
deemed sufficient). FDR is less conservative than Bonferroni, and has been shown to have 
greater power at reducing the probability of false positives.  
Statistical analyses were conducted on the same dependent variables defined in 
Experiment 1, in addition to the time point of the trajectory deviations. A within-subjects 
2x2x3 RM-ANOVA was performed with Movement type (approach vs. avoidance), Target 
side (Left vs. Right) and Picture Valence (Negative vs. Neutral vs. Positive) as factors on all 
dependent variables obtained. All analyses and follow-up statistics are presented as in 
Experiment 1.  
 
6.4.1.7. Control analyses on the arousal of the distractors 
As in Experiment 1, all analyses were repeated using the arousal (high vs. low) of the 
emotional pictures instead of the valence. A within-subjects 2x2x2 RM-ANOVA was 
performed with Movement type (approach vs. avoidance), Target side (left vs. right) and 
Picture Arousal (high vs. low) as factors on all dependent variables obtained.  
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6.4.2. Results 
 
6.4.2.1. Individual picture ratings  
To control for individual differences, participants rated the valence and arousal of 
each picture. Paired samples t-tests revealed that negative and neutral pictures were not 
rated differently from the IAPS (neg-IAPS = 2.63 ± 0.00, neg-rate = 2.36 ± 0.23; neut-IAPS = 
5.00 ± 0.00, neut-rate = 5.22 ± 0.11). Positive pictures were rated significantly less positive 
than the IAPS ratings but were still perceived as positive (pos-IAPS: 7.57 ± 0.00, pos-rate: 
7.04 ± 0.16; t(10) = 6.33, p = 0.007). The results suggest that subjects perceived pictures as 
being their correct valence.  
For arousal, paired samples t-tests revealed that negative (neg-IAPS = 6.20 ± 0.00, 
neg-rate = 3.60 ± 0.27; t(10) = -9.62, p < 0.001) and positive (pos-IAPS: 4.90 ± 0.00, pos-rate: 
3.21 ± 0.46; t(10) = -3.64, p = 0.005) pictures had a lower arousal that the IAPS arousal 
ratings. The arousal of neutral pictures did not differ from the IAPS ratings (neut-IAPS = 3.15 
± 0.00, neut-rate = 3.04 ± 0.46). Overall, pictures were rated as being less arousing than the 
IAPS ratings.  
 
6.4.2.2. Effects of Valence on reaching trajectories  
All of the results below represent effects of distractor valence (positive, negative, 
neutral), target location (left vs. right) and the type of movement made (approach vs. 
avoid). 
 
6.4.2.2.1. Speed of processing and movement initiation: Reaction times (RTs) 
The initiation of movement was expected to be influenced by the valence of the 
emotional pictures but only in Experiment 2B, since movement initiation occurred after the 
appearance of the emotional picture. In both Experiment 2A and 2B there was no effect of 
emotional valence on the initiation of movement.  
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6.4.2.2.2. Kinematic measures (tPV, PV, MT)  
 
Movement speed: Average Peak Velocity of arm reaching 
The velocity of approaching or avoiding may be influenced by valence, with faster 
movements towards positive pictures and away from negative pictures. In Experiment 2A, 
results showed that PV was affected by whether participants had to approach or avoid 
(Movement type, F(1, 10) = 5.96, p = 0.035, η
2
p = 0.37) and whether they had to reach to the 
left or the right (Side, F(1, 10) = 8.64, p = 0.015, η
2
p = 0.46). Participants were faster to reach to 
the right compared to when moving to the left (left: 1.54 ± 0.03 m/sec, right: 1.58 ± 0.04 
m/sec; t(10) = −2.94, p = 0.015, Cohen’s d = -0.89). Participants were also faster to approach 
than to avoid the new target (approach: 1.57 ± 0.04 m/sec, avoidance: 1.54 ± 0.03 m/sec; 
t(10) = 2.17, p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.59). There was no influence of valence on PV.  
In Experiment 2B, PV was affected by both the movement type and side (Figure 
6.11A; Movement type*Side, F(1, 8) = 6.47, p = 0.034, η
2
p = 0.45). When approaching, moving 
to the left was slower than when moving to the right (left: 1.42 ± 0.04 m/sec, right: 1.54 ± 
0.04 m/sec; t(8) = −6.00, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.93). Equally, when avoiding, moving to the 
left was slower than to the right (left: 1.46 ± 0.04 m/sec, right: 1.52 ± 0.03 m/sec; t(8) = 
−3.35, p = 0.010, Cohen’s d = -1.14). 
In addition, PV was affected by whether participants reached to the left or the right 
(Side, F(1, 8) = 34.83, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.81) and by the valence of the emotional picture (Figure 
6.11B; Valence, F(2, 16) = 3.89, p = 0.042, η
2
p = 0.33). Participants moved faster to the right 
than to the left (left: 1.44 ± 0.04 m/sec, right: 1.53 ± 0.03 m/sec; t(8) = −6.11, p < 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -1.99). For valence, participants moved faster when presented with positive 
pictures, followed by neutral and negative (negative: 1.48 ± 0.03 m/sec, neutral: 1.48 ± 0.04 
m/sec, positive: 1.50 ± 0.04 m/sec). However, only the PV between neutral and positive 
pictures differed from each other (t(8) = −2.71, p = 0.027, Cohen’s d = -0.96). Moving in 
positive contexts was significantly faster than moving in neutral contexts. There was a trend 
for faster reaching in positive relative to negative contexts (t(8) = −2.16, p = 0.062, Cohen’s d 
= -0.94). Valence therefore affected movement speed when moving to the left or the right.  
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Figure 6.11. Peak velocity while approaching and avoiding A) Interaction between movement type and side, 
showing that participants were faster to reach to the left than to the right. B) Main effect of valence showing 
that reaching was faster when presented with positive pictures relative to neutral and negative. Error bars (+1 
S.E.M.); * significant at the p <0.05 level.    
 
Time of Peak Velocity  
In Experiment 2A, both the valence of the emotional picture and the side that 
participants moved to influenced the time at which PV was reached (Figure 6.12A; 
Valence*Side, F(2, 20) = 4.72, p = 0.021, η
2
p = 0.32). When a negative picture was presented, 
PV was reached faster when moving to the left compared to the right (left: 179 ± 10 ms, 
right: 196 ± 10 ms; t(10) = −3.06, p = 0.012, Cohen’s d = -0.94). Equally, when a positive 
picture was presented, PV was reached faster when moving to the left than to the right (left: 
179 ± 10 ms, right: 191 ± 10 ms; t(10) = −2.87, p = 0.017, Cohen’s d = -0.87). There was no 
difference between moving to the left and right when a neutral distractor was presented.  
Furthermore, whether subjects had to approach or avoid the target and the side also 
influenced the time of PV (Figure 6.12B; Movement type*Side, F(1, 10) = 5.22, p = 0.045, η
2
p = 
0.34). For approach, participants were faster to reach PV when moving to the left than to 
the right (left: 173 ± 11 ms, right: 190 ± 10 ms; t(10) = −2.84, p = 0.018, Cohen’s d = -0.87). 
However, when avoiding there was no difference when moving to the left or the right.  
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Figure 6.12. Influence of valence and 
movement type on time to peak velocity. 
A) Interaction between valence and side, 
showing that when negative and positive 
pictures were displayed, participants 
reached peak velocity faster when moving 
to the left. B) Interaction between 
movement type and side showing that 
when approaching, reaching peak velocity 
to the left was faster than when moving to 
the right. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * 
significant at the p <0.05 level.  
 
There was a main effect of side, (F(1, 10) = 5.57, p = 0.040, η
2
p = 0.36). When 
participants moved to the left, they reached PV faster than when they moved to the right 
(left: 180 ± 11 ms, right: 190 ± 10 ms; t(10) = −2.36, p = 0.040, Cohen’s d = -0.68).  
In Experiment 2B, there was only a main effect of the side to which participants had 
to move to on the time of PV (Side, F(1, 8) = 8.75, p = 0.018, η
2
p = 0.52). When participants 
moved to the left, they were faster to reach maximum speed than when they moved to the 
right (left: 191 ± 17 ms, right: 211 ± 16 ms; t(8) = −2.99, p = 0.017, Cohen’s d = -1.03). 
 
Movement time (duration) of execution 
Similar to the above variables, valence did not influence how fast a movement was 
completed. Instead, in Experiment 2A, movement time was affected by whether 
participants had to approach or avoid (Movement type, F(1, 10) = 22.90, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.70) 
and by whether they moved to the left or right (Side, F(1, 10) = 120.32, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.92). 
Participants were faster to complete their trajectory when moving to the right compared to 
the left (left: 417 ± 10 ms, right: 354 ± 9 ms; t(10) = 10.94, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.25). 
Participants were also faster to complete their movement when approaching compared to 
avoiding the target (approach: 373 ± 11 ms, avoidance: 398 ± 9 ms; t(10) = −4.78, p = 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = -1.49). 
In Experiment 2B, movement time was affected by whether participants had to 
approach or avoid (Movement type, F(1, 8) = 8.73, p = 0.018, η
2
p = 0.52) and by the side 
(Side, F(1, 8) = 83.75, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.91). Participants were faster when moving to the right 
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compared to the left (left: 427 ± 16 ms, right: 359 ± 14 ms; t(8) = 9.03, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 
4.73). Participants were also faster to move when approaching compared to avoiding the 
target (approach: 386 ± 15 ms, avoidance: 400 ± 15 ms; t(8) = −2.96, p = 0.018, Cohen’s d = -
0.65). 
 
6.4.2.2.3. Speed of visuomotor corrections: Lateral velocity deviations from the control  
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate the influence of valence on 
visuomotor corrections, giving insight into bottom-up and top-down processes. Corrections 
to new targets were expected to be faster when paired with positive pictures. Corrections 
away from new targets should be faster when presented with negative pictures. In 
Experiment 2A, the timing of corrections was affected by whether subjects approached or 
avoided the target (Figure 6.13A; Movement type, F(1, 10) = 7.79, p = 0.019, η
2
p = 0.44), and 
by the side they had to reach to (Figure 6.13B; Side, F(1, 10) = 9.89, p = 0.010, η
2
p = 0.50). 
Corrections occurred earlier when participants approached targets compared to when they 
avoided targets (approach: 202 ± 8 ms, avoidance: 239 ± 7ms; t(10) = −2.80, p = 0.019, 
Cohen’s d = -0.95). Corrections also occurred earlier when reaching towards targets on the 
right side relative to the left (left: 237 ± 7 ms, right: 204 ± 6 ms; t(10) = 3.14, p = 0.010, 
Cohen’s d = 0.95).  
 
 
Figure 6.13. Influence of movement type, side and valence on the speed of visuomotor corrections. A) Effect 
of movement type showing that deviations occurred significantly earlier when approaching than when moving 
away from new targets. B) Effect of the side of reaching showing that deviations occurred earlier when 
reaching to targets presented on the right compared to the left. C) Effect of valence and movement type 
indicating that for emotional pictures, deviations to the targets occurred significantly earlier compared to 
when neutral pictures were presented. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); * significant at the p <0.05 level. 
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Movement type and valence appeared to influence the timing of visuomotor 
corrections (Figure 6.13C; Movement type*Valence, F(1,20) = 3.18, p = 0.063, ηp2 = 0.24). This 
interaction revealed that when emotional pictures were shown, visuomotor corrections to 
the respective target were earlier when approaching than when avoiding. Approaching was 
faster than avoidance when presented with negative (app: 196 ± 12 ms, avoid: 256 ± 12 ms; 
t(10) = -3.12, p = 0.011, Cohen’s d = -0.93) and positive (app: 195 ± 10 ms, avoid: 233 ± 11 ms; 
t(10) = -2.56, p = 0.028, Cohen’s d = -0.76) pictures. There was no difference in the timing of 
these corrections when neutral pictures were shown. Valence therefore influenced the 
timing of visuomotor corrections to respective targets. For visualisation purposes, Figure 
6.14A shows the lateral velocities for subject 11 for all conditions for Expt 2A.  
 
 
Figure 6.14. Mean lateral velocities showing the speed of visuomotor corrections for subject 11. A) Lateral 
velocities for Expt 2A. First two upper panels show the mean lateral velocities compared against the control 
trajectory (± 1 standard deviation represented by the shaded area) for approaching left and right targets when 
positive (green lines), negative (red) and neutral (blue) pictures were shown. Blue circles represent targets, 
green circles represent the picture. The last two upper panels show the mean lateral velocities for moving 
away from the target with the emotional picture. B) Comparison mean lateral velocities for Expt 2B. These 
velocities appear to be more direct and less variable than those for Expt 2A. Lateral velocities for approaching 
and avoiding targets when positive (green lines), negative (red) and neutral (blue) pictures were shown.  
 
 In Experiment 2B, corrections were affected by whether subjects approached or 
avoided the target (Movement type, F(1, 8) = 13.88, p = 0.006, η
2
p = 0.63), and by the side 
they had to reach to (Side, F(1, 8) = 22.99, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.74). Corrections occurred earlier 
when participants approached targets compared to when they avoided targets (Figure 
6.14B; approach: 196 ± 16 ms, avoidance: 241 ± 13 ms; t(8) = −3.73, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = -
1.27). Corrections also occurred earlier when reaching towards targets on the right side 
relative to the left (left: 245 ± 12 ms, right: 192 ± 16 ms; t(8) = 4.79, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 
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1.69). Movements to respective targets for subject 1 were more direct compared to Expt 2A, 
as shown in Figure 6.15.  
 
 
Figure 6.15. Raw trajectories for participant 1 when a negative picture was presented. A) Raw trajectories 
(black lines) when approaching and avoiding new targets in Expt 2A showing corrections towards or away from 
new targets relative to the control condition (dark blue line). Blue circles represent targets, green circles 
represent the picture. B) Raw trajectories when approaching and avoiding in Experiment 2B. Trajectories 
appeared to be more direct in Expt 2B compared to 2A.  
 
The above results did not alter for Experiment 2A and 2B when the lateral velocities 
were split into early and late epochs. No significant effects were found in the early part of 
the trajectory, whereas deviations occurred in the late part of the trajectory, similar to 
Experiment 1.  
In sum, the results for the kinematics of a movement indicate an influence of the 
type of movement to be made (approach vs. avoid) and the biophysical properties of the 
arm (moving to the left vs. right). Overall, moving towards a target is faster than moving 
away from a target, and moving to the left is faster than moving to the right. There was an 
influence of valence on the timing of visuomotor corrections when approaching and 
avoiding but there was no influence of approach-avoidance tendencies.  
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6.4.2.2.4. Effects of Valence on accuracy, precision and angle 
 
Accuracy of reaching: Euclidean distance of the endpoint from the target  
As in Experiment 1, the Euclidean distance gave insight into the accuracy of the 
movement relative to the target. In Experiment 2A, the accuracy was affected by whether 
subjects approached or avoided and by the side (Figure 6.16A; Movement type*Side, F(1, 10) = 
21.95, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.58). When approaching the target, endpoints were closer to the 
target when moving to the left compared to the right (left: 20 ± 2 mm, right: 40 ± 4 mm; 
t(10) = −5.63, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.84). Similarly, when avoiding, endpoints were closer to 
the target when moving to the left compared to the right (left: 22 ± 2 mm, right: 48 ± 4 mm; 
t(10) = −8.62, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -3.11). Participants were also more accurate when 
moving to the right when approaching versus avoiding (t(10) = −4.77, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -
1.47).  
 
 
Figure 6.16. Influence of valence and movement type on reaching accuracy. A) Interaction between the 
movement type and side, showing that moving to the left was more accurate than moving to the right. B) 
Interaction between movement type and valence, showing that accuracy was better when approaching than 
avoiding when neutral and positive pictures were shown. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at the p <0.001 
level; * significant at the p <0.05 level. 
 
The valence of the emotional pictures and the type of movement made (e.g. towards 
or away) was expected to influence movement accuracy. Indeed, the results showed an 
influence of movement type and the valence on the endpoint distance (Figure 6.16B; 
Movement type*Valence, F(2, 20) = 4.54, p = 0.024, η
2
p = 0.31). When negative pictures were 
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presented, there was no difference in the distance to the target between approach and 
avoidance movements. When neutral pictures were presented, the distance from the target 
was shorter when approaching compared to avoiding (approach: 29 ± 2 mm, avoidance: 37 
± 3 mm; t(10) = −3.77, p = 0.004, Cohen’s d = -1.27). Similarly, for positive pictures, the 
distance was shorter when approaching compared to avoiding (approach: 31 ± 2 mm, 
avoidance: 35 ± 3 mm; t(10) = −2.71, p = 0.022, Cohen’s d = -0.71), suggesting greater 
accuracy for neutral and positive pictures relative to negative.  
In addition to the above interaction, the endpoint distance relative to the targets 
was also affected by whether participants approached or avoided (Movement type, F(1, 10) = 
10.95, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.52) and by the side of the movement (Side, F(1, 10) = 51.22, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.84). Endpoints were in general closer to the target when subjects approached 
(approach: 30 ± 2 mm, avoidance: 35 ± 3 mm; t(10) = −3.26, p = 0.009, Cohen’s d = -1.11). 
Equally, endpoints were closer to the target when participants reached to the left compared 
to the right (left: 21 ± 2 mm, right: 44 ± 4 mm; t(10) = −6.99, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -2.39). 
In Experiment 2B, the Euclidean distance relative to the targets was affected by 
whether participants approached or avoided (Movement type, F(1, 8) = 18.31, p = 0.003, η
2
p = 
0.70) and by the side of the movement (Side, F(1, 8) = 18.50, p = 0.003, η
2
p = 0.70). Endpoints 
were closer to the target when subjects approached (approach: 30 ± 3 mm, avoidance: 32 ± 
3 mm; t(8) = −4.43, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = -1.58). Equally, endpoints were closer to the target 
when participants reached to the left compared to the right (left: 21.67 ± 4.05 mm, right: 
40.50 ± 2.76 mm; t(8) = −4.31, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = -1.45). There was no effect of valence 
on accuracy.  
   
Precision of reaching: area of the ellipse 
In Experiment 2A, the precision of the movement was influenced by approach and 
avoidance (Movement type, (F(1, 10) = 6.88, p = 0.025, η
2
p = 0.41) and by the side (Side, (F(1, 
10) = 11.79, p = 0.006, η
2
p = 0.54), supporting the results for the Euclidean distance. The area 
of the ellipse surrounding the endpoints was smaller when subjects approached the target 
than when they avoided (approach: 579 ± 78 mm2, avoidance: 887 ± 138 mm2; t(10) = -
2.34, p = 0.041, Cohen’s d = -0.078). Similarly, the area was smaller when reaching toward 
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left compared to right targets (left: 556 ± 116 mm2, right: 911 ± 101 mm2; t(10) = -4.27, p = 
0.002, Cohen’s d = -1.29). Participants were more precise in correcting when approaching 
relative to avoiding the targets, and more precise when reaching to left targets, the latter 
possibly as a result of the biophysical properties of the arm. Figure 6.17A shows the mean 
endpoints for all subjects when approaching and avoiding when positive, negative and 
neutral pictures were presented.  
These main effects were qualified by a 3-way interaction between the movement 
type, the side of reaching and the valence of the emotional picture (Movement 
type*side*valence, F(1,10) = 3.73, p = 0.042, ηp2 = 0.27). This interaction was split for each 
side. When participants reached to the left, picture valence did not significantly affect the 
precision of approaching or avoiding. When participants reached to the right, participants 
were more precise when approaching or avoiding (F(1,10) = 5.42, p = 0.042, ηp2 = 0.35). 
Overall, valence did not impact the precision of reaching.  
 
 
Figure 6.17. Influence of valence on reaching precision. A) Ellipses fitted around the mean endpoints for all 
subjects when positive (green), negative (red) and neutral (blue) pictures were presented for Expt 2A. B) 
Ellipses fitted around the mean endpoints for all subjects in Expt 2B. Ellipses in Expt 2B are smaller, and 
therefore more precise, than ellipses in Expt 2A. Precision was greatest when participants planned their 
correction prior to the initiation of movement.  
 
 In Experiment 2B, precision was also influenced by approach and avoidance 
(Movement type, (F(1, 8) = 5.51, p = 0.047, η
2
p = 0.41) and by the side (Side, (F(1, 8) = 10.77, p = 
0.011, η2p = 0.57). The area of the ellipse was smaller when subjects approached the target 
than when they avoided (approach: 562 ± 93 mm2, avoidance: 765 ± 149 mm2; t(8) = -
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2.35, p = 0.047, Cohen’s d = -1.00). Similarly, the area was smaller when reaching toward left 
compared to right targets (left: 445 ± 58 mm2, right: 881 ± 180 mm2; t(8) = -3.28, p = 0.011, 
Cohen’s d = -2.42). Participants were therefore more precise when approaching and when 
moving to the left. Figure 6.17B shows the mean endpoints for approaching and avoiding in 
Expt 2B. Visual inspection shows that precision was greater in Expt2B than Expt 2A. 
Precision was greatest when participants planned their correction prior to the initiation of 
movement.  
 
Orientation of the spread of the endpoints: angle of the ellipse 
In both experiment 2A and 2B, there was no effect of approach or avoidance, the 
side of reaching or the valence on the angle of the ellipse surrounding the endpoints.  
To sum up, the accuracy of reaching movements was influenced by valence, but 
precision and orientation of reaching movements was not. Valence only affected accuracy 
when it was presented after the initiation of movement (Experiment 2A) and not before 
(Experiment 2B). Furthermore, participants were more accurate when approaching low-
threat stimuli. In both experiments accuracy was influenced by the type of movement made 
and the biophysics of the arm. Precision was affected by the type of movement made, with 
better precision for approaching compared to avoiding, and by the side of reaching.  
 
6.4.2.3. Effects of Arousal on action execution  
All of the results below represent effects of distractor arousal (high vs. low), target 
location (left vs. right) and the type of movement to be made (approach vs. avoid). In 
general, the results for arousal did not differ from those for valence.  
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6.4.2.3.1. Kinematic measures (PV, tPV, MT)  
 
Movement speed: Average Peak Velocity of arm reaching  
In Experiment 2A, PV was affected by the side (Side, F(1, 10) = 11.29, p = 0.008, η
2
p = 
0.57). Participants were slower when moving to the left compared to the right (left: 1.50 ± 
0.05, right: 1.55 ± 0.04; t(10) = −2.77, p = 0.008, Cohen’s d = -0.45).  
In Experiment 2B, PV was affected by both the movement type and side (Movement 
type*Side, F(1, 8) = 5.97, p = 0.040, η
2
p = 0.43). When approaching, moving to the left was 
slower than when moving to the right (left: 1.42 ± 0.04 m/sec, right: 1.55 ± 0.04 m/sec; t(8) = 
−4.89, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.68). Equally, when avoiding, movements were slower when 
moving to the left than to the right (left: 1.45 ± 0.04 m/sec, right: 1.51 ± 0.03 m/sec; t(8) = 
−3.20, p = 0.013, Cohen’s d = -1.04). In addition, participants were slower when moving to 
the left compared to the right (Side, F(1, 8) = 25.26, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.76; left: 1.43 ± 0.04 
m/sec, right: 1.53 ± 0.03 m/sec; t(8) = −5.07, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.78).  
 
Time of Peak Velocity  
In Experiment 2A, there was no effect of arousal, movement type or the side of 
reaching on the time at which PV was reached.  
However, in Experiment 2B, there was a main effect of side (Side, F(1, 8) = 6.53, p = 
0.034, η2p = 0.45). When participants moved to the left, they reached PV faster than when 
they moved to the right (left: 191 ± 17 ms, right: 209 ± 16 ms; t(8) = −2.53, p = 0.035, Cohen’s 
d = -0.88). 
This main effect was qualified by an effect of both the arousal and the side 
(Arousal*Side, F(1, 8) = 5.99, p = 0.040, η
2
p = 0.43). When arousal was low participants 
reached PV faster when moving to the left than the right (left: 188 ± 18 ms, right: 212 ± 16 
ms; t(8) = −3.37, p = 0.010, Cohen’s d = -1.14).  
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Movement time (duration) of execution 
In Experiment 2A, movement time was affected by whether participants approached 
or avoided (Figure 6.18A; Movement type, F(1, 10) = 35.84, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.80) and by 
moving to the left or the right (Side, F(1, 10) = 82.01, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.90). Participants were 
faster when approaching compared to avoiding the target (approach: 372 ± 12 ms, 
avoidance: 421 ± 11 ms; t(10) = −5.96, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.89). Participants were also 
faster when moving to the right compared to the left (left: 415 ± 10 ms, right: 379 ± 11 ms; 
t(10) = 8.99, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -5.03).  
 
Figure 6.18. Influence of movement type 
on movement times. A) Duration of the 
trajectories was significantly short when 
approaching than when avoiding. B) 
Duration of the trajectories was shorter 
when moving to right than to left targets. 
Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at the 
p <0.001 level; * significant at the p <0.05 
level. 
 
These effects were qualified by an effect of movement type and side (Figure 6.18B; 
Movement type*Side, F(1, 10) = 31.17, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.78). When approaching, moving to 
the right was faster than moving to the left (left: 400 ± 11 ms, right: 345 ± 12 ms; t(10) = 
20.69, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 7.35). Similarly, when avoiding, moving to the right was faster 
compared to the left (left: 431 ± 12 ms, right: 412 ± 12 ms; t(10) = 2.70, p = 0.024, Cohen’s d = 
0.88).  
In Experiment 2B, movement time was also affected by approaching and avoiding 
(Movement type, F(1, 8) = 43.21, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.84) and by moving to the left or the right 
(Side, F(1, 8) = 63.67, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.89). Participants were faster when approaching 
compared to avoiding the target (approach: 384 ± 15 ms, avoidance: 421 ± 16 ms; t(8) = 
−6.61, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -2.26) and faster when moving to the right compared to the 
left (left: 428 ± 16 ms, right: 377 ± 15 ms; t(8) = 7.89, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.71).  
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These effects were qualified by a combined effect of movement type and side 
(Movement type*Side, F(1, 8) = 10.56, p = 0.012, η
2
p = 0.60). When approaching, moving to 
the right was faster than moving to the left (left: 418 ± 17 ms, right: 350 ± 14 ms; t(8) = 
9.67, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.60). Similarly, when avoiding, moving to the right was faster 
compared to the left (left: 437 ± 15 ms, right: 405 ± 18 ms; t(8) = 3.42, p = 0.009, Cohen’s d = 
1.15). 
 
6.4.2.3.2. Speed of visuomotor corrections: Lateral velocity deviations from the control 
The arousal of the pictures may also impact visuomotor corrections. In Experiment 
2A, the time point of the deviations from the control was affected by whether subjects 
approached or avoided the target (Movement type, F(1, 9) = 23.64, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.70), and 
by the side they had to reach to (Side, F(1, 9) = 15.47, p = 0.003, η
2
p = 0.61). Corrections 
occurred earlier when participants approached targets compared to avoidance (approach: 
198 ± 8 ms, avoidance: 242 ± 7 ms; t(9) = −4.25, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.99) and when 
reaching towards targets on the right side relative to the left (left: 229 ± 7 ms, right: 208 ± 9 
ms; t(9) = 3.79, p = 0.004, Cohen’s d = 0.52). 
In Experiment 2B, the time point of corrections was affected by whether subjects 
approached or avoided the target (Movement type, F(1, 8) = 11.34, p = 0.008, η
2
p = 0.58), and 
by the side they had to reach to (Side, F(1, 8) = 19.65, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.68). Corrections 
occurred earlier when approaching targets compared to avoidance (approach: 186 ± 17 ms, 
avoidance: 237 ± 14 ms; t(8) = −3.09, p = 0.009, Cohen’s d = -1.32), and when reaching 
towards targets on the right relative to the left (left: 238 ± 12 ms, right: 196 ± 15 ms; t(8) = 
3.36, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = 1.36). 
In sum, the kinematic results indicate an influence of the type of movement made 
(approach vs. avoid) and the biophysical properties of the arm (moving to the left vs. right). 
These results did not differ from the valence results above demonstrating that the arousal 
of the pictures also does not have an influence on early and late processes.  
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6.4.2.3.3. Effects of Arousal on accuracy, precision and the angle  
 
Accuracy of reaching: Euclidean distance of the endpoint from the target 
In Experiment 2A, the accuracy of reaching was affected by whether subjects 
approached or avoided and by the side they had to move to (Figure 6.19; Movement 
type*Side, F(1, 10) = 40.73, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.82). When approaching, endpoints were closer to 
the target when moving to the left compared to the right (left: 20 ± 2 mm, right: 39 ± 4 mm; 
t(10) = −4.73, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.59). However, when avoiding, there was no difference 
in the accuracy between left and right targets.  
 
Figure 6.19. Influence of movement type on reaching accuracy. 
Accuracy was greater when reaching to the left than to the right 
when approaching. Error bars (+1 S.E.M.); ** significant at the p 
<0.001 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accuracy was also affected by whether participants approached or avoided 
(Movement type, F(1, 10) = 39.15, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.81) and by the side of the movement 
(Side, F(1, 10) = 11.28, p = 0.008, η
2
p = 0.56). Endpoints were closer when subjects avoided 
compared to approach (approach: 29 ± 2 mm, avoidance: 21 ± 1 mm; t(10) = 6.01, p < 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.01). Equally, endpoints were closer to the target when participants reached to 
the left compared to the right (left: 20 ± 2 mm, right: 30 ± 3 mm; t(10) = −3.33, p = 0.009, 
Cohen’s d = -1.18). 
In Experiment 2B, accuracy was affected by approaching or avoiding (Movement 
type, F(1, 8) = 137.75, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.95). Endpoints were closer to the target when 
subjects approached compared to avoid (approach: 30 ± 3 mm, avoidance: 22 ± 3 mm; t(8) = 
12.38, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 4.52). This effect was qualified by a combined effect of both 
the movement type and the side (Movement type*Side, F(1, 8) = 74.77, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.90). 
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When approaching, accuracy was better when moving to the left than to the right (left: 22 ± 
4 mm, right: 39 ± 3 mm; t(8) = −3.71, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = -1.22). However, when avoiding, 
there was no difference in accuracy between left and right targets.  
   
Precision of reaching: area of the ellipse  
In Experiment 2A, precision was influenced by the side to which movement had to 
be made (Side, (F(1, 10) = 5.20, p = 0.049, η
2
p = 0.37). The area was smaller when reaching 
toward left targets compared to right (left: 562 ± 94 mm2, right: 806 ± 131 mm2; t(9) = -
2.28, p = 0.049, Cohen’s d = -0.77). Thus, participants were more precise in correcting when 
approaching targets relative to avoiding the targets, and more precise when reaching to left 
targets, the latter possibly as a result of the biophysical properties of the arm. For 
illustration purposes, Figure 6.20A shows ellipses fitted around the mean endpoints for high 
and low arousal for Expt2A.  
 
   Figure 6.20. Precision of reaching as a function of the arousal of the emotional picture. A) Ellipses fitted 
over the mean endpoint distribution for all subjects in Expt 2A.Reaching was more precise when reaching to the 
left than to the right. B) Ellipses for Expt 2B. There was no effect of low (blue dots) or high (red dots) arousal on 
reaching precision. Like for valence, reaching appeared to be more precise for Expt 2B than 2A.  
 
In Experiment 2B, there was no effect of arousal, movement type or the side on the 
area of the ellipse around the endpoint distribution. Precision, however, did appear to be 
better in Expt 2B than 2A (Figure 6.20B).   
 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Six 
259 
 
Orientation of the spread of the endpoints: angle of the ellipse 
 
 In Experiment 2A, angle was influenced by approaching and avoiding and the side of 
reaching for the target (Movement type*Side, (F(1, 10) = 12.49, p = 0.006, η
2
p = 0.58). When 
approaching, there was no difference in the angle between left and right targets. When 
avoiding, the angle of the ellipse was more negative when moving to the right compared to 
the left (left: 0.80 ± 8.94 deg, right: -38.20 ± 10.21 deg; t(10) = 3.33, p = 0.009, Cohen’s d = 
1.06).  
Similarly, in Experiment 2B, there was an effect of both approach and avoidance and 
the side of reaching for the target (Movement type*Side, (F(1, 8) = 7.43, p = 0.026, η
2
p = 0.48). 
When approaching, there was no difference in the angle between left and right targets. 
When avoiding, the angle of the ellipse was more negative when moving to the right 
compared to the left (left: 15.50 ± 12.36 deg, right: -35.51 ± 9.99 deg; t(8) = 3.32, p = 0.011, 
Cohen’s d = 1.11). 
To sum up, accuracy, precision and the orientation of the spread of the endpoints 
were influenced by the type of movement made and the biophysics of the arm but not by 
arousal. Arousal therefore did not impact early or late processes in visuomotor corrections.  
 
6.4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated the influence of valence automaticity on visuomotor 
automaticity. Using a design in which participants made approach and avoidance actions in 
response to emotional target “jumps”, it was expected that emotional pictures and their 
associated response tendencies would influence the speed of visuomotor corrections, in 
addition to influencing other movement kinematics. The timing of when participants made 
movement corrections was expected to reveal possible underlying fast or slow mechanisms 
driving emotional influences.  
Two experiments were conducted to assess if action execution and motor re-
planning are influenced by approach-avoidance tendencies. In the first experiment, the 
target jumped after movement initiation, and in the second experiment the target jumped 
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before movement initiation. In the former, there was no planning prior to movement 
initiation, whereas in the latter participants planned corrections prior to initiation. 
Corrections were expected to be more attenuated in the second experiment. Surprisingly, 
irrespective of these planning differences, both experiments revealed that correcting 
towards new targets occurs earlier than correcting away from new targets, demonstrating 
fast and slow mechanisms underlying reaching corrections that are independent of planning 
processes. Importantly, there was an influence of emotional valence on visuomotor 
corrections and on the accuracy of reaching. Overall, valence automaticity did not influence 
visuomotor automaticity, confirming the results from Experiment 1.  
 
Valence only affects the kinematics of movements initiated after the presentation of the 
emotional picture  
The current results demonstrate that emotional valence, but not approach-
avoidance tendencies, influence the updating of motor plans. However, unlike in 
Experiment 1, emotional valence did not influence movement kinematics when reaching 
was initiated before the appearance of the emotional stimulus. Instead, temporal 
characteristics were influenced by valence when the emotional picture was presented 
before action initiation. In Expt 2B velocity was greater when presented with positive 
relative to neutral pictures, irrespective of moving towards or away. Valence therefore 
appeared to influence motor planning that took place prior to movement initiation, 
supporting previous work (de Oliveira et al., 2012; Esteves et al., 2016).  
Speculatively, because participants made reaching movements towards the screen, 
and therefore in the direction of the emotional stimuli, movements may have been faster 
due to underlying approach tendencies associated to positive stimuli. Indeed, recent 
evidence has shown that peak velocity is higher when approaching positive stimuli relative 
to neutral or negative (Esteves et al., 2016). Similarly, it has been demonstrated that 
participants are faster to move in positive contexts (Albert et al., 2010; Chiu et al., 2014). 
Thus, faster movements when positive pictures were shown suggest that positive contexts 
are conducive to faster movement execution, but only when valence is incorporated into 
the movement plan prior to initiation. Positive pictures therefore influenced the planning of 
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reaching movements prior to their initiation, demonstrating an effect of valence on motor 
planning. This result is supportive of Chapter Four, which demonstrated a valence effect on 
the planning of action parameters prior to action execution, and goes against previous work 
that had demonstrated that movement execution is not influenced by the valence of stimuli 
presented before action initiation (Coombes et al., 2006; Stins et al., 2015). 
 
Early versus late trajectory corrections are influenced by emotional valence   
One of the main goals of this experiment was to determine if emotional approach-
avoidance tendencies influenced the speed of visuomotor corrections. According to 
previous work (Day and Lyon, 2000), the timing of when these corrections occur should 
reveal differences between underlying fast and slow mechanisms. Indeed, both experiments 
showed that corrections occurred earlier when participants moved towards targets 
compared to when they moved in the opposite direction, irrespective of valence. This 
suggests that reaching movement is under the control of two mechanisms: a fast and highly 
automatic process and slower, less automatic process that can be modified by the subjects’ 
intention (Pisella et al., 2000; Striemer et al., 2010).  
Unlike the predictions, these fast and slow mechanisms were not influenced by 
approach-avoidance tendencies, even when pictures were presented before the initiation of 
movement. In contrast, there was a potential valence effect that suggested that corrections 
to approach when presented with emotional pictures were faster than corrections to avoid. 
Crucially, this difference was not present when neutral pictures were shown. Speculatively, 
faster approach than avoidance when presented with emotional pictures may be driven by 
the fast prioritisation of emotional information relative to neutral information even when it 
is task-irrelevant (Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Given that the earliest 
visuomotor corrections towards a stimulus occurred at around 200 ms, by this time 
emotional information was fully processed (Olofsson et al., 2008) and top-down attentional 
mechanisms (Pessoa et al., 2002) may have been employed to guide faster corrections to 
approach compared to avoidance.  
 Indeed, top-down attentional mechanisms have been suggested to play a role in 
guiding the fast and slow responses in visuomotor corrections (Day & Lyon, 2000). This 
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attentional model suggests that moving to a target engages and locks attention, whereas 
moving away from a target requires inhibiting this attention shift and redirecting it to the 
opposite location of the target (Tipper et al., 1998). If emotional pictures are prioritised, it 
may be possible that emotional stimuli facilitated the “locking in” of attention to the new 
target and disrupted inhibition when moving away from the new target. In contrast to 
models proposing the existence of fast or slow pathways guiding visuomotor corrections, 
attentional models suggest the existence of fast and slow responses under one unified top-
down single pathway (Day & Lyon, 2000; Tipper et al., 1997). Interestingly, this effect of 
valence was not present when the emotional picture was presented prior to the initiation of 
movement. In this case, motor planning had already occurred, meaning there was no need 
for attentional prioritisation during an on-going movement because participants had already 
been exposed to the emotional information. Emotional valence therefore influences 
visuomotor automaticity via attentional prioritisation during, but not prior to, action 
execution, supporting attentional models guiding visuomotor corrections (Day & Lyon, 2000; 
Tipper et al., 1998).  
Despite the results being similar for both experiments, it is clear that movements 
made towards or away from new targets were more direct in Expt 2B, with less dragging of 
the arm towards the central target, as had also been observed in Day & Lyon (2000). 
Furthermore, movement corrections were numerically faster in Expt 2B than 2A. These 
discrepancies in trajectory and timing of corrections are not surprising given that in Expt 2B 
participants began the movement after the target jump and could plan a movement to the 
respective target area in advance, whereas in Expt 2A participants had planned a movement 
to the central target before knowing where they would have to move to. Thus, the timing of 
when this target jump occurs (before or after movement initiation) reveals differences in 
motor planning. This difference however, did not seem to impact the fact that deviations 
made towards targets occurred earlier than those away from the targets, suggesting that 
irrespective of when the target jump occurs, the same visuomotor process was available for 
both tasks, although the strength of this process may be task-dependent.  
Thus, the data are supportive of attentional models (Rushworth et al., 1997; Tipper 
et al., 1998) that show that top-down attentional mechanisms are responsible for guiding 
visuomotor corrections. Importantly, these attentional mechanisms appear to be enhanced 
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in emotional contexts. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first evidence of a link 
between emotional information and the speed of visuomotor corrections, indicating an 
influence of emotional valence on mechanisms underlying motor updating during action 
execution.    
 
Reaching accuracy may be influenced by valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies  
There was an effect of valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies on accuracy, 
with better accuracy when approaching in low threat (i.e. positive and neutral) situations 
compared to when negative pictures were presented. Like in Experiment 1, the end stage of 
the movement was influenced by valence. Better accuracy in low-threat contexts may be 
explained by two possible mechanisms. Firstly, negative pictures may have caused response 
interference and disrupted accuracy due to threatening visual information capturing 
attention and consuming resources for completing the task (Erthal et al., 2005; Hartikainen 
et al., 2000; Hartikainen, Siiskonen, & Ogawa, 2012). Secondly, moving towards the screen 
in low threatening contexts may have been compatible with tendencies associated to 
positive stimuli, leading to more accurate movements. Thus, these results suggest a possible 
effect of approach tendencies on the end stage of reaching. Moving towards positive stimuli 
is predisposed, whereas approaching is incongruent negative stimuli. The lack of accuracy 
when approaching could reflect an underlying avoidance tendency during negative contexts. 
Overall, the end stage of a reaching movement may be susceptible to a top-down 
attentional effect guided by approach-avoidance tendencies.  
Moving towards targets was more accurate and precise than when moving in the 
opposite direction. Thus, even though moving towards targets is considered a fast and 
automatically guided mechanism (Day & Lyon, 2000), it produced more accurate 
movements towards the targets in comparison to movements entirely controlled by the 
participants’ intention to move in the opposite direction. This could be related to the 
uncertainty of moving away. Moving to a target is more certain because feedback 
mechanisms know the exact location to where the finger needs to move to. Instead, moving 
in the opposite direction requires redirecting attention, which is slower and introduces 
uncertainty into the movement. That is, the subject is not entirely sure of where the finger is 
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going to land because they need to redirect attention away from the new target. Indeed, 
feedback mechanisms inform of the location of the arm in space which is used to estimate 
the endpoint relative to the target location (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000). If the finger is far 
away from the location to where it needs to move to (as is the case in the away condition), 
the comparison between the endpoint and the new target location introduces uncertainty 
which biases the estimation of where the finger needs to land. The delay in correcting to the 
opposite direction of the target, combined with decreased precision and accuracy of the 
endpoints, suggests that moving away was under the influence of high uncertainty and was 
counterintuitive to reaching towards.  
 
Alternative influences on reaching 
In both experiments, accuracy and precision were better when moving to left targets 
compared to right targets, suggesting that moving to the left was biomechanically easier to 
make with the right arm (Cos et al., 2011; Cos et al., 2014; Hogan, 1985). Because the target 
jump occurred after movement initiation in Expt 2A, it suggests that biomechanical costs 
appear to be incorporated into feedback mechanisms during visuomotor corrections. 
Biomechanical costs are incorporated into the decision-making process before movement 
initiation (Cos et al., 2014; Marcos et al., 2015). However, to my knowledge, there is no 
evidence showing that biomechanical costs are incorporated into feedback mechanisms 
during ongoing movement.  
Furthermore, in both experiments, participants initiated a movement correction to 
the right approximately 30 seconds before a correction to the left. This result corroborates 
previous evidence showing that corrections made to right targets occur roughly 18 ms 
before corrections made to left targets showing that moving to the right is faster than 
moving to the left (Day & Lyon, 2000; Welsh & Elliott, 2004). Evidence for this delay is also 
observed when looking at the raw trajectory corrections from the control condition (Figure 
6.15), in which corrections made to the right occurred earlier than corrections to the left. 
Such discrepancies are due to a delay in the transfer of information between hemispheres. 
When the target jumped to the left, the right visual field would have detected this jump. All 
subjects reached with their right arm and therefore a jump to the left would have required 
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information to be transferred from the right to the left hemisphere in order to guide the 
right arm. These results highlight the importance of considering arm properties in the 
experimental design. This problem has been largely ignored by the reaching literature, as 
most reaching studies typically only use one arm for reaching and do not incorporate the 
location of the targets into their analyses. To truly control for this issue, an additional 
control group reaching with their left arm should have been used. 
In sum, Experiment 2 replicated previous work showing that reaching movements 
can be influenced by fast and slow mechanisms (Day & Lyon, 2000; Day & Brown, 2001) and 
by the biophysical properties of the arm (Hogan, 1985). There was an influence of valence 
on visuomotor automaticity, with emotional stimuli influencing top-down attentional 
mechanisms engaged in driving fast and slow visuomotor corrections. Furthermore, there 
was an effect of approach-avoidance tendencies on the end stage of a movement, possibly 
guided by approach-avoidance tendencies. As was the case with Experiment 1, there was no 
evidence for an influence of valence automaticity on visuomotor automaticity. 
 
6.5. General Discussion 
This chapter aimed to shed light on the influence of emotional approach-avoidance 
tendencies on the ability to update motor plans in the face of ever changing environments. 
More specifically, I investigated whether approach-avoidance emotional tendencies (i.e. 
valence automaticity) influenced fast and slow pathways involved in correcting movements 
during action execution (i.e. visuomotor automaticity).  
Two experiments were conducted to determine this influence. Both experiments 
demonstrated that emotional valence, but not their related approach-avoidance tendencies, 
influenced the latter stages of reaching, indicating a possible top-down influence of emotion 
on action execution. Importantly, Experiment 2 showed that emotional valence, but not 
emotional tendencies, influenced visuomotor automaticity. Thus, the main contribution of 
this chapter was to show that emotional valence influences top-down attentional 
mechanisms involved in motor updating during action execution and confirm that approach-
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avoidance tendencies do not influence action execution and on-going motor planning, 
supporting Chapter Four.  
 
Valence automaticity does not influence visuomotor automaticity 
There was no influence of valence-related approach-avoidance tendencies on 
mechanisms underlying motor updating. This suggests that approach-avoidance tendencies 
are limited to influencing action selection and do not influence feedback mechanisms 
involved in guiding visuomotor updating during execution. The current experiments are 
supportive of evidence demonstrating no effect of emotions and their related approach-
avoidance tendencies on the execution of actions (Coombes et al., 2007; Stins et al., 2011) 
and argue against previous suggestions of a possible influence of emotional tendencies on 
action execution (Esteves et al., 2016; Stins et al., 2015).  
A possible reason for a lack of an effect of valence automaticity may be because in 
both experiments, participants did not form the explicit goal to approach or avoid the 
emotional stimulus. Thus, emotional pictures were considered task-irrelevant and 
participants did not apply the task-instructions to emotional information. Common-coding 
models had suggested that approach-avoidance tendencies arise not from the evaluation of 
the stimulus but as a result of intended action effects which consequently triggers the 
action most suited to achieve the goal (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Eder & Hommel, 2011; 
Hommel et al., 2001; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). A specific goal to approach a stimulus may 
activate a positive code which will overlap with the code for a positive stimulus. This overlap 
on the codes is what ultimately leads to one action being faster than another. Thus, goals 
are formed by contextual requirements such as, for example, task-instructions.  
In Experiment 1 participants formed a goal about moving towards the target and the 
emotional stimulus was presented as a task-irrelevant distractor. Thus, individuals were not 
instructed to respond to the emotional distractor. Indeed, previous work has suggested that 
for emotional distractors to have an impact on task performance they necessarily need to 
be task relevant (Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik, & Safadi, 2012; Okon-Singer, Tzelgov, & Henik, 
2007). In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to approach or avoid non-emotional 
targets paired with emotional information. The task instructions did not explicitly state to 
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approach or avoid emotional stimuli and therefore individuals did not form approach-
avoidance goals.  
The current results are therefore supportive of common-coding models (Lavender & 
Hommel, 2007) by highlighting the importance of task-instructions in triggering approach-
avoidance tendencies. These data are also supportive of Chapter Three which had already 
demonstrated that task-instructions are needed for eliciting approach-avoidance, in support 
of other work (Liefooghe et al., 2012; Waszak et al., 2013) and that there are no implicit 
effects of such tendencies on action selection. This chapter confirms that emotional 
approach-avoidance tendencies do not (implicitly) influence action execution. Valence 
automaticity and visuomotor automaticity therefore appear to be independent processes.  
 
Emotional valence influences action execution via top-down mechanisms 
Both experiments provided evidence for an influence of valence on the later stage of 
the reaching movement, when emotional content was likely to have already been 
processed. Emotional stimuli therefore did not influence execution via fast, bottom-up 
processes, but instead biased motor updating through slower, top-down influences (Pessoa 
et al., 2002). Furthermore, the effect of emotional valence on the latter part of movement 
suggests that awareness of the emotional stimulus was necessary to update motor plans. 
Work has demonstrated that emotional information is typically processed 100-200 ms after 
it is initially presented (Olofsson et al., 2008; Oya et al., 2002; Pizzagalli et al., 1999). If 
movement times for both experiments were between 350-450 ms, it is highly likely that 
later stages of reaching movements were influenced by the conscious evaluation of the 
emotional pictures. The processing of emotional information was likely mediated via 
conscious, top-down attentional processes (Pessoa et al., 2002; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2011).  
Importantly, emotional valence interacts with visuomotor automaticity and 
influences the speed of fast and slow responses, most likely via a higher-order attentional 
mechanism. This is supportive of the single pathway model proposed by Day & Lyon (2000) 
whereby discrepancies between early vs. late corrections are guided by the extra time taken 
for top-down areas to overcome the initial attention directed to the new target and redirect 
attention to move in the opposite direction, resulting in slower corrections (Tipper et al., 
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1998; Welsh & Elliot, 2004; Welsh, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2007). Importantly, these 
attentional mechanisms are influenced by the prioritisation of emotional stimuli 
(Vuilleumier et al. 2001; Ohman et al. 2001; Pessoa et al. 2002), which facilitated the 
“locking in” of attention to the new target and disrupted attentional inhibition when moving 
away from the new target. For instance, in Experiment 2 when moving towards the new 
target location there was no competition for attention and attention was automatically 
directed towards the new stimulus, facilitated by emotional content. In contrast, in the 
avoidance condition, participants moved away from the new target, therefore creating a 
new competing target located in the opposite direction. The target with emotional content 
becomes the non-target, whereas the target in the opposite direction is upgraded to target 
status. Thus, when moving away we have a target and non-target competing with each 
other, and this requires that the attention initially directed to emotional content is inhibited 
and redirected to the new target. Due to prioritisation, this process was disrupted. 
Furthermore, the effects observed were present even when the target jump occurred 
before the initiation of arm reaching (Expt 2B) and when motor planning to the new target 
was most likely complete, supporting the attentional model.  
Contrary to Experiment 2, in Experiment 1 only one target was presented at a time. 
However, emotional distractors (i.e. non-target stimuli) were presented in the periphery, 
possibly creating competition with the actual target. Indeed, because emotional distractors 
were prioritised by attention, a higher degree of top-down control was necessary to 
suppress the tendency to move to the competing distractor. The completeness of the 
inhibitory process is what determines if trajectories deviate towards or away from a 
distractor (Welsh & Elliott, 2004). In this case trajectories ended up further away from the 
target than was originally intended (Tipper et al., 1997).  
In sum, the data support the single-pathway model whereby higher-order 
attentional mechanisms guide visuomotor corrections and bias the end stage of reaching 
movements. Importantly, emotional stimuli appear to interact with how fast this attentional 
mechanism is deployed as a result of prioritisation of emotional information. Emotional 
valence therefore influences feedback mechanisms during motor updating. Moreover, the 
lack of an influence of approach-avoidance tendencies suggests that, despite emotional 
content being consciously perceived, approach-avoidance tendencies were not incidental.  
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Conclusion  
In sum, this chapter aimed to demonstrate in a novel manner whether emotional 
approach-avoidance tendencies influence motor re-planning during action execution. More 
specifically, do automatic predisposed tendencies influence the fast and slow mechanisms 
underlying visually guided movement? The data from both experiments showed that motor 
plans are updated by a top-down, attentional mechanism (Tipper et al., 1997, 1998) that 
serves to direct attention to competing targets during execution. These attentional 
mechanisms are influenced by the prioritisation emotional information relative to neutral 
stimuli and by conscious awareness of the emotional content of the stimuli. Approach-
avoidance tendencies did not implicitly influence mechanisms underlying visuomotor 
corrections, demonstrating independence between these processes. Overall, the results 
show that emotional stimuli impact action execution and suggest that mechanisms 
underlying emotional processing and online motor updating are not independent from each 
other.  
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7. Chapter Seven. Discussion 
 In this section, I will discuss how the above experiments have contributed to our 
understanding of how emotion and motor processes interact. More specifically, the main 
goal of this thesis was to determine the influence that emotional approach-avoidance 
tendencies have on different motor stages, from action selection and planning to action 
execution, and whether the conscious evaluation of emotional stimuli is necessary for these 
tendencies to impact movement generation. In the following, I discuss the significance of 
the current work, highlight outstanding questions and future experiments that could be 
conducted to add to the above evidence. I also speculate on clinical applications of the 
studies in this thesis.  
 
7.1. Approach-avoidance tendencies and emotional context flexibly influence action 
selection  
 The generation of movement is constituted of two separate phases: the “what” 
phase, concerned with the selection of a motor goal, and the “how” phase, which 
determines the selection and specification of an action that will fulfil the motor goal (Cisek 
& Kalaska, 2010; Wong et al., 2015; Zhu & Thagard, 2002). What determines how actions 
are selected to approach and avoid emotional stimuli remains the subject of much debate. 
For instance, previous work has suggested that such actions are selected in a hardwired 
manner, independent of context and tied to specific arm movements which activate certain 
muscle groups (e.g. pulling/muscle flexion to approach a positive stimulus) (Cacciopo et al. 
1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999). In contrast, approach-avoidance may be goal-directed (Eder & 
Rothermund, 2008; Eder & Klauer, 2009; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Markman and Brendl, 
2005), activated as a function of the task instructions and contextual demands (i.e. the 
reference-frame; should I move away from the stimulus or move the stimulus away from 
me?). Chapter Two contrasted these proposals to determine how selection of approach-
avoidance actions occurs. This work was motivated by the observation that the idea that 
emotional actions are selected according to specific movements that activate certain muscle 
groups, such as those used for pulling (i.e. flexion) and pushing (i.e. extension), seemed too 
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rigid and incompatible with the idea of a flexible motor system that responds to different 
contexts and updates itself as the environment changes, as proposed by the affordance 
competition hypothesis (ACH; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). Although previous work 
had already suggested that approach and avoidance are not tied to specific arm movements 
(Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004), the determinant factors in the 
selection of such actions remained unknown.  
 Chapter Two demonstrated that selection of approach-avoidance actions is 
influenced by both the reference-frame and approach-avoidance tendencies. That is, the 
goal to approach and avoid was determined by whether an agent moved relative to an 
emotional stimulus or whether the stimulus moved relative to the agent, and by approach-
avoidance emotional tendencies. How fast this goal was determined influenced the speed of 
action selection and initiation, with faster actions to approach positive and avoid negative 
stimuli. Crucially, action selection could not be explained by specific arm movements or 
muscle groups.  
 The evidence presented here supports ecological and flexible frameworks that 
consider the numerous possibilities for action in a given environment, such as the ACH 
(Cisek & Kalaska, 2010), and proposals that the evaluation of action goals and anticipated 
consequences determine approach-avoidance behaviour (Eder & Rothermund, 2008, Eder & 
Klauer, 2009; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). This “evaluative-coding” framework (Eder & 
Klauer, 2009; Lavender & Hommel, 2007) postulates that both the emotional stimulus 
presented and the goal have an affective coding (e.g. a positive stimulus and an approach 
goal coded positively). When these codes are compatible, a faster response will occur. For 
example, an action “towards”, such as moving the self towards a stimulus, is in itself 
associated with a positive valence. When the goal is a positive stimulus, the shared positive 
coding of the stimulus and the action goal will lead to faster selection of approach. Thus, 
there is an overlap between perceptual and action codes. The work presented here provides 
some critical reappraisal of the long standing idea that approach-avoidance tendencies are 
‘hardwired’. I thus confirmed the concept of flexible approach-avoidance actions: an 
identical action (e.g. towards/approach) can be positively or negatively coded depending on 
the valence of the stimulus and the context in which action is executed.  
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Importantly, while evaluative-coding frameworks had suggested that task 
instructions and goals determine affective coding, it had not been demonstrated that 
affective coding of actions is also determined by the reference-frame. What the work 
presented here adds to current theory is that the reference-frame is an important 
determinant of the context of behaviour and actions goals, and that approach-avoidance 
tendencies interact with the context. Since this work was published (Saraiva et al. 2013), 
other chapters (Chapters Three, Four and Five) have shown similar results (Table 7.1) and 
other studies have confirmed the flexibility of approach-avoidance actions in emotional 
situations (Beatty, Cranley, Carnaby, & Janelle, 2016; Eder, Rothermund, & Hommel, 2016; 
Laham, Kashima, Dix, & Wheeler, 2015; Ly, Huys, Stins, Roelofs, & Cools, 2014; Phaf, Mohr, 
Rotteveel, & Wicherts, 2014; Rotteveel et al., 2015).   
 
 Approach Avoid Pos-Neg RT 
Difference 
Negative Positive Negative Positive App Avoid 
Chapter  
Two 
Object Ref. 692 ± 24 655 ± 21 671 ± 24 703 ± 23 -37 32 
Self Ref. 668 ± 25 639 ± 20 673 ± 23 703 ± 23 -29 30 
Chapter Three 628 ± 16 587 ± 14 650 ± 16 663 ± 16 -41 13 
Chapter Four 735 ± 19 721 ± 19 769 ± 23 803 ± 22 -14 34 
Chapter Five 601 ± 19 578 ± 16 609 ± 19 630 ± 16 -23 21 
Table 7.1. Effects of approach-avoidance tendencies on action selection. Reaction times for approaching and 
avoiding positive and negative stimuli across four chapters. When participants were required to approach 
positive stimuli, RTs were always significantly faster than when approaching negative stimuli. When 
participants initiated avoidance for negative stimuli, RTs were significantly faster than avoiding positive stimuli. 
This effect was consistent and significant across different experiments, showcasing the replicability of this 
result. Approach-avoidance tendencies influence the speed of action selection and initiation. All RTs are 
presented in ms ± 1 S.E.M. 
 
Selecting approach-avoidance: interactions between top-down and bottom-up processes? 
The current work supports the idea that approach-avoidance behaviour is 
predisposed and goal-directed, suggesting that approach-avoidance selection is not a purely 
“bottom-up” driven process, but that top-down areas are also involved. Thus, while the 
current data do not question the role that bottom-up, subcortical areas such as the 
amygdala and the basal ganglia play in triggering fast reactions to emotional stimuli, as has 
been shown previously (LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Rolls, 1999), they do suggest the involvement 
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of top-down cortical areas in approach-avoidance behaviour. Speculatively, it is possible 
that in some emotional situations the influence from top-down areas is weaker, for instance 
in contexts where fast and urgent action is required to an unexpected threatening stimulus. 
In contrast, other situations that are deemed less urgent, such as avoiding a small spider on 
the ceiling, top-down areas evaluate contextual demands and “overrule” bottom-up 
processes. Some work has shown support for this. For instance, the OFC is activated during 
the selection of valence-related approach-avoidance actions, demonstrating that this area is 
essential to override predisposed response tendencies and guide the selection of actions 
contrary to these tendencies (Roelofs et al., 2009). Similarly, other studies have shown that 
the OFC is involved in overriding learned reward associations (Elliott et al., 2000; Rushworth 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, other work showed that disruption to the anterior PFC using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation impaired the correct selection, and subsequent initiation, 
of approach-avoidance actions (Volman et al., 2011, 2016). Although I can only speculate 
from behavioural data, top-down areas involved in higher-order control appear to be 
involved in the selection of approach and avoidance. Top-down and bottom-up areas may 
therefore interact to bias the selection of actions in emotional contexts, in support of the 
ACH.  
 
Action selection in emotional contexts: is the level of threat important?  
 Action selection of approach-avoidance actions is now thought of as flexible, goal-
directed and contextually driven process (Beatty et al., 2016; Lang & Bradley, 2013; Laham 
et al., 2015; Ly et al., 2014; Phaf et al., 2014). Some open questions do arise. Work has 
suggested that stimuli should be categorised according to their level of threat (Fanselow, 
1994; Pessoa, 2009). The “predatory imminence continuum” model, for instance, suggests 
that according to the level and type of threat of a negative stimulus, action selection will 
transition from passive immobility to active fight-or-flight responses (Fanselow, 1994). More 
recent work suggested a spectrum in which positive and neutral stimuli are considered low-
threat, and high-arousing negative stimuli are considered high-threat (Pessoa et al., 2009). 
Thus, taking into consideration the extremes of a threat spectrum (i.e. only positive and 
negative) may be insufficient to understand action selection in emotional contexts. If we 
were to categorise emotional valence according to this spectrum, and approach-avoidance 
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tendencies were to be guided by the level of threat, both positive and neutral stimuli may 
lead to the faster selection of approach compared to negative stimuli. Moreover, 
contextualising stimuli according to their level of threat may also address the range of 
defensive responses associated to negative stimuli, whereby both approach and avoidance 
can be triggered depending on the negative content. To my knowledge, the influence of the 
level of threat on the selection of approach-avoidance tendencies remains undetermined. It 
would be interesting to see if task instructions which refer to positive and neutral stimuli as 
“low-threat” and negative as “high-threat” might influence selection. If neutral stimuli do 
not impact approach-avoidance, then it would confirm that approach-avoidance tendencies 
are valence related and not classified according to the level of threat.  
 
7.2. Emotional valence impacts different stages of motor processing 
 The “how” phase of movement generation is divided into two processes: action 
selection and movement planning. Movement planning is the process that establishes the 
parameters that define how a movement is executed and a goal is achieved (Desmurget et 
al., 1999; Marteniuk, 1987; Paulignan et al., 1997; Wong et al., 2015). However, in the face 
of ever-changing environments, these parameters may sometimes need to be updated in 
real time throughout execution to accommodate new goals and opportunities and ensure 
successful behaviour (Desmurget et al., 1999; Goodale et al., 1986). Thus, we have two 
interrelated yet individual motor processes (i.e. motor planning and action execution) that 
may be biased by approach-avoidance tendencies in order to ensure appropriate behaviour.   
In the previous section I demonstrated that that the selection and initiation of 
actions is influenced by the reference-frame and by approach-avoidance response 
tendencies. Some models postulate that selection, movement planning and the re-planning 
of actions during execution are separate processes that work in parallel and rely on the 
same sensory information from the environment (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). This 
parallel processing is important because it essentially suggests that while these processes 
have different underlying mechanisms, information that biases one process may also bias 
other processes. For instance, we may be faster at selecting, planning and executing 
approach actions to positive stimuli compared to negative stimuli. Some recent evidence 
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has supported this idea by demonstrating that the speed of executing approach-avoidance 
actions is influenced by the valence of the stimulus, showing effects on motor planning 
(Esteves et al. 2016). To this end, the influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on motor 
planning and the updating of motor plans was investigated in two chapters. Chapter Four 
examined biases on motor planning by investigating vigour, that is, the effort expended 
once an action has been initiated in order to achieve a desirable outcome (Niv et al., 2007). 
Chapter Six examined if emotional changes in the environment influenced the updating of 
motor plans while executing actions. In addition, biases of approach-avoidance tendencies 
were also investigated on the ability to suppress actions that are no longer appropriate or 
advantageous (Aron et al. 2007; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Just like planning and 
execution, it was postulated that approach-avoidance tendencies would have an influence 
on response inhibition. Chapter Five examined this.  
 
 Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Six 
Max Force Speed of Inhibition  Area under curve Precision  
Negative 76.3 ± 4.4 319 ± 40 ms 37382 ± 1993 mm
2 1260 ± 101 mm2 
Positive 74.7 ± 4.4 431 ± 43 ms 36630 ± 1878 mm
2 1279 ± 94 mm2 
Neutral -- 416 ± 42 ms -- 1303 ± 93 mm
2 
Table 7.2. Effects of emotional valence on motor processes after action selection. Approach-avoidance 
tendencies did not influence motor planning or action execution. In Chapter Four, participants made more 
effort (i.e. pressed harder) when presented with negative relative to positive stimuli. In Chapter Five, 
participants were faster to inhibit their responses (i.e. faster SSRTs) when presented with negative relative to 
positive and neutral stimuli. In Chapter Six, reaching trajectories and precision were affected by valence. 
Trajectory deviations (i.e. area under the curve) were significantly larger when presented with negative 
relative to positive stimuli. Precision (i.e. endpoint area) was significantly better for negative relative to 
positive and neutral stimuli. Emotional valence therefore appears to influence performance once a decision to 
approach or avoid has been made.  
 
All three chapters show an effect of emotional valence on different motor processes 
(Table 7.2). In contrast, there were no effects of approach-avoidance tendencies. Chapter 
Four demonstrated that vigour was greater and less variable in negative relative to positive 
contexts, suggesting that motor planning prior to movement initiation is biased by negative 
valence. Similarly, Chapter Six established an effect of valence on the late phase of reaching, 
affecting the accuracy and precision of movement. For instance, Experiment 1 showed that 
negative distractors caused larger late movement deviations relative to positive and neutral 
stimuli, and that emotional distractors increased the accuracy and precision of reaching 
Ana Carolina Saraiva  Chapter Seven 
276 
 
relative to neutral ones. Experiment 2 showed that visuomotor corrections were faster 
when targets were paired with positive and negative pictures, and that accuracy was better 
when presented with positive and neutral relative to negative stimuli. In Chapter Five 
stopping processes were influenced by negative stimuli but not by positive or neutral 
stimuli. Overall, these results show that emotional valence impacts different stages of motor 
processing and suggest that mechanisms underlying emotional processing and motor 
processing are not independent from each other. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first demonstration of the impact of emotional valence on different underlying mechanisms 
of motor processing, confirming a link between emotions and action.  
The results are clear: while emotional valence itself influenced the execution and 
suppression of actions, their associated approach-avoidance tendencies did not. This 
dissociation is important for two reasons. Firstly, the current work appears to have divorced 
the effects of approach-avoidance tendencies on different motor processes, with approach-
avoidance tendencies influencing action selection but not motor planning, action execution 
or response inhibition. This answers the main goal of this thesis: approach-avoidance 
tendencies do not influence all motor processing. To my knowledge, this dissociation has 
not been demonstrated previously. This thesis therefore provides novel insight into the 
mechanisms whereby emotional tendencies are linked to action. Secondly, this work shows 
novel evidence of separable effects of valence and valence-related tendencies. The former 
influences motor planning, action execution and response inhibition whereas the latter only 
influences action selection. This suggests that valence and approach-avoidance tendencies 
do not share the same underlying mechanisms. While this was not a goal of the thesis, the 
experiments were designed in such a way that it allowed dissociating valence from 
emotional tendencies. To my knowledge this is the first demonstration of separable effects 
of valence and response tendencies on different motor stages within the same experiments.  
The lack of any influence of approach-avoidance tendencies on other motor 
processes other than selection is at odds with the ACH (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) 
and evaluative-coding frameworks (Eder & Klauer, 2009; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). The 
ACH postulates that, despite being separate processes with different underlying 
mechanisms, there is parallel processing between action selection, planning and execution 
during behaviour. Furthermore, biases arising from one process should, in principle, 
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influence processes working in parallel. Similarly, evaluative-coding frameworks suggest that 
selection, planning and execution of actions should be facilitated through stimuli they share 
features with (Eder, Müsseler, & Hommel, 2011). Thus, it was expected that any biases on 
selection should also influence the planning and execution of actions. In accordance with 
the model of movement generation (Figure 1.1; Wong et al. 2015), my results suggest that 
approach-avoidance tendencies influence the early formation and generation of goals that 
will subsequently only bias the selection of actions. Any ensuing motor stage may not be 
biased by the generation of these motor goals because presumably the bias will have 
already occurred. For instance, in the current experiments, goals were formed as a function 
of context, and this goal informed which action should be selected. The commitment to 
specific actions was therefore made prior to the involvement of other motor processes, 
such as planning. The current work is supportive of previous work that had dissociated 
effects of approach-avoidance tendencies on action selection and execution (Coombes et 
al., 2007; Stins et al., 2011).  
This possibility may also explain the dissociation between approach-avoidance 
tendencies and valence. Approach-avoidance tendencies are goal-directed (Lang & Bradley, 
2013; Lavender & Hommel, 2007) and only influence action selection, whereas valence itself 
is not goal-directed and instead has a generic effect on actions (Lang et al. 1997). Thus once 
an action has been committed during the selection phase, valence may be capable of 
generically influencing subsequent motor processes irrespective of whether an approach or 
avoidance was chosen. What this evidence suggests is that emotional stimuli do influence a 
variety of motor processes, but this influence is manifested in different ways, with 
emotional approach-avoidance tendencies influencing selection, and emotional valence 
taking over thereafter. There therefore appears to be an “emotion continuum” whereby 
response tendencies and emotional valence work together to inform motor processes 
during emotional behaviour, akin to the “threat continuum” postulated by Fanselow (1994). 
Why should this be the case? Biasing the selection of goals and actions is the first and most 
crucial step in movement generation and therefore it is highly advantageous to be selective 
during this phase. It is here that “what to do” is resolved. However, following selection, 
processes relative to “how to do it” can be unselective because the action itself has already 
been chosen. Any planning or implementation of movement parameters occurs relative to 
the selected action and not to initial biases on goal formation. 
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The main contribution of this thesis is therefore to demonstrate that predisposed 
tendencies do not influence all motor stages, and that valence and approach-avoidance 
tendencies have dissociable effects on motor processing. Some open questions do remain. 
Firstly, given this distinction between approach-avoidance tendencies and valence on motor 
processing, it is necessary to further investigate the point at which this “switch” in influence 
between approach-avoidance tendencies and valence occurs. This would give further insight 
into the different mechanisms whereby emotions and actions are linked. Secondly, it may 
be possible that the lack of effects in subsequent motor stages may be related to 
instructions being exclusive to selection. For example, in Chapter Four participants were not 
instructed to press as hard as possible to approach or avoid an emotional stimulus, 
therefore it was expected that approach-avoidance tendencies would incidentally affect 
force production. However, given the role of goals in approach-avoidance behaviour, it 
would be interesting to see if an effect of such tendencies on vigour would arise if 
individuals are explicitly told to press as hard as possible. This would set a goal during action 
execution. Similarly, in Chapter Six, explicitly instructing participants to approach or avoid 
emotional target jumps may reveal underlying effects of automatic tendencies on the speed 
of visuomotor corrections. Thus, giving participants explicit goals during movement may 
reveal influences of such tendencies on action execution.  
   
7.3. Forming action goals: an automatic process?  
The formation of goals is crucial for informing processes that select actions. In the 
introduction I stated that the “what” phase is concerned with how a motor goal is created, 
whereby stimulus identification and evaluation are necessary to determine the value of a 
stimulus (e.g. good or bad) and what needs to be done to the stimulus (e.g. approach or 
avoid). The deployment of attentional resources plays a fundamental role in this process by 
selecting the object of interest and excluding the surrounding environment, thereby 
increasing the availability of resources necessary for action (Wong et al. 2015). Evidence 
suggests that emotional stimuli may facilitate this process by prioritising the processing of 
emotional relative to non-emotional information (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 
2001).  
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This thesis presents evidence in favour of the prioritisation of emotional information 
(Bradley et al., 1997; Ohman et al., 2001; Pratto & John, 1991; Vuilleumier, 2005; Yiend, 
2010) and of increased perceptual processing of emotional stimuli (Pessoa et al., 2005, 
2002; Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003) relative to 
neutral stimuli. Chapter Five, for example, demonstrated that positive and negative stimuli 
slowed down response initiation compared to neutral stimuli. Similarly, in Chapter Six, 
emotional stimuli but not neutral pictures influenced the speed of visuomotor corrections, 
as well as the accuracy and precision of reaching movements. Thus, it is clear that emotional 
stimuli had an influence on the availability of attentional resources necessary for goal 
formation, which subsequently influenced motor processes. While this result is not novel, it 
corroborates previous work, further indicating the extent of the intricate relationship 
between emotion and action processes.  
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the explicit evaluation of the emotional 
stimulus is essential for the formation of approach-avoidance goals (Eder & Klauer, 2009; 
Eder & Rothermund, 2008). In contrast, others suggest that the automaticity of approach-
avoidance is implicit, without the necessary conscious evaluation of the emotional stimulus 
(Chen & Bargh, 1999; Duckworth et al., 2002; Krieglmeyer et al. 2010). The implicit or 
explicit nature of approach-avoidance biases on different motor stages was investigated as 
an additional goal of this thesis.  
The evidence presented confirms that there are no implicit effects of approach-
avoidance tendencies on any stages of motor processing and that explicit evaluation 
seemed crucial for specifying the goal to approach and avoid. Chapter Three demonstrated 
that explicit task instructions override implicit approach-avoidance tendencies: task-
irrelevant subliminal and supraliminal emotional primes did not implicitly elicit approach-
avoidance tendencies. Instead, task instructions related to approach and avoidance goals 
dictated which actions were initiated by the prime and the target. This was also 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, which determined that the evaluation of the content of a 
negative stimulus was critical for eliciting approach or avoidance. Furthermore, experiment 
two in Chapter Five showed that when task instructions were not relevant to emotional 
stimuli, approach-avoidance preparatory processes were not influenced. Similarly, in both 
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experiments in Chapter Six task-irrelevant emotional distractors failed to implicitly elicit 
approach-avoidance tendencies.  
Taken together, this evidence shows that for approach and avoidance to be elicited, 
there first needs to be the conscious evaluation of the emotional stimulus, followed by the 
explicit intention to approach or avoid. Despite previous work suggesting that action 
selection is only influenced by response tendencies when there is an explicit goal (Eder & 
Klauer, 2009), it had not yet been demonstrated that this may also apply to action 
execution. The current work demonstrates this to be the case. While these results may not 
be novel per se, they add to the existing literature and are supportive of common-coding 
accounts (Eder & Hommel, 2013; Eder & Klauer, 2009; Eder & Rothermund, 2008) which 
assume that for approach-avoidance tendencies to be elicited, stimulus evaluation must 
first occur. The few studies which have not required conscious evaluation, or have applied 
implicit measures, have not revealed approach-avoidance effects (Rotteveel and Phaf, 2004; 
Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). This is supported by a recent meta-analysis which 
revealed that in studies in which emotional valence was task-irrelevant, there were no 
approach-avoidance effects (Phaf et al., 2014).  
If explicit instructions and conscious evaluation of the emotional stimulus are 
necessary, what does this mean for automaticity? Approach-avoidance tendencies are 
assumed to occur automatically and unintentionally, without the need for explicit goals 
(Chen & Bargh, 1999; Duckworth et al., 2002). However, it is becoming more evident that 
approach-avoidance behaviour is likely driven by both bottom-up processes involved in 
processing an emotional stimulus (LeDoux, 1996), and top-down processes that generate 
goals following context evaluation (Lavender & Hommel, 2007). Here, this interaction is 
evident in the fact that in all chapters that instructed participants to approach and avoid 
specific pictures and in which the goal was explicit (Chapters Two, Three and Four), 
approach was still faster for positive and avoidance for negative. The mere fact that even 
when participants have intentional control over their actions, certain actions are faster than 
others points to approach-avoidance behaviour being goal-directed (i.e. relies on explicit 
task instructions) but also predisposed (i.e. automatic). That is, in goal-directed situations if 
such tendencies were not predisposed, we would expect there to be no difference in 
initiating approach towards positive and negative stimuli because presumably participants 
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can control motor initiation. However, this is clearly not the case and supports previous 
studies (Roelofs et al. 2009, Volman et al. 2011, 2016) which have revealed that despite 
action instructions, some actions are harder to overcome than others and that eliciting 
actions opposite to predisposed tendencies requires higher-order areas such as the anterior 
PFC and OFC that exert top-down control to override automatic tendencies, often requiring 
more attentional capacity to do so (Gawronski et al., 2005). 
The work presented in this thesis therefore adds to existing knowledge by providing 
novel evidence that approach-avoidance tendencies only influence motor processing when 
goals are explicit and emotional stimuli are consciously evaluated, and that this is applicable 
to action preparation and possibly execution. This work has also contributed further to our 
understanding of automaticity by demonstrating that even in goal-directed situations, 
approach-avoidance tendencies prevail, contrasting previous suggestions that automatic 
processes are exclusively fast, goal-independent and unconscious (Moors & De Houwer, 
2006). Instead, approach-avoidance tendencies are predisposed, conscious and goal-
dependent, possibly guided by interactions between bottom-up and top-down processes.  
From the perspective of theories on automaticity, the automatic nature of approach-
avoidance tendencies is still very much debatable. This is because purely automatic 
behaviour is considered to be unconscious and goal-independent (Moors & De Houwer, 
2006), yet the majority of approach-avoidance work claiming automaticity allows for 
conscious and goal-dependent behaviour. Future work addressing the automaticity of 
approach-avoidance actions must design experiments in which both conscious/unconscious 
evaluation and goal-dependent/independent factors are taken into consideration. Only 
work incorporating all factors will allow us to determine the nature of automatic approach-
avoidance tendencies. For instance, although Chapter Three compared the 
conscious/unconscious element, it did not evaluate situations in which approach-avoidance 
is goal dependent and independent. Participants may, for example, be given explicit 
approach-avoidance instructions relative to positive and negative stimuli (goal-dependent) 
or be simply instructed to move relative to an emotional stimulus in the direction indicated 
by an arrow (goal-independent).  
In addition, while the evidence suggests that any influence of approach-avoidance 
tendencies on action execution must arise from explicit approach-avoidance goals, there is 
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no evidence that actually shows this to be the case. As such, it is necessary to implement a 
task in which participants are provided with approach-avoidance goals while they are 
performing a task. An adaptation of the task used in experiment two of Chapter Six might be 
a possible avenue to explore this.  
 
7.4. Human actions are affected by the activation of a primitive defensive circuitry 
Much evidence in the emotion literature has shown that negative (or threatening) 
content is more influential than positive information (Anderson et al., 2003; Fox, Russo, & 
Dutton, 2002; Sagliano, D’Olimpio, Scafati, & Trojano, 2016; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2015). For instance, negative stimuli have been shown to have a stronger 
involuntary interference on ongoing tasks relative to positive stimuli, and to more readily 
recruit attention (Hartikainen et al. 2000; Pessoa et al. 2002; Pratto & John, 1991). Similarly, 
biases on behaviour appear to be stronger when presented with negative or threat-related 
emotions (Lang et al., 2000). Furthermore, studies on the processing and detection of 
emotional stimuli postulate a so-called “threat advantage” whereby the processing of 
negative stimuli with threatening content is prioritised over other stimuli (Ohman et al., 
2001; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Importantly, from an anatomical perspective, 
the areas responsible for the processing of threat and negative emotions, such as the 
amygdala, have been more straightforward to identify (LeDoux, 2000; Phelps, Lempert, & 
Sokol-Hessner, 2014; Rolls, 1999) than those associated with positive emotions (Rolls, 
1999). Given the more prominent effect of negative relative to positive stimuli on 
behaviour, it is not surprising that there are more models that explain how defensive 
behaviour occurs (e.g. Fanselow, 1994; Lang et al., 1997; LeDoux, 2012) relative to 
behaviour in pleasant or positive contexts (Lang et al., 1997). These “defensive” models 
suggest that negative or threatening stimuli lead to heightened vigilance that orients 
attention to the stimulus resulting first in immobility and subsequently in active defensive 
action (Fanselow, 1994), selected from a repertoire of possible actions such as withdrawal 
or attack based on their level of threat (Lang & Bradley, 2013).  
This thesis is supportive of the above work by showing that negative stimuli had a 
greater influence in a variety of motor processes compared to positive stimuli. In Chapters 
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Two and Three, there was no difference between the selection of approach and avoidance 
actions in negative contexts, a result that was suggested to stem from the existence of a 
“threat continuum” (Bradley et al., 2001; Fanselow, 1994) that activates a variety of 
defensive actions such as, for example, fight-or-flight depending on the context. 
Furthermore, Chapter Five showed that response inhibition is faster for negative pictures 
possibly as a result of freezing mechanisms (Facchinetti et al., 2006; Löw, Weymar, & 
Hamm, 2015; Roelofs, Hagenaars, & Stins, 2010; Stins et al., 2011). This demonstrates that 
negative stimuli not only elicit fight-or-flight mechanisms but also freezing, supporting the 
idea of a repertoire of defensive actions that are context sensitive (Lang & Bradley, 2013). 
Negative stimuli therefore impact motor processes depending on the contextual 
requirement (i.e. to escape or defend).  
Chapter Four also demonstrated that only negative pictures lead to greater and less 
variable vigour, whereas Chapter Six showed that reaching accuracy is disrupted in negative 
contexts only. Both chapters therefore show an influence of negative or threatening content 
on action execution. These data support work suggesting faster prioritisation of negative 
information by the attentional system relative to less threatening content, in addition to 
highlighting the attention-grabbing properties of negative pictures, adding to a wealth of 
existing literature (Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, De 
Houwer, & Theeuwes, 2010; Ohman et al., 2001; Pratto & John, 1991).  
 Negative stimuli therefore appear to influence various stages of motor processing 
including action preparation, response suppression and action execution. This provides 
further evidence for the existence of a fast defensive circuit that prioritises threatening 
information and rapidly influences the motor system in order to carry out appropriate and 
beneficial actions that avoid costs (LeDoux, 1996). Moreover, this thesis offers support for 
“defensive” models, such as the defence-cascade model (Lang et al. 1990) and the 
“predatory imminence continuum” (Fanselow, 1994), by showing that a wide variety of 
responses are triggered by negative stimuli. Although, admittedly, the results provided here 
are not novel, taken together they confirm an effect of negative stimuli on various motor 
processes. This demonstrates an intricate relationship between negative stimuli and the 
motor system and further suggests that these stimuli are more relevant to survival. 
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Given their greater impact on motor processes and behaviour, perhaps it is more 
appropriate to investigate the link between emotions and actions using negative stimuli 
only, taking into account the fact that such stimuli can elicit both approach and avoidance 
depending on the context. It would be interesting to narrow down on the specificity of 
negative stimuli and their associated actions, namely investigate which negative stimuli 
automatically trigger avoidance, which automatically trigger approach and which result in 
freezing. Some work has already addressed this by suggesting that angry faces potentiate 
approach (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), and fearful faces potentiate avoidance (Hammer 
& Marsh, 2015; Marsh et al., 2005). However, Chapter Two, along with others (Coombes et 
al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2005), suggests that the context is important in determining whether 
fearful stimuli trigger avoidance or approach. Similarly, work on vigour has shown 
differential effects of a variety of negative stimuli (Coombes et al., 2007), with greater 
vigour when presented with pictures of mutilation compared to pictures of attack. The 
existing evidence provides support to the theory that negative stimuli potentiate different 
actions. It remains unknown how different negative stimuli influence different motor 
processes. Understanding this would give further insight into the predisposition of 
emotional reactions.  
 
7.5. Possible clinical applications?  
This thesis demonstrated that approach-avoidance tendencies influence selection 
processes. From a clinical perspective, understanding the impact that such tendencies have 
on action selection in normal individuals will serve as a comparison against clinical 
populations who, for example, display atypical social behaviour. Specifically, if response 
tendencies influence the selection of actions, it is possible that training to learn such 
tendencies may help those with atypical social behaviour. One example of such a population 
are children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) who suffer from emotional impairments 
and behave abnormally in response to emotional social cues. Such children lack the 
understanding of emotional expressions and emotional contexts, and show a lack of 
motivation to engage with others (DSM-V, American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 
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2002). From a social and motivational perspective, ASD populations may not consider 
positive or aversive situations in the same light as normal individuals (Chevallier et al., 
2012), failing to generate goals to maximise action outcomes. Thus, they may not have the 
approach-avoidance tendencies that normal individuals have. Can these tendencies be 
learned such that it improves social behaviour in children with ASD? 
 
According to common-coding accounts, representations of perceptual consequences 
are generated through experience and stored in memory, becoming retrieval cues that will 
be used in subsequent similar situations and thereby leading to the selection of the most 
appropriate action (Eder & Rothermund, 2009; Hommel et al., 2001; Lavender & Hommel, 
2007). This is similar to the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), whereby affective 
experiences are stored together with produced actions, becoming markers that are 
triggered in certain situations. Indeed, it is through actions that many of us create 
associations in our brains. For example, spelling out a telephone number might sometimes 
be more difficult than to actually type it on the phone. Motor memory therefore is 
sufficiently powerful to influence the automaticity of our actions. Thus, it is possible that 
training individuals to approach or avoid certain stimuli might influence action selection. 
Previous work has successfully trained normal individuals to be faster to approach or avoid 
certain stimuli, even when they were unaware of the intention to do so (Woud et al., 2008; 
Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013). Training ASD children on approach-avoidance tasks in 
which they directly observe the consequences of their actions may help them create 
automatic tendencies and interact more appropriately in the real world. Recent evidence 
suggests that children with ASD display increased approach towards cartoons of positive 
stimuli but fail to assign this positive coding to real stimuli (Silva, Da Fonseca, Esteves, & 
Deruelle, 2015). This suggests that these tendencies may be present but only manifest in 
abstract scenarios. Training may help create these motivational associations to real stimuli. 
To the best of my knowledge, no other studies have implemented an emotional approach-
avoidance task on individuals with ASD. This avenue shows potential for promising results.  
 
The same logic applies to clinical populations with emotional phobias, such as fear of 
spiders, or with mood disorders such as those with anxiety or depression. Subjects with 
phobias and anxiety have a tendency to avoid the stimulus that causes them fear (Roth & 
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Cohen, 1986), whereas individuals with depression display decreased tendencies to 
approach and increased avoidance (Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggiero, & Eifert, 2003; Jacobson, 
Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001). For example, previous work has found that individuals with a 
fear of spiders are faster to avoid than to approach such stimuli (Rinck & Becker, 2007), and 
individuals with social anxiety can be trained to display greater social approach behaviours 
(Taylor & Amir, 2012). Training should presumably lead to the automatic selection of certain 
actions, and therefore training participants to approach or avoid certain emotional stimuli 
may help individuals overcome certain phobias or depressive tendencies. Training has been 
successfully applied to alcoholic individuals who have a tendency to approach alcohol, with 
studies demonstrating that it is possible to retrain automatic approach-avoidance 
tendencies in such individuals (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011; Wiers, 
Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010). In sum, clinical work should capitalise on the goal-
directed nature of approach-avoidance behaviour to treat individuals who display atypical 
social behaviour.  
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